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ABSTRACT 
 
Elizabethan espionage has been mistakenly stereotyped by both popular works and 
academic historiography as a collective and constitutional state service, working purely 
for national security. This thesis shifts the focus of the investigation into the world of 
espionage and intelligence control, moving it from the conventional concern for 
national defence towards a new location within the power politics of the 
mid-Elizabethan regime, from 1568 to 1588.  
 
From the late 1570s, the divisive policy of English intervention in the continental 
Protestant wars—whether such intervention should primarily serve the ‘advancement 
of the Gospel’, or instead be in the service of English interests and mindful of ruling 
legitimacy—split the Elizabethan intelligence service into rival components. William 
Cecil Lord Burghley and Principal Secretary Francis Walsingham hence individually 
organised their clientele-based secretariats and spy systems. The first half of the thesis 
will explore why and how Walsingham privatised, administered and financed his 
intelligence clientele. It will further reveal how the two systems competed over 
intelligence, at home and abroad, attempting to undermine each other’s prominence 
inside the regime, and ultimately to benefit their respective parties in policy debate.  
 
Focusing on the divided spy systems, the second half of the thesis will discuss two 
historical controversies respecting the mid-Elizabethan polity: first, the existence and 
nature of faction/party; and second, Elizabeth’s gynaecocracy, a form of government 
which was situated unstably between royal absolutism and a monarchical republic. A 
political divide arose between Burghley and Walsingham from the late 1570s and 
peaked in 1585 to 1586, though it never deteriorated so dangerously as to become 
rebellious ‘factionalism’, as in the 1590s. This conflict originated chiefly in their 
divergence over English interventionist policy, rather than from personal enmity or a 
struggle for patronage. During the 1580s, Walsingham manipulated his espionage 
effectively to tempt the irresolute Elizabeth to favour of his political aims: the 
execution of Mary Stuart, and anti-Spanish militarism. Sometimes, a common interest 
reconciled the rival parties, uniting them together against Elizabeth’s personal rule. The 
ministerial dominance over espionage selectively isolated the sovereign from the very 
heart of policy-making. The Privy Council, by controlling intelligence and state 
information, became the alternative and practical head of the regime.  
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 6 
Introduction 
 
On 30 January 1585, Principal Secretary Francis Walsingham wrote Lord Treasurer 
Burghley a letter using extraordinarily harsh rhetoric. He first refuted certain 
calumnious reports in Burghley’s hands, which ‘myght work some doubtfull conceypt 
of my good wyll towards you’. Walsingham then denied the suspicion of his 
involvement in the ‘growe of Factyon’ at court. Finally, he condemned Burghley’s 
opposition to ‘my sute for the farming of the custome’ of certain English ports. 
Intelligence of these matters, ‘confyrmed so many wayes’, now induced Walsingham 
to credit ‘former reports of your L. myslyke of me’. The wrathful Walsingham 
announced that henceforward ‘yt was a more save [safe] coorse for me to howlde your 
L. rather as an ennemye than as a frende’.1 Touching the sources of his information, 
Walsingham was reluctant to divulge them, only stating: ‘yf I myght doe yt with the 
credyt of an honest man I woold not fayle to satysfyie your L. therin Besydes yt may 
reatche to sooche persons as are not to be caused in question.’ 2  Presumably, 
Walsingham gained his intelligence not from spies, but from within the Privy Chamber, 
or even possibly from Queen Elizabeth, who manipulated factiousness to enhance 
royal supremacy. Walsingham’s recriminations expose the papered-over antagonism 
beneath Elizabeth’s seemingly harmonious regime in the mid-1580s. From the late 
1570s, mutual hostility and rivalry seem to have grown dramatically within English 
high politics, though not simply because of personal enmity or patronage distribution, 
as in Walsingham’s accusations of Burghley in this hostile letter. Divisions over 
whether to give military and financial aid to the Dutch revolt, the hidden background 
                                                 
1 TNA, SP 12/176/19, Walsingham to Burghley, 30 Jan. 1584/5. 
 
2 TNA, SP 12/176/20, Walsingham to Burghley, 30 Jan. 1584/5. Both letters are given further discussion 
in Chapter V.  
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to this letter, were deepening a pre-existing split.  
 
This episode throws light on three central issues of this thesis: intelligence, 
faction/party, and queenship. This thesis moves the focus of research on 
sixteenth-century English intelligence away from its traditional concern with national 
defence, towards the power politics of the mid-Elizabethan regime. Far from being 
employed simply in national security, Elizabethan espionage served individual parties 
in their rivalry over policy. This benefited the sovereign by giving her multiple sources 
of intelligence. However, royal incapacity in the bureaucrat-dominated circulation of 
information was also reshaping the English polity, turning it from the personal rule of 
an absolute monarch, to a monarchical republic. The research begins in 1568 when 
Mary Queen of Scots fled to England for political asylum; this event sees the debut and 
subsequent rise in Elizabethan high politics of Francis Walsingham, the most famed 
Elizabethan spymaster. The study concludes in 1588, rather than 1590 the year of 
Walsingham’s demise, because by then the mid-Elizabethan political divide had 
narrowed, Mary Stuart’s execution in February 1587 and the near certainty of war 
against Spain acting to heal this breach.  
 
Previous attempts to understand Elizabethan espionage, whether in popular works like 
Robert Hutchinson’s or academic ones by scholars such as John Bossy and Robyn 
Adams, usually focus either on specific figures like Walsingham or the spy William 
Herle, or on spying against plots.3 Yet the systematic organisation and management of 
espionage have received far less attention. The first aim of this thesis is to therefore 
                                                 
3 Robert Hutchinson, Elizabeth’s Spy Master: Frances Walsingham and the Secret War that Saved 
England (London, 2006). John Bossy, Under the Molehill: An Elizabethan Spy Story (New Haven & 
London, 2001). Robyn Adams, ‘ “The Service I am here for”: William Herle in the Marshalsea Prison, 
1571’. Huntington Library Quarterly 72 (2009), 217-38; ‘Signs of Intelligence: William Herle’s Report 
of the Dutch Situation, 1573’, Lives and Letters 1 (2009), 1-18. 
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reconstruct Walsingham’s private secretariat, examining its administrative structure, 
division of labour, routine and remuneration. 
 
Secondly, research into the spy systems will verify that party rivalry had arisen by the 
late 1570s out of the disagreements over English interventionist policy. It will also 
reveal how Walsingham manipulated espionage to promote his godly ideology of 
universal Protestantism. Traditional studies on Elizabethan espionage usually 
misunderstand it as a constitutional and collective state service, generally under 
Secretary Walsingham’s sole direction, and working purely for national security. Yet 
the intelligence service that operated during most of the Elizabeth’s reign was far from 
this centralised and patriotic ideal. Alan Haynes refers to it as the practices of 
individuals collaborating, not a department; service was controlled by individual 
officials of state.4  Elizabeth I’s biographer John Black was one of the first to 
reconceptualise intelligence gathering as ‘a necessary piece of equipment for anyone 
who aimed at taking a leading part in policy making’. It attracted all the heavyweights 
of the Elizabethan Council—Burghley, Walsingham, Leicester, and later in the 1590s 
Robert Devereux Earl of Essex, and Robert Cecil—who spared ‘themselves no effort 
to acquire, by an elaborate system of espionage, every scrap of information likely to be 
of use to them in the discharge of their duties’.5 Political rivalry over policy thus split 
Elizabethan espionage into individual systems. John Archer likewise depicts 
Elizabethan spying not simply as a ‘systematic apparatus of surveillance at home or 
abroad’, but as cliental groups competing to hunt for, or even fabricate, intelligence for 
the royal rewards of patronage:  
 
                                                 
4 Alan Haynes, Invisible Power: The Elizabethan Secret Service, 1571-1603 (Stroud, 2000), xi.  
 
5 J. B. Black, The Reign of Elizabeth 1558-1603, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1959), 208-209.  
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The queen solicited information from her mightiest servants, rewarding them with 
prestige and authority. Rival officeholders like Burghley and Walsingham competed 
for whatever scraps of intelligence their own clients—spies in their pay, pursuivants, 
and occasional informers—discovered or invented….Elizabeth had to decide upon the 
relative value of what she heard while weighing her servants’ competing interest 
against one another.6 
 
Apparently, Archer adopts the patronage theory of John Neale and Wallace MacCaffrey, 
agreeing that Tudor factionalism developed out of materialism, and disregarding the 
influence of both ideology, which Conyers Read emphasized, and personal enmity, as 
explored by Simon Adams. Most significantly, all three assume that as a distributor of 
patronage, the monarch could, first, ensure his or her multiple channels to intelligence, 
second, maintain an equilibrium in the regime, and ultimately, reinforce royal 
supremacy. But they overestimate the control of royal patronage over bureaucratic 
politics. 
 
Recently, Stephen Alford has drawn out this connection between espionage and the 
allocation of power in regime politics, in his newly published book touching on the 
intelligence history of the reign of Elizabeth I. He characterises intelligence as ‘a form 
of political currency to buy favour and reputation and to damage court rivals’. In his 
opinion, the ministerial dominance over intelligence circulation diminished Elizabeth’s 
queenship, diverting the initiative on policy away from her and towards her male 
counsellors, and further driving the English polity towards a ‘monarchical republic’. 
Faced with Catholic dangers but frustrated at Elizabeth’s inefficient rule, her ministers 
strove for ‘survival at all cost, even to the extent of subverting the will of the queen 
they sought to serve’; at times they ‘acted upon their own authority’. The development 
                                                 
6 John Michael Archer, Sovereignty and Intelligence: Spying and Court Culture in the English 
Renaissance (Stafford, 1993), 4-5.  
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happened in the Privy Council-led execution of Mary Queen of Scots in 1587, and 
Secretary Robert Cecil’s 1601 drafting of a mechanism for a foreign succession in the 
event of Elizabeth’s death.7 Alford narrows this internal power struggle to that waged 
between Essex and the Cecils in the 1590s. However, this does not explain why 
Elizabethan espionage had split into divided systems as early as the late 1570s, and 
why in the 1580s it entered into a period of intense competition.  
 
Up to this point, these scholarly arguments have been conceptual. The second purpose 
of this thesis is therefore to explore the evidence concerning the mid-Elizabethan 
period to demonstrate that intelligence was employed not only for national defence, but 
also within the regime for party rivalry or faction. In addition, the majority of 
historians have consistently questioned the existence of any Elizabethan political 
divide before the 1590s. Simon Adams denied it, saying there was a lack of evidence 
of an open rupture between the heavyweights at Elizabeth’s court, caused either by 
personal enmity, by competition over patronage, or the exclusivity of their followings.8 
Alford agrees with John Guy that despite being opposed over the issue of military 
deployment during the 1580s, all sides in the Council still operated rationally under a 
broader Protestantism and the centralised functioning of the state. By exploring the 
competition between the individual intelligence groups, this thesis will confirm the 
existence of a political divide from the late 1570s. Caused by the differences over 
English interventionist policy, the hostility peaked in the mid-1580s, though it never 
came to so internecine a clash as happened in the 1590s.  
 
                                                 
7 Stephen Alford, The Watchers: A Secret History of the Reign of Elizabeth I (London, 2012), 13.  
 
8 Simon Adams, ‘Faction, Clientage, and Party: English Politics, 1550-1603’, History Today 32 (1982), 
33-39. 
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Finally, and differently from the traditional definition of espionage as a purely 
masculine activity, this thesis explores how Elizabeth, through her female privy 
chamber, operated an alternative system of intelligence. Most significantly, it will 
analyse how Elizabeth’s relative exclusion from the ministerial circulation of 
information drove the English polity towards a monarchical republic. It must be noted, 
however, that all sovereigns, regardless of gender, were circumscribed by the court in 
both physical and social terms, and equally reliant on their bureaucratic systems of 
information. Counsellors or spymasters, for a complex set of competing interests, 
would select or conceal information from kings as much as queens. Jacob Soll has 
demonstrated that Louis XIV was handicapped by his ministers’ dominance over state 
information. His intimate Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-83) created an unprecedented 
state information system to enhance his king’s personal absolutism. But Louis’s 
kingship therefore became ineffectively centralised, parasitical on the administrative 
devices and information collection designed by Colbert.9 
 
Accordingly, Elizabeth’s being a woman was not necessarily pertinent to the fact of her 
sovereignty being limited by her ministers’ control of information. But her male 
ministers, who ascribed her irresolute and sentimental rule to her sex’s inferiority, 
therefore more severely limited the information allowed to her, isolating her from 
policy-making. This development drove the English polity from personal rule towards 
a monarchical republic. This latter ideal was defined by Patrick Collinson in his 
significant essay, ‘The Monarchical Republic of Queen Elizabeth’, with a particular 
concern for the ‘other face’ of Elizabethan public life: the Elizabethans without 
Elizabeth. He set out this paradoxical manifesto, defining Elizabethan England, not as 
                                                 
9 Jacob Soll, The Information Master: Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s Secret State Intelligence System (Ann 
Arbor, 2009).  
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a personal despotism, but as ‘a piece of republic’: ‘a state which enjoyed that measure 
of self-direction which…was the essence of liberty, but with a constitution which also 
provided for the rule of single person by hereditary right’.10 This political dichotomy, 
in response to a universal fear of gynaecocracy, decentralised sovereignty to the Privy 
Council and Parliament; the former was in particular granted ‘a position to contemplate 
the world and its affairs with some independent detachment, by means of its own 
collective wisdom and with the Queen absent: headless conciliar government’. 
Therefore, ‘at times there were two governments uneasily coexisting in Elizabethan 
England: the Queen and her Council’.11 On the other hand, however, being a female 
ruler may have put Elizabeth in a stronger position than a male monarch in organising 
intelligence, because her female chamber offered her an alternative information supply, 
which, although possibly less efficient, bypassed male control. 
 
Chapter One traces Walsingham’s entry into Elizabethan high politics through his 
participation in Secretary William Cecil’s intelligence clientele, which promoted him 
speedily from being an unknown member of parliament in 1568, to the residential 
ambassador to France in 1570, and finally to the Principal Secretaryship with a seat in 
the Privy Council in December 1573. These experiences—first on Mary Stuart’s 
tribunal to investigate the Casket Letters in 1568, and then with the first Anjou 
matrimonial negotiations in 1571-1572—enlightened Walsingham as to the impact of 
intelligence on policy as well as on his indecisive Queen. His preferment to the counsel 
group furthered his divergence from his patron Burghley over English intervention in 
continental Protestant wars, and consequently gave impetus to his departure from 
                                                 
10 Patrick Collinson, ‘The Monarchical republic of Queen Elizabeth I’, in John Guy, ed., The Tudor 
Monarchy (London, 1997), 119, 114. 
 
11 Ibid., 118.  
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Burghley’s cliental espionage after 1576.  
 
Chapter Two discusses the why, when and how of Walsingham’s withdrawal from 
Burghley’s system by looking at the former’s private and household-based secretariat, 
examining its structure, routine and remuneration, something which has been 
surprisingly little researched. The establishment of Walsingham’s own spy system was 
postponed until between 1576, when Thomas Smith’s retirement as joint Sectretary 
strengthened Walsingham’s position, and 1578, from which point the policy quarrel 
over the Dutch Protestant revolt accelerated his departure from Burghley’s side. 
Thereafter more evidence appears of innovations that moved Walsingham’s system 
towards privatisation, enlargement, multi-class employment, and cosmopolitanism, as 
well as of how he financed the espionage. His intelligence secretary Nicholas Faunt’s 
‘Discourse Touching the Office of Principal Secretary of Estate’ offers insights into 
routines, archives, and the allocation of employment inside Walsingham’s secretariat.12 
The intelligence letters of the spy Nicholas Berden from the mid-1580s reveal the 
procedures of the cipher secretary Thomas Phelippes in decrypting and annotating 
secret reports. Walsingham became the key figure pushing espionage towards a 
privatised system that was used to advance personal ideology in politics. 
 
Chapter Three investigates the competition in espionage in Paris during the 1580s 
between Edward Stafford’s embassy system, which was favourable to Burghley, and 
Walsingham’s spy network. It shows first how the two systems monitored, defamed, 
and hindered each other, as well as how they vied for Catholic intelligence. Stafford’s 
political partiality for Burghley and his pro-Catholic background motivated Secretary 
                                                 
12 Charles Hughes, ‘Nicholas Faunt’s Discourse Touching the Office of Principal Secretary of Estate, c. 
1592’, English Historical Review 20 (1905), 499-508. 
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Walsingham to intercept the former’s private correspondence and spy on his embassy. 
Stafford retaliated by forcibly intervening in the activities of Solomon Aldred, a spy of 
Walsingham’s, who lobbied the exiles and ‘plundered’ the leading exile William 
Gifford, a figure who was nearly lobbied successfully by Aldred. This chapter also 
analyses the unusual increase in Catholic apostasy and semi-conformity to Elizabeth’s 
Protestant reign in the 1580s, looking particularly at the English operation of coercion 
and mercy, the exiles’ struggle for survival, and division within the Catholic ranks. 
Presumably, Burghley became predominant in the intelligence competition in Paris: his 
control over Stafford’s embassy broke Walsingham’s monopoly on continental 
intelligence, and as Lord Treasurer and the Master of Wards he was able to exert 
control over exiles’ estates and families, consequently drawing to himself more 
Catholic intelligence than did Walsingham. 
 
Chapter Four sees Walsingham’s successful comeback in the matter of home 
counter-plots against Mary Stuart in the 1580s. It begins by illustrating the sharp 
contrast between the unusual absence of intrigues from 1573 to 1583, and the intense 
discovery of plots that followed in the 1580s. It then explores how Walsingham 
excluded Burghley’s party from his counter-plots, and his attempt to monopolise 
intelligence in order to promote his policies. The discovery of the Throckmorton Plot 
not only had the pro-Cecil Earl of Shrewsbury replaced by Walsingham’s man Amias 
Paulet as Mary’s new guardian, but tempted Elizabeth into publicly breaking with 
Spain. The research on the Babington Plot reveals the delicate division of spying 
labour and the workings of Walsingham’s intelligence secretariat; its success forced the 
irresolute Elizabeth to sanction Mary’s execution. The final section argues that 
Burghley avoided being kept in ignorance of Walsingham’s intelligence activities, first, 
through being absolutely trusted by Queen Elizabeth; second, through his mastery of 
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wardships; and third, thanks to his spies working for both sides.  
 
The first four chapters portray a change in the relationship between Burghley and 
Walsingham in terms of their espionage, moving from cooperation to rivalry. 
Intelligence had become a tool for political parties to use in promoting their partisan 
ideologies, and in preventing each other from gaining an ascendancy in the regime. 
The final two chapters move the focus away from intelligence employees towards their 
spymasters’ role within power politics, and from spying activities towards the 
influence of intelligence on party politics and queenship in Elizabeth’s regime.  
  
In terms of research into the divided Elizabethan intelligence systems, Chapter Five 
considers the three key debates in the historiography concerning Tudor factionalism: 
the terminology of ‘party’ and ‘faction’; the periods when it is said to have existed; and 
whether its nature was defined by personal enmity, patronage or policy. First, by 
examining the diverse contemporary usage of the terms ‘party’ and ‘faction’, it adopts 
the former as more moderate and less dangerous to political stability. Second, the fact 
of the divided and competing espionage systems from the late 1570s shows that a party 
rivalry existed inside Elizabeth’s regime from 1578 and peaked around 1585. 
Unrelated to personal enmity and patronage, this political divide originated in 
ideological differences: whether English policy should serve first the glory of God, or 
state interests and ruling legitimacy. The final section of this chapter will explore how 
his intelligence operation affected policy decisions about armed English intervention in 
the Dutch Protestant war in 1585. 
 
Chapter Six discusses a scholarly controversy over the Elizabethan polity—whether it 
was governed by personal rule or was a monarchical republic—by examining 
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Elizabeth’s incapacity in her ministerial system of information and intelligence. The 
first section examines Elizabeth’s use of her female chamber in transmitting 
information, and the reasons why it failed: an unstable supply of intelligence, 
Elizabeth’s financial caution, and her male counsellors’ antipathy to female 
participation in politics. The inefficiency of the female chamber system sometimes 
resulted in the Queen’s ignorance of key matters, as in February 1587 when 
Walsingham and Burghley cooperated towards Mary’s execution without Elizabeth’s 
knowledge. Through consideration of William Davison’s trial, the chapter explains the 
reasons why the Council isolated their Queen from the execution: the appeal for a 
mixed rule, the concept of female inferiority, disappointment at Elizabeth’s irresolution, 
and their self-identity as godly counsellors. This chapter concludes that the lack of 
initiative in intelligence was marginalising Elizabeth’s queenship, reducing her regime 
to an acephalous conciliar one. 
 
The Conclusion reveals the disorganisation of Walsingham’s espionage system 
immediately after his death in April 1590, and makes an overall estimation of his 
career as a spymaster. It also offers a new reading of Elizabeth’s Rainbow Portrait. 
This reading overthrows the traditional understanding of the painting as praise for the 
glorious Queen Elizabeth and her royal absolutism. By referring to contemporary 
politics, the success of Robert Cecil in factional struggle, and an aging Queen, the 
portrait is revealed as extolling: first, the union of Elizabethan espionage under 
Secretary Cecil’s control; second, the Cecils’ ambition to be the exclusive royal eyes 
and ears monopolising state knowledge; and third, the Cecils’ hope of becoming the 
mouths of the polity, jointly making policy and driving England towards a 
‘monarchical republic’.  
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The Dispersal of Walsingham’s Papers 
Any attempt to understand the life and career of Francis Walsingham is hampered by 
the intractability of fragmentary archives. A great majority of intelligence reports were 
either burned after they were read, in accordance with instructions, or vanished at 
Walsingham’s death in 1590. This latter archival dispersal was the result of, first, 
Walsingham’s practice of mixing private with public papers; second, pilfering by 
Walsingham’s servants who were either seeking gifts for new patrons or trying to 
protect themselves after their involvement in highly sensitive political events; third, the 
collection policy for the State Papers, which concentrated solely on official documents 
and dismissed material of a purely personal nature; and finally, because of rampant 
stealing by subsequent antiquarians. Little evidence survives to explain when, how, or 
by what route Walsingham’s papers travelled from his family study into government 
archives and private libraries. By tracing back from the present distribution of 
Walsingham’s papers, the following will reconstruct both the major collections which 
formed immediately after Walsingham’s death in 1590, and the routes of further 
document dispersal. 
  
Walsingham sorted his papers by subject, instead of by document type. The model of 
the categorisation of his files is recorded in an inventory compiled by one of his 
secretaries Thomas Lake in 1588, now entitled ‘Walsingham’s table book’. 13 
Walsingham’s papers were organised first under thematic headings, either relating to 
countries, as in ‘France & Flanders’ and ‘the Sc[ottish] Qu[een]’, or by various ‘Home 
matters’, such as ‘Musters’; the rest fell into the class of ‘Diverse Matters’. Within 
these subject headings, the papers were subdivided by year or relevance. Accordingly 
                                                 
13 BL, Stowe MS 162.  
 
The Dispersal of Francis Walsingham’s Papers 
Francis Walsingham died on 6 April 1590
Walsingham’s private servants/secretaries State Paper Office Antiquarians 
Thomas Lake Robert BealeRobert Proby Examination by Burghley 
and Thomas Heneage 
Ralph Starkey William Camden Mr. Phillipp 
Sir. George Carew
Arthur Atye 
 
Thomas Heneage 
d. 1595 
Elizabeth Lake Moyle Finch
Heneage Finch
1580-1631 
Heneage Finch 
1st Earl of Nottingham (1621-1682)
Daniel Finch  
2nd Earl of Nottingham (1647-1730)
Built Burley-on-the-Hill 
Finch collection 
Robert Cecil 
Lansdowne MSS 
Michael Hicks 
Hatfield Papers
William Hicks 
1682 
Richard Chiswell 
By 1699 
John Strype 
Mr. James West 
Sir William Petty 
1st Marquess of Lansdowne 
(1737-1805) 
1807 British Museum 
Thomas Lake 
1630 Robert Cotton 
Dame Frances Weld
1641
Lancelot Lake 
1654 
Lancelot II 
1680 
Lancelot III 
1689 
Warwick Lake 
1693 
Mary Lake 
1709 
James Brydge 
1st Duke of Chandos 
The Cannons House (1713)
1746 The sale of the Duke of Chandos’s Library
Thomas Carew of Crowcombe (1702-1766) 
Lieutenant-colonel Carew 
1868 Donation to Public Record Office 
PRO 30/5 
 1903 Sotheby auction 
British Library National Library of Wales Trinity College Dublin
BL 
Yelverton MSS
7 May 1590 
John James and Peter Proby
An estimate of espionage 
charge, spy list, and map
26 May 1590 
Allowances for messengers 
signed by Queen Elizabeth
State Paper Office in 
Whitehall 
15 Oct. 1597: Three rooms under the 
Banqueting House at Whitehall; John James 
and Thomas Lake 
Jan. 1600: John James died. Thomas Lake 
became the senior Keeper of State Paper 
Office 
1610: the new Keepers Levinus Muncke and 
Thomas Wilson 
1614: the new Keepers Thomas Wilson and 
Ambrose Randolph 
Remained at Walsingham’s house 
Seething Lane/Barn Elms 
Jan. 1619: Destruction of certain papers by a 
fire at Whitehall 
1862: Removal of the State Papers to the 
Public Record Office in St James’s Park 
1701 Robert Cotton 
transferred the 
collection to the 
nation 
Aug 1619 
The return of William 
Davison’s papers to 
State Paper Office 
1628  
Sold to Simond 
D’Ewes 
1705 Robert Harley 
1st Earl of Oxford and Mortimer 
Edward Harley (1689-1741) 
Henrietta née Cavendish Holles (d.1755) 
Margaret Cavendish Bentinck 
Duchess of Portland (d. 1785) 
1753 British Museum 
Other private collections 
BL Stowe MS 162 
Walsingham’s table book (1588)
BL Microfilm M/488 
Expense account of Francis Walsingham 
for transport, intelligence etc. as 
Ambassador to the Low Countries, from 
the stock of John Waller, bookseller in 
London 
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they were set into subject ‘boxes’, or wrapped into ‘bondles’, ‘parcels’ or ‘bags’ 
marked with a letter.14 Two of the stores were ‘at the study [of Walsingham’s house in 
Seething Lane] in London’ in chests, or ‘at the Court [Whitehall] vpon the shelves’.15 
Sometimes writings were carried to Barn Elms, Walsingham’s manor on the Thames 
west of London.16 It had been an administrative habit since the later Middle Ages for 
the storage of official documents to be increasingly decentralised into the custody of 
the department, or the post-holder, that produced them. This was ‘a natural result’, 
Robert Wernham stated, ‘of the growth of bureaucracy in the older courts…As the 
bureaucracy solidified, so its officials came to look upon their offices almost as their 
free holds and to regard their archives, if not exactly as private property, at least as 
strictly office muniments’.17 Storage of files as bundles or packets facilitated later 
retrieval for circulation and consultation, and was portable for the Secretary’s office 
when travelling with the itinerant court.18 However, loose papers kept in bundles were 
at a higher risk of loss than bound volumes. ‘There hath been found of late greate 
Confusion in the keeping of loose papers though they bee digested in to bundells’, 
                                                 
14 Walsingham’s system of organisation repeated that suggested by Hugh Oldcastle in A Profitable 
Treatyce (1543). ‘It is also necessarie that you haue a chyst in your counting house for your letters, 
wherein you shall put them as soone as you haue red them, and written the day of receite on the backe 
side, till the month be ended, and gather all that yee receiued that moneth, and fold them somewhat large, 
and binde them in a bundle. And in the case yee receiue diuers letters from one place, as Venice, Iene, 
Florence, London, Cyuill, or Andwerpe, yee shall binde all that is from one of these places in a bundell 
by themselues and write vppon the vpper letter Venice, or Iene, or any other place that they come from.’ 
John Mellis, A Briefe Instruction and maner how to keepe bookes of Accompts after the order of Debitor 
and Creditor, & as well for paper Accompts partible. Expansion of Hugh Oldcastle’s 1543 translation of 
Pacioli, now lost. (London, 1588), STC 18794, F6r-F8r. 
 
15 Hubert Hall, Studies in English Official Historical Documents (Cambridge, 1908), 33.  
 
16 BL, Harley MS 6035 f. 36v, Walsingham’s ledger book for 1583-1584.  
 
17 ‘At the end of James I’s reign Sir Thomas Wilson,…, was still recovering papers that had been taken 
home by Secretary Davison, who had ceased to act in 1587.’ R. B. Wernham, ‘The Public Records in the 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, in Levi Fox, ed., English Historical Scholarship in the Sixteenth 
and Seventeenth Century (London, 1956), 12-15, 21.  
 
18 Mark Taviner, ‘Robert Beale and the Elizabethan Polity’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, St. Andrew 
University, 2000), 21-22. James Daybell, The Material Letter in Early Modern England: Manuscript 
Letters and the Culture and Practices of Letter-Writing, 1512-1635 (Basingstoke, 2012), 217-22. 
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confessed Nicholas Faunt, another of Walsingham’s secretaries.19 Papers in bundles 
were also more easily extracted.  
 
Opinion was divided over Walsingham’s categorisation of papers by subject. Faunt 
prized this system for serving ‘chiefly for the clearinge of things in doubt, which 
hereby may bee readily found out; whereas without this care both this necessarie 
presedent wilbee euer wantinge and greate inconveniences may growe throughe the 
losse of papers and vnorderlie keepinge of them’.20  By contrast, Robert Beale, 
Walsingham’s chief assistant and brother-in-law, criticised Walsingham for breaching 
an order to make ‘a separac[i]on betweene those thinges w[hi]ch are her Ma[jestie’s] 
Recordes and appertaines unto her and those w[hi]ch a Secretarie getteth by his private 
industrie and charge’. Public papers were supposed to enter the Treasury of the Receipt 
of Exchequer in the Chapter House of Westminster Abbey.21 But this order had been 
neglected by Walsingham, and ‘thinges w[hi]ch weare publicke have bine culled out 
and gathered into private bookes’ in his ‘private Custodie’.22 Archival privatisation, 
Beale maintained, would not ‘give anie light of service to yonge beginners’. And upon 
Walsingham’s death, ‘all his papers and bookes both publicke and private’ were seized 
‘by those who would be loath to be used so themselves’—that is, by his private 
employees, ironically including Beale himself, and by the government.23 
                                                 
19 Hughes, ‘Nicholas Faunt’s Discourse’, 505. 
 
20 Ibid., 504. 
 
21 Amanda Bevan, ‘State Papers of Henry VIII: the Archives and Documents’, State Papers Online, 
1509-1714 (Thomson Learning EMEA Ltd, 2007).  
 
22 Robert Beale, ‘Treatise of the Office of a Councellor and Principall Secretarie to her Ma[jes]tie’ 
(1592), in Conyers Read, Mr. Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth (Oxford, 1925), I, 
431. Faunt’s ‘Discourse’ and Beale’s ‘Treatise’, both offering insights into the Elizabethan Secretaryship, 
are further discussed in Chapter II. 
 
23 Beale, ‘Treatise’, 431. 
 
 20
 
Beale’s criticism came with the benefit of hindsight, when he had witnessed the 
archival chaos that followed Walsingham’s death in April 1590: papers stolen, and 
confusion in proceeding with Walsingham’s espionage. It was a fate that potentially 
awaited every Elizabethan heavyweight, whose papers could easily be pilfered by their 
intimate servants when they died. Simon Adams has discovered that many of 
Leicester’s papers concerning ‘the Queen’s letters in matter of secret importance’ were 
seized by Richard Browne, who was steward or keeper of either Leicester House or 
Wanstead, Leicester’s two main residences, and by Arthur Atye, Leicester’s principal 
secretary from 1574.24 Between Burghley’s death in August 1598 and his funeral, his 
chief secretary Michael Hicks smuggled an equivalent of 115 volumes of Burghley’s 
papers (now the Lansdowne MSS) into his own house at Ruckholt, Essex.25 Moreover, 
some private letters concerning the relationship between Queen Elizabeth and 
Christopher Hatton, at one point may have fallen into the hands of her private secretary 
Thomas Windebank, who passed them to his son Francis, Secretary of State to Charles 
I. Fortunately, these letters remained in the office of the Secretary of State when 
Francis was exiled to France in December 1640.26  
 
Likewise, as soon as Walsingham died on 6 April 1590, parts of his papers were 
removed by his household servants, either for themselves or as gifts to please new 
                                                 
24 Simon Adams, ‘The Papers of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, I: The Browne-Evelyn Collection’, 
Archives, 20 (1992), 63-85; ‘The Papers of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, II: The Atye-Cotton 
Collection’, Archives 20 (1993), 131-44; ‘The Papers of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, III: The 
Countess of Leicester’s Collection’, Archives 22 (1996), 1-26. The Annual Report of the Deputy Keeper 
of the Public Records 30 (1869), 216. 
 
25 A Catalogue of the Lansdowne manuscripts in the British Museum (London, 1819), ix.  
 
26 Robert Lemon, ed., Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Edward, Mary and Elizabeth, 1547-80 
(London, 1856), xii-xiii.  
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patrons. Peter Proby, in Walsingham’s service from around 1578 and accounted ‘very 
honest and used in place of good creditt as one well accompted of by Mr. Secretary 
[Walsingham]’, turned for patronage to Thomas Heneage, the Vice Chamberlain.27 
Some of Walsingham’s private letters may have accompanied him into Heneage’s 
household. Heneage died in 1595; his papers were bequeathed to his only daughter 
Elizabeth, who married Moyle Finch, and ultimately fell to her great grandson Daniel 
Finch, second Earl of Nottingham, who kept them at Burley-on-the-Hill in Rutland. 
The Finch collection contained one original entitled ‘Instructions which Sir Francis 
Walsingham gave his nephew [Thomas Walsingham] when he sent him into foreign 
parts to travel’, which was destroyed by fire in 1908.28 Once again in search of 
patronage, immediately upon the death of Heneage in October 1595 Proby turned to 
Robert Cecil. To please Cecil, Proby sent him ‘the cabinet wherein is the written 
description of Ireland, with the map which was Mr. Secretary’s, and written by Mr. 
Davizon when he was in the Tower’, and some of Walsingham’s books. He promised 
to wait on Cecil at court, with ‘good testmonye of sundrye Imployments of Importance, 
for which I was Largely promised in her majesty’s name but yet vnpreferried’.29  
 
Misappropriation by household servants may explain the poor archival holdings of 
                                                 
27 Proby served Walsingham as an intelligence agent in 1589, together with his cousin William 
Humbarsten and the spies David Vassewr and one Kirkham (who spied on the movements of the Duke 
of Parma), and William Stanley in the Low Countries. Unfortunately, most of Proby’s intelligence 
reports to Walsingham have now vanished. P. W. Hasler, ed., The House of Commons, 1558-1603 
(London, 1981), III, 254-55; Austin T. Young, The Annals of the Barber-Surgeons of London (London, 
1890), 532-35; TNA, PC 2/14/326, [Metting] 18 Apr. 1587; TNA, SP 78/19/10, Peter Proby to 
Walsingham, 14 Jan. 1589; TNA, SP 78/19/12, Proby to Walsingham, 17 Jan 1589; William Humbarsten 
to Proby, 11 Jun. 1589, CSPF, 1589, 312; [Meeting] 18 Jun. 1589, Acts of the Privy Council, XVII, 285.  
 
28 Read, Walsingham, III, 451-52. Guides to Sources for British History to Principal Family and Estate 
Collection: Family Names A-K (London, 1996), 57-58. The Finch family papers have been edited in 
Report on the Manuscripts of Allan George Finch, Esq. of Burley-on-the-Hill, Rutland (London, 
1913-22), 4 vols. 
 
29 CP 35/85, Pe. Probyn to Sir Robert Cecil, 21 Oct. 1595. 
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documents produced by Walsingham’s secretaries. Francis Mylles, in charge of 
diplomacy and intelligence, was a leading figure in Walsingham’s secretariat, next to 
Beale who served concurrently as Clerk of the Privy Council and Laurence Tomson as 
the Queen’s Latin secretary. Surprisingly there are few of his papers still in existence: 
thirty-four in the State Papers and one in Egerton MS 1694.30 These include fourteen 
letters from Mylles at Walsingham’s house on Seething Lane to Walsingham at Barn 
Elms, written during the Babington Plot from July to September 1586. Apparently, 
Mylles acted as the helmsman resident in Walsingham’s London house or at court, 
managing secretarial business.31 The lack of his papers may partly reflect the oral, 
rather than written, exchange of information inside the secretariat. But there is no 
surviving record of correspondence between him and Walsingham while the latter was 
away from London, even during Walsingham’s embassies to the Low Countries in 1578 
(accompanied by Tomson), to France in 1581, and to Scotland in 1583. Likewise, few of 
Nicholas Faunt’s papers survive, except for one report to Walsingham on the 
examination of the Scottish Jesuit William Creychton, who together with another Jesuit 
Patrick Addie, in September 1584 sailed from Dieppe to Scotland to take part in a 
conspiracy to restore Catholicism and liberate Mary Stuart.32 Faunt can be studied only 
through his correspondence with his friend Anthony Bacon, an informant of 
Walsingham’s in Paris; the originals of these letters remain in the Bacon Papers MSS 
647-662 in the Lambeth Palace Library.33 It is reasonable to assume that Walsingham’s 
immediate employees pilfered their own papers or other valuable documents during 
                                                 
30 BL, Egerton MS 1694 f. 19, Fr[ancis] Mylles [Secretary to Sir F. Walsingham], 18 Jun. 1576. 
 
31 The significant role of Francis Mylles in Walsingham’s secretariat is discussed in Chapter II.  
 
32 TNA, SP 12/173/14, Nicholas Fante to Walsyngham, 14 Sept. 1584.  
 
33 This collection was used by Thomas Birch in Memoirs of the reign of Queen Elizabeth: from the year 
1581 till her Death (London, 1754). Birch’s transcripts are now BL, Additional MSS 4109-4124.  
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Walsingham’s life, or on his death. Some of these were then transferred into the hands 
of new patrons.34 It is why the Landsowne MSS and Hatfield Library contain not a few 
of Walsingham’s private letters on intelligence matters.35 Among these, interestingly, 
are some transcripts of diplomatic reports addressed to Walsingham, provided by Sir 
Edward Stafford, the English Ambassador in France from 1583 to 1590 and Burghley’s 
partisan.36 
 
Robert Beale, Walsingham’s brother-in-law, was another pilferer, ‘primarily of material 
he had either produced or collected himself for his own particular political activities’.37 
This included material relating to his missions to Mary Queen of Scots, such as 
Additional MSS 48027 and 48049, which contain the papers relating to Mary’s plots, 
and her secret correspondence and keys to ciphers with English exiles and conspirators, 
like Charles Paget and Anthony Babington. Beale collected or copied these probably 
during his secretarial attendance on Walsingham from 1570 and his customary 
deputations during Walsingham’s embassies to France in 1581 and Scotland in 1583. 
Mark Taviner has made a detailed analysis of Beale’s papers and their later dispersal.38 
The collection consists of letters Beale had written himself, those he later acquired, and 
some copied from the State Papers and the Cotton collection. The majority of them 
concern relations with the Low Countries between 1576 and 1587, as well as Beale’s 
                                                 
34 The fact that Walsingham’s servants turned to serve new patrons is discussed in the Conclusion.  
 
35 Private letters: e.g. BL, Lansdowne MS 48 f. 148, Leicester to Walsingham, 10 Nov. 1586; CP 11/97, 
same to same, 30 Jul. 1581, concerning Walsingham’s royal nickname ‘Moor’. Intelligence reports to 
Walsingham from: e.g. Robert Carvyle, W. Shute, Laird of Pury Ogilvire in Paris, Doctor Christopher 
Parkins in Poland, Richard Tomson in Spain, Francois de Civille in Paris, and one prison spy Alexander 
Bonus.  
 
36 Stafford’s cliental fidelity to Burghley is discussed in Chapter III.  
 
37 Beale to Robert Cecil, 28 Sept. 1597. Taviner, ‘Robert Beale and the Elizabethan Polity’, 23.  
 
38 Ibid., 20-45. 
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involvement with Mary Queen of Scots in the 1580s. Beale sent Robert Cotton some 
part of his collection, including several of Walsingham’s letters.39 After Beale died in 
1601, the rest of his papers descended to the Yelverton collection, either through the 
marriage between Beale’s eldest daughter Margaret and Henry Yelverton, or through his 
anonymous second personal clerk who served Beale from 1593 and then turned to the 
Yelverton family for employment after Beale’s death.40 Beale’s papers remained in 
Yelverton ownership at Easton Maudit until 1785. They were then transferred to the 
London residence of the Calthorpes in Grosvenor Square, until 1953 when they entered 
the British Museum.  
 
Thomas Lake was the likely thief of Walsingham’s entry book of December 1579 
containing letters to and from Ireland, and Walsingham’s Journal book 1570-1583. In 
1713, his great-granddaughter Mary Lake inherited his property Cannons House, and 
in doing so may have brought both books to her husband James Brydge, the first Duke 
of Chandos.41 With the sale of the Duke of Chandos’s library in 1747, the books 
passed directly or indirectly into the hands of Thomas Carew of Crowcombe Court.42 
In 1868, Lieutenant-Colonel Carew invited John Bruce, the director of the Camden 
Society, to inspect about 200 volumes ‘which had not been looked at by any competent 
person within living memory’; Walsingham’s Journal book was thence unearthed.43 At 
Bruce’s suggestion, in June 1868 Colonel Carew donated six volumes of his 
                                                 
39 E.g. BL, Cotton MSS Caligula C/IX ff. 69-90; Galba D/III f. 157.  
 
40 Taviner, ‘Robert Beale and the Elizabethan Polity’, 25. 
 
41 T. F. T. Baker, ed., Victoria County History of England: Middlesex (London, 1976), V, 96-99, 113-17. 
 
42 Susan Jenkins, Portrait of a Patron: The Patronage and Collecting of James Brydges, 1st Duke of 
Chandos (1674-1744) (Burlington, 2007).  
 
43 John Bruce, Notes of the Treaty carried on at Ripon between King Charles I and the Covenanters of 
Scotland, 1640, Camden Society, 100 (1869), xxxviii.  
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manuscripts, including the two books mentioned, to the Public Record Office for the 
use of Calendar editing, classified as the Carew Papers (PRO 30/5).44 Both books 
remain in the National Archives, Kew, catalogued as PRO 30/5/4 and 30/5/5.45 
 
Following the pilfering of individual documents by household employees came the 
wholescale confiscation of Walsingham’s papers by the government. Within a month of 
Walsingham’s death and confronted with a series of claims from agents for payments, 
Burghley, who had resumed the Secretaryship, together Thomas Heneage, the joint 
Keeper of the Records in the Tower of London, inquired urgently into Walsingham’s 
espionage network, using as evidence his papers and the abstracts retained by his 
employees.46 They were assisted by John James, Keeper of the State Papers, and Peter 
Proby.47 On 7 May, James and Proby estimated for Heneage the costs of continuing ‘a 
course of understanding how things pass in Flanders, France and Spain’. A partial list 
was reconstructed, of people engaged in espionage and of the places they worked, 
ranging over the major cities of France, the Low Countries, Italy, Spain, Germany and 
                                                 
44 J. Hogan and N. McNeill O’Farrell, eds., The Walsingham Letter-Book or Register of Ireland: May, 
1578 to December, 1579 (Dublin, 1959), ii-iii.  
 
45 TNA, PRO 30/5/4, Walsingham’s entry book December 1579 of letters to and from Ireland,  printed 
in Hogan and O’Farrell, eds., The Walsingham Letter-Book or Register of Ireland. But as the editors note, 
the ‘summary indications on the part of the copyists are not reproduced except where the information as 
given might be useful’, and ‘Nor has it been considered necessary to reprint such letters as have been 
already printed in full or in extenso in official sources’. TNA, PRO 30/5/5, Walsingham’s Journal book 
1570-1583, printed in Charles T. Martin, ed., Journal of Sir Francis Walsingham from December 1570 to 
April 1583, Camden Miscellany VI, 104 (1871). The rest of Carew’s papers were dispersed at the sale at 
Sotheby’s in 1903. 
 
46 Paul E. J. Hammer, The Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics: The Political Career of Robert 
Devereux, 2nd Earl of Essex, 1585-1597 (Cambridge, 1999), 154-55.  
 
47 Taviner misidentifies this ‘Mr. D. James’ as Dr. Francis James, a civil lawyer who had only just 
entered Walsingham’s household service in early 1590. Taviner, ‘Robert Beale and the Elizabethan 
Polity’, 120-21. Francis James: Hasler, The House of Commons, II, 373; Brian P. Levack, The Civil 
Layers in England, 1603-1641: A Political Study (London, 1973). John James: Hasler, The House of 
Commons, II, 374. CP 45/89, Peter Proby to Robert Cecil, 18 Oct. 1596, ‘D. Jeams who at his 
[Walsingham’s] deathe, had the sortinge of his Lordship’s papers, he can best informe your honour (and 
so I told Mr. Chanceler) wher those and suche lyke are’. 
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Turkey, and also concerning specific figures such as Mary Queen of Scots and her 
friends at Sheffield and in the North, and foreign ambassadors. 48  On 26 May, 
according to these reports, Queen Elizabeth permitted Burghley to pay certain 
messengers who held bills or warrants subscribed by late Francis Walsingham.49 
 
Afterwards the Privy Council devolved Walsingham’s papers onto John James, in 
charge of the ‘Office of Her Majesty’s Papers and Records for business of State and 
Council’ at Whitehall. He kept sorting them, and managed the administrative retrieval 
of those required for consultation. On 7 May 1591, the Council assigned James, 
together with Jeffrey Fenton, Anthony Ashley, and an unnamed attorney, to make 
diligent search amongst the divers papers of Walsingham, to give light to the charge of 
treason against John Perrot, the former lord deputy of Ireland. They were authorised to 
‘reparie unto such place and places as you shall understand any of the writings, bookes 
or letters of the said Sir Fraunces to be remaining’. Any discovery had to be made with 
‘a perfect note of the several parcels of the said papers, and take the same into your 
owne custodie to be disposed of according to such order as hath bin formerly given 
you herein’.50 Two of Beale’s diplomatic memoranda in 1594 and 1596 refer to 
James’s custody of Walsingham’s archives: ‘whereof mr D. James may mak a 
particular extract out of the Papers of mr Secretary Walsingham’, and ‘whereof mr D. 
James can geue you out of mr Secretaries papers particular notes’.51 On 6 October 
                                                 
48  TNA, SP 12/232/11, Sir Thomas Heneage to Burghley, 7 May 1590. The recreated list of 
intelligencers has disappeared now. TNA, SP 12/232/12, ‘The names of foreign places from whence Mr. 
Secretary Walsyngham was accustomed to receive his advertisements of the state of public affairs’, 7(?) 
May 1590.  
 
49 CP 167/47, ‘Allowances for Messengers and others’, 26 May 1590.  
 
50 TNA, PC 2/18/254, [Meeting] at the Star Chamber, 7 May 1591.  
 
51 BL, Additional MS 48044 f. 339v, ‘An advise, in what sorte, her Matie, and the Frenche Kinge, maye 
proceade to deal with the Princes of Germanie, about the late League’, 1594; Additional MS 48102 f. 
356r, ‘Paper advising an Anglo-French alliance, drawn up by Beale prior to negotiations culminating in 
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1596, Beale again recorded that he had delivered to Burghley at his house in the Strand, 
‘two Buckeram bags full of papers sometimes belonging to Mr. Secretary Walsingham, 
deliuered to Sir Henry Killigrew and myself heretofore by Mr. D. James: Item his L. 
had at the same tyme of the bundell O. the peces marked 1.6.9.10.17 of the bundell 
marked O. the pre. 6’.52 Lake’s inventory of 1588 contains a note probably by James: 
‘Ireland A book of Plotts and discourses Sr R. Cecill hathe it of me, 1596’.53  
 
However, not all of Walsingham’s papers were confiscated and relocated to Whitehall; 
parts of his archive remained in his study in Seething Lane until at least 1596. In 
October of that year, Peter Proby reported to Robert Cecil that he was to survey the 
contents of Walsingham’s study:  
 
By Mr Chanceler I am wyllyd to looke out suche papers as ar in that studye whearof I 
have the key at savoye, which doe concern the treatye with the stats, and the contract 
made betwein Her Majesty and them, and to bringe the same to his honour. I have 
acordingly sought, and fynd only articles in frenche of 1585 concerninge the same 
course…there is in Englishe an extrackt out of therle of Leicester’s Instructions from 
her Majesty, which I suppose to have bin delivered to Sir Thomas Heneage by Mr 
Secretary at the time of his goinge to the states and this is a copie of Mr. Lake’s 
handwrytinge…the originall of the contracts…I suppose they were in Mr. Secretary his 
study at Walsingham House in a chest.54 
 
On 15 October 1597, in order to make order out of chaos, James and the joint Keeper 
Thomas Lake removed the Queen’s records, as well as Walsingham’s papers, to three 
rooms under the Banqueting House at Whitehall, with the Records of the Council and 
                                                                                                                                               
the Treaty of Greenwich between England and France’, 1596.  
 
52 BL, Additional MS 48116 f. 100r.  
 
53 BL, Stowe MS 162 f. 2r. 
 
54 CP 45/89, Peter Proby to Robert Cecil, 18 Oct. 1596. 
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the Signet. There they installed manuscript ‘presses’, storage shelves, and a fireplace 
for drying documents, and sorted, indexed, and bundled all available papers ‘of lesser 
use’ dating from 1550 on.55 Afterwards, in 1610, the newly assigned Keeper Thomas 
Wilson again transferred them to ‘very convenient rooms near the old Banquetting 
House at Whitehall’, and divided the papers under the two heads of ‘Domestical’ and 
‘Foreign’.56 
 
Walsingham’s papers in the custody of John James and Thomas Lake (and later 
Thomas Wilson) may have been dispersed a second time into the hands of private 
individuals, through a process of loans, pilfering, and the ‘public-only’ selection policy 
of the State Papers.57 In terms of the first of these, certain loans of Walsingham’s 
papers were never returned to the State Paper Office. In July 1599, when a new 
resident ambassador was being sent to France, the Keeper of the Exchequer could not 
find any bond for the ￡30,000 lent to King Henry VI, whilst he was King of Navarre. 
There had been ‘a book in folio, bound in vellum’, wherein Walsingham recorded 
briefly all the assurances for foreign loans. This Burghley had obtained with other 
papers of Walsingham’s, and inserted therein the Dutch States General’s bonds. Not 
having been returned, it was supposed to have come to Robert Cecil’s hands with other 
books of a like nature.58  
 
                                                 
55 CP 56/24, ‘The Queen records’, 15 Oct. 1597. TNA, SP 12/271/82, Henry Maynard to Cecil, 7 Jul. 
1599. 
 
56 The Annual Report, 221. 
 
57 John James died in 1602. Sir John Haryngton to Robert Cecil, 31 Jan. 1600/1601, HMC Salisbury, XI, 
25.  
 
58 TNA, SP 12/271/82, Henry Maynard to Cecil, 7 Jul. 1599; TNA, SP 12/271/83, Vincent Skinner to 
Cecil, 7 Jul. 1599; Sir Horatio Palavicino to Cecil, 13 July 1599, HMC Salisbury, IX, 233. 
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Second, an unknown number of Walsingham’s private papers were filtered out by the 
State Paper Office, which accepted essentially ‘private muniments of the King, his 
courts, and his government’, and ‘office archives of the secretaries of state’.59 Any 
‘irrelevant’ material of a purely personal nature was inadmissible as State Papers. As 
Simon Adams suggests, this selective collecting policy, rather than deliberate 
suppression because of sensitive information, is the only possible explanation for the 
disappearance of all Walsingham’s personal (and family) papers and those of William 
Davison. As Walsingham died heirless, his weeded-out papers did not devolve to his 
family descendants but like vagrants wandered for centuries, at times being lost or 
misplaced, or becoming detached from other papers for auction.60 It is worth noting 
that the portion of Walsingham’s archives eliminated from the State Papers contains 
many items concerning sensitive ‘public’ issues of the time. The Elizabethan 
government’s working distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ was not ‘based upon 
the subject or import of the papers in question, but on the means and “industrie” which 
had lain behind their creation or collection’. Accordingly, papers such as ‘journals’, 
‘memorial’ books and ‘entry books’ were sorted to ‘private’ because of the means of 
their production, despite their subject matter being of ‘public’ relevance.61 This 
standard saw most of Walsingham’s working books rejected by the State Papers. One 
of the most significant was the ‘booke of secret intelligences’, which recorded the 
names of spies, the aliases and cipher alphabets they used, and their payments; it was 
                                                 
59 Wernham, ‘The Public Records in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries’, 11. G. R. Elton, The 
Sources of History, Studies in the use of Historical Evidence: England, 1200-1640 (London, 1969), 
66-75.  
 
60 It was not until the eighteenth century that ‘illustrations of manners’ as opposed to ‘papers of state’ 
were considered worth preserving. The first nationally organised survey of private manuscripts and 
papers of historical interest held in British archives hence began in 1869, with the foundation of the 
Historical Manuscripts commission. This interest continues today, as part of the National Archives. Alan 
Marshall, ‘The Secretaries Office and the Public Records’, State Papers Online, 1603-1714 (Cengage 
Learning EMEA Ltd, 2000). 
 
61 Taviner, ‘Robert Beale and the Elizabethan Polity’, 24.  
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known to have existed in early 1590 but very unfortunately has disappeared.62 The 
few working books that do survive are: Walsingham’s table book of 1588 (Stowe MS 
162) and his ledger book 1583-85 (Harley MS 6035) in the British Library; his Journal 
1570-83, the entry book of Ireland 1579 (written partly by Tomson, Faunt and Lake) in 
the Carew Papers, Lisle Cave’s French language letter book (1571-89), and Laurence 
Tomson’s foreign entry book (1577-79), all in the National Archives.63  
 
Finally, rampant pilfering by antiquaries disastrously dispersed Walsingham’s papers 
into the hands of private individuals. Wanting to produce an annalistic-style history of 
the British Isles, Robert Cotton established the second-best collection of Walsingham’s 
papers (approximately 900 letters), inferior only to the State Papers. These came partly 
from private secretaries or clients of contemporary personages, people like Beale, 
Arthur Atye, and William Camden. His collection, catalogued as Titus B/XII, contains 
extensive material relating to Ireland (1578-1579) ‘oute of Sir Fr. Walsingham’s notes’ 
or ‘bookes’, each section being preceded by a cover sheet marked with a letter 
(possibly according to Walsingham’s original catalogue): e.g. book I (ff. 43r-55v) and 
book H (ff. 62r-75v).64 Cotton noted on book B (ff. 345r-366v): ‘Ireland, I had of Mr. 
Phillipp and my L. Carew [Sir George Carew, Earl of Totnes]’.65 Cotton also acquired 
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63 TNA, SP 104/162, France, Flanders, German states and Holland: Lisle Cave’s letter book, 1571-1589. 
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64 Out of Walsingham’s ‘notes’ or ‘bookes’: BL, Cotton MSS Titus B XII, ff. 43r. 63r, 159r, 172r, 345r. 
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Walsingham’s manuscripts by stealing from the State Papers.66 His theft of these latter 
documents was facilitated by his political position––as an unofficial secretary to the 
Lord Privy Seal the Earl of Northampton, as a client of the favourite Somerset and the 
Earl Marshal Arundel, and as a member of several official commissions—which gave 
him ready access to official archives. 67  In the Cotton MSS, among the letters 
addressed to Walsingham (approximately 613), up to 82% concentrate on diplomacy, 
news, and intelligence relating to Scotland in the 1580s.68 The rest of the letters to and 
from Walsingham concern mainly his first embassy to France, especially in 1572; his 
embassy to the Low Countries with William Cobham in 1578; Walsingham’s spying on 
the French embassy in London in 1583; and Leicester’s expeditions to the Netherlands 
in 1586 and 1589. These major fragments not only reflect Cotton’s interest in specific 
issues of Elizabethan politics, but also prove that he obtained Walsingham’s papers 
often as entire bundles, rather than as loose separate documents.69 In 1753, the Cotton 
library formed one of the foundation collections of the newly established British 
Museum.  
 
As Cotton’s secretary, Ralph Starkey had privileged access to Cotton’s library. There 
he copied numerous manuscripts of Walsingham’s correspondence during his first 
embassy to France, classified now as Harley MS 260.70 However, Starkey is better 
                                                 
66 Colin G. C. Tite, The Early Records of Sir Robert Cotton’s Library: Formation, Cataloguing, Use 
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known for his ownership of William Davison’s papers, which contained many original 
and copied letters to Walsingham sent from his colleagues (particularly Leicester while 
on the Dutch expedition; Harley MS 285), or from his continental spies (Harley MSS 
286, 287, 290).71 This collection came to the attention of the Keeper Thomas Wilson. 
On 10 August 1619, the Privy Council authorised Wilson to search Starkey’s house, 
and seized ‘a sackfull of papers to the number of 45 pacquets’, chiefly comprising 
Davison’s ambassadorial documents.72 Nevertheless, the contents of Harley MSS 
285-287 can been seen as evidence that Wilson failed to seize all of Starkey’s Davison 
papers. After Starkey died in October 1628, his collection of Walsingham’s papers was 
bought by Simonds D’Ewes between 1628 to 1632. 73  Then in 1705 D’Ewes’s 
grandson sold them to Robert Harley.74 While in the hands of the D’Ewes and Harley 
families, several other of Walsingham’s papers (scattered in Harley MSS 6845, 
6992-6994), and his ledger book 1583-1585 (Harley MS 6035), were added to the 
collection.  
 
In addition to this dispersal, some of Walsingham’s papers also found their way to the 
Egerton and Stowe MSS, now in the British Library. The Egerton collection obtained 
Walsingham’s items presumably through the marriage between George A. F. 
Rawdon-Hastings, second Marquess of Hastings, and Barbara Yelverton, Baroness 
Grey de Ruthyn.75 The archive was acquired by the British Museum at auction in 
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1856.76 The Stowe collection contains Walsingham’s table book of 1588, the copies of 
Walsingham’s correspondence during his first French embassy, and many original 
letters addressed to him.77 After a number of vicissitudes, these papers found their 
ways into the hands of Thomas Astle (1735-1803), Keeper of the Records in the Tower 
and a Trustee of the British Museum.78 It is unclear how he secured them, whether 
from London salerooms, or by inheritance from his father-in-law the Revd Philip 
Morant, antiquarian and noted historian of Essex. When Astle died in 1803, his former 
patron’s son George Grenville, first Marquess of Buckingham, bought his whole 
manuscript collection, and removed it to Grenville’s seat, Stowe House in 
Buckinghamshire. In 1849 the collection was offered for private sale to Bertram 
Ashburnham, fourth Earl of Ashburnham, and was again transported, this time to 
Ashburnham Palace, Sussex. In 1883, the Earl’s son, also Bertram, sold the Stowe 
MSS to the government, thereby passing Walsingham’s papers to the British Museum 
and ultimately to the British Library.  
 
Faced with rampant pilfering by antiquarians, the Jacobean government, in June 1612, 
instructed Levinus Muncke and Thomas Wilson, the new Keepers appointed in 1610, 
to order the papers of the recently deceased Earl of Salisbury in Salisbury House, 
bringing them into the State Paper Office. Hereafter, this became the custom: when a 
Secretary of State or other minister resigned office or died, a warrant would be issued 
to deliver their detained official papers to the Keeper. 79  Then in 1619 Wilson 
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77 BL, Stowe MSS 142 f. 27; 151 f. 29; 143 ff. 67-79, 107; 147 ff. 214, 216-338. Catalogue of the Stowe 
manuscripts in the British Museum (London, 1895).  
 
78 In 1763, Thomas Astle was appointed by George Grenville, the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of 
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recovered parts of Davison’s papers from Ralph Starkey. Perhaps, however, we should 
thank the early Jacobean antiquarians for stealing documents; it saved numerous 
papers from being damaged or obliterated by a fire at Whitehall in January 1619. This 
disaster destroyed valuable documents, including the correspondence from 
Walsingham’s first embassy to France, mainly dating from 1570 and 1571. ‘When the 
Banquetting house at Whitehall was burnt down, the office [the room within the 
Holbein Gate] suffered by the hasty removing of the Papers to the place they are now 
in, many were lost and some burnt.’80 For the remainder of the century, the surviving 
part of the State Papers was lodged in the newly rebuilt tower of the Whitehall 
Gateway, in two rooms opening into three closets and three turrets.81 
 
Despite being kept in both official and private custody, some of Walsingham’s papers 
either vanished through accident and negligence, or were sold to unknown buyers. The 
original expense account for Walsingham’s transport, posting horses, and ‘Intelligence 
or Spyalles’ during his Dutch embassy in 1578 is an example. This was once in the 
stock of John Waller, a London bookseller, but has now disappeared.82 Fortunately, 
some of these documents that went missing at a later date had been transcribed by 
contemporary historians. But some of these authors selectively edited the papers in 
question according to their political partiality and client loyalties, consequently 
shaping historical prejudices against specific Elizabethan political figures, especially 
Leicester.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
80 Ibid., 222. 
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William Camden was one such, whose account is coloured by his partisan loyalty to 
Burghley and the latter’s anti-war policy. He was initially commissioned to write the 
Annales by his patron Burghley, who about 1597 ‘willed mee to compile in an 
Historicall stile, the first beginninge of the Reigne of Queene ELIZABETH…to 
eternize the memory of that renowned Queene’.83 Around 1608 James I pressured him 
into continuing this project, in order to rebut the charges appearing in Jacque-Auguste 
de Thou’s Historia sui temporis (1606) of Mary Stuart’s adultery and murder of her 
husband.84 In addition, Camden himself attempted to reform contemporary English 
historiography by the likes of Polydore Vergil and Edward Hall, by removing any 
mysterious or unnatural element, and all ‘Ignorance’, ‘doubtfulnesse’ and ‘falsitie’.85 
His Annales became essentially a documentary history, ‘the first English narrative 
history founded…on what we would now call “primary sources”’.86  
 
These primary sources came first from Burghley, who in 1597 ‘set open unto mee, first 
his owne, and then the Queenes Roles, Memorials, and Records’. Also via Burghley’s 
influence, Camden procured privileged access to the state archives: ‘charters and 
Letters patents of Kings and great personages, letters, consultations in the Councell 
Chamber, Embassadors Instructions, and Epistles…The Parliamentarie Diaryes, Actes, 
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and Statutes…and…every Edict or Proclamation’.87 Second, Camden made extensive 
use of Robert Cotton’s library, as evidenced by the record of loans written in Cotton’s 
hand.88 Moreover, as an antiquarian and an inside observer of many of the events of 
Elizabeth’s reign, Camden recorded accounts passed to him ‘from my Ancestors and 
credible persons, which have beene present at the handling of matters’.89 Such 
‘credible persons’ included Burghley himself, who related his early employment in the 
household of the Duke of Somerset as the latter’s Master of Requests; Margaret 
Douglas, Countess of Lennox, grandmother of James I, who was herself imprisoned in 
the Tower three times; and Alexander Nowell, the dean of St Paul’s, who described to 
Camden the Duke of Norfolk’s execution, confirming that, on 2 July 1572, he was with 
the Duke on the scaffold.90 
 
The debate on Camden’s scholarly impartiality is never ending, and will continue in 
the following chapters. Camden himself maintained he had a ‘love of Truth’.91 Against 
the rising suspicion that he had compromised his scholarly integrity under royal 
pressure to give a favourable account of Mary Stuart, Camden declared:  
 
As for danger, I feared none, no, not from those which thinke the memorie of 
succeeding age may been extinct by present power…as many as have practiced cruetie 
upon Writers that have embraced Truth, have heaped dishonour upon themselves, and 
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glorie upon them…To suspition either of favour, or disaffection, I have left no 
place…I might satisfie the truth onely.92  
 
Indeed, by looking at Camden’s working copy of the Annales, now in Cotton MS 
Faustina FI-X, Wallace MacCaffrey found no indication of changes between its earlier 
drafts and final edition.93 Yet Camden reneged on his other promise that he would 
exclude any prejudice or partiality from his writing.94 The Annales show his partisan 
favour towards Burghley, partly arising from his access to Burghley’s papers, and 
partly due to his own inclination towards moderate Protestantism. In the Annales, 
therefore, he disparaged Catholicism and Puritanism, both of which in his opinion 
molested the social hierarchy and resisted constituted authority.95 Burghley’s chief 
antagonist, Leicester, was pictured as being personally immoral and politically 
aggressive. Camden even described him and Walsingham as the only ringleaders of 
Mary Stuart’s death in 1587, in order to exculpate the similarly complicit Burghley and 
his family from the guilt of their involvement in the execution of King James’s 
mother.96 In addition, although his presentation of Queen Elizabeth at the height of her 
power was tailored to meet James’s idealized self-image of royal supremacy, Camden 
did not withhold criticism of Elizabeth’s inefficiency.97 Camden represented her as 
‘being naturally slow in her resolutions’ because she was a woman, with a ‘womanish 
impotency’ that was easily manipulated by her ministers; these accounts downplayed 
                                                 
92 Camden, Annales, C3r. Trevor-Roper, ‘Queen Elizabeth’s first historian: William Camden’, 133.  
 
93 MaCaffrey, The History of the most renowned and victorious Princess Elizabeth, Late Queen of 
England, xxxvi. Kevin Sharpe, Politics and Ideas in Early Stuart England (London, 1989), 215. 
 
94 Camden, Annales, C3r. 
 
95 MaCaffrey, The History of the most renowned and victorious Princess Elizabeth, Late Queen of 
England, xxxviii-xxxv. Herendeen, William Camden, 404, 407. 
 
96 See Chapter IV. 
 
97 Watkins, Representing Elizabeth in Stuart England, 61-63  
 
 38
her absolute monarchy.98  
 
Taking a contrary position in his Fragmenta Regalia (1641), Robert Naunton, another 
commentator on Elizabethan politics, depicted Elizabeth as ruling by faction. His 
working sources mainly came from the State Papers to which Naunton had privileged 
access as a Principal Secretary of State, documents in his own possession, and oral 
records. From the first sort, he learned of Queen Elizabeth’s own ‘frequent letters and 
complaints to Deputy Mountjoy [Charles Blount, 8th Baron Mountjoy, who served as 
Lord Deputy 1600-1603]’ of the costly expense of the Irish army and royal financial 
straits, catalogued now in the State Papers of Ireland.99 Naunton also collected many 
original papers written by Leicester, as well as intelligence reports sent from France by 
the spy William Parry to Leicester and Burghley, ‘containing many fine passages and 
secrets’ in ciphers (now lost).100 More significantly, Naunton’s service for the second 
Earl of Essex in spying on the fugitive Spanish Secretary of State, Antonio Perez, from 
1596 to 1599, and his later Secretaryship at the Stuart court, acquainted him personally 
with many late Elizabethan and early Jacobean events.101 In addition, Naunton also 
relied on Henry Wotton’s State of Christendom (1594) for information about 
Elizabeth’s policy towards Spain, and cited Walter Ralph’s History of the World (1614) 
in describing Elizabeth’s lack of generosity in rewarding her soldiers and in 
commenting on the trial of John Perrot. Probably the Latin edition of Camden’s 
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Annales, published in 1625, also became one of the secondary sources for Naunton’s 
work.102 
 
Fragmenta Regalia was written in the context of Naunton’s quest for royal patronage, 
which consequently shaped the text as loyal propaganda for divine sovereignty. He 
credited Elizabeth’s triumph over both internal revolts and foreign invasions to her 
‘destiny’ and ‘fortune’; God was on her side.103 And her intellectual qualities as a 
monarch, her ability, and her being ‘learned (her sex and her time considered) beyond 
all common belief’, were commended.104 Under her royal supremacy, her ministers 
‘acted more by her own princely rules and judgment than by their own will and 
appetites’, and ‘she ruled much by faction and parties, which she herself both made, 
upheld, and weakened as her own great judgment advised’.105  In short, Queen 
Elizabeth was the final policy-maker, ‘very capable of counsel, absolute enough in her 
own resolutions’.106 Accordingly, Naunton analogised Elizabeth’s absolute monarchy 
to Charles I’s rule in the 1630s, both given by providence; any man who resisted this 
government was opposing God’s will.107 
 
Another valuable documentary history is Dudley Digges’s The Compleat Ambassador 
(1655), an edited compilation of the great majority of Walsingham’s correspondence 
from his two French embassies (1570-1573 and 1581). Some of the originals, 
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particularly documents written in 1570 and early 1571, have vanished, probably burnt 
in the fire of 1619.108 Digges presumably copied these letters when they were owned 
by Ralph Starkey or Simond D’Ewes, classified now as Harley MS 260, with some 
supplements from the State Papers. It is reasonable to assume Digges used the 
duplicates made by Starkey rather than the originals in the Cotton collection. For 
instance, regarding the correspondence on 10 August 1572, Digges cited two letters 
from Walsingham to Thomas Smith, one to Cecil, and one to Leicester. The order and 
texts conform to the Harley MSS, but none of these exists in the Cotton MSS.109 
Likewise, in terms of the correspondence on 11 September 1572, there is only one 
letter from Leicester to Walsingham in Digges’s work, identical to that held in the 
Harley MSS, but the Cotton MSS have two more separately from Smith and from 
Burghley.110 On 5 December 1572, Walsingham wrote in sequence to Smith, Burghley, 
Leicester, and Burghley again; none of these four letters exists in the Cotton MSS, but 
only in Harley’s collection. 111  Interestingly, the latter has one additional letter 
Burghley addressed to Walsingham, which Digges does not cite, implying he either 
ignored or selectively presented documents for some purpose.112 The State Papers also 
enriched Digges’s work; the instruction by the Queen to Walsingham on 19 December 
1570, and the letter of Walsingham to Cecil on 28 January 1571, existed only in the 
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State Papers.113 Despite being a copy of Starkey’s duplicate, Digges’s work can be 
used as a trustworthy authority, as the copied texts appear almost identical to the 
originals in the Cotton MSS.  
 
Digges’s book may have been written out of a Jacobean nostalgia for the time of 
Elizabeth I. In the early seventeenth century, the universal unpopularity of the Stuart 
regime created a fashion to rewrite the glorious history of Elizabeth’s rule. The figure 
of Elizabeth further became the axis of propaganda between the royalists and the 
parliamentarians in the Civil Wars. Then in the Interregnum, ironically, her 
representative of monarchy became an obstacle to the Commonwealth government: the 
government feared it might encourage dreams of a restoration. An opposite and 
gendered fabrication of Elizabeth, therefore, was developed. This denied that female 
rule was monarchy, and attributed Elizabeth’s glorious reign to ‘her submission to her 
masculine and wise councillors’.114 Accordingly, it is not surprising to observe that 
Digges followed this historiographical fashion. He found it ‘doubly inscrutable’ that 
‘she was a Woman and a Queen’. Elizabeth was described as a Queen making the final 
decisions, but also an indecisive woman who was very easily affected by misleading 
intelligence. Her only excellence, in Digges’s estimation, was her judgment in making 
‘good choice of her Servants, though she rewarded but sparingly’. She had ‘the 
Fortune to find them more loyal and secret then those Princes that succeeded her’. 
Because of Digges’s agenda, his archival selection lays much greater stress on the 
correspondence between Elizabeth’s ministers, than on that between them and the 
Queen. By doing this, he magnified the efforts of her ministers, chiefly Burghley and 
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Walsingham, and minimised the role of Queen Elizabeth in her own reign. 
 
These three works by Digges, Naunton and Camden will be frequently discussed 
throughout this thesis. Their partisan prejudices and different pictures touching both 
factiousness and Queen Elizabeth’s specifically female rule will be treated carefully, 
and will also become central issues for this research. 
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Chapter I: The Rise of Walsingham, 1568–1573 
 
This chapter traces Walsingham’s entrance into Elizabethan high politics through his 
employment in Secretary William Cecil’s espionage clientele from 1568 to 1573. 
Elizabeth’s political inheritance in 1558 was far from ideal: she faced Mary Stuart’s 
claim to the English succession; international Catholicism, which regarded her as a 
heretic bastard and left her diplomatically isolated; domestic collision over the new 
Protestant settlement; and an empty treasury. In some urgency, the thirty-eight-year-old 
Cecil assumed the helm of her unstable regime, taking the roles of councillor and 
Principal Secretary, and from 1561 being additionally entrusted with the Court of 
Wards and Liveries.1 Efficiency both in the Court of Wards and the Secretaryship 
depended on the supply of sound information and intelligence. Great profits could arise 
from transferring wardships, so escheators and feodaries had to ‘have Argus eyes 
piercing into all conveyances’ to closely monitor wardship status amongst the landed 
class.2 It was also requisite for every Elizabethan Secretary, as Robert Beale stated, to 
offer the Queen and her Council the latest information concerning Church and religion, 
the routine of regional councils, military deployment, commerce, royal revenues, and 
‘forraine Espialls and Intelligences’ like ‘the number of the strangers, Denizens and 
others both in London and in other places of this Realme’. In other words, the 
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Secretary needed to acquaint himself thoroughly with ‘the State of the whole 
Realme,…w[hi]ch by progress of time and experience he shalbe able to spie and 
amende’.3 Robert Cecil, who succeeded his father William as Secretary in 1596, 
emphasised the Secretary’s discretion in ‘all matters of speech and intelligence’.4 The 
Elizabethan intelligence service, therefore, grew primarily to meet a political need, and 
it was in working for Cecil in this context that Walsingham rose to prominence within 
Elizabeth’s regime.  
 
By the early 1570s, Cecil’s intelligence service had achieved some kind of systematic 
procedure. This has been verified in Robyn Adams’s investigation into William Herle’s 
spying in the Marshalsea during the Ridolfi Plot in the spring of 1571.5 This ‘greatest 
enterprise’ aimed to intercept letters between two key suspects in this plot: John Lesley, 
Bishop of Ross, Mary Stuart’s representative in London, and his agent Charles Bailly.6 
The investigations into the Ridolfi Plot bring three of Cecil’s intelligence mechanisms 
to light: overseas espionage and information for ambassadors, prison networks, and 
Cecil’s intelligence secretariat. An overseas spy William Sutton tipped off Cecil about 
Bailly’s impending journey to England.7 Walsingham, then the English ambassador in 
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Paris, confirmed this intelligence.8 This prior warning of Bailly’s arrival allowed Cecil 
to arrange his arrest at Dover and make certain deployments within the prison, in this 
case involving a spy called Herle.9 Accused of piracy off the Isle of Wight, Herle 
agreed to take on the role of prison spy in the Marshalsea in early 1571, in exchange 
for commutation or release, or perhaps exculpation with ‘good opinion and name’.10 
The Marshalsea, located in Southwark, was one of the chief prisons used to detain 
recusants, political criminals, and those accused of maritime offences like piracy. This 
politically sensitive jail had a supervisory mechanism to block the prisoners’ outward 
correspondence, except those letters under its tacit watch. Prison spies were 
safeguarded and kept in contact with the authorities under the guise of interrogation. In 
jail, Herle acted as a letter-conduit between Bailly and Lesley, but diverted their 
enciphered letters to Cecil for surveillance and copying. Herle was also expected to 
secure the cipher-alphabet so that Cecil’s team could not only read the correspondence, 
but also add to its contents. This could only work if Burghley’s intelligence team had 
mastered certain intelligence technologies and routines: letter delivery, copying, 
deciphering, forging and resealing. In addition – as confirmed by Adams’s research 
into the marginal figures in Herle’s reports during his later secret diplomacy with 
William of Orange in mid-1573 – Cecil’s private secretariat had a file management 
system which collated, digested and inscribed intelligence into an ordered form, 
convenient for Cecil to read swiftly.11 By the early 1570s then, Cecil’s espionage had 
achieved a degree of maturity and systematic division of secretarial business. 
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Employment within Elizabethan espionage relied more on a private clientele than on 
government office, and was paid with patronage instead of regular salaries. Spymasters 
redistributed patronage earned from the Crown—like conveyances of wardships, 
pensions, promotion in office, pardons, and entrée to royal favour—downwards to their 
intelligence employees. For example, private informant William Dethick begged to be 
a custodian of records of ‘descents’, and another petitioner to be a registrar of baptisms, 
marriages and burials.12 Herle requested in 1574 ‘the whole feodariship of Wales’, an 
office that assisted escheators in surveying local wardships, and then in 1575 a feodary 
appointment for ‘conselements’ and ‘the survey of certayn covent leases’.13  
 
People mired in guilt, exile or poverty might easily be made use of as spies in 
exchange for pardons. Herle spied inside the Marshalsea in 1571 for commutation of 
his sentence; English Catholic émigrés served Elizabeth’s Protestant government to 
redeem their liberty, family estates, and for licences to return home.14 Escaping 
England because of debt, in 1566 Christopher Rooksby in Edinburgh volunteered to 
spy for Cecil on Mary Queen of Scots, who had readily admitted him into her 
anti-Elizabeth intrigues: a proposed alliance and invasion involving continental 
Catholics and English Catholic aristocrats including the Duke of Norfolk, and the Earls 
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of Derby, Shrewsbury, Northumberland and Westmorland.15  Cecil kept Rooksby 
spying in Edinburgh until 1572, partly by appealing to his faith and patriotism, but 
more with the lure of eventual pardon and help.16  
 
Senior intelligencers could earn a privileged entrée to government or royal favour. 
John Lee served Cecil by shadowing English émigrés in Antwerp from 1569.17 Before 
the Dutch uprising of 1578, the Low Countries were the primary shelter for 
Elizabethan Catholic exiles. Because of geographical access to the ‘imperial 
route’—running from the Netherlands, up the Rhine and into Italy by the St Gotthard 
or the Brenner Passes—exiles either headed for Rome along this path, or settled down 
at Antwerp, Brussels and Leuven, places which thus became the top priorities for 
English espionage.18 Lee and an exile called John Prestall jointly unravelled some 
regicidal intrigues, warning Cecil to watch ‘her [Queen Elizabeth’s] meats and drinks, 
for some say she shall not reign long’.19 Lee and John Fitzwilliams also acted as 
intermediaries between Cecil and exiles like Francis Norton and Charles Neville, both 
of whom requested Cecil’s influence with Queen Elizabeth to obtain a royal pardon. In 
return, Norton pledged his duty to Cecil’s espionage.20 Lee was arrested in Antwerp in 
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1572 when monitoring the local Spanish forces. Though in prison, however, he kept 
collecting intelligence and after his release resumed his work for Burghley. In 1595 his 
spying efforts finally earned him an audience with Queen Elizabeth who ‘geve me 
thanks in regard of my service voluntarily of myself offered to her Majestie’. Burghley 
also promised to ‘further’ his suit for an official post.21 
 
In return for such valuable services, leading Elizabethan ministers could elevate their 
core clients into the formal systems of bureaucracy. Alan Smith has demonstrated that 
the majority of the Cecils’ household secretaries entered central administration, chiefly 
into foreign embassies, or the financial offices of the lower exchequer and the duchy of 
Lancaster, or the Irish departments responsible for the local musters, wardship and 
exchequer. Such clients became the eyes of their patrons, watching over government 
routines.22 Walsingham is perhaps the prime example of this; because of his espionage 
work for Cecil he rose from a little-known Kentish gentleman to official prominence as 
the Principal Secretary.  
 
Walsingham had joined Cecil’s espionage network by August 1568, a ‘dangerous 
tyme’ as he saw it. 23  He alerted Cecil to the urgent danger of rebellion and 
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assassination: 
 
Wheyinge [the informant’s] his earnest protestatyon, of the credyt of the partye that 
came from the nature of the matter, as of the greatest importaunce, the mallyce of this 
present tyme, the alleageaunce, and pertyculer good will I owghe her majestye, and the 
daynger, that might grow unto me, by the concealynge therof. Yf any sooche thinge 
which God defende hereafter, should happen…And I beseeche your honor that I may 
without offence conclude that is this devysion, that reygnethe amongst us. There is 
lesse daynger in fearinge to muche then to lyttle and that ther is nothinge more 
dayngerouse than securyte.24 
 
Walsingham cautioned against believing that the Queen’s safety could be guaranteed 
by the patriotism and fidelity of her subjects.25 From the late 1560s, instances of 
‘mallyce’ and ‘devysion’ from Scotland, Rome, Spain and France caused profound 
disquiet. In May 1568 for instance, the dethroned Mary Stuart fled to England looking 
for asylum, but found herself an unwelcome guest under house arrest. ‘Preservation of 
the person of the Queen of Scots…to be right heire’ soon became one of the excuses 
used for the Northern revolt in 1569.26 The bull Regnans in excelsis issued by Pope 
Pius V in February 1570 excommunicated Elizabeth from the Catholic Church, 
which—from the Catholic point of view—freed her subjects from loyalty, obligation 
and obedience to this pretended sovereign. Relations between London and Madrid had 
also deteriorated sharply in 1567, when 10,000 troops led by the Duke of Alva reached 
the Low Countries to quell local Protestant revivalism. This army seized all local 
English property and imposed an embargo on commerce.27 In a counter move at the 
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end of 1568, Elizabeth detained five Spanish treasure ships when they sheltered from a 
storm in Plymouth and Southampton.28 
 
These crises facilitated Walsingham’s rapid rise within Elizabeth’s regime. On 18 
August 1568, Francis wrote to Cecil on behalf of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, 
Elizabeth’s ambassador to France during the first civil war, who was too ill to write 
himself. The letter concerned a financial request brought by Robert Stuart, a man in 
service to James Stuart, Earl of Moray and the Scottish regent. Robert was sent by the 
Huguenot leaders Louis de Bourbon-Vendôme, Prince de Condé, and Gaspard de 
Coligny, Admiral of France, who were struggling in the third civil war. They appealed 
firstly to Cecil, who in 1559 had advocated English military intervention to support the 
Protestant lords of congregation in Scotland. Walsingham pleaded with Cecil to 
arrange an audience for Stuart with the Queen, for Stuart had important messages to 
render only by mouth.29 Cecil made no response to this petition. The Huguenots and 
their English advocates misunderstood Cecil’s theory of English intervention, which 
was applied to Scotland, Stephen Alford explains, in accordance with ideas of 
traditional English ‘superiority over Scotland’ rather than religious conviction.30 Cecil 
in fact shared Queen Elizabeth’s aversion to intervention in foreign quarrels on behalf 
of rebellious subjects. 31  Unsurprisingly, later the Queen refused to receive the 
Huguenot envoy. 
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For Conyers Read this letter from Walsingham to Cecil marked the former’s entrance 
into English foreign affairs. 32  Simon Adams believes that in the late 1560s 
Walsingham had served in an unrecorded capacity on one of Throckmorton’s Scottish 
embassies. Walsingham’s fellowship with Cecil may have begun earlier, in 1563, when 
Cecil acted as a referee for Francis’s parliamentary selection at Lyme Regis, Dorset.33 
The last paragraph in this 1568 letter certainly demonstrated their pre-existing 
association in foreign espionage. Walsingham apprised Cecil that ‘touchynge thos 
matters wherein you appoynted me, I will tomorrowe in the mornynge attende vppon 
your honor to advertyse you what I have don therin’.34 Fluent in Italian as a result of 
his Marian exile in Padua, Walsingham was serving as a handler between Cecil and an 
Italian solider Thomas Franchiotto.35 Franchiotto, alias Captain François, had been in 
the pay of the French crown for four decades but, or so he claimed, his Protestant faith 
had convinced him to forsake his French paymasters. He was recommended to Cecil 
by the English Ambassador in Paris Henry Norris, and used to investigate the intrigues 
of the Guises in support of Mary Stuart.36 Until the end of 1568, Walsingham passed 
on to Cecil intelligence gained by Franchiotto, who was termed by Walsingham as ‘my 
friend’ in his letters to the Secretary. Franchiotto discovered the preparation of twelve 
‘galleys for the transportinge of certayn souldyars’, intended for military support for 
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the northern uprising,37 and also that the Cardinal of Lorraine, with Spanish support, 
had sent certain Italians into England for ‘a practyce in hande for the alteratyon of 
relygion, and the advauncement of the Queen of Scott to the Crowne’. 38  On 
Franchiotto’s tipoff, Walsingham cautioned the Queen to ‘exercise great watchfulness 
over her food, utensils, bedding, and other furniture, lest poison should be administered 
to her by secret enemies’. And he sent Cecil a list of suspicious newcomers in England 
during the past three months, ‘whose greatest desire is to upset and change the existing 
regime’.39  
 
It was proposed to Cecil that intelligence be manipulated in order to convict Mary 
Stuart of the murder of her second husband, Henry Lord Darnley. At the first tribunal, 
held at York in October 1568, the Scottish Confederate Lords had failed in their 
attempts to convict Mary because of their reluctance to exhibit the key proof, the 
Casket Letters—a silver box containing eight letters, two marriage contracts and 
twelve sonnets said to have been written by Mary to Bothwell. Cecil hastily intervened 
to retrieve the situation. Unlike Queen Elizabeth, who hoped to act as a mediator 
between Mary and her Scottish subjects, Cecil aimed to have Mary declared guilty in 
order to weaken her claim to the English succession and to strengthen regent Moray’s 
Anglophile regime. Cecil moved the second tribunal south to Westminster, and added 
himself and four extra judges to it. At this time Walsingham suggested,  
 
Yf for the dyscoverye of the Queen of Scotts consent to the murder of her husband ther 
lack suffycyent proves, he [Franchiotto] is able (yf yt shall please you to use him) to 
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dyscover certayn that should have ben imployed in the sayde murder who are here to 
be produced.40  
 
It is unclear whether Cecil adopted the advice. The Casket Letters, produced in the 
tribunal six days later and ‘affirmed’ to be in Mary’s own hand, stubbed out her hope 
of restoration.41 
 
Walsingham’s fidelity in the business of Franchiotto saw him promoted to surveillance 
of the Ridolfi Plot. In early 1569, Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk, was apprehended 
over his proposed marriage with Mary. In October Walsingham investigated this 
intricate conspiracy, especially the complicity of Roberto di Ridolfi. This Florentine 
banker was accused of having, from 1561 or 1562, smuggled papal funds from 
Flanders to the northern recusants ‘by bills of exchaunge’, then in September 1569 of 
repeating this method to transfer ￡3,000 from Don Guerau de Spes, the Spanish 
ambassador in London, to the Bishop of Ross.42 Under Elizabeth’s command, Ridolfi 
was detained at Walsingham’s dwelling ‘without conference until he may be examined 
of certain matters that touche her Highness very nearly’. 43  Cecil authorised 
Walsingham to search Ridolfi’s lodgings for evidence, although he learned nothing 
further.44 In late January 1570, Ridolfi resumed his liberty on bail of ￡1,000 and a 
pledge that he would not ‘deale directly or in indirectly in any matters concerning to 
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hir Majesty or the state of this Realm’.45 
 
It is hard to understand this easy escape of Ridolfi’s, whose testimony Queen Elizabeth 
observed was ‘farr otherwise than the truth is’ and that ‘in some poynts he will not 
declare his knowledge’.46 Partly Elizabeth had him released for fear that under torture 
he might expose her secret diplomacy, for Elizabeth had used him to mediate between 
London and Brussels.47 More probably, Walsingham, praised by William Camden as 
one who ‘knew excellently well how to winne men’s minds unto him, and to apply 
them to his owne uses’, had persuaded Ridolfi to change sides.48 In October 1570, he 
recommended Cecil recruit Ridolfi to help reconcile differences between England and 
Flanders: ‘the late exsperyence that I have dyvers wayes had of him, makethe me to 
hope that yf he were imployed in that behalfe, he woold deale bothe dyscreatly and 
upprightly, as one bothe wyse and who standethe on terms of honestye and 
reputatyon’. 49  Walsingham’s suggestion was accepted. In March 1571, before 
departing for Rome, Ridolfi was received secretly by Elizabeth at Greenwich Palace, 
where ‘he did in like sort make profession of great affection to serve Her Majesty and 
this crown’, and obtained ‘a very favourable passport’ as her blessing.50 This however 
was ‘a catastrophic error of judgement’; both Walsingham and Cecil were hoodwinked 
by Ridolfi, wrongly leaving him at liberty to plot again.51 Ridolfi soon joined another 
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Catholic uprising with the Pope and King Philip of Spain to put Mary on the English 
throne. It failed, Charles Bailly was arrested, and in order to placate a Parliament intent 
on executing Mary, in 1572 Norfolk was beheaded. Walsingham’s devotion to the 
business of Franchiotto and Ridolfi earned him an ambassadorial appointment to 
France in September 1570.52 
 
Mitchell Leimon has described Walsingham’s embassy as ‘a meteoric arrival on the 
English political scene’, astonished that Cecil’s intelligence agent, unfamiliar as he was 
with English high politics and inexperienced in national diplomacy, had gained so 
crucial an assignment.53 After John Man, the last Elizabethan ambassador in Madrid, 
was recalled in 1568, until the succession of James I England had no resident 
ambassador on the continent, except in France. The representatives there were either 
experts in statecraft like Nicholas Throckmorton and Thomas Smith, or high-born 
gentlemen with close family or privy-chamber ties with the Queen, like Henry Norris 
(as well as later Henry Brooke and Edward Stafford). 54  In contrast to another 
ambassadorial candidate (and Cecil’s brother-in-law) Henry Killigrew, Walsingham’s 
credentials were much inferior.55 The Queen (or Cecil) selected Walsingham partly 
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because of Killigrew’s smaller financial means, although Walsingham himself was 
loath to accept the costly Paris embassy which was ‘like to bring me to beggary’.56 
Presumably, Cecil also supported Walsingham’s nomination in the interests of 
patronage and espionage (assigning ambassadors was a royal prerogative, though the 
recommendation of the Council or of the relevant departments was generally 
adopted).57 On the showing of his early espionage work, the man Cecil preferred for 
the embassy was an obedient agent proficient in spying, rather than a skilled or 
aristocratic diplomat. Walsingham repaid Cecil’s patronage with his allegiance. His 
letters to Cecil throughout his French embassy were full of phrases of client reverence 
and awe.58 Even after Cecil’s move to the post of Lord Treasurer in August 1573, 
Walsingham still continued to follow Burghley’s instructions, placing Jacomo Manucci 
in the French embassy in Madrid.59 
 
Scholarly attention has been mostly concentrated on Walsingham’s diplomatic efforts 
in the first Elizabeth–Anjou matrimonial alliance and the Treaty of Blois, rather than 
on his espionage. In contrast to modern historians, however, Dudley Digges began The 
Compleat Ambassador with a description of Walsingham’s abilities as an intelligence 
agent, explaining  
 
how vigilant he was to gather true Intelligence; what Means and Persons be used for it; 
how punctual he was in keeping to his Instructions, where he was limited; and how 
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wary and judicious where he was left free.60 
 
Before Walsingham headed for Paris, Elizabeth had urged him to keep watch over ‘all 
manner of their doings there, as well private as publick, that may be prejudiciall to us 
or our estate’.61 He began as soon as he arrived in France by associating with leading 
continental Protestants, including the Vidame de Chartres, François de Beauvais and 
Sieur de Briquemault. He addressed the Elector Palatine, volunteering to assist in the 
Elector’s correspondence with Queen Elizabeth.62  In addition, intelligencers like 
Nicholas Cabry, Franchiotto, and an Italian Captain Tomasso Sassetti, visited or were 
used in Walsingham’s embassy, suggesting that Walsingham had initiated his network 
of spies, and that its headquarters was his Paris residence.63 On the location of this 
residence, however, historiography does not agree. Conyers Read followed Karl 
Stählin in situating it in the fashionable Faubourg Saint Germain.64 On the basis of a 
document written by Sassetti, John Cooper places Walsingham’s Paris house in Saint 
Marceau, south of the city walls and on the left bank of the Seine, a centre of 
Protestant activism.65 However, Cabry’s letter to Walsingham refers to Saint Martin, 
the northernmost district of Paris. 66  Regardless of its exact whereabouts, 
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Walsingham’s Paris lodging sustained his pan-European espionage 
activities—activities that reached as far as Constantinople—until the late 1580s.  
 
One focus of Walsingham’s surveillance was the Valois Court and the Guises, who 
were the practical leaders of the French Catholic radicals and the chief support of their 
niece Mary Stuart.67 Walsingham’s informants were either introduced by Norris with 
good credit, or were household servants bribed for the purpose. They acquainted him 
with secrets at court touching Charles IX’s health, the Catholic princes’ armed 
enterprise to Ireland, and some marriage alliances connived by the Spanish ambassador, 
the Guises and Mary Stuart’s adherents.68 Suspicious newcomers, especially English 
exiles, were also placed under surveillance. In March 1572, Walsingham ordered his 
spies in Paris to monitor Anthony Standen, an English gentleman exiled for his support 
of Mary Stuart’s claim to the English throne, who had become a pensioner of Philip II. 
Standen had lately left Spain for Paris, making ‘some speech unto a Frenchman whom 
he [Walsingham] trusted, of some hope there would be in England of change or ever 
Summer ended’.69 Like many needy exiles, Standen served all sides for money to 
sustain himself. By late 1568 he had cultivated Norris by alleging the existence of 
foreign plots to intervene in Scotland, gaining access to Ambassador Walsingham in 
the early 1570s. After Mary’s execution in 1587, Standen salvaged his career through 
loyalty to Walsingham. Under the pseudonym Pompeio Pellegrini, he tracked Spanish 
military preparations during the Armada. He hoped for a ‘reintegration to her Highnes 
favour’ via Walsingham’s influence. In 1588 the Queen recognised his efforts with an 
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annual pension of￡100.70  
 
Generally Walsingham had suspicious foreigners spied on by their compatriots. In 
early 1571 he received Maurice Fitzgibbon, the exiled Catholic Archbishop of Cashel 
in Ireland. Fitzgibbon’s two-year exile in Spain had acquainted him with King Philip’s 
plans to invade England, and he promised to leak these secrets to Elizabeth’s 
government ‘if Her Majesty would restore him to his country and place’. 71 
Walsingham distrusted him, assigning two Irishmen, a Captain Thomas and another 
Irish soldier, to monitor their compatriot. Captain Thomas was instructed to ‘repair 
unto the said Archbishop, and to do him any friendship and service, he might here 
shew him in this court, in respect he was a Nobleman, and of his Country’.72 
 
Walsingham’s Paris embassy had first taught him about the influence of intelligence on 
policy, via the matrimonial negotiations between Queen Elizabeth and Henry Duke of 
Anjou. The initiative for this match came from the Huguenots in June 1568, though 
was soon terminated when the third French civil war broke out in October. Two years 
later, the idea was revived by Odet de Coligny, Cardinal of Châtillon. The Huguenots 
expected to contribute a French-English alliance to their joint campaign with William 
of Orange in the Low Countries.73 The proposed dynastic match was timely for both 
crowns. It appealed to Charles IX as a means of raising his military reputation and 
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promoting domestic coherence. Meanwhile the amity between the Habsburg and Valois 
families had ended in 1570 with Philip II’s new marriage to Anna of Austria, the elder 
daughter of the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian II, following the death of his first 
wife Elisabeth de Valois in 1568. Queen Mother Catherine turned her eyes to the still 
single Elizabeth, who might bring her favourite son a royal crown. England welcomed 
this French match too. Cecil referred to Elizabeth’s marriage as a matter of state rather 
than a personal issue. Since her accession, he had urged matrimony chiefly in the 
interests of the Protestant succession and as a way of securing diplomatic alliances. He 
never stopped praying that ‘God wold direct you [Queen Elizabeth] hart to procure a 
father for your children and so shall your children of all your realm bless your sede. 
Neither peace nor war without this will proffitt us long’.74 Ideally her marriage would 
secure England an heir and a powerful foreign ally, rather than merely a royal consort: 
a domestic marriage would hardly benefit the state ‘in riches, estimation or power’.75 
Simultaneously in 1570, the need for a new ally had became an urgent matter for 
England diplomatically isolated from international Catholicism, most notably Spain 
and the Papacy. An alliance with France was made a priority for Elizabeth’s regime, 
although there remained arguments about Anjou’s age, religion and nationality. At this 
key moment, matrimonial negotiations resumed with greater optimism.  
 
Unfortunately Queen Elizabeth’s intransigence in the cause of religion repeatedly 
reduced the marriage negotiations to stalemate, and ultimately to a breakdown.76 She 
insisted that her consort must worship by the English Prayer Book, and be forbidden to 
take ‘any manner of religion in outward exercise that is in her conscience contrary and 
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repugnant to the direct word of Almighty God’.77 Cecil achieved little consensus with 
his Queen about Anjou’s faith. As early as 1570 Cecil had intended to allow a limited 
exercise of the Mass in Anjou’s household—‘he may for three dayes in the weke use 
his own religion’ in his private chamber and with only six or seven of his own 
attendants present—in order to help the negotiations proceed.78 Suddenly Elizabeth’s 
stance became unusually firm; Burghley suspected she was misled by unsound 
intelligence.79 To Walsingham, he grumbled at her unexpected change:  
 
Now suddainly her Majestie hath thought good at this time to send only the French 
Articles, and her answers, and for the rest she meaneth to reserve until she may 
understand how her answers are taken, and specially how the knotty point of Religion 
will be smoothed. And the cause of this change (as I conjecture) groweth of some late 
intelligence brought thence, that if the Queens Majestie will stand earnestly upon that 
point for Religion, it shall be assented unto, which causeth her to proceed this 
confidently. 
 
He feared that ‘this matter of Religion is but projected to colour the delay in breaking 
off’. Walsingham was ordered ‘to invent sufficient answer’ and moderate the impatient 
anger of the French side.80 In May Cecil complained again: 
  
The Queen’s Majestie was by some informed, that saw the Letters [of the French 
ambassador], that was no such difficulty in the matter of Religion…I was by one of 
some value secretly informed, that if this matter of Religion were earnestly sticked 
unto, and peremptorily pressed, it would be obtained; whereupon the answer was 
conceived, and I commanded to report it to the French ambassador, who hearing it 
seemed much dismayed and concluded that he saw not but this answer should make a 
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breach and end of the whole…It were strange that any one man should give comfort to 
the ambassador in the cause, and yet the same man to persuade the Queen Majestie 
that she should persist; both these things are done; but I dare not affirm by any one.81 
 
These intelligences fastened Elizabeth’s attention on the cause of religion. 82 
Apparently, this kind of information reached the Queen directly, bypassing Secretary 
Cecil. Who supplied the misleading intelligence? The French ambassador in London 
denied it. Walsingham was an even less likely source, as his letters to the Queen were 
previewed by Secretary Cecil, and obviously at this time he was at Cecil’s side. 
Certainly, as a zealous Protestant, Walsingham would hardly relish any marriage 
between his sovereign and a Catholic consort—touching this Anjou match, the only 
scruple he had was ‘the exercise of his [Anjou’s] religion, being myself not persuaded 
that an evil may be done whereof good may come’.83 However, he kept in mind the 
overall interests of state. At the beginning of his embassy, he declared to Leicester that 
he had left ‘my private passions behind me, and do here submit myself to the passions 
of my prince, to execute whatsoever she shall command me, as precisely as I may’.84 
Walsingham shared with Cecil a concern for England’s strategic position, for which 
this French match was a ‘so great necessitie’: he recognised that it offered both a 
defensive alliance against Spanish-led Catholicism and a possible heir for the English 
succession, and in addition that it would break ‘an unnatural match’ between Anjou 
and Mary Stuart that had been proposed by the Guises to counter Elizabeth’s regime 
                                                 
81 Ibid., 100-101.  
 
82 Ibid., 97, (96). The French Queen Mother Catherine rejected this demand and asserted Elizabeth 
‘should also receive some part of the blemish, by accepting for a husband such a one as by sudden 
change of Religion might by though worldly respects void of all Conscience and Religion’. Ibid., 89. 
 
83 Walsingham to Burghley, 28 Apr. 1571, CSPF, 1569-1571, 436-37.  
 
84 Digges, The Compleat Ambassador, 29.  
 
 63
and the Huguenots.85 This marriage was too crucial to fail. As he wrote to Leicester, 
‘when I particularly consider her Majesties state, both at home and abroad, so far forth 
as my poor eye-sight can discern; and how she is beset with Forraign peril, the 
execution whereof stayeth onely upon the event of this match, I do not see how she can 
stand, if this matter break off’.86 This was why Walsingham collaborated with Cecil to 
promote and salvage the Anjou match, even being ‘somewhat swerving from the 
precise course of her Majesties instructions’—in short, ignoring religion when 
necessary.87 If he failed in this mission, Walsingham explained to the French diplomat 
Paul de Foix, ‘it should be for lack of judgement and experience, and not for lack of 
goodwill’.88  
 
Leicester was the one under greatest suspicion at the time, as having supplied the false 
information that caused Elizabeth to stand firm on the matter of religious worship. 
Writing to Walsingham, he stated that ‘we are bound to thank God to see her Majestie 
so well to stand to the maintenance of the cause of Religion’, and ‘God sent her 
Majestie alwayies during her life so to stand to the defence of so just a cause’.89 He 
believed also that France ‘will rather yield then break off’. 90  When the match 
eventually failed, Leicester regretted little but celebrated ‘Almighty God strengthen her 
Majestie true zeal to Religion’.91 Leicester’s influence over the Queen was equal to 
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Burghley’s, and either his privileged access to Elizabeth or his connection with her 
female chamberers might have been the means of bringing her intelligence damaging 
to the French match, without Cecil’s knowledge. 
 
The failure of the Anjou match taught Walsingham how intelligence—even if 
false—could affect the inclination of his irresolute Queen. In the matter of this 
projected marriage, Elizabeth presented herself as the final decision-maker. In reality 
though, her queenship performed inconsistently in patriarchal politics—she could 
assume more initiative over matters of personal importance and royal prerogative, such 
as marriage, than on those concerning national security and intelligence. Elizabeth’s 
fundamentally unstable queenship has given rise to a paradox in the historiography 
concerning Tudor sovereignty. Geoffrey Elton claimed that a Tudor revolution in 
government, beginning in Henry VIII’s reign, had transferred the power within the 
regime from the royal court to the government.92 But he also stated that Queen 
Elizabeth ‘alone conducted policy with an eye solely to her success as a monarch and a 
symbol of national unity’.93 This contradiction is repeated in Wallace MacCaffrey’s 
portrait of Elizabeth. Far from powerful in her early reign, Elizabeth usually listened to 
the proposals submitted by her councillors, ‘rejecting or accepting them but rarely 
taking the lead herself’.94 However, her dominance of patronage distribution helpfully 
preserved some policy initiative for the sovereign. ‘It was she who brought the Council 
to life, in its collective consultative capacity, by asking its advice; without her 
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command it could not function in this way.’95 Elizabeth’s exercise of queenship, 
restricted by the nature of policy and intelligence supply drove England towards a 
two-headed rule: the Queen and her Council.96  
   
This early diplomatic test in France sharpened Walsingham’s ideology of state affairs 
and gynaecocracy, inspiring him to build his own spy system in the cause of 
international Protestantism. Interestingly, Walsingham confided his real political 
arguments more to his new ‘friend’ Leicester than to the ‘patron’ Cecil. Four months 
into his embassy, in April 1571, Walsingham declared to Leicester that ‘Above all 
things I wish God’s glory and next the queen’s safety.’97 He also revealed his fear of 
being ruled by a woman, whose gender made her less reasonable—a worry articulated 
most clearly in John Knox’s writings against the ‘monstruous regiment of women’, 
published during the period of Walsingham’s Marian exile.98 For example, in July 
1572, Walsingham indicated to Leicester that ‘if God had not raised up the Prince of 
Orange to have entertained Spain, a dangerous fire ere this time had bin kindled in our 
own home’.99 But persuading the Queen to aid the Dutch Protestants would be hard, 
‘First for that her Majestie beinge by sexe fearefull, cannot but be irresolute, 
Irresolucion beinge an ordinarie comepanion to feare, A thinge most dangerous in 
martiall affaires, where opertunitieis offered are to be taken at the first rebound.’100 If 
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some evidence (like intelligence) could convince the Queen that expeditions to the 
Low Countries would succeed without danger, ‘then feare givinge place, reason shall 
have his full course to directe her majesty to be resolute in her determinacions’.101 
God-assigned male ministers and their espionage, Walsingham insisted, could 
complement inferior female rule.  
 
Unfortunately, Walsingham’s early lack of power and patronage hindered the 
development of his nascent intelligence system. Before rising to be senior Principal 
Secretary in 1576, he continued to act as a courier between Burghley and his spies. In 
early 1571, Walsingham received an appeal from Robert Huggins, one of the French 
ambassador’s men in Madrid, who had spied for the English ambassador in Spain, 
Thomas Challoner, from 1562, but was imprisoned in 1569 on the charge of ‘sending 
advertisement to England’. Walsingham requested Cecil to employ Huggins, who 
‘upon some pension, shall advertise from time to time how things pass there’.102 Other 
capable spies he also recommended to Burghley. For example, he commended the Irish 
Captain Thomas as a ‘very honest and civil’ servant, ‘who from time to time hath been 
a very good instrument for the discoverie of the practises against Ireland; which he 
hath done with the hazarding of his life if his dealing with me, or with Sir Henry Norris 
were known’.103 Thomas was then assigned to work with Herle. Others, like Sassetti 
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and a Frenchman Mr. Lyster, were also introduced into Cecil’s intelligence service.104 
Walsingham believed the Queen ‘shall find them no less ready to serve her, then if they 
were her own natural subjects’.105 
 
The existing historiography has mistakenly credited Walsingham as being the creator 
of the Elizabethan secret service. In actual fact, Cecil was its pioneer, initially driven 
by the official information requirements of his secretaryship and his supervision of the 
Court of Wards. He fostered his espionage network through patronage. Walsingham’s 
early political career was essentially dependent on this patronage framework. His 
embassy in Paris was formative for his statecraft and political reputation, both in terms 
of regime politics and his later espionage system. Walsingham’s fidelity to Cecil 
elevated him to a place in power politics. It appears to have been a custom in Tudor 
government that a returning ambassador became a prime candidate for significant 
domestic offices of state.106 On 20 December 1573, shortly after returning to England, 
Walsingham assumed the Principal Secretaryship, and on the following day gained a 
seat in the Privy Council. His entry into the very heart of the regime began polarising 
the divergent positions regarding English interventionist policy that he and Burghley 
held. Accordingly the Elizabethan intelligence service split into rival components.
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Chapter II: Walsingham’s Secretariat 
 
‘Nowe amoungst all particular offices and places of charge in this state, there is none 
of more necessarie vse, nor subiect to more cumber and variablenes; then is the office 
of principall Secretarie.’ Nicholas Faunt, Discourse touching the Office of Principal 
Secretary of Estate, c. 1592.1 
 
This chapter explores the why, when and how of Walsingham’s withdrawal from 
Burghley’s intelligence clientele. It focuses particularly on Walsingham’s private 
secretariat, examining its structure, routine and remuneration. Walsingham’s 
administration, despite being large and active, has been poorly served by modern 
historiography. This is in contrast to the Cecils’ secretariat after 1580, which has been 
well researched by Alan Smith and George Morrison, and that of the Earls of Essex 
and Leicester, described respectively by Paul Hammer and Simon Adams.2 
 
‘The loosely organised intelligence network he [Walsingham] inherited from Burghley’, 
Robert Hutchinson writes, ‘was only patchily effective’.3  In making this claim, 
Hutchinson follows the lead of Conyers Read and Penry Williams who also questioned 
the existence of both Cecil’s and later Walsingham’s spy ‘systems’—the systems ‘with 
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which legend has credited them’.4 Quite aside from the inappropriateness of imagining 
that Elizabethan espionage ought to have been conducted along the lines of a modern 
model like MI5 or MI6, there are a number of problems with this position. For a start, 
Robyn Adams’s investigation into William Herle’s spying in the Marshalsea in 1571, 
as presented in the first chapter, verifies that by the early 1570s Cecil’s espionage had 
achieved some degree of maturity, using prison surveillance and skilful deciphering 
and forging, as well as the systematic division of secretarial business. Secondly, 
Walsingham did not ‘inherit’ Burghley’s system, as is evident from the very small 
degree of overlap in lists of both household secretariats and spies. Although 
relinquishing the office of Secretary in 1572, Burghley installed his friend Thomas 
Smith and his client Walsingham in the vacant Secretaryships, ensuring that 
information supply would continue as before and feed back to him alone. Elizabeth’s 
ongoing reliance on Burghley assured his central role in guiding policy. The new 
Secretaries found it expedient to transmit the Privy Council minutes and letters to 
Burghley to draft, correct, and dispatch when he was absent from the court. Much of 
the time Smith had to request Burghley, on sick leave, to ‘retorne these writings with 
your judgement and correction of them where they need’, otherwise the Queen would 
refuse to sign papers until he approved them.5 In 1585, the experienced Walsingham 
desired Burghley to ‘send your L. two mynutes of letters, the one for the trayning of 
the marityme coun[t]yes, the other for the dysarming of the Recusants. I praye your L. 
after you have perused and corrected them to returne them’.6 These all testify to 
Burghley’s continuing omni-competence in administration. Admittedly, the eminence 
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of a post hinged less on itself than on its holder. ‘Under Elizabeth’, Penry Williams 
agrees, ‘the great succession of William Cecil, Francis Walsingham, and Robert Cecil 
gave the post of Secretary of State its central permanent and critical significance in 
government’.7  
 
Burghley had little inclination to share his intelligence resources with colleagues, as is 
evident from the fact that his secretariat worked alone in Cecil House at the Strand, 
away from the government, and that his spies, like Rooksey and John Lee, still reported 
solely to him. A very small minority, like Herle and William Parry, were also in service 
for Walsingham, though this did not come about until 1581 when Walsingham had 
become sole holder of the Secretaryship.8 Burghley and his party loathed their spies’ 
additional fidelity to others. In October 1583, Edward Stafford, Elizabeth’s new 
ambassador in Paris and one of Burghley’s adherents, cautioned Burghley that Parry 
‘hath depended vppon some others’, supposedly Walsingham.9 Walsingham learned of 
Burghley’s spies only when they were ‘in danger of death’, like an Irishman Thomas 
Bath (alias Tomazo) in Flanders, or via his friendship with men like Anthony Bacon.10 
Burghley’s personal bond with the Queen, and his anxiety for intelligence hindered the 
efficiency of the newly incumbent Secretaries in administration and espionage. 
  
Meanwhile, Walsingham, as a novice at court, lacked sufficient patronage to develop 
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his specialisation in espionage, and hence postponed establishing his spy system until 
the late 1570s. A small minority of his secretaries, like Beale, Lisle Cave and Francis 
Mylles, and spies like Walter Williams, Jacomo Manucci and Anthony Standen, had 
followed him from or even before his Paris embassy; one Agard and one auditor 
Jenison served as his informants in Ireland in 1575. But his independent recruitment of 
intelligence operatives only really began in 1578, gathering pace in the 1580s, as 
Secretary Walsingham was initially ‘lodged embarrassingly far from’ Queen 
Elizabeth.11 In mid-1575 he voiced his helplessness to Burghley: ‘I have as yet harde 
nothinge of that matter, and am not lyke to heare therof very muche being lodged as I 
am far of from the courte; and having no great dysposytyon to repayre thither, but 
drawn by espetiall occasyon’.12 His alienation from the Crown isolated him from the 
distribution of royal patronage, except for his annual Secretary’s wage of £100 and, 
from 1574, a series of export licences for cloth and occasionally wool.  
 
The year 1576 brought changes, favourable for Walsingham’s footing in the regime but 
accelerating his departure from Burghley’s influence. By March 1576, cancer of the 
throat had so incapacitated Thomas Smith that he withdrew from public affairs. 
Walsingham took over Smith’s keeping of the Privy Seal and rose to be the leading 
Secretary. Leimon marks Smith’s resignation as the real beginning of Walsingham’s 
escape from Burghley’s ‘tutelage’.13 According to an act against overseas fugitives in 
                                                 
11 Walter Williams was mentioned frequently in the correspondence between Ambassador Walsingham 
and other home colleagues, Dudley Digges, ed., The Compleat Ambassador, or, Two treaties of the 
intended marriage of Qu. Elizabeth of glorious memory comprised in letters of negotiation of Sir 
Francis Walsingham (London, 1655), 216, 262, 283, 313, 334, 346. Anthony Standen: ibid., 182-84. 
Manucci and the Captain Sassetti: ibid., 270-71, 322-24; BL, Harley MS 6991 f. 58, Walsingham to 
Burghley, 20 Aug. 1573; Hutchinson, Elizabeth’s Spy Master, 46. Leimon, ‘Sir Francis Walingham and 
the Anjou Marriage Plan’, 8. 
  
12 BL, Harley MS 6992 f. 15, Walsingham to Burghley, 7 Aug. 1575.  
 
13 Leimon, ‘Sir Francis Walingham and the Anjou Marriage Plan’, 9.  
 
 72
1571, travelling licences had to be permitted ‘by the Greate Seale of Englaund, Privie 
Seale or Privie Signet’.14 As new Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal (1576–1590), 
Walsingham therefore had the ready means of delivering his spies abroad, and 
recruiting homesick émigrés for his spying service. In 1578, Bernardino De Mendoza, 
the new Spanish Ambassador in London, rated Walsingham as pivotal in Elizabeth’s 
Council.15 In 1581, the nickname ‘the Moor’ Elizabeth accorded Walsingham marked 
that he was formally admitted into the élite circle of the Queen’s intimates. 16 
Walsingham’s growing discretion in office and his political prominence would 
facilitate his establishment of a spy network.  
 
In the meantime, the lurking menace from international Catholicism had been 
redrawing the power landscape within Elizabeth’s regime. In 1578, the annexation of 
Portugal by Spain was nearly a foregone conclusion. After Don John of Austria died in 
the autumn of 1578, Alexander Farnese soon took over the Low Countries by force. At 
the same time, plotting recusants had assembled in the newly built English College in 
Rome. The abrupt rise of the pro-Guise Esmé Stuart in Scotland was threatening 
Morton’s Anglophile government. This series of Catholic turmoils drove Elizabeth’s 
Council to a policy quarrel (or ‘faction’, as some historians term it) over English 
interventionism in continental Protestant battles: whether such intervention should 
primarily be in the service of God’s glory, or in the service of English interests and 
mindful of ruling legitimacy. 17  The former position—representing a kind of 
                                                 
14 13 Eliz. c. 3, Statutes of the Realm, IV. 531-34.  
 
15 Mendoza to Philip II, 31 Mar. 1578, CSP Spanish, 1568-1579, 571-73.  
 
16 CP 11/97r, Leicester to Walsingham, 30 Jul. 1581. Leimon suggests that ‘the Moor’ may have been 
used by the Queen for Walsingham before 1570.  
 
17 ‘Faction’ is discussed in greater detail in Chapter V.  
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cosmopolitan Protestantism by force—was endorsed by Leicester and Walsingham, but 
met with strong opposition from Burghley and Sussex. Leimon ascribes this 
polarisation of policy to the changes of offices of Burghley in 1572 and Walsingham in 
1573. The worsening state finances warned Treasurer Burghley against costly wars, 
and in addition, leaving the Secretaryship had extricated Burghley from a daily 
confrontation with unpleasant news, the type of which would naturally infuse the 
post-holder with ‘an alarmed and activist frame of mind’.18 This may be why the new 
Secretary Walsingham and his secretarial assistants were driven towards supporting an 
aggressive policy.  
 
In actual fact though, Burghley’s and Walsingham’s changes in office in 1572 did not 
so much cause as deepen the pre-existing divide between Burghley’s political 
pragmatism and Walsingham’s godly Protestantism. This divide is evident much earlier, 
in their differing responses to Mary I’s Catholic regime, to which Cecil bent his knees 
whilst Walsingham chose exile. Not surprisingly, the realistic Burghley defined the 
English policy of intervention in terms of jurisdiction and state interest. A central 
justification Burghley used for the English armed aid offered to the Scottish lords of 
congregation in 1559, Stephen Alford states, was English superiority over Scotland. 
‘The Crowne of England hath a just and unfeyned title, of longer continuance, than the 
frendshipp, betwixt Scotland and fraunce, unto the superioretye of Scotland.’ 19 
Burghley shared Elizabeth’s aversion to intervention in foreign dominions on behalf of 
plotting subjects: it was legal for sovereigns to suppress any rebel in their domain. 
Accordingly, in 1568 they both dodged a financial request from the Huguenots who 
                                                 
18 Leimon, ‘Sir Francis Walingham and the Anjou Marriage Plan, 1574-1581’, 9-12.  
 
19 Stephen Alford, The Early Elizabethan Polity: William Cecil and the British Succession Crisis, 
1558-1569 (Cambridge, 1998), 58-60, 163-64. 
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were struggling hard in the third civil wars. From 1578 Burghley supported the 
Spanish suppression of its Dutch rebels, ‘a thing that any prince would do, as her 
Majesty did upon the like occasion both in England and in Ireland’. However, 
Burghley was not without mercy towards non-English Protestants in distress; he sought 
to improve their plight via diplomacy or royal matrimony, as with the two Anjou 
courtships. In contrast, Walsingham’s Marian exile and first French embassy, 
especially his witnessing of the bloody St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre, had 
sharpened his political creed: ‘above all things I wish God’s glory and next the Queen’s 
safety’. But his godly zeal was restrained by his reliance on Cecil’s patronage. From 
1576 however, the risks to international Protestantism and Walsingham’s promotion in 
office deepened the rift in policy between the two, leading Francis away from his 
patron Cecil. Walsingham shared Leicester’s militarism and desire to free their 
persecuted coreligionists, with the ultimate aim of the ‘advancement of the Gospel’. 
Non-armed means of action were opposed as appeasement of Catholic tyranny.20 
Intelligence became necessary for policy debate. The Elizabethan intelligence service 
therefore split into rival components.  
 
Walsingham’s political ambitions spawned a pressing need for private espionage and a 
larger household secretariat, both of which grew rapidly from the late 1570s. It was 
common for Elizabethan kingpins to establish their private secretariats, which ‘would 
mutate and grow as circumstance and ambition dictated’.21 Personal secretariats 
consisted of household servants only, subject to patronage employment at the will of 
their masters. Though not bureaucratic, they did much of the administrative work of 
                                                 
20 Digges, The Compleat Ambassador, 121.  
 
21 Mark Taviner, ‘Robert Beale and the Elizabethan Polity’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, St. Andrew 
University, 2000), 117-18. 
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the state. ‘Elizabethan government was clearly a mixture of “bureaucratic” and 
“household” elements, combining the official machinery of institutions…with the 
informal processes of administration which took place within the personal offices of 
the leading ministers and officials.’22 
 
There are three discernible characteristics in the organisation of Walsingham’s 
secretariat: privatisation, in other words, a preference for conducting his intelligence 
work with his own secretariat away from court; expansion in size, compared to 
Burghley’s network; a cosmopolitan and mixed-class approach, meaning the 
recruitment of personal secretaries and intelligence employees from a broader social 
spectrum in terms of education, professionalism and international experience, rather 
than from just the ranks of the nobility. For secrecy and convenience, Walsingham used 
personal residences and the services of clients in preference to government halls and 
official employees. His secretariat had two departments individually responsible for 
diplomacy and intelligence. Normally the former accompanied Walsingham, shuttling 
between the Queen’s tournaments, his ‘lodging at Cort’, and his dwellings: his London 
residence in Seething Lane and the suburban Barn Elms in Surrey.23 Unlike Burghley, 
who dealt with intelligence business habitually in his ‘littell chamber att White hall’, 
Walsingham settled his intelligence department in his London house, away from 
Burghley’s entourage in government.24  On 14 September 1584, Nicholas Faunt, 
Walsingham’s intelligence secretary, wrote to Walsingham from ‘your honours house 
                                                 
22 Alan G. R. Smith, The Emergence of A Nation State: The Commonwealth of England, 1529-1660 
(London, 1984), 117.  
 
23 Faunt to Anthony Bacon, 8 May 1582, in Thomas Birch, Memoirs of the reign of Queen Elizabeth 
(London, 1754), I, 45-46. 
 
24 BL, Lansdowne MS 31 ff. 22r-23v, Herle to Burghley, 19 Aug. 1580.  
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in London’, giving full particulars of the examination of the Jesuit Creychton.25 
During the Babington Plot, in July 1586, his senior intelligence secretary Francis 
Mylles addressed letters to his master constantly from Tower Hill, the district 
containing Walsingham’s London house.26 Mylles’s letters in the next three months 
signified the place of writing more precisely: ‘Walsingham house in Seething Lane’, 
London.27 At that time Walsingham was away at Barn Elms, socialising insincerely 
with the plotter Anthony Babington.28 Thomas Phelippes, another leading intelligence 
secretary, moved between Chartley (where Mary Stuart was jailed), Barn Elms, and the 
court. His prime duty at court, as Walsingham repeatedly reminded him, was to 
acquaint the Queen with their latest proceedings and win her support.29 
 
‘When anie businesses cometh into the Secretarie’s handes’, Beale noted, the Secretary 
‘shall doe well for the ease of himselfe to distribute the same and to use the helpe of 
such her Ma[jes]tie’s servants as serve underneath him, as the Clercks of the Councell, 
ye Clercks of the Signett, the Secretarie of the Latin and of the French tonge, and of his 
own servants’.30 By contrast, Faunt recommended only using private servants in the 
secretariat:  
 
it shall bee needefull, that hee vse as little as hee may the advise and help of his equalls 
or superiours in aniethinge that toucheth the substance of his office and charge a thinge 
                                                 
25 TNA, SP 12/173/14, Faunt to Walsingham, 14 Sept. 1584. 
 
26 TNA, SP 53/18/65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 90, Mylles to Walsingham, 22, 23, 24, 29, 30 Jul. 1586.  
 
27 TNA, SP 53/19 ff. 44, 54, 105, Mylles to Walsingham, 13, 24 Aug.; 19 Sept. 1586; TNA, SP 
12/194/42, Mylles to Davison, 14 Oct. 1586.  
 
28 TNA, SP 53/18/92, Walsingham to Phelippes, 30 Jul. 1586. Confession by Robert Poley, [Aug.] 1586, 
CSP Scotland, 1585-1586, 595-602. 
 
29 TNA, SP 53/19/80, 83, 96, Walsingham to Phelippes (‘my servant at court’), 3, 4, 10 Sept. 1586.  
 
30 Robert Beale, ‘Treatise of the Office of a Councellor and Principall Secretarie to her Ma [jes]tie’ 
(1592), in Read, Walsingham, I, 426-27.  
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that would derogate from the credit of that place and his owne sufficiency, neither yet 
by vseinge anie of the inferiour officers to doe such things as apperteyneth nott to them, 
and may bee done by his owne servants, giue them likewise occasion to loke into his 
doeinges and as some are forward enough to take upon them to shewe their owne 
experience and skill for some further end.31 
 
This suggestion arose from Faunt’s self-serving desire to solidify his patron’s reliance 
on the clientele service by rejecting the involvement of officials. Apparently 
Walsingham adopted Faunt’s model. This degree of independence from the 
government, and the absence of a second Secretary from 1581 following the death of 
Thomas Wilson, meant that Walsingham’s secretariat needed to expand to cope with 
the growing workload of administration and espionage. According to Beale, ‘The Lord 
Thr[easur]er Burghley, being Secretarie, had not above two or three [secretaries]’,32 
and Alan Smith has demonstrated that Burghley as Treasurer and Master of Wards 
never had more than four assistants responsible for foreign business and wardship.33 
Walsingham’s secretariat was at least six times this size. His household secretaries 
from the 1560s or during his French embassy were Beale, Ralph Warcop, Lisle Cave 
and Francis Mylles. Walsingham’s Journal (Dec. 1570–Apr. 1583) mentions other of 
his servants in France by name: Walter Williams, Jacomo Manucci, a ‘Harcort’, a 
‘Digbye’, and John de Rosse; the first four are recorded as letter-carriers to and from 
England.34 Walsingham’s ‘brother’ William Dodington acted as his factor in England. 
After Walsingham rose to the office of joint Principal Secretary in 1573, and then 
                                                 
31 Faunt, ‘Discourse’, 500.  
 
32 Beale, ‘Treatise’, 427. 
 
33 Burghley’s secretariat from 1580 to 1582 included Michael Hicks, Vincent Skinner and Barnard 
Dewhurst, and from 1583 to 1593 they were joined by Henry Maynard. Smith, ‘The Secretariats of the 
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34 Charles T. Martin, ed., Journal of Sir Francis Walsingham from December 1570 to April 1583, 
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especially when he took the leading role in 1576, his secretariat expanded further: 
Laurence Tomson joined in 1573, Faunt from 1578, and in the mid-1580s Thomas 
Lake, Thomas Phelippes and Thomas Edmondes. William Bland and Thomas 
Middleton served in his customs affairs.35 Walsingham’s ledger book 1583–1585 also 
records others who performed secretarial duties in the 1580s, including Edward 
Burnham, Walter Williams, and the partially anonymous Ciprian, Charles, Weekes, 
Wilkes and Horcle.36 The Exchequer Teller Books of Issues list still more servants 
who signed for Walsingham’s annuities: Ralph Pendlebury, John Cottesforde, 
Christopher Barker, Roger Draunsfelde, William Stubbs, Thomas Oldesworth and 
Peter Proby.37 Simon Adams marks Charles Francx as Walsingham’s servant in 
1586.38   
 
This bulkiness in scale gave rise to a fear about secrecy. ‘Burthen not yourselfe w[i]th 
to many Clercks or servants as S[i]r Fra[ncis] Walsingham did’, Beale cautioned. Faunt 
similarly warned that ‘the multitude of servantes in this kinde is hurtfull and of late 
yeares hath bredde much confusion with want of secrecie and dispatch in that place’. 
Burghley’s practice of acquainting only two or three with his secret business was more 
advisable; ‘Burghley is more circumspect’.39 Beale’s and Faunt’s criticisms reflect the 
                                                 
35 Read, Walsingham, III, 387. 
 
36 BL, Harley MS 6035, Burnham: ff. 15v, 34r. Ciprian: ff. 27r, 32v, 35v, 36r, 51v, 54v, 68v, 70v, 101v, 
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38 Adams, Household Accounts, 356, n. 702; 369.  
 
39 Beale, ‘Treatise’, 427, 432; Faunt, ‘Discourse’, 500-501.  
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suspicious nature of Walsingham, a man who never relied on a single opinion.  
 
Inside Walsingham’s secretariat, a ‘principall servant’, ‘in whome the greatest trust is 
to be reposed’, was set to be ‘chiefly charged with Forraine matters’.40 This official 
acted as Walsingham’s ‘owne penne, his mouth, his eye, his eare, and keeper of his 
most secret Cabinett’. During Walsingham’s first French embassy, his ‘brother Beale’ 
presided in this position over his initial secretariat.41 Beale co-worked with Ralph 
Warcop, who had served Walsingham from 1570 and was praised by the latter as ‘verry 
godly and honest in whom I repose great trust’.42 Beale quit when he rose to be the 
Clerk of the Council in July 1572. So did Warcop, after their return from Paris in the 
spring of 1573, to pursue his academic career at New College, Oxford. Hereupon 
Laurence Tomson, newly employed in 1573, headed the secretariat and concurrently 
served as the Queen’s Latin secretary.43 Tomson was joined by John Wolley as another 
Latin secretary around 1577, and by Thomas Edmondes in the 1580s. 
 
Beneath this principal servant, a second servant had responsibility for ‘matters of 
intelligence Cyfers and secrett advertisementes’.44 Francis Mylles, who had served 
Walsingham from as early as 1566, was the first to assume this charge, and was 
responsible for correspondence with the continental spies and for reporting the status 
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42 TNA, SP 70/119 f. 16, Walsingham to Cecil, 11 Jul. 1571; TNA, SP 70/119 f. 18, Walsingham to Sir 
Thomas Heneage, 11 Jul. 1571; Taviner, Robert Beale and the Elizabethan Polity, 79-81, 112. 
 
43 In 1586 Tomson wrote to William Davison of his ‘twelve years’ service. TNA, SP 12/195/69, Tomson 
to Davison, 27 Dec. 1586.  
 
44 Faunt, ‘Discourse’, 502. 
 
 80
of home Catholics.45 His intelligence duties came to be shared with Nicholas Faunt 
and Thomas Phelippes. Faunt had entered Walsingham’s secretariat by 1578, and was 
engaged in carrying dispatches to and from continental English informants. 46 
Phelippes first comes to notice in June 1578 as ‘young Philippes’ in the employ of 
Amias Paulet the English ambassador in Paris, and he excelled at deciphering and 
forgery.47 By the mid-1580s he had become a key linchpin in Walsingham’s secretariat. 
Another specialist was Arthur Gregory, expert in opening letters and forging seals.48 
 
Mylles’s secretarial tasks also involved addressing, dispatching, abridging, 
categorising and filing papers. He endorsed and sorted incoming correspondence into 
three kinds—‘home lettres’, ‘Councell matters’ and ‘Divers matters’—then every 
morning placed the sorted papers in ‘seuerall Bundells for the present vse of them’ or 
into ‘some Chest or place’ for longer term filing.49 He must ensure that ‘there bee noe 
hinderance or confusedness in the searchinge of them’, and served as ‘a remembrancer 
of all such matters as are of most necessarie dispatch’.50 Mylles had assistants in filing: 
Lisle Cave, who had served Walsingham in Paris from mid-1571, and then Ciprian and 
                                                 
45 ‘To search out the two suspectes persons’, BL, Harley MS 6035 f. 36v.  
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47 TNA, SP 83/7 f. 39, Wilson to Walsingham, 30 Jun. 1578.  
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Thomas Lake.51 Lake earned the nickname of ‘swiftsure’ for his speed and accuracy in 
secretariat business, and he also assisted in decoding letters, like that from Pury Ogilby, 
whom Archibald Douglas had won over as a spy for Walsingham.52 Lake compiled 
Walsingham’s table book of 1588 and Cave edited the French language letter book of 
1571–1589, implying that they enjoyed considerable discretion in sorting 
Walsingham’s papers.53 
 
Chronic illness and frequent absences on diplomatic missions or royal journeys obliged 
Walsingham to devolve partial authority onto his intelligence secretariat. This ranged 
from the management of intelligence correspondence and payments, to interrogations 
and arrest, and the exercise of discretion in espionage. A majority of spies were thus in 
contact with Mylles and Phelippes, but not necessarily in communication with 
Walsingham directly. They reported up-to-date intelligence and the progress of their 
missions, as well as requesting instructions. Mylles remained the only recipient of the 
spy David Jones’s intelligence letters. When spying in the Marshalsea in mid-1574, 
Jones kept appealing to Mylles for a transfer to other promising locations where he had 
learned that recusants were secretly resorting and holding Mass.54 In 1585, Phelippes 
dispatched the spy Gilbert Gifford to Paris, where he successfully infiltrated the exiled 
English community.55 In June 1586 Mylles ordered Nicholas Berden to investigate 
Ambassador Stafford’s dishonourable sale of diplomatic dispatches to the Duke of 
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Guise.56 At the end of the Babington Plot, on 4 August 1586, Walsingham delegated 
full responsibility to Mylles to arrest John Ballard, with the warrant signed by Lord 
Admiral Charles Howard.57  
 
The efficiency of Walsingham’s espionage was partly a result of his tolerant 
recruitment of servants who, although low-born, were better qualified in academic and 
cosmopolitan terms than Burghley’s. Burghley’s mastership of wards, and Leicester’s 
aristocratic blood constituted their narrowly gentry-based clienteles.58 By contrast, 
Walsingham shaped himself, in Leimon’s phrase, as a ‘poor and dutiful Protestant, 
apart from Burghley and Leicester’, and attracted Protestant idealists or men from 
further down the social scale.59 A great majority of Walsingham’s servants were of low 
birth. Beale was the son of a mercer in London. Warcop was the eldest son of the 
London mercer Cuthbert Warcop.60 Phelippes’s father William was a cloth merchant 
and customs officer for wool in the Port of London. Thomas Lake’s father Emery 
(Almeric) served as a minor customs official in Southampton. Surprisingly, these 
non-noble clients possessed no less a distinguished university education than their 
noble counterparts, through travel or exile had extensive experience of the continent, 
and possessed the associated skills in languages, cipher and counterfeiting. 
Walsingham’s team also demonstrated a widely cosmopolitan background. Beale was a 
Marian exile who had studied in Strasbourg and Zürich, and had several diplomatic 
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apprenticeships in Paris under Sir Henry Norris and Walsingham. Warcop accompanied 
his devoutly Protestant family into exile on the Continent under Mary’s reign, and 
settled in Frankfurt in 1556. After returning to England he entered Peterhouse in 
Cambridge in 1559, and graduated with a BA from Christ Church at Oxford in 1565. 
Tomson’s grand tour gave him an international experience, ranging over Northern 
Europe (Geneva, France, Germany), to Italy and also Russia. Faunt was perhaps the 
man who sheltered at Walsingham’s Paris house during the St Bartholomew’s Day 
massacre.61 By contrast, with the exception of Vincent Skinner, Burghley’s assistants 
had little previous experience outside England; his household performed as a noble 
‘nursery’ or ‘agency’ to the royal court. The outstanding professionalism of 
Walsingham’s secretariat rendered it fit to be solely responsible for espionage.  
 
Walsingham’s day started when ‘hee riseth from his Bed or whilst hee lieth in his bed’, 
with him making notes in ‘a generall memorial Booke’, on ‘all things presently 
accurringe or that upon anie occasion shalbee remembred’, and marking out such 
matters as had been dispatched and reserving others which had not, so ‘that the 
multitude of affaires doe not cause some important matter to bee forgotten’.62 The 
only surviving example of these volumes now is the manuscript known as BL, Harley 
6035 (1583–1585). Its pages were written by a multitude of different hands, mostly by 
Walsingham and Mylles, and occasionally by Lake, Beale, and some that remain 
unidentified.63 This ‘filofax’ reminded Walsingham of his daily schedule, ranging 
from letter-writing and personal appointments, to drafting notes to brief the Queen in 
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audience. 64  Walsingham also documented in the memorial book his use of his 
secretaries: Mylles, Faunt, Tomson, Lake and Ciprian are mentioned throughout for 
copying, abbreviating, fetching, or sorting papers into ‘collections’, ‘books’ or 
‘boxes’.65 Two Clerks of the Council—Beale and Wilkes—and Faunt appear in 
conjunction with Council business.66 Generally Walsingham perused the papers with 
this memorial/ledger book beside him, and on it he ‘sett downe other thinges though it 
bee done in one word or darkly in tearmes not easily to bee vnderstood of others if the 
matter bee of secrecie’.67 This may explain the existence of enigmatic symbols, like 
flowers, hands and crosses, scored at the head of some notes throughout the diary.68  
 
While Walsingham penned his memorial book, his secretariat, whether at court or at 
home, started working with the first batches of post arriving between seven and eight 
o’clock each morning. On 15 October 1586, Walsingham’s letter arrived at Windsor 
‘this morning at vij’.69 On 3 August 1586, ‘this mornyng at viijth of the clock’, Mylles 
at Seething Lane received intelligence from Phelippes about Babington’s whereabouts 
in London.70 Post would arrive throughout the day; on 14 January 1581, at Whitehall, 
‘In this afternoone we [Walsingham] receyved advertissementes from the low 
contries.’71 Government correspondence could be sent by the royal post, and also 
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through diplomatic and ambassadorial channels. A regular royal post had existed since 
1509, and was chiefly responsible for letters written by the Secretary upon the Queen’s 
business and dispatches sanctioned by the Council.72 This restriction on its activity 
and its lack of efficiency forced Elizabeth’s ministers and diplomats abroad to develop 
their own postal services.73 Walsingham made his London residence and Barn Elms 
the headquarters his postal system. On 29 July 1578, Edmund Tremayne wrote to 
Walsingham then away on the Dutch embassy, ‘in much haste being at your house 
[Seething Lane] while this messenger gives short warning of his departure’.74 A 
survey of 1589 records that sixty-eight horses were stabled at Barn Elms, suggesting 
that this was another centre of Walsingham’s postal system. 75  In general, 
Walsingham’s post took less than four days to make it from London to anywhere 
inside England, even as far as Edinburgh. On the morning of 25 September 1583, 
Walsingham received letters from Robert Bowes, the royal envoy in Scotland, dated 23 
September.76 On 1 May 1585, Amias Paulet, keeper of Mary Stuart, received ‘your 
[Walsingham’s] lettres of the xxviijth of the last’.77 Postal delivery that took up to a 
week was considered somewhat shameful. On 2 March 1586, Paulet complained to 
Walsingham that ‘your [Walsingham’s] lettres of the xxvth of Februarye dispatched at 
Greenwiche at 8 in the morning, came not to my hande until the first of this present at 
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2 of the clock in the after noone; which is slower speede then is meete in such cases’.78 
 
The time between the arrival of the first post and Queen Elizabeth’s rising (presumably 
before 10 o’clock), Walsingham spent in public interviews or in perusing letters that 
his secretariat had endorsed and annotated.79 Once received, letters would be enrolled 
in a pre-bound paper book called the ‘Journall’,  
 
wherein is Continually to bee recorded, the certaine day of the month and the howers 
when anie dispatch is made or receiued…further in this booke should alsoe bee noted 
the arrival and dspatch of anie Ambassonder or messenger sent abroad or comeinge 
hither and of such gent…the particuler assemblies of the Councell out of the Court and 
the occasion if it bee remarkable the times of Conferences and private meetings of the 
Sec: and others in Commission.80  
 
Only one of Walsingham’s Journals survives (December 1570–April 1583), and 
‘although all the entries are in the first person, the manuscript is not in Walsingham’s 
own hand, but in that of his secretary.’81 The entries during the period covering 
Walsingham’s first French embassy (1570–1572) were filled in by Warcop and Cave, 
and in the next decade by Lake and other unidentified servants.82 ‘In order to save 
space’, its printed version by C. T. Martin in 1870 omitted Walsingham’s memoranda 
for each day, and extracted the lists of his correspondence from the notices of 
Walsingham’s movements and placed it at the end. Actually, the entries consist of both 
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sets of records placed either side of a central date. The date would be first noted 
vertically across the middle of the page, on which Walsingham’s schedule would be 
filled in on the right-hand side, and then on the left side of the date another servant 
would register Walsingham’s inward and outward correspondence for each day.  
 
After being registered, all incoming letters were allotted to the relevant department. 
The intelligence letters of Nicholas Berden, Walsingham’s most capable spy in Paris in 
the mid-1580s, offer insights into the procedures of Walsingham’s secretariat in 
decrypting and annotating secret reports.83 In Elizabeth I’s reign, political insecurity 
and religious uncertainty accelerated the use of encryption techniques—that is, 
invisible ink and cipher—in secret diplomacy, conspiracies and surveillance. In March 
1587, Ambassador Stafford informed Walsingham that ‘in thes doubtfull tymes 
wherein so much mallice is borne agaynst England men are loth to have ther names or 
exposition knowe’.84 Writing under a pseudonym was common in espionage in order 
to preserve an informant’s identity and to convey information securely. Thus, once 
Berden’s pseudonymous letters were received, Phelippes would start by identifying the 
sender subscribed ‘Thomas Rogers’ by using the no-longer extant ‘booke of secret 
intelligences’, which contained the names of agents, their aliases, cipher alphabets, and 
their payments, and was safely kept in Walsingham’s ‘most secret Cabinett’.85 This list 
would also have contained the names of Edward Grately alias John Foxley, Pierre d’Or 
alias Henri Châteaumartin, one Barnard alias Robert Woodward or Robert Wood, and 
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William Sterrell alias Robert Robinson or Henry Saint Martin.86 Even Walsingham 
and Phelippes used variant pseudonyms to correspond with different spies. The 
Catholic exile George Norton (alias William Robinson) sent family letters to ‘his 
brother John Robinson’, actually Walsingham.87 Phelippes assumed the alias of either 
Henry Willsdon or James Dalison in contact with Gilbert Gifford in 1587, and another 
alias John Morice with Sterrell in 1592. From 1597 to 1600, he disguised himself as a 
London merchant Peter Halins in correspondence with Cecil’s spies John Petit (alias J. 
B.) and G. Sanf (alias Van Molen) in Flanders.88 
 
Identifying a spy facilitated the correct recovery of the invisible ink and cipher system 
he used. The previous historians’ statements on invisible ink have been rather vague. 
The art of invisible ink became familiar during the early modern period through 
printed pamphlets of secrets and manuscript recipe books, which instructed in the use 
of varying substances—alum powder or salt ammoniac, vinegar, urine, or the juice of 
oranges, lemons and onions—all of which were only detectable only if treated with 
heat, water, or a powder such as coal dust.89 A servant of the exile Thomas Copley, a 
Catholic prisoner at the Rye, confessed that he made secret writings ‘with the juys of 
an ora[n]ge and beynge drye theis nothinge see but clen papper’.90 Acting as a prison 
spy in the Rye in 1582, Walter Williams learned about the plan of the traitors to convey 
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intelligence by clandestine writing with ‘the juse’.91 In September 1587, Phelippes 
wrote to Gilbert Gifford in Paris under the feigned direction of Francis Hartley, ‘with 
the juce of an onion or some like juyce’.92 While in English captivity, Mary Stuart was 
a zealous practitioner of this art. In a letter to her envoy James Beaton in Paris which 
fell into Walsingham’s hands, she instructed that ‘You can (under the pretext of 
sending me some books) write in the blanks between the lines (alum appears to me the 
best, or gall nuts).’93 Berden routinely employed invisible ink in his communications 
with Walsingham and Henry Palavicino.94 He disguised these reports as mercantile 
letters in order to transmit information about the movements of Catholic powers and 
English exiles. He penned brief messages regarding business in normal ink, which 
covered up the following secret intelligence written in invisible ink. For example, the 
beginning of his report to Walsingham on 18 October 1585 was readable to outsiders:  
 
I have sent ij severall patorns of suche stuff as yor honor requyred, one was sent the 
18th of September, the other of the laste of the same, which was all I sent sithence I 
sent by my Frend. The Marchante who conveyed soche parcells as I sent heretofore 
hathe sent me worde, that in respect of the warres he will nott send any more stuffe of 
soche valewe, least yt shoulde myscarrie by soldiars…yt please yor honor to take some 
new order… 
 
The next three pages in invisible ink described the Spain-led plan for the invasion of 
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Dec. 1585; SP 15/29 f. 98, same to same, 28 Dec. 1585.  
 
 90
Scotland.95  
 
At the end of this same letter, Berden promised next time to send copies of some 
encoded Catholic letters, which he had no skill to decipher. Epistolary encryption and 
decryption was initially used by Mylles and Cave, and then in the 1580s mostly by 
Phelippes or Lake.96 Cryptography started with simple substitution ciphers, then 
moved on to the nomenclator, a system based upon alphanumeric or symbolic 
substitution.97 A typical nomenclator is that used by Walsingham during his first 
French embassy, in two letters to Cecil on 12 August 1571 and on 25 October 1572, 
respectively.98 In accordance with a cipher index, he used multiple ideograms in 
substitution for common letters, and represented important figures and places by either 
symbols, capitals, or numbers in squares.99 For secrecy, his correspondence with Cecil 
alternated between variant cipher systems.100 When occupying the office of Secretary 
himself, Walsingham continued to develop nomenclator ciphers, instructing his 
secretaries to send to his spies ‘for the owld Cyphers’ and to ‘make new Cyphers’.101 
Interestingly, except for the 1571 and 1572 examples above, almost none of his cipher 
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pamphlets survive in the State Paper collection of Elizabethan ciphers.102 These three 
volumes, bound by 1862, consist of a myriad of alphanumeric code tables and keys to 
ciphers used by Elizabeth’s ambassadors and diplomats, English spies like John Lee 
and Robert Poley in Flanders, and by Mary Stuart’s partisans like the Guises, William 
Maitland, Thomas Morgan and Charles Paget. The volumes include a newly created 
index which lists the names of users, and the place and date a cipher was sent. 
 
An undated letter between Catholic exiles William Gifford and J. Throckmorton in 
Rome provides an example of Phelippes’s deciphering methodology. 103  Firstly, 
Phelippes made a fair copy of the original. In order to track the cipher, on the back of 
its final page he added five variant cipher keys—two code numbers, two alphabets, and 
one symbolic—which had presumably been intercepted previously. Phelippes noted: 
‘these figures at the side of the word shewe by w[hi]ch alphabet to write’.104 
Accordingly he added the names of people next to their code numbers throughout the 
main body of the text. Then he annotated in the margin next to a section he had marked: 
‘where he writes out of charactr he disguiseth by these termes of she & wenche as if he 
spoke of women’.105 Phelippes also noticed one possible mistake Gifford himself had 
made in encrypting: ‘Quere whether 83 were not mistaken by the writer himself for 73 
for yt is an abrupt transition to 83 w[hi]ch in other places is Parsons [Robert 
Persons].’106 
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Following decryption, a summary of the letter would be written on the addressed cover. 
Berden’s letter of 28 December 1585 certified that ‘the newe Excommunication 
Againste England is graunted, and that yt shall shortly be sent into England...yt is gone 
in allreddy abovte v weke paste, and that other Gilbert Gyfford or some of the prests yt 
went in abovte the some tyme did carrye yt’. Berden also reported the spreading 
rumour in Paris of Gifford’s ‘apprehencion at the coaste’. This was abstracted as: ‘New 
excommunication to go into England. Gilbert Gifford’s apprehension in England 
known’.107 Above the abstract a cipher mark ‘X’ was added to enable filing.108 Finally, 
decrypted letters were circulated to Walsingham, who habitually underlined or 
expunged sensitive words, made marginal notes or instructions, and ordered letters to 
be either copied into ‘sundrie bookes of paper’, or digested into the subject ‘boxes’ or 
‘bundells’.109 The former were letter-books, and were classified into ‘forraine services’ 
and ‘home service’. Each was subdivided by country or policy. The letter-books 
functioned therefore as a narrative record, combining chronological duplicates of 
originals (including the related instructions of charges and minutes of further 
directions), with newly added abstracts, comments and updated follow-ups to relevant 
proceedings.110 In 1588 Thomas Lake catalogued all of Walsingham’s letter-books into 
a table book.111 These formulary books together with other archival boxes and bundles 
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were stored at Walsingham’s house in chests, or ‘at the Court [Whitehall] vpon the 
shelves’. Unfortunately most of Walsingham’s letter-books have been lost, except for 
three in the National Archives: the entry book of Ireland of 1579 (organised partly by 
Tomson, Faunt and Lake), Cave’s French language letter-book (1571–89), and 
Tomson’s foreign entry book.112 
 
After 10 o’clock, generally Walsingham briefed the Queen in her private chamber, 
‘with daily attendyng, for the most part iij or iiij tymes in the day; yt maketh me wery 
of my lief’.113 There were three tasks of the Secretary in audience: to present letters, 
warrants and suits requiring Elizabeth’s signature; to report information and counsel; 
and to hear dictations for drafting documents in Elizabeth’s name.114 He could either 
brief Elizabeth verbally—by reading a document verbatim or a pre-prepared précis—or 
by giving her a document to read it herself.115 A minute in Walsingham’s autograph of 
June 1585 was prepared to report the status of England’s defence, outlining the 
Queen’s treasure and her subjects’ armed preparations, with observations under each 
head.116 Another minute on 5 August 1586 kept the Queen briefed on Walsingham’s 
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counter-plot against John Ballard and Antony Babington.117  
 
After Elizabeth’s briefing, Walsingham organised the royal audience with foreign 
ambassadors and ministers, usually at 2 or 3 pm. For instance, on 17 March 1586 
Walsingham requested the Lord of Lochleven and the Master of Weymss to arrive at 
his chamber in Greenwich by 2 pm, from whence he would introduce them to the 
Queen.118 During the audience, at which it was not always necessary that Walsingham 
was present, he could either proceed with his paperwork or attend Council meetings. 
Afterwards Walsingham might work at the court until midnight. His letter to 
Ambassador Douglas on 27 July 1588 was done ‘from the Court at Richmond…at 11 
at Night’.119 Otherwise in the evenings he received visitors or colleagues at home. On 
22 August 1585, by the Queen’s command, Walsingham directed Davison to ‘sende 
for you to my house at Barne Elmes and to confer with you about the state of the lowe 
cou[n]t[r]yes. I praye you meete me there this night’.120 
 
It was a punishing routine for Walsingham’s health. A longstanding urinary ailment 
kept him frequently away from the court, on the first occasion between 5 and 16 March 
1574.121 A more serious bout of sickness in December kept him absent for nearly four 
months, although he continued working from his bed ‘at my lodgeinge’.122 He was 
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again away sick at the beginning of 1576, in 1577 and 1578. By September 1576 the 
exhausted Walsingham begged for permission ‘to be qutye of the place I serve in, 
which is subject vnto so any thwarts and harde speches’.123  
 
On the other hand, his toil earned him increasing political prominence and royal 
patronage. He was sole Secretary following Thomas Wilson’s death in May 1581, until 
William Davison’s appointment in September 1586. A significant number of his new 
central and local offices brought him substantial profit through annuities. The 
Chancellorship of the Order of the Garter (22 April 1578) brought a pension of £100 
annually and a lodging in Windsor Castle; the Duchy of Lancaster (15 June 1587) was 
a lucrative sinecure worth £142 16s.124 Royal lands granted to him included: Odiham 
in Hampshire by November 1578, Barn Elms in 1579, Little Otford in Kent in 1587, 
and manors in Durham and York in March 1588. What was most profitable for 
Walsingham was a royal patent: the six-year customs of all the important western and 
northern ports from August 1585, at an annual rent of up to £11,263. Out of this he was 
allowed to draw a munificent 58% profit annually.125 Unlike Burghley and Leicester, 
who were keen to build extensive residences symbolic of power and wealth, 
Walsingham invested his wealth in espionage.  
 
Remuneration for employees in Walsingham’s intelligence service was made mainly in 
four ways: state subvention, royal pension, official promotion and parliamentary 
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seats.126 First, the Privy Seal allowed Walsingham to appropriate funds to distribute to 
his intelligencer employees. But many of the Privy Seal warrants issued to 
Walsingham ‘from tyme to tyme went without prest or Account and without showing 
the cause of the employment of the same’, and more were consumed in the fire in 
1619.127 The invoices of Walsingham’s Dutch embassy from 17 June to 5 October 
1578 include one entitled ‘The charges of Intelligence or Spyalles’ which lists the 
names of his informants during this time and their individual rewards, amounting to 
just over £243.128 Another docket compiled by Thomas Lake in 1589 records the 
annual funds issued to Walsingham ‘to be paid over to such persons [intelligencers] as 
Her Majesty hath appointed him’: £500 in 1585, rising to £2,100 in 1586 as a response 
to the Babington Plot, and then further to £2,800 before the Spanish Armada.129 This 
increasing investment implied that the financially cautious Queen Elizabeth had come 
to recognise the effectiveness of espionage.  
 
Certain capable spies earned royal pensions instead of salaries. In reward for 
Phelippes’s effort against the Babington Plot, in May 1586 Queen Elizabeth signed a 
bill for his pension of a hundred marks: ‘you [Phelippes] wyll not beleve in how good 
parte she acceptethe of your seryvce’, wrote Walsingham.130 In July 1586, Nicholas 
Berden and Gilbert Gifford shared a piece of royal patronage, of which ‘Berden shall 
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receave 30ls and G. G. may have the rest’.131 In March 1587, the Queen and 
Walsingham promised to pension Gifford with £100 annually for his loyal attention.132 
In 1588, Anthony Standen gained an annual pension of £100 for his tracking of 
Spanish military preparations during the Armada.133 In addition, it is worth noting that 
a peculiarly privileged intimacy with key political players made their private 
secretaries a medium in suits for their masters’ patronage, benefiting these men greatly 
in terms of political influence and personal wealth.134 For example, in 1585 Henry 
Stanley, Earl of Derby, appealed to Mylles to remind Walsingham of a suit for the 
conformity of Thomas Ashton and Richard Eltonheade.135 In January 1586, a suitor 
Gilbert Towle from Berwick bestowed on Lisle Cave ‘either a Scoth sadle or an 
halberd’, for furthering his letter to Walsingham.136  
 
Serving the Principal Secretary was an important ladder of advancement which might 
secure a stable future in government, though in Walsingham’s system a very limited 
number of employees could have their wishes fulfilled. Beale assumed a Clerkship of 
the Privy Council on 8 July 1572, albeit through the political patronage of Thomas 
Smith, Burghley and Leicester.137 Davison was elevated to the second Secretaryship in 
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1586, and Tomson became the royal Latin secretary. In the autumn of 1586, with the 
help of Walsingham and Davison, Mylles acquired a reversion to one of the Privy Seal 
clerkships. In 1588 Walsingham successfully recommended Berden for a position he 
coveted, a royal purveyor of poultry—Berden’s father was a London poulterer, so 
Berden’s new position greatly benefited the family business.138 Edward Brunham, who 
served Walsingham as a courier, first on the French routes and then on the Antwerp 
one, ended up as a water-bailiff in Flushing. 
 
Most often Walsingham rewarded his private employees with seats in the House of 
Commons.139 Until 1587 when he was appointed the Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster, Walsingham himself controlled too few parliamentary seats for this, but 
Leicester and Francis Russell Earl of Bedford (one of the most prominent 
parliamentary patrons in the state, and an old friend from Walsingham’s Marian exile 
in Italy) used their borough vacancies for Walsingham’s patronage purposes.140 Mylles, 
the member for Poole in the Parliaments of 1584 and of 1586, was nominated by the 
borough patron Leicester; in 1588 he was returned for Winchester where Walsingham 
was high steward. Beale was elected MP for Totnes and Dorchester as Bedford’s 
nominee in 1572 and 1584; Tomson for Weymouth and Melcombe Regis in 1572, 1584 
                                                 
138 TNA, SP 12/209/19, 107, Berden to Walsingham, 14 Mar., 22 Apr. 1588. 
 
139 Walsingham’s secretaries sitting in Parliament: 
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and 1586.141 Tomson was returned for Downton in 1588, through the offices of 
Thomas Wilkes.142 Walsingham placed his men in the Commons not only as payment 
for client service, but also to defend the Council’s (or the Queen’s) resolutions. Owing 
to considerations of secrecy he favoured a limited oligarchy, and sought to narrow the 
initiative in policy-making to a pivotal group of the Council.143 With policy already 
decided, there would be nothing for Parliament to do except legislate. This may be why 
Walsingham’s servants are so silent in the minutes of the Commons proceedings.144 
 
Although remunerated in these various ways, it would be wrong to ascribe the 
allegiance of Walsingham’s servants to materialism alone. Conyers Read labelled 
Walsingham’s household as a ‘perfect hot-bed of Puritanism’, which was based on a 
shared ideological and religious position.145 Phelippes was ‘all for’ Protestantism, 
albeit ‘gredye of honor and profitt’.146 Warcop’s religious outlook and his Marian exile 
                                                 
141 Ibid., 190 
 
142 Phelippes was an exception in the parliamentary patronage allotted by the Walsingham-Leicester 
grouping. He may have been nominated for Hastings in 1584 by the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, 
Lord Cobham, who belonged to Burghley’s group. Hasler assumed that Lord Cobham’s brother, Sir 
Henry Cobham, was Ambassador in France between 1579 and 1583 assisting Walsingham on a special 
mission. Phelippes was evidently used by him in deciphering. It is reasonable to assume that Phelippes 
was Cobham’s nominee in the Parliaments of 1584 and 1586.  
 
143 Walsingham’s definition of the regime will be presented in Chapter VI.  
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146 TNA, SP 53/16 f. 50, Thomas Morgan to Mary Stuart, 5 Oct. 1585: ‘It is very like that one Phillippes 
hath great accesse to your Hoste [Amias Paulet]…If you doe use him according to my former Instruction 
may be that he may be recovered to your service. But trye him long and in small matters before you use 
him, being a severe Haguenot and all for that state, yet glorious and greedy of honor and profitt’.  
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utterly committed him to Walsingham’s radical Protestantism; Tomson’s sympathy 
with Puritanism did likewise.147 Tomson’s working intimacy with Walsingham and 
linguistic gifts (he spoke twelve languages) gained him access to the making of 
government policy towards English Puritanism. In 1575 he pleaded with his master to 
intervene in the dispute then splitting opinion at Magdalen College, Oxford. This 
caused resentment among some of the Fellows, condemning Tomson as one who 
‘should goe about to seke the ruine of our Churche and establyshed relegion under the 
pretence of reformation, the subversion of other colleges, namelye of our famous and 
noble mother Magdalen College’.148 Between 1577 and 1578, Tomson, on behalf of 
the ailing Walsingham, cooperated with Davison, Elizabeth’s envoy in the Low 
Countries, and Rossell, a French Protestant in English espionage, to promote 
Walsingham’s proposed Anglo-Dutch alliance against Spain.149 In December 1586 
Davison, seeing that Tomson would have no prospects after Walsingham’s death, 
attempted to find him fresh preferment. Tomson declined; he was not ‘desirous to turn 
my cogitations that way, for that I have spent now almost twelve years in those service 
without any regard or recompense any manner of way, and to my great charges and 
decay of health’.150 He resigned from his public career when Walsingham died in 
1590.  
 
The privatised nature of Walsingham’s clientele-intelligence system was a 
double-edged sword. Walsingham’s substantial debts at his death in April 1590 suggest 
                                                 
147 TNA, SP 83/16 f. 26, T. Longston to Tomson, 2 Jun. 1582; Backus, ‘Laurence Tomson (1539-1608) 
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that despite state subventions, his spying expenses had been exceeding his own 
resources. And his espionage system based on a clientele collapsed immediately after 
his death without any male heirs. It was not uncommon in the workings of a household 
clientele that if—due to decease or a decline in power—patrons were unable to offer 
patronage, then clients would without hesitation transfer their loyalty elsewhere. 
Unlike Burghley’s aristocratic protégés, in the absence of patronage Walsingham’s 
low-born clients lacked any protection and could easily become financially 
encumbered. Therefore, after Walsingham died, the majority of his secretaries and 
spies salvaged their careers by soon turning either to Walsingham’s son-in-law Robert 
Devereux, second Earl of Essex, or to the Cecils.151  
 
On the other hand, this system of private intelligence employees paid by patronage 
instead of an official salary ensured that their fidelity and the intelligence they gathered 
were devoted in the first place to their patron Walsingham, and not the state.152 And 
the tolerant employment of people from a wide range of backgrounds, speedily 
elevated Walsingham’s system to a high degree of efficiency, presumably between 
1581 and 1586 when he monopolised the Secretaryship. A surprising number of his 
private spies started being dispatched overseas (particularly to Paris), were placed in 
the French embassy in London, and were even set on Walsingham’s opposing 
colleagues. Certain exiled Catholics and some of Burghley’s spies also turned their 
service to Walsingham. His mature system of espionage hence started to compete with 
Burghley’s, at home and abroad, particularly in matters concerning English 
interventionism—whether in the interests of ruling legitimacy or for God’s glory, 
                                                 
151 The collapse of Walsingham’s intelligence system is described in the Conclusion. 
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whether to be excluded from or to advance the continental Reformation. The next two 
chapters will investigate the rivalry between the two divided spy systems in a series of 
events concerning Catholic exiles in Paris and domestic counter-plots. 
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Chapter III: Spying on Catholic Exiles in Paris in the 1580s 
 
Walsingham’s intelligence system, newborn in the late 1570s, reached a high degree of 
efficiency in the 1580s.1 Its spectacular growth was a result of: first, Elizabeth’s 
tightening policy against Catholic recusancy; second, an increase in the number of 
Catholic exiles converting to support of Elizabeth’s regime; and finally, the fact that 
the international climate, newly unfavourable to Protestantism, was pushing 
Walsingham to improve his espionage in order to drive England towards armed 
interventionism. Accordingly, the competition for intelligence played out between 
Walsingham’s system and Burghley’s reached a climax at home and in Paris, the new 
refuge of English Catholic exiles in the final quarter of the sixteenth century.  
 
The studies of John Bossy and recently Catherine M. Gibbons offer the best guide to 
the movements of Elizabethan exiles in France.2 Around 1580, a new kind of Roman 
Catholic infiltration—three Jesuit missionaries Edmund Campion, Robert Persons and 
Ralph Emerson landed in England, and in 1581 the Pope’s emissary Nicholas Sander, 
whose De Visibili Monarchia (1571) justified deposing Elizabeth as a heretic, 
interfered in the Irish rebellion—called for new legislation. Parliament passed an ‘Acte 
to retayne the Quenes Majesty’s Subjects in theire due Obedyence’, extending the 
crime of treason to any Englishman who reconciled others or himself to Catholicism, 
or sought to withdraw others from the established church or ‘from the 
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acknowledgement of their natural duties unto Her Majesty’.3 The forfeit for absence 
from divine service at the parish church rose greatly to £20 monthly for the first 
offence, and for the fourth a cumulative penalty of praemunire was imposed.4 The 
statute of 1585 declared that missionary priests sent by the Pope to England were 
‘traitors, practisers of treasons, and the seed-men of sedition and rebellion’.5 To escape 
persecution and to enjoy greater liberty of faith, from 1580 there was a notable outflow 
of English Catholics to the Spanish Netherlands, Spain and France, countries that were 
both Catholic and geographically convenient. According to John Bossy, the foundation 
of the seminary at Douai in 1568 and the Dutch revolt from 1578 encouraged the use 
of the French route. By 1589 when the final French civil war broke out, over a 
thousand English exiles had assembled in the major cities in France: Orléans, Rouen, 
Bordeaux and Reims. In 1582, there were more than 300 in Paris alone.6 In 1584, after 
being ingloriously expelled from England for his collusion in the Throckmorton Plot, 
Bernardino De Mendoza assumed the Spanish embassy in France, giving a new 
impulse to anti-Elizabeth conspiracies in Paris. During his preceding London embassy, 
Mendoza had asserted that any business promoting Catholic restoration in the British 
Isles ‘would have to be directed from France’.7 After arriving in Paris, Mendoza soon 
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allied himself with the Guises, who were shocked that Anjou’s death in June 1584 had 
almost confirmed the Huguenot Henri de Bourbon as claimant to the French crown.8 
The Guise–Spanish alliance, along with numerous English exiles in the city, gave the 
anti-Elizabeth schemes a fresh start. In order to monitor these traitorous, rebellious and 
seditious practices, England needed a highly efficient espionage network in Paris, 
which hence became the main overseas arena in the struggle between Burghley’s 
system and Walsingham’s.  
 
This chapter focuses first on the competition in espionage between Edward Stafford’s 
embassy and Walsingham’s spy network, revealing how the two systems monitored, 
defamed, and impeded each other, as well as contended for the Catholic intelligence 
that would benefit their patrons in policy debates. Second, an unusual increase in 
Catholic apostasy and semi-conformity to Elizabeth’s Protestant rule will be analysed, 
looking particularly at the English operation of coercion and mercy, exiles’ desire for 
keeping life and faith intact, and Catholic internal division. This research reveals the 
anxiety Burghley shared with Queen Elizabeth concerning Walsingham’s rising 
monopoly on information, and their efforts to restore the balance of power in the 
regime. 
 
1. Sir Edward Stafford in the Paris Embassy 
The 1580s saw the power rivalry inside Elizabeth’s government extend to Paris, where 
Walsingham installed his personal spy network in competition with Edward Stafford’s 
embassy which was favourable to Burghley. The two sides competed for intelligence in 
                                                                                                                                               
 
8 Stuart Carroll, Martyrs and Murderers: The Guise Family and The Making of Europe (New York, 
2009), 242-55.  
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order to ensure their respective patrons could take a leading role in policy debates. The 
uniqueness of the English embassy in Paris gained remarkable strength in the 1580s, 
initially from the rising importance of the French route to Rome. The expulsion of 
Mendoza from Elizabeth’s court in 1584 excluded the Spanish embassy from England 
until 1603, consequently burdening the English embassy in Paris with an extra duty to 
supply its home government with Spanish information. This embassy, ‘the crossroads 
of the diplomatic world where Huguenot, Guise, Spanish, English and Catholic exile 
interests all co-existed’, formed a sensitive part of Secretary Walsingham’s empire of 
espionage.9  
 
Stafford’s assumption of the Paris embassy from 1583 to 1590 interrupted 
Walsingham’s dominance of continental intelligence. Despite the fact that as Secretary 
it was under his nominal jurisdiction, Walsingham relied more on his own spy system 
than on this embassy, which in itself implies his suspicion of the newly assigned 
Ambassador Stafford. There was a grave charge of treachery levelled at Stafford, 
which has received sustained scholarly attention. Martin Hume, Albert Pollard, 
Conyers Read, and John Neale found themselves drawn to two opposing positions, 
either in defence or refutation of the charge that Stafford, lacking money, sold national 
secrets to the Guises and to Spain.10 More recently Mitchell Leimon and Geoffrey 
Parker have re-identified him as a self-serving double agent, whose political ambition 
to solidify his prominence in Elizabeth’s regime and to assure his future career in the 
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post-Elizabethan dynasty drove him to intelligence work for both sides.11 There is no 
intention here to continue the debate on Stafford’s treachery, but rather to point out that 
factionalism caused Stafford to be an ineffectual ambassador, hindered by 
Walsingham’s party in fulfilling his service for Burghley as a medium in espionage and 
secret diplomacy.  
 
Conyers Read believed Walsingham’s private spying in Paris started in 1587 when 
Stafford’s treachery became certainties. However, in actual fact, most of the reports 
from Walsingham’s spies in France concentrated around 1585, indicating that these 
spies had been trained and dispatched before then; Stafford’s integrity had not yet been 
called into question, with accusations only surfacing in January 1587. Walsingham 
pre-arranged spying on Stafford, presumably from the latter’s initial embassy, for two 
reasons. First, Walsingham was prejudiced against this new ambassador’s closeness to 
Catholicism, which stemmed from the backgrounds of his mother Dorothy Lady 
Stafford and his second wife Douglas Howard (Lady Sheffield), both of whose families 
(the Poles and the Howards) embraced the Roman Church and were politically inclined 
to conservatism. Second, and more offensive to Walsingham, was Stafford’s access to 
Queen Elizabeth via her female privy chamber and his partiality for Burghley. 
Ironically, it was these two things that redeemed the disadvantage of Stafford’s 
inexperience in diplomacy—limited to an apprenticeship under Ambassador Henry 
Brooke during the Anjou marriage negotiations (1578–1581)—earning him the support 
of Elizabeth and Burghley for the Paris post.  
 
It had been one of Queen Elizabeth’s habits to employ her female chamber in 
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 108 
diplomacy as an extension of her royal body. After 1576, Elizabeth shared Burghley’s 
jealousy towards her new chief Secretary Walsingham’s increasing control over state 
information and policy formation; from 1581 Walsingham’s monopoly in that post 
intensified this fear. She started conducting diplomatic and intelligence matters by 
occasionally bypassing the Secretary’s formal procedure, and instead working via her 
female chamber or else through Burghley, who shared her conservative outlook.12 This 
is reflected in the fact that from 1579 to 1590 she selected her representatives at Paris 
from Burghley’s party and from those with ties to her gentlewomen of the bedchamber: 
Henry Brooke and later Stafford. In 1578, the second Anjou match entered into formal 
consultation in the Council, and suffered strong opposition from the radical Protestants 
headed by Walsingham and Leicester. Thereafter Elizabeth began isolating their party 
from this scheme, having their staunch ally Amias Paulet replaced by Henry Brooke as 
new ambassador in France in October 1579, and later in 1580 excluding Walsingham 
from her communications with Anjou. The Brookes retained a strong allegiance to 
Burghley, who was a close ally of Sussex, the outspoken promoter of the Anjou match; 
Henry’s sister-in-law Frances Lady Cobham, one of Elizabeth’s bedchamberers, 
committed herself to the Cecils only. Brooke’s appointment announced Elizabeth’s 
willingness to grasp her last chance for marriage.13  
 
Stafford, Brooke’s successor in 1583, also had family connections that were naturally 
attractive to Elizabeth, whose aunt Mary Boleyn was the first wife of Stafford’s father 
William. His mother Dorothy Lady Stafford, acting Mistress of the Robes from 1564, 
was one of the Queen’s favourite sleeping companions, and his sister Elizabeth Lady 
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Drury-Scot joined the Privy Chamber from 1569 until 1599: their royal attendance 
provided Stafford with chamber access directly to the Queen. Stafford’s political 
fidelity to Burghley was undoubted.14 Between 1574 and 1576, he had undertaken 
business in Emden and France for Burghley. In June 1583, Walsingham asked Stafford 
about his intention of accepting the embassy offer, seeking to lure him with promises 
of support: ‘yff I [Stafford] lyked to have him [Walsingham] to presse her [Queen 
Elizabeth] any farther, he woulde dare ytt yff I woulde’. Stafford rejected 
Walsingham’s offer, and soon invited Burghley to play his patron, declaring ‘I desired 
him not by any meanes, and so left. For I have whooly disposed myselfe to depend of 
your good counsell and helpe, to doe whatt you thinke best and to goe as farre, and to 
doe as much and as lyttell as you shall thinke good.’15 In May 1586, Paul Choart de 
Buzenval, a French agent in London, confirmed the consistent partiality of 
Ambassador Stafford, who ‘depends only upon him [Burghley]; but it may cost him 
dear, and he may be sure that the greatest advancement he will ever have is where he is; 
I am astonished that he does not see that this one [Walsingham] is better, and at the end 
of his days begin to depend on him, which he had never done’.16 In January 1587, 
Mendoza also described Stafford as a ‘creature’ of Burghley’s and deeply in his 
confidence.17 Stafford’s heading of the Paris embassy and his bedchamber influence 
on the Queen could reinforce Burghley’s position at court. This threefold 
connection—Burghley, the Paris embassy, and the female chamber—offered Elizabeth 
an alternative intelligence-diplomacy route, regulating the power balance by 
restraining Walsingham’s expanding control over foreign affairs and information 
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circulation. 
 
Stafford did deliver on Burghley’s anticipation of hidden espionage and diplomacy. He 
sent Burghley regular copies of his reports to Secretary Walsingham and the Queen, 
now preserved in the Hatfield Library, and highly classified papers which ‘no lyvinge 
creature knew of’ aside from the Queen and Walsingham.18 This private intelligence 
would reach Burghley not through formal ambassadorial channels, but initially through 
Robert Cecil, Burghley’s second son, who during 1583 and 1584 was on his grand tour. 
Robert cooperated with Stafford until August 1584, collecting information about the 
tumultuous French political situation after Anjou’s death. Two of their informants were 
Stafford’s gaming partners, Marchaumont and Simier, Anjou’s closest confidants.19 
Robert informed his father of intelligence in the form of letters home, in order to evade 
any official inspection. More often, Stafford passed intelligence to Burghley through 
his mother Lady Stafford. The outgoing Henry Brooke left his successor few 
documents, and refused to acquaint Stafford with his local informants in the houses of 
either the Spanish ambassador or the Scottish, or of his connections in the Guise 
household. (This was probably due to an old grudge that Stafford, during his 
involvement in the Anjou marriage negotiations, had questioned the intelligence 
supplied by William Waad, who was valued highly by Brooke.20) Stafford responded 
by sending Burghley a copy of all his and Brooke’s dispatches, submitted to the 
Secretary ‘in a packet to my mother’. Burghley was reminded ‘to seal up this in 
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another Paper, and deliver ytt to my mother, sealed, as all Coppyes else that heereafter 
I shall send you’. Presumably they were to be passed to the Queen via Lady Stafford.21 
 
Walsingham tried to obstruct this flow of information. In December 1583, three 
months after Stafford’s arrival in Paris, Walsingham had suggested he should write 
home less often, with the excuse that the Queen ‘is many tymes so offended with the 
charges of often posting as I dare not make her prevy of all the dispatches I receave 
from you’.22 In March 1584, Stafford’s private letters were intercepted, opened and 
read by Walsingham’s searchers at the port of Rye. Stafford’s remonstrance received 
Walsingham’s insincere apology, accompanying a caution to ‘do well to packet up all 
your private letters in a packet directed to me’.23 Stafford complained to Burghley 
sarcastically: ‘I am contented Mr Secretarye shall think I am childe and canne nott 
fynde the bondage he would bringe me in’.24 Walsingham’s intervention was indeed in 
vain. The King of Navarre, Henri de Bourbon, informed Elizabeth in early 1587, that 
the Duchess of Guise was aware of certain of Elizabeth’s private affairs which ‘could 
not possibly have reached her except through this ambassador’. 25  Predictably, 
Stafford’s route via the bedchamber still worked, assisting foreigners in 
correspondence direct with Queen Elizabeth without going through a formal 
diplomatic channel under Walsingham’s control.26  
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Stafford also served Burghley by collecting intelligence that was only available to him 
because his Catholic background was attractive to Mary’s partisans and encouraged 
émigrés to establish contact. As soon as he arrived in Paris in October 1583, Stafford 
confidentially received the Archbishop of Glasgow James Beaton, Mary Stuart’s 
representative at the French court. Mary expected to improve the situation of her 
captivity in England through Stafford’s powerful friend Burghley, who was suspected 
of befriending Mary.27 Certain émigrés sought, via Stafford, to make contact with 
Burghley with regard to their home interests.28 Some were taken with Burghley’s 
comparatively moderate attitude towards the Elizabethan Reformation, which had been 
propagandised in his pamphlet The Execution of Justice.29 Published in December 
1583, this text acted as an appeasement to the Catholics recently disappointed by the 
failed Anjou–Elizabeth match earlier that year. This failure, followed by Anjou’s death, 
disappointed Elizabethan Catholics in their hopes of religious toleration, and drove 
malcontents towards the Catholic League, organised by the Guises with Spanish 
support in 1584.30 In a timely move, Burghley’s pamphlet aimed to pacify this 
uneasiness. He first condemned the pretensions of rebels. ‘It hath been in all ages and 
in all countries a common usage of all offenders…, to make defense of their lewd and 
unlawful facts by untruths and by coloring and covering their deeds (were they never 
                                                 
27 TNA, SP 78/10 f. 66, Stafford to Walsingham, 27 Oct. 1583. Burghley to Shrewsbury, 24 Dec. 1575, 
Edmund Lodge, ed., Illustrations of British History (London, 1838), II, 52-56. Mary to Guillaume de 
l’Aubépine, French ambassador (1585-9), 17 Jul. 1586, Read, Walsingham, II, 51. Mendoza to Philip II, 
24 Jan. 1587, CSP Spanish, 1587-1603, 7. John Daniel Leader, Mary Queen of Scots in Captivity 
(Sheffield, 1880), 287. 
 
28 The issue respecting Burghley’s control over exiles’ home interests is discussed in the final section of 
this chapter. 
 
29 Robert M. Kingdon ed., The Execution of Justice in England by William Cecil and A True, Sincere, 
and Modest Defense of English Catholics by William Allen (Ithaca, 1965), xvii-xviii. 
 
30 Gibbons, ‘The Experience of Exile and English Catholics: Paris in the 1580s’, 81. 
 
 113 
so vile) with pretenses.’31 Burghley made clear that there was no real persecution for 
religion in England, but only for treason and sedition. Only traitors, in the service of 
the Pope, who imperilled their country and Queen, would be treated with the penalties 
of expulsion, torture, or execution. Burghley promised a conditional toleration in 
religion: any man who resisted foreign invaders and eschewed civil rebels, should be 
allowed ‘in their own like cases for a truth and rule’.32 His distinction between faith 
and treason earned him goodwill from certain moderate Catholics. Charles Neville, 
Earl of Westmorland, who was exiled for raising an insurgent force in the Northern 
Rising of 1569 and who had reached Paris in June 1580, aspired after ‘assurance of his 
lyfe…to keepe lyfe and soule together’. In 1586 he resumed pleading for Burghley’s 
help via Stafford.33 The Jesuit historian Leo Hicks asserted that Burghley’s work 
aimed to divide Catholics, in order to prevent or delay any concerted movement from 
abroad.34 Actually, it was Catholic domestic difficulty that had sowed the seed of their 
inner dissension. 
 
Stafford declared he would treat these exiled suitors well in order to get intelligence 
serviceable to Queen Elizabeth: ‘for my parte I am of a mynd to use the Divell 
himselfe well yf he co[u]ld come to me in the lykenes of a man to serve the Queene 
with all’.35 He defended himself thus: ‘I never knowe nor h[e]arde of any Ambassador 
                                                 
31 Ibid, 3. Stephen Alford, Burghley: William Cecil at the Court of Elizabeth I (New Haven & London, 
2008), 248-51. 
 
32 Ibid, 21.  
 
33 TNA, SP 15/29 f. 154, Aldred to Walsingham, 14/24 Apr. 1586. TNA, SP 15/30 f. 190, Richard 
Hakluyt to Burghley, 11 Apr. 1588. BL, Harley MS 288 f. 187, Stafford to Walsingham, 25 Apr. 1588. 
Alford, The Watchers, 140.  
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35 TNA, SP 78/10 f. 66, Stafford to Walsingham, 27 Oct. 1583.  
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thatt was blamed for seekinge intelligence anye waye thatt he coulde’.36 Stafford 
promised to prevent them ‘from doing any good of me’, though as it turned out he 
reneged on this promise.37 In early 1584 he developed a connection with Charles 
Arundel, his kinsman by marriage, who had fled to Paris late in the autumn of 1583 in 
consequence of the discovery of the Throckmorton Plot and was now receiving a 
pension from Spain. Arundel acquainted Stafford with Spanish intelligence and with 
the Guises and Mendoza.38 Also through Arundel, Stafford sold the Guises and 
Mendoza English intelligence in order to pay for his costly gaming and embassy 
expenses.39 By May 1586, the Duke of Guise had given the needy Stafford 3,000 
crowns; in return Stafford sent him certain information through Arundel.40 In June, 
Walsingham’s spy Nicholas Berden, alias Thomas Rogers, accused Stafford of being 
bribed by the Duke of Guise to the sum of 6,000 crowns to show his diplomatic 
dispatches.41 Mendoza suggested to the Spanish King that ‘now was the time for your 
Majesty to make use of him [Stafford] if you wished any service done’, because ‘this 
ambassador is much pressed for money,…his poverty is reason enough to expect from 
him any service, if he saw it was to be remunerated’. Mendoza advised sending 2,000 
crowns to Stafford, who through Arundel had offered some intelligence about a fleet 
soon to be despatched from England against Portugal, as ‘a sample and hansel of his 
                                                 
36 TNA, SP 78/11 f. 85, Stafford to Burghley, 1 May 1584.  
 
37 TNA, SP 78/10 f. 68, Stafford to Walsingham, 31 Oct. 1583. Bishop of Glasgow to Mary Stuart, 21 
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goodwill’.42 Then in February, Mendoza again verified that Stafford had ‘offered 
himself entirely through me, in the assurance that your Majesty would not order him to 
do anything against the interest of his mistress the Queen’.43 King Philip praised the 
use of ‘the new correspondent’ Stafford, and ‘the third party’ Arundel as being ‘very 
appropriate’.44  
 
Presumably Stafford sometimes sold national secrets to Catholics with Burghley’s 
connivance, on the grounds that certain highly secret intelligence he passed on came 
from Burghley, whereas Walsingham had deliberately kept Stafford ignorant of the 
state of affairs in England.45 But it would have been impossible to sell valueless 
intelligence to the Guises and Mendoza, who were not innocents squandering money 
on insignificant or outdated news, current gossip, or misinformation; only high-level 
intelligence could maintain their interest. Burghley was under great suspicion of 
offering this information. In early 1587, Stafford supplied Mendoza with the most 
important secrets regarding a proposed expedition by Francis Drake: the number of 
ships, their crews, their armaments and possible destinations, which were known at the 
court by ‘no living soul but the Queen and the Treasurer’.46 But either Elizabeth, or 
Burghley more probably, hoodwinked Spain by divulging false news via Stafford: the 
fleet’s destination was not Lisbon or Cape St. Vincent, but Cadiz.47 It is unclear 
whether Stafford knew or not. 
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Stafford’s intelligence business with Mendoza fitted him to act as a go-between in 
Burghley’s secret diplomacy with Spain in early 1587. When Mary was convicted of 
high treason for her collusion in the Babington Plot, Burghley, through Stafford and 
Arundel, guaranteed Mary’s life to the Madrid court. He complained about ‘his 
enemies’ Leicester and Walsingham, of their action ‘to set the Queen against him by 
saying that he was more devoted to the queen of Scotland than anyone’.48 When Mary 
was executed in February 1587, Burghley, again via Stafford and Arundel, repeatedly 
exculpated himself, stating that Mary’s death ‘has been against his will’. This tragedy 
for both monarchy and Catholicism was contrived by ‘a pair of knaves’: Leicester and 
Walsingham. Burghley reproached them for taking advantage of his absence through 
illness, allying themselves with Lord Hunsdon and the Lord Admiral to force the 
Queen to execute Mary, otherwise they would veto ‘any money to maintain the Dutch 
war or to fit out a naval force to help Don Antonio’.49 In actual fact, Burghley was the 
helmsman in the whole process of Mary’s execution. After Mary’s trial at Fotheringay 
in October 1586 had delivered a verdict of guilty, which was then proclaimed in 
Parliament in November, early the next month Burghley started drafting her execution 
warrant.50 Secretary William Davison confirmed that Burghley handed him the final 
version of the death warrant, ‘to be engrossed and brought unto her [Queen Elizabeth] 
to signe’.51 On 3 February 1587, Burghley called the Council to dispatch this signed 
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warrant for Mary’s execution, without his Queen’s knowledge.52 Burghley’s double 
dealings may have been aimed at gaining more buffer time for England to equip itself 
for the impending wars. But it was also a whitewash of his act of ‘regicide’, protecting 
the Cecils from the malice of the motherless James VI of Scotland, heir presumptive to 
the English throne.53 
 
Suspicious of Stafford’s undue intimacy with Catholics, from the beginning of his 
embassy Walsingham had warned him not to be remiss in performing his duty, which 
might be compromised by contact with Catholic émigrés through his wife Lady 
Sheffield. 54  Simultaneously, Walsingham proceeded with diplomacy via his man 
Henry Unton and Michel de Castelnau, seigneur de Mauvissière, the French 
ambassador in London, by whose means business was channelled directly to King 
Henri III. Faced with Stafford’s protest against being kept in ignorance, Walsingham 
defended himself ironically: ‘it is often seen if when Ambassadors were not made 
acquainted with matters, they seake by all the matters…to crosse them’.55 Aware of 
Walsingham’s antipathy towards him, to his ‘only friend’ Burghley Stafford hardly 
stopped complaining of Walsingham’s interference in his embassy.56 He attributed the 
rebuff of his espionage schemes for obtaining news of the Jesuits and Mary’s adherents, 
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54 TNA, SP 78/10 f. 95, Walsingham to Stafford, 1 Dec. 1583.  
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which were often rejected by Elizabeth, to Walsingham’s jealousy.57  
 
More significantly, Walsingham set his sights on this untrustworthy ambassador.58 In 
1584, a new chaplain, Richard Hakluyt, had been ordered to monitor the embassy, and 
was also responsible for gathering information about America for the English 
colonists.59 Thereupon, two of Stafford’s senior servants, Michael Moody and William 
Lilly, were detained by Walsingham in 1584 and 1585, on the charges of conveying 
letters to and from Catholics, of selling intelligence to Thomas Morgan, an English 
exile serving Mary Stuart as her chief cipher clerk, and of reading Leycester’s 
Commonwealth, a scandalous pamphlet published in September 1584.60 In mid-1585, 
Mylles sent Nicholas Berden into France, where he investigated the matter concerning 
Ambassador Stafford, which ‘being both dishonourable and very perilous is worthy to 
be noted and wisely to be foreseen’. The allegations in Berden’s report of 1586 were 
severe: he accused Stafford of selling information to the Duke of Guise; of imparting 
secrets to Arundel; of offering the means for Catholic émigrés to forward letters and 
messengers to their partisans in England; and, most gravely, of being bribed by the 
Guises to show them diplomatic letters.61 Stafford certainly knew these ‘badd disposed 
people’ were spying on him. He refuted Berden’s accusations, calling him a ‘very a 
knave and as very fal[s]e withall as many is in England or France’.62 Walter Williams, 
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sent to the embassy in 1586, was derided as ‘a drunk knave’.63 In late 1587, some 
copy letters of Gilbert Gifford’s, assigned by Phelippes to monitor the French embassy, 
fell into Stafford’s hands when Gifford was arrested in Paris. Stafford criticised these 
letters as ‘the most villainous against me and mine that could be’. To Burghley he 
condemned Gifford’s charges, complaining ‘both I and mine are in worse predicament 
than the confessed traitors that are on this side the sea’.64 
 
It is worth noting that the reports of Walsingham’s spies can hardly be taken as proof 
of Stafford’s treachery, owing to their potential influence in the rivalry between the 
government system and the network of private clientele. Clients’ livelihoods were 
insecure and reliant on their spymasters’ patronage. Degrading the government system 
would enhance or ensure private employment. Sniffing out Walsingham’s hostility to 
this pro-Cecil embassy, naturally these opportunistic spies would bear false witness or 
exaggerate discord, in order to increase Walsingham’s reliance on them, his private 
clientele.65 Therefore, blackening Stafford (or other officials) became a ‘custom’ for 
spies.66 Espionage was not just a game played between Elizabeth’s Protestant regime 
and her traitorous Catholics, or even between Walsingham and Burghley in their 
antagonism over policy. Another competition for patronage was in progress, between 
official systems and private spies, who often stumbled across and over one another. 
 
Stafford’s secret work for the Queen and Burghley ensured his place, despite the fact 
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that his treachery had been widely speculated on. Walsingham never gave up hoping to 
monopolise the official intelligence resources by expelling Burghley’s men. From 
January 1585 his adherent Paulet replaced the pro-Cecil Earl of Shrewsbury as Mary’s 
final warder. This transfer announced Burghley’s withdrawal from, and thereafter 
Walsingham’s monopoly on, first-hand intelligence plotting around the captive Mary. It 
had been planned to replace Stafford with a friendly or neutral official like Edward 
Wotton. When the rumours about Stafford’s treacherous sale of national intelligence 
spread back to the home government, Leicester and Walsingham seized the chance to 
attack him.67 Surprisingly, Stafford would not be recalled until 1590. Read ascribed his 
survival to the insufficiency of evidence carried by Walsingham’s spies.68 It is also 
possibly because Walsingham feared that Stafford’s recall might recoil against him; it 
had been the custom in Elizabeth’s government that returning ambassadors would 
become prime candidates for significant domestic offices of state, especially for the 
Secretaryship. Smith and Walsingham had been ambassadors in France, Thomas 
Wilson in Brussels, and William Davison in the Low Countries. Besides, in early 1587, 
the Elizabethan political rivalry had eased—Burghley had assisted Walsingham in the 
matter of the late Philip Sidney’s debts, and both the execution of Mary Stuart and 
military policy against Spain were almost confirmed. Stafford took advantage of the 
changed political climate. But, controversially, after his exceptionally long embassy of 
eight years, except for a seat in the Commons there was no office of significance 
assigned to him. Stafford’s suspected treachery was not an obstacle to his political 
future; a few years later he nearly assumed the Secretaryship. At the end of August 
1591, ‘no secretary has yet been appointed, though the Queen had given it out, and the 
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parties, Sir Edw. Stafford and Mr. Wotton, were ready to be sworn at Nonsuch’.69 This 
proposed appointment came to nothing, because ‘it pleased nobody’, notably Burghley 
who had reserved this post for his son Robert.70 
 
2. Walsingham’s Espionage in Paris 
The limited influence exerted by Secretary Walsingham over Ambassador Stafford 
forced the former to develop his own espionage in Paris instead of relying on the 
embassy intelligence service. By 1585 at the latest, Walsingham was either dispatching 
numerous spies over to France, like Nicholas Berden, Thomas Bernes, Walter Williams, 
Maliverey Catilyn, or recruiting the local exiles for his espionage, such as one Barnard, 
Gilbert Gifford, and Solomon Aldred. The value of these spies to Walsingham lay in 
their credibility within Catholic circles, either because of their Catholic origins and 
careers in exile, or because of their infiltration into Catholic networks.71 
 
However, prisons offered Walsingham’s spies the easiest access to Catholic circles. As 
early as 1572, the Privy Council noted its increased concern about the potential 
disorder of Catholics, who had been scattered in prisons and ‘as well by their craftie 
intelligences with other prysoners as by their prectyses abroad corrupt others in 
stubbornes’.72 In 1586, while visiting the priests imprisoned in Newgate, Maliverey 
Catilyn suggested that ‘the prysones of England are very noursseryes of Papiste, 
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banishe them for god sake, or lett them remaynce close prysoners, that they may not 
dayly poyson others’.73 A memorandum of 1586, prepared at Elizabeth’s court for 
espionage in Spain, advised that the only way for spies to gain ‘creditt and safetie there 
in Spaine’ was to simulate being Catholic and to make visits to Catholics in jail, where 
pretended friendliness would ‘fain some friends for his better access into foreign parts 
and Catholike countries’. 74  Some spies went further, cultivating intimacy with 
Catholic captives.  
 
Walter Williams served Walsingham by monitoring the Earl of Oxford, and later from 
1575 an exile Thomas Copley on the Continent.75 Returning in 1582, this ‘trusty 
servitour’ was thereupon infiltrated into the jail at Rye, to extort intelligence from 
Catholic captives. But Catholic suspicion terminated his espionage in the prison in 
1583. A mock letter, signed by Pasquinus Romanus to ‘the most reverent Signor’ at 
Paris, reported,  
 
Having the opportunitie of this bearer, Mr. Walter Williams, gentleman, who of long time 
hath byn my fellow prisoner, onely taken vpon suspition, I cold not but, at his speciall 
request, write this much of his conversation since his abiding with me, which is that his 
devotion towards the good ale is very substantiall, for every morning he hath great 
conference with the Clerk of the Town touching the same. He is a great faster, but he 
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praieth little.76 
 
Walsingham intercepted this letter, consequently transferring Williams first to penetrate 
the French embassy in London, and then from 1586 to infiltrate Stafford’s embassy in 
Paris.77 
 
Maliverey Catilyn was a master in prison spying. He served Walsingham in espionage 
for godly glory and patriotism, promising ‘such service as might witness what 
vnfagned dutie I owe to Gode religion, to her majestie’s person, and to my Countreie 
preservation, for the better performance whereof I have hetherto nether resspected 
danger of my Life nor expence of my pore living’.78 Having ceased his intelligence 
work for a time, probably for military service in the Low Countries, in 1580 he prayed 
to resume Walsingham’s service, ‘his most desyred favor’.79 In mid-1581 Catilyn 
posed as a Catholic, meeting some contacts somewhere near the Sussex coast. These 
‘bad men’, and one unnamed ‘who exceedeth all the rest’, ‘greatly pyttied my 
[Catilyn’s] case’, and allowed Catilyn to join them.80 One of his new companions, in 
March 1581 had smuggled back from France into England a priest named John Adams, 
who had been arrested at Rye and sent to Walsingham to be examined. Catilyn’s 
companion also had a brother ‘on the other syde’ named Gyles Whyte alias Richard 
Thomas, ‘ffrom whom he receyveth lettres and books for his frends thre or foure tymes 
every yeare’ and then conveyed to a merchant at Billingsgate called Cox. In 
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midsummer he had kept some jewels belonging to the Jesuit Edmund Campion, who 
had entered England disguised as a Dublin jeweller, and had helped another priest to 
land secretly in England at Stokes Bay near Portsmouth, giving him ‘dyrections what 
course he should take’. Catilyn ended this report hastily and pardoned his scribbling, 
because his companions ‘heare with me…cry to me for speed because they would be 
this night at London and for the avoyding of susspycion I dare not be tedious’.81  
 
To discover more, later in April 1586 Catilyn prepared to be a prison spy by 
associating with Catholic exiles. In Rouen, through Jacques Servile, Catilyn befriended 
Thomas Myttey, an Englishman serving as a papal spy. Servile and Myttey 
commended Catilyn as a ‘man fytt to be imployed in matters of high moment’, 
instigating his return to England, to ‘fetch the comendacions of Catholiques such as he 
woulde name’.82 Back in England in mid-1586, Catilyn submitted a long list of the 
names and descriptions of Catholic recusants throughout England, on which Phelippes 
endorsed ‘Catclins observations touching corrupt subjects’. 83  In early summer, 
Walsingham embedded Catilyn as a prison spy at Portsmouth, where Catilyn noted his 
observations in ‘a payre of writing tables’ [table book] hidden in ‘the bombast [padding] 
of my doblett’.84 In response to his wishes, Catilyn was then transferred to the 
Marshalsea, where he was assured by one Jackson, a fellow priest-inmate, that a 
Franco-imperial invasion and popular Catholic uprising would free them before the 
harvest was in. In order to transmit the intelligence he received out of prison, Catilyn 
struggled hard to get hold of paper and ink, and had to allay the suspicion of his keeper 
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who ‘in truth useth me lyke a prisoner commytted for high treason, so that I was forsed 
to charge hym in her majestie’s name to delyver this to your honour’.85 On 9 August, 
Catilyn informed Walsingham that Babington was then in Derbyshire but shortly 
would be leaving.86 When Walsingham had discovered all he could, in August Catilyn 
was transferred to survey the strength of Catholicism in the north. In an anonymous 
letter to Walsingham, possibly from Catilyn, John Taylour of Newcastle, John Gastell, 
and other gentlemen, were accused of being the handlers of correspondence between 
the ‘papists on this syde and beyond the Seas’.87 
 
Likewise, Nicholas Berden also successfully familiarised himself with the Catholic 
community in Paris through imprisonment. In 1581 he had been in the service of the 
exile George Gilbert, a wealthy Suffolk gentleman who had converted to Catholicism 
while touring the Continent two years before, and was now exiled in Reims and Rome. 
Berden was recommended to Walsingham by Horatio Palavicino, a merchant who 
served Walsingham by collecting intelligence. In a letter full of nationalistic rhetoric, in 
January 1584 Berden wrote to Walsingham from Rome, to excuse his betrayal of the 
Catholicism that had nurtured him:  
 
When soever my occasion shalbe offered wherin I may adeventure some rare and 
deseperate expoloyte such as may be for some of my countrie and my own credit, you 
shall always fynde me most resolute and ready to performe the same…The only I 
crave that though I professe myself a spye which is a profession…that I prosecute the 
same nott for gayne, butt for the safete of my nature country.
88
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However, Berden also worked for money. He used his working intimacy and influence 
with Walsingham to extract bribes from the Catholics who were soliciting for mercy. 
On 11 June 1586, he begged Phelippes to procure him the liberty of Ralph Bickley, a 
seminary priest in the Gatehouse Prison, which would be worth £20 for Berden, and 
also the freedom of Richard Sherwood alias Carlton, a prisoner in the Counter in Wood 
Street, worth £30. ‘This monye will do me great pleasure being now in extreme nede 
thereof; neither do I know how to shyft any longer without yt’.89 
 
From March to May 1585, Berden infiltrated the Catholic underground in London, and 
filed despatches every few days: he dined with Father William Weston, from whom he 
learned of certain refuges for English recusants, and that ‘the Papists do expect forty or 
fifty preists from Rome, and Rammys, to arryve here in England’.90 He also learned of 
the means by which Catholic prisoners corresponded between the Clink, the 
Marshalsea, and the Martyn Tower;91 and of the manner by which newly ordained 
priests and popish books were stowed away on French boats bound for Newcastle, 
where the royal officer Robert Higheclyf ‘is a papiste in harte & made acquaynted with 
there comynge’.92 Berden in addition informed Walsingham of the conveyance of 
messages to Mary Stuart by Ralphe Elves, servant to Mr. Fenton of Norleaze,93 and 
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the networks supporting seminary priests in England.94 In July 1585 Walsingham 
arranged for Berden to be arrested together with a priest Edward Stransham (or 
Transome, alias Barber), and committed to jail. There Berden befriended Stransham, 
and secured an introduction to Thomas Fitzherbert, a Jesuit at the heart of the English 
exiles in France.95 
 
Having obtained letters of reference, Berden was discharged from the prison and sent 
by Mylles to France. There he spied on Ambassador Stafford, and provided 
Walsingham with a valuable alternative means of intelligence. By early August he had 
arrived in Rouen, where, with Stransham’s guarantees, he met Thomas Fitzherbert, 
who ‘received me into his Companye moste willingly & hathe given me credytt with 
all the Papists here’.96 Fitzherbert imparted to him the details of an impending 
Catholic invasion of England:  
 
Charles Arundell with the Duke of Guyse shall conduct some part of an army vppon 
the west parts of England, the Erle of Westmorland, whoe is also at Parys, is promised 
to receive x thousand men & c thousand crownes of the D. of Guyse to invade the 
Northe parts vppon the Southe parts, that Thomas Throgmorton shall invade with 
Spanishe Forces. The duke of Guyse will invade England by way of Scotland, and 
other Spanish Forces to enter vppon Ireland. This is thought to be performed this 
winter.97 
 
More significantly, he disclosed the worsening dissension within Catholic circles. In 
June 1585, the Catholic League gained an overwhelming success in the Treaty of 
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Nemours, consequently dividing itself between pro-Jesuit extremists and anti-militants. 
They ‘are devided in Factions, viz., the Bishoppe of Rosse, Charles Padgett, Thomas 
Morgan & Thomas Throgmorton & some few Prests; & on the other parte is doctor 
Allen, he playeth on both hands & Thomas Throgmorton is Rather with the Jesuyts & 
ther partie then agaynst them.’98 The neutrality adopted by Berden ensured that he did 
not miss any intelligence from either faction.99 By late August he had headed for Paris, 
staying there till the early months of 1586. He acted as a letter-carrier from Edward 
Grately, alias Bridges, to Henry Donne, who was privy to all the proceedings and 
correspondence concerning the Catholic invasion, so Berden sent Walsingham 
verbatim copies of these.100 
 
Berden’s intelligence regarding the Catholic rift was confirmed by another spy 
Solomon Aldred, who calculated that this could only benefit the Queen. 101 
Walsingham had the chance to use his spies to enlarge the discord between these two 
main Catholic factions. Walsingham chose to infiltrate the anti-militant group, which 
was led by secular priests and exiles like Morgan and Paget, partly because some of his 
spies came from that side or had infiltrated it, and partly because this faction showed 
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more disposition to compromise. To this scheme, Solomon Aldred and Gilbert Gifford 
were well placed to act as lobbyists. Aldred was one of the heads of the Welsh 
grouping in the English College at Rheims. He was introduced to Walsingham by 
Henry Unton in 1583, and in November 1584 placed himself at Walsingham’s 
service.102 Gifford kept up his acquaintance with the Welsh group at Paris and at Rome, 
including some of its leaders like his cousin Dr. William Gifford.103 Their apostasy 
enabled the Secretary to step up his intrigues amongst the Catholic exiles. Aldred acted 
initially as a carrier of division into the College at Rome.104 In 1585, Aldred and 
Gifford (alias Francis Hartley) reached Paris, and there also started dismantling the 
Catholic community from the inside.  
 
Firstly, from early 1586 Aldred lobbied Dr. William Gifford and Father Edward Grately, 
probably in order to obstruct the preparations for an invasion of England and the 
Babington Plot, both in active progress. William Gifford, then Professor of Theology at 
the English College in Reims, was one of the younger leaders of the ‘Welsh’ 
party—the anti-Spanish party in the College—in northern France; Grately was 
chaplain at the Earl of Arundel’s house and now Gifford’s companion in exile.105 
Discord with the Jesuits pushed William Gifford to set up a faction. There would be 
‘five or six scholars of the best’ following his course against Robert Persons, a leading 
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light of the Jesuits and ‘a wily ffox seyng the world is turned revers on his syd’.106 
Unpredictably, Ambassador Stafford intervened in this process of lobbying which 
should have been exclusively undertaken by Walsingham’s men, having ‘sweet 
speches’ with Gifford in Aldred’s lodging. Walsingham cannot have been informed of 
this in advance; Aldred was ‘persuaded you [Walsingham] will not mislike’ Stafford’s 
sudden attendance. Presumably Stafford’s involvement was required by Dr. 
Gifford—as an ambassador, Stafford was more trustworthy than a personal spy. The 
exiles’ preference for negotiating with Ambassador Stafford rather than with 
Walsingham’s spies was often evidenced, and at times frustrated Walsingham’s private 
espionage. In the negotiations with the Earl of Westmorland about his return to 
England, for example, the Earl begged Aldred to ‘get the Ambassador to talk with 
him’.107 Stafford’s control of the embassy system helped Burghley to learn of, or 
interfere in, his colleague Walsingham’s espionage.  
 
Compared with the irresolute Dr. Gifford, Grately was zealous from the beginning. 
Grately’s correspondence with Walsingham has been neglected by historians working 
in this field. In his two letters to Walsingham, under the alias John Foxley, Grately 
offered his loyalty, promising to be ‘so forward’ and ‘very affectionate to follow the 
course that you expected’.108 He also praised Queen Elizabeth’s recent clemency 
towards her Catholic subjects. The freedom and toleration in faith the Queen granted 
would ‘enforce any disconted mindes to excessive joye’. Her ‘prudente relaxation’, 
moreover, would help subvert any treasonable intention which any strangers had to 
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disturb the peace of the state. He promised to endorse this English moderation and 
bloodless policy, and persuade both English and foreign Catholics to accept the 
authority of Elizabeth’s Protestant regime. It is interesting that in both letters Grately 
took a positive view of Secretary Walsingham, modifying this well-known radical 
Protestant into a gentleman who was not extremely cruel, and who sought ‘not the 
death or ruin of any subject’. Later, Grately worked with Gilbert Gifford to produce a 
book that attacked a pamphlet written by William Allen and Robert Persons to justify 
Henry Stanley’s treachery against Queen Elizabeth in the Low Countries.109 This book 
had Grately detained by the Inquisition at Padua in 1588, and later in 1590 transferred 
to the Inquisition at Rome for five years.  
 
Aldred’s group at Paris became ‘so strong that many good Catholics feared them’.110 
A French Jesuit priest De la Rue, alias Samerie, who acted as chaplain for Mary Stuart 
disguised as her valet and her physician, in October 1585 informed Mary of this 
worsening dissension.  
 
Many English with certain intelligence which they have at Rome and in England spread 
abroad the bruit that the Queen of England is for the present very benign and clement, 
and that she no longer prosecutes any one for the Catholic religion, and that they do not 
care to use arms against others, that they do not wish, and will not permit, the foreigner to 
enter England, and that—such is your fortune—they have fallen into so great suspicion of 
those who have treated your affairs that no one dares to trust them any longer, and they 
desire to have another way to signify everything to your majesty; and the English are in 
dissension and division.111 
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He alerted the Catholics that Elizabeth’s government had skilfully used the propaganda 
of religious toleration and patriotism against foreign invasion, to deepen the division 
within Catholicism. Likewise, the Pope suspected that English Protestants had 
prompted certain cardinals to acts which would lead to Mary’s ruin. Two pro-Jesuit 
partisans, Allayn and Eusebius, hence headed for Rome to investigate the truth. 
Morgan, then imprisoned in the Bastille, complained that England—or ‘that ungracious 
State’, as he called it—had ‘lately entred into a pra[c]tise to move some division and 
difference in opinion in some poyntes between the Catholike priestes themselves’. It 
was appealing for some priests banished overseas to resume consultations with the 
Secretary. Their conversion, Morgan supposed, aimed to ‘proffitt theyr country and not 
to serve Secretary Walsingham’.112 More interestingly, he revealed that the apostasies 
of Dr. Gifford and Grately were pretended, and that ‘if the purpose goes forwardes’ 
they would then turn from the Secretary and serve Mary. This letter fell into 
Walsingham’s hands, leading thereby to an unhappy break in this plan.113  
 
When discussing Walsingham’s scheme for disrupting Elizabethan Catholicism, a 
suggestion by Conyers Read is worth considering. He asserted that the Secretary did 
not merely attempt to increase the breach between ‘the Jesuits’ and ‘the Seculars’. He 
aimed further to create a split within the latter, by dividing the secular priests from the 
laity. Walsingham may have believed that, in contrast with the priests whose 
grievances against the government were purely religious, the lay group was more 
dangerous since they used a cloak of religion to conceal their political plots. In other 
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words, the anti-Jesuit secular priests, with purely religious motives, would be easier to 
draw towards the English side.114  
 
Read’s suggestion is questionable. First, the statute in 1585 specifically denounced 
Catholic priests as ‘traitors’ and ‘the seed-men of sedition and rebellion’, 
acknowledging priests as more politically dangerous than lay Catholics.115 Second, 
certain intelligence reports to Walsingham and correspondence between English exiles 
show that more and more lay people in exile, especially high-born gentry, were 
suspected of being, or actually turned out to be, English informants. They may have 
included the anti-Jesuits Thomas Morgan, Charles Paget, Charles Neville, Solomon 
Aldred and Gilbert Gifford. Among the pro-Jesuits was Charles Arundel; other 
individuals included George Norton and Ralph Liggons. The dual strategy of the 
English—enforcing punishment and showing mercy—was not the only reason for them 
to betray Catholicism. Disapproval of the Jesuits’ extremism, a desire to secure a better 
Catholic future, and concern for their own interests in England, were prime 
inducements for their conditional conformity. It is to this theme that we now turn. 
 
3. Faith or Survival? 
In the final two decades of the sixteenth century, unusually high numbers of Catholic 
exiles were either under suspicion of serving Protestant England as spies, or accused of 
doing so by their co-religious opponents. Roger Yardley, alias Bruerton, a servant of 
George Gilbert’s, was sent by the Catholic authorities to Castel Sant Angelo in Rome 
on suspicion of being a spy; ultimately he proved his loyalty through long 
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imprisonment in England.116 Charles Paget and Charles Arundel accused each other of 
being a spy ‘on all sides’. Thomas Morgan was ‘of all the Papists here’ generally 
accounted a spy.117 In 1590, the anti-Jesuit Morgan was arrested and detained by the 
Duke of Parma in the Low Countries. At his trial in Flanders, three witnesses, Charles 
Browne, Colonel William Stanley and Hugh Owen, all of whom were on the side of the 
Jesuits and Spain, together testified against him. He was denounced as a ‘vile spy’ for 
Queen Elizabeth, intent on discovering plans against her and cultivating division 
amongst the English Catholics.118  
 
This indictment has driven the historiography about Morgan in opposite directions. 
The Jesuit historians John Hungerford Pollen and Leo Hicks levelled the severest 
criticisms, condemning both Morgan and Paget as ringleaders under English direction 
who encouraged Catholic dissension and lead Mary to the scaffold.119 Morgan was 
denounced as an agent provocateur who recommended Mary to trust in Walsingham’s 
men like Gilbert Gifford and Robert Poley, and Leicester’s men like Christopher Blunt 
and William Greene. 120  He encouraged Mary to communicate with Babington, 
describing the latter as trustworthy and encouraging Mary to ‘write three or foure 
Lines of your owne hande to the sayd Babington declaring your good conceipt of him 
and the confidence you repose in him…in so doing your Majesty shall much increase 
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Babington’s good affection towardes you’. 121  Morgan’s suggestion alerted 
Walsingham to a loophole in Mary’s correspondence, allowing him to intercept Mary’s 
letters to Babington, especially the one written on 17 July 1586. It became the key 
evidence for her charge of high treason.122 Recently, another Jesuit Francis Edwards, 
and John Bossy who has researched in the archives of the Elizabethan French embassy 
in London, have rejected such criticisms of Morgan. They commended him as a 
‘perfectly serious political figure’ who devoted himself to looking after Mary’s 
correspondence abroad.123 For many today, this English exile remains an enigma, with 
questions over his dubious Catholic faith, his secret contact with the English envoys in 
Paris, and his relationship with Burghley.124 Morgan’s fidelity to Catholicism and 
Mary Queen of Scots is undoubted. But, occasionally, prompted by fear for his survival, 
and driven also by the partisan strife within the exiled Catholic community, the 
evidence implies that he served Elizabeth’s Protestant regime as a temporary double 
agent. Like many exiles such as Thomas Copley, Morgan limited his conditional 
conformity to intelligence business, and was not complicit in Mary’s death. Such men 
never doubted that Mary’s accession to the throne of England was the only hope of 
restoring both their reputations at home and English Catholicism.  
 
The English authorities had planned to employ this exiled group as intelligence moles.  
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In 1578, Ambassador Paulet had suggested Walsingham should handle Morgan 
carefully, as he would be helpful to discovering many things ‘which are now secret’.125 
When Morgan was detained in the Bastille in 1585, Queen Elizabeth promised, that if 
this traitor ‘carries himself dutifully in discovering what he knows, she would “for his 
sake, if he desire it,” extend extraordinary grace to him’.126 The pro-Spanish Charles 
Arundel was inducted into Burghley’s espionage through Stafford. Other refugees, like 
William Gifford, spontaneously reconciled themselves with the Elizabethan regime 
because of theological differences with the Jesuits. Still others, such as the laymen 
Charles Neville and Ralph Liggons, and the priests Anthony Tyrrell and Richard 
Baynes, did so for self-survival. They begged to be pardoned, to receive their liberty, 
family estates, and licences to return home.  
 
Under torture or on the gallows, liberty and life might become dearer than faith.127 It 
was the custom in the English Council that ‘no prisoner for high treason escapes with 
his life, unless he be absolved and swears to do some signal service’.128 Restraint and 
release was a prerogative of Elizabeth’s councillors, which enabled them to arrange 
their spies in and out of jail, and to surrender prisoners for intelligence work. On the 
day of Edmund Campion’s execution on 1 December 1581, a Catholic priest John Hart, 
convicted of treason for his preaching on the subject of martyrdom, pleaded with 
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Walsingham for ‘such undoubted hope of my life if my conformity shall be agreeable 
thereunto’. In exchange for remission, he confessed ‘some great matter’ intended 
against England, and promised to spy on William Allen to learn ‘the very secret of his 
whole heart’. His hopes came to naught. This was probably because Walsingham, who 
in 1571 had mistakenly discharged Ridolfi, setting him at liberty to plot against the 
realm again, refused to commit the same error twice. Hart remained in the Tower, but 
cheated the executioner in May 1582, possibly by reiterating his offer of conformity. 
He was expelled from England in 1585 and died a year later in Poland.129 
 
Thomas Morgan’s complicity in the Parry Plot of 1585 infuriated Queen Elizabeth, 
who requested King Henri of France to extradite Morgan and Charles Paget, both 
‘disturbers of the common quiet of the realm’. But her requests were rejected; instead 
Morgan was cast into the Bastille under the joint protection of King Henri and the 
Guises.130 Impatient at the endless captivity, in 1586 Morgan, through Giordano Bruno, 
a pensioner in the French embassy in London, conveyed his yearning for release to 
Ambassador Stafford. Morgan promised  
  
to reveal many things if the queen is prepared to get him out of prison. I think it is likely 
that he will keep his promise. First, to get out of the Bastille. Also because he regards 
himself as having been abandoned by those who employed him in this matter [i.e. the 
conspiracy: meaning Beaton and Guise] who do nothing to procure his release. Further, 
long imprisonment has got the better of his popish enthusiasm.  
 
His cooperation was suggested by his fellow inmate, the French Protestant noble 
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Comte de la Magnane (René de Montbourcher).131 It was presumably Stafford, who 
personally knew the Comte, who arranged for the latter to ‘sometimes haunt him 
[Morgan] in the Bastille’. It was a good opportunity, Stafford suggested to Burghley, to 
draw in a leader of the anti-Jesuits by playing on his ‘hope of fair promises and hope of 
liberty’.132  
 
Anthony Tyrrell, another Roman Catholic priest, also preferred life to faith. During his 
third detention in 1586, he witnessed the execution of his friend John Ballard for 
participating in the Babington Plot, which served as a turning point. He approached 
Burghley, who had warranted his first release in 1576. In exchange for pardon, Tyrrell 
committed himself to ‘dyscover a number of treasonable practyses’ and to apostatize, 
renouncing his allegiance to the Pope.133 Again with Burghley’s help, and offering his 
personal recantation of Catholicism, Tyrrell was set up as a prison spy in another jail, 
the Clink. There he served the government’s propaganda efforts against Roman 
Catholicism, and monitored his past companions and gathered intelligence. In terms of 
Tyrrell’s government service, two points are noteworthy. First, while according to the 
surviving sources, it was Burghley who pardoned Tyrrell, Michael Questier has located 
him on Walsingham’s side (although there are few records of relations between them). 
Second, Questier ascribes Tyrrell’s (and others’) repeated alternation between 
recusancy and apostasy partly to the fear of losing his life, but more to the offers of 
mercy from Elizabeth’s government, which proved irresistible.134 However, for Tyrrell 
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and many of his fellows, conversion to the cause of Elizabeth’s regime was motivated 
not only by time-serving and materialism, but also a shared idea of semi-conformity 
which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
The desire to obtain an official licence to return home was another reason for homesick 
exiles to surrender themselves to the English authorities. Travel licences had to be 
signed ‘by the Greate Seale of Englaund, Privie Seale or Privie Signet’.135 As the 
Secretary from 1573 to 1590, and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal from 1576, 
Walsingham assumed the latter two offices. This authority to grant licences provided 
Walsingham with a ready means to deliver spies abroad. It also facilitated his spies in 
their lobbying of émigrés. Solomon Aldred in 1586 tried to persuade a Roger, servant 
of the Earl of Westmorland, to return home. Aldred even assured Roger that it would 
be possible to procure the means to absolve him of escaping from the Clink.136 While 
being persuaded to defect in early 1586, Dr. William Gifford was provided with ‘an 
ample pasporte to pass into England’ by Walsingham.137 Despite relinquishing the 
Secretaryship in 1572, Burghley could issue licences indirectly through the office of 
the Great Seal, which was held by his brother-in-law Nicholas Bacon (1558–1579), 
and then a gentleman under his patronage, Thomas Bromley (1579–1587). For 
permission to return home, some gentlemen or even priests, like Ralph Liggons and 
John Gore, were willing to serve these English ministers.138  Liggons had been 
employed in Paris encrypting communications between Mary Stuart and the Duke of 
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Parma in the Low Countries.139 By 1588, he contacted John Conway, an official agent 
and probably Burghley’s informant, declaring his wish to go home and return ‘himself 
under her Majesty’s most obedience and to become her reformed good subject’.140 
Because of his many years’ acquaintance with the Catholic network in England, this 
refugee hoped to provide intelligence in exchange for a licence to return.  
 
In lobbying gentry exiles, Burghley apparently had greater success than Walsingham, 
probably as a result of his man Stafford’s control over the official embassy channels in 
Paris, and because of Burghley’s own exclusive influence over exiles’ family estates. 
An Acte agaynst Fugytyves over the Sea of 1571 decreed that those going overseas 
without special licence, and who did not return within six months, should forfeit ‘all 
theyre Manors Lands Tenementes and Hereditamentes’.141 This severe economic 
punishment extended also to the families of those denounced as ‘dysobedyent 
trayerous and rebellious Fugytives’. The Lord Chancellor Thomas Bromley presided 
over allocating and recovering exiles’ properties. To their desolate wives and children, 
he had only to provide between one-third and one-quarter of their estates. If a refugee 
returned to England, agreed to ‘yeeld himself to any one of the Queenes Majesty Privy 
Counsell, acknowledging his Faulte’, and submitted himself to the Queen, after one 
year he would be permitted to restore ‘all his Landes and the Profittes’.142 Under the 
terms of An Acte for thexplanacon of a Statute made againste Fugitives over the Seas 
of 1572, the property of exiles was forfeit, and under the oversight of the Exchequer 
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became part of the possessions of the Duchy of Lancaster. 143  In other words, 
confiscated lands would merge with royal property, under the supervision of Lord 
Treasurer Burghley. The guardianship, education, marriage, or even public service of 
the children of exiles was completely dominated (or transacted) by Burghley as the 
Master of the Court of Wards. In short, control of exiles’ families in England fell 
almost wholly into the hands of William Cecil.  
 
Some exiles, fervently hoping to recover their property, chose adherence to Burghley. 
In May or June 1573, Thomas Copley repeatedly begged Burghley to retain his stable 
revenues from his confiscated property.144 Copley hoped to recover some of this 
money to fund his life overseas. He repaid the Treasurer with some low-level 
intelligence. The exiled Paget brothers were also eager to restore their family 
possessions. But the stewardship of the Paget estates in Staffordshire and Derbyshire, 
belonging to Thomas Lord Paget, had been assigned to Amias Paulet in 1585. During 
the time when Paulet was requesting this perquisite—continuously from May until the 
summer of 1585—Paulet, whose patrons were Leicester and Walsingham, offered 
Burghley copies of almost every dispatch between him, Walsingham, and Leicester. 
This was at the very sensitive period when he was keeping guard over Mary Stuart in 
Tutbury, and Walsingham’s secret plan against the Babington Plot was almost ready. 
Paulet acquainted Burghley with some details about Walsingham’s impending 
counter-plot, from which Burghley was isolated.145 
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The English authorities also gave recusants rewards as inducements to surrender. John 
Nichols and Christopher Perkins converted to the established church in return for 
benefices granted by the Privy Council; Lawrence Caddy for an allowance to return to 
Oxford and an annual pension of sixty crowns.146 Through these dual strategies of 
coercion and mercy, some recusants in overseas exile and in English prisons were 
conquered by Elizabeth’s ministers, to the point where they joined in espionage.  
 
4.  Occasional Conformity 
It would be a misconception, however, to ascribe the increasing Catholic apostasy in 
the 1580s only to the English manipulation of material considerations. An internal 
factor is also worth considering: the divisions within Roman Catholicism itself. For 
reasons of both survival and faith, certain Catholic moderates or ‘deviationists’ from 
the Allen–Persons line tried to adopt a new position: occasional conformity to 
Elizabeth’s Protestant regime. This stance reflected their patriotic resistance to the 
armed invasion led by the Jesuits and Spain, and the significant increase of Catholic 
apostasy. In the following discussion, this new Catholic moderate attitude will be 
analysed through the example of the pro-Jesuit enterprise.  
 
Patriotism encouraged certain Catholic exiles to work for their Protestant-ruled state. 
The invasions attempted under Philip II’s leadership never won full agreement 
amongst English exiles. The military strategy was particularly boycotted by anti-Jesuit 
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émigrés, including secular priests like Owen Lewis and William Gifford, and the 
laymen Charles Neville, Morgan, and the Pagets. Neville, Earl of Westmorland, was 
the one whose patriotism at the last moment before the wars overrode his faith. In the 
spring of 1586, he approached Walsingham through Solomon Aldred, acknowledging 
his great fault committed in his young days. He pledged that if the Queen promised 
him grace and a pension, ‘whatever service she commanded him to do, he would do it 
so effectually, against the Spaniard or anyone else, that she should find herself satisfied 
for the past injury’.147 Simultaneously, the Earl demanded another formal meeting 
with Ambassador Stafford, probably due to his greater trust of an official representative 
and his preference for the moderate Burghley. On the eve of the Spanish Armada, the 
Earl, through Richard Hakluyt, again begged Burghley to move the Queen ‘to become 
his gracious maistresse’ once again. Burghley was beseeched to ‘have hym in 
remembrance and to vouchsafe by one or other means to let hym [be] heard’.148 As 
repayment he offered some intelligence touching ‘the archtraitor’ Morgan in Paris, and 
the Duke of Parma in the Low Countries. Later, through Stafford, Neville continued to 
plead for royal mercy, and sent some intelligence ‘touching the intended Spanish 
invasion’. He declared ‘his stomak is against a stranger’s settinge foote in his 
countrie’.149  
 
The enmity of the anti-militant group of Catholic exiles against Spanish hegemony is 
clear. In the examination of 1590, Morgan ‘frankly confesses that he would be sorry to 
see his country subjugated by foreigners, and especially Spaniards’.150 By 1597, Ralph 
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Liggons had been identified by both Spanish and English agents as one of the most 
dangerous of the anti-Spanish group. King Philip III of Spain was advised to banish 
Liggons to Sicily, together with Charles Paget and William Tresham, far away from the 
Catholic power centres.151 There are two main reasons for this exiled group of English 
gentry to have so strongly opposed the invasion scheme: the interdependence between 
their hereditary estates and the English regime, and their disagreements with the Jesuits 
over the Catholic restoration.  
   
Peter Holmes has researched the theological and moral arguments behind the Catholic 
tendency towards anti-recusancy in the 1580s.152 While the official pressure on 
Catholic conformity became intense, notably after 1581, a call for anti-recusancy 
(occasional conformity) began to rise amongst the Catholics. In England, the validity 
of attendance at Protestant churches was one of the main issues debated. Alban 
Langdale and Thomas Bell, on theoretical and casuistical grounds, defended ‘church 
papistry’ as lawful in specific circumstances. Church attendance was only to ‘give a 
sign of allegiance and due loyalty to my prince’. ‘Church papists’, Alexandra Walsham 
observes, could maintain a good conscience and faith in God when performing this 
civil obligation.153 They didn’t give internal assent; their outward compliance was 
performed only as a formality to avoid ‘just fear’ of official punishments. Human law, 
Langdale stated, could not oblige a man to put his life in danger, unless this secular 
obedience imperilled the Catholic faith and their common interests.  
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This issue of occasional conformity spread to the Continent where printed propaganda 
acquainted exiles with this new moderate way. Exiles fell into the same dilemma 
between survival and faith—whether to submit to their temporal sovereign Elizabeth in 
order to protect their home interests and family future. For both their own survival and 
the survival of their religion, certain exiles redefined the division between divine faith 
and temporal allegiance. As early as 1574, Anthony Tyrrell had asserted that ‘it is 
lawful for Christian Catholic men to fly and save themselves in the time of persecution, 
not so much for their own private safety as to do good in time to come unto others’.154 
During his third captivity in 1586, this Catholic priest agreed to set ‘my religion and 
Order’ apart, and asserted that he would be glad to perform the natural duty ‘I doe owe 
unto Her Majesty both before God’.155 Almost at the same time, to Walsingham, 
William Gifford declared that upon ‘assurance of freedom in religion and conscience’ 
he would like to ‘live in oure naturall soyle under the protection of hir Majesty’. He 
advocated reconciliation between the Catholic gentry and Elizabeth’s regime, in order 
to obstruct ‘the subversion of hir Majesties estate and the utter ruininge of all oure 
families without any regarde of religion’.156 In short, this group hoped to achieve a 
win–win deal, keeping both body and soul intact. Unfortunately, the Roman leaders 
and the Jesuits, who from the 1580s had dominated in internal conflicts, overruled their 
appeal for semi-recusancy. Robert Persons insisted that the Church might tolerate, but 
would not necessarily approve of them.  
 
Why did Persons reject this idea of occasional conformity? The Jesuits’ resistance can 
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be explained by the worsening ‘domestical difficulties’ within Catholicism.157 The 
rivalry between different factions was a result of divisive ideologies towards Catholic 
restoration in England, which arose from different backgrounds between the secular 
exiles and the priests. This discord stimulated an increase in secular apostasy, 
benefiting Elizabeth’s regime and espionage, and hampering the Jesuit-led conspiracies. 
John Bossy defined this divisive Catholic exile community as a missionary group, 
formed on separatist principles.158  
 
The first disagreement within the group was around the expectation of divine 
providence. The secular priests believed that the Catholic restoration would come to 
England in God’s good time. What Catholics had to do, while awaiting the outcome of 
providence, was to perfect themselves in both spirit and intellect, in monasteries or in 
colleges. Through the practice of semi-conformity, like ‘church papistry’ at home and 
civil obligations abroad (like offering information), these moderates expected to win a 
little room for the Catholic restoration, and more time for God’s providence.159 It was 
unnecessary to make an immediate change by force. This moderate concept was 
welcomed by certain lay exiles mired in the dilemma between loyalty and faith. They 
preferred to wait patiently for the natural death of Queen Elizabeth, who was known to 
be in ill health and had no heir, and then to welcome the accession of the Catholic 
Queen Mary and a Catholic return to England. 
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These moderate views were opposed by members of the younger pro-Jesuit generation, 
like Gregory Martin, Edmund Campion, William Reynolds, and Robert Persons. Few 
of them were of the gentry class, or came from areas of the country where ‘seigneurial 
Catholicism’ remained strong. ‘They were clerks first and last’.160 According to their 
beliefs, the time of restoration should be achieved by working, not by waiting; by 
bloody recusancy or military action, not by passive compromise. The holy mission 
from 1580 was oriented toward a renaissance of the Roman Church. Naturally, they 
rejected the hoped-for semi-conformity of the moderates.  
 
A different expectation of public service was a further reason for this division. From 
1580, under the leadership of the Jesuits, the new public role of the clergy was 
established. Ecclesiastics were encouraged to extricate themselves from nostalgia for 
the medieval church, urged to step out of monasteries into colleges and improve their 
clerical professionalism in public service. This active interference in secular politics 
was unwelcome among the gentry, the traditional ruling class in England.161 There 
was a significant shift in power in early modern Europe, which the Jesuits may have 
ignored or refused to confront. In sixteenth-century European society, a less reversible 
change was proceeding: a transfer of ruling power from the ecclesiastical towards the 
lay aristocracy. And in English households, a priest often worked under the household 
patronage of a Catholic nobleman, as his domestic chaplain. In other words, the 
English aristocracy, whether on the basis of social class or of the patronage system, 
was perceived as superior to the clergy. According to Robert Persons’s ideal of a 
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clerk’s public role and that of a church state, church authority supervised the lay 
through an ecclesiastical commission. This wishful attempt to resume the dominant 
role of the church would doubtless be boycotted by the English gentry class. It was 
antipathetic, seen as a kind of encroachment on secular rule. Charles Paget blamed the 
priests and Dr. Allen for their meddling ‘in public matters of our country’, wondering 
‘why priests did not meddle with their breviaries only and the like’.162 Another exile 
William Tresham opposed ‘hym self directly with Padget and Throgmrton against the 
proceeding of Persons, for he did not lyke that gentlemen shoolde be directed by 
Prests’.163 A part of the English Catholic gentry came to see that they would be better 
off being a minority Catholic sect ruled by their Protestant counterparts, than playing 
inferiors to an ecclesiastical establishment contrived by the clergy. This antipathy 
among the laity may be an alternative explanation for Catholic resistance to the Jesuits.  
 
Despite opposition from the Jesuits, many anti-Jesuit moderates still advocated 
separation between politics and religion, and for survival pledged loyalty to the 
English Protestant regime. Hence between 1580 and 1598 there was a significant 
increase in apostasy, recantation or dual service, on the part of seminary priests and lay 
exiles.164 For instance, George Norton, an exiled rebel from 1569, began his career as 
a double agent in the early 1580s. He was closely involved with the circle of Scottish 
exiles in Paris, and in 1581 joined the Duke of Lennox’s government in Scotland. 
Using the alias William Robinson, he supplied Walsingham with intelligence on 
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Scotland or on English exiles, including Morgan and the Pagets.165 ‘He is willing to be 
imployed, and to do all that he can to deserve her Majesty’s grace’.166 Norton’s 
intelligence of the Scottish Catholics’ intrigues earned him a pardon and a return home 
in 1586.167  
 
However, a dangerous shadow existed in this delicate operation between faith and 
allegiance. Some semi-conformists were thus pronounced apostates or spies for 
England. Certain temporal apostates, like John Hart, Robert Gray, and Martin Nelson, 
were never sure of how far they could adopt occasional conformity. In fact, it had 
probably become a kind of free evaluation through inner conviction and personal 
conscience. Aside from certain irregular conformity approved by papal dispensation, 
everyone could refer his obedience to the princes as lawful in religion. Keeping on 
testing the bottom line of the Roman Church, these opportunists hoped for an easy 
co-existence between survival and faith. 
 
Regarding Catholic semi-conformity, there are two points worth noting. First, the 
emergence of semi-separatism gave an impulse to a further separation between politics 
and religion in the Catholic Church. Questier suggests that from the late sixteenth 
century numerous Catholics were inspired (or compelled) to consider whether it was 
necessary for a theocracy to be established. Edmund Bunny wrote to Persons, asking 
whether ‘their religion and regiment [could] be parted’.168 More and more Catholics 
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preferred keeping politics and religion apart. A priest, Thomas Wright, abandoned the 
Jesuit enterprise in 1593 on purely political grounds, because he was a loyalist and was 
given official permission to exercise liberty of conscience in religion.169 John Ashton, 
a Lancashire gentleman, also decided to conform to the royal supremacy rather than 
the established church. Hence, towards the end of the sixteenth century, the idea of the 
separation of the Church of Rome from the Court of Rome had started to be promoted 
by certain loyalists, like Richard Montagu. A pure religion excluding politics was 
forming.  
 
Secondly, for the English authorities, instigating Catholic exiles to undertake 
pro-English spying was a dangerously double-edged sword. Exiles’ ‘occasional 
conformity’ might easily become ‘occasional recusancy.’ Elizabeth’s government could 
use exiles to disclose plots and polarise Catholic circles, but sometimes the tactic could 
backfire. For example, the opportunist Charles Paget has often been criticised by 
historians for his dishonesty in begging for pardon, and his lack of loyalty to either 
side. 
 
It is not sufficient to accept the Jesuit scholar Leo Hicks’s assertion that the chief 
purpose of English governmental propaganda like Burghley’s was to sow division 
among Catholics.170 The dissension already existed; what England did was only to 
accelerate it. This inner crisis was fatal in the Catholic war against Protestant England, 
and Elizabeth’s cunning ministers seized the opportunity. By granting pardon through 
official authorities, they competitively drew the exiles into their personal service. 
                                                                                                                                               
 
169 BL, Lansdowne MS 109 f. 48. 
 
170 Hicks, An Elizabethan Problem, 136-37.  
 151 
Discontented with the Jesuit leadership and facing the English strategies of coercion 
and mercy, many exiles became hesitant. Eventually, for survival, some of them chose 
conversion, apostasy or the service of two sides.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter clarifies three misconceptions evident in previous discussions of 
Elizabethan espionage, which concern competitiveness, Burghley’s continuing 
prominence in both intelligence and policy-making, and Elizabeth’s royal superiority 
over factions/parties. Firstly, the Parisian example shows that far from being united, 
Elizabethan espionage was divided into competitive networks. True, there was no 
absolute separation between Stafford’s embassy system and Walsingham’s personal 
one—Walsingham continued his secretarial contact with Stafford, both in official 
business and some necessary intelligence missions. But when touching on key 
espionage activities, like the lobbying of exiles, Walsingham employed his own system. 
Working to benefit their respective patrons in the supply of information for policy, the 
two systems monitored, suppressed and even expelled each other, in order to 
monopolise the intelligence market in Paris. 
 
Second, Alan Haynes’s assumption that from the late 1570s Burghley had been reduced 
to reading second-hand information can be overridden by the fact that Stafford was 
secretly employed by Burghley.171 And in the competition to secure the cooperation of 
English Catholics abroad, the majority of gentry exiles preferred to approach Burghley 
via Stafford, partly because of the credibility of Stafford’s embassy and Burghley’s 
authority over their home interests, and partly because some favoured Cecil’s moderate 
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stance. Their preference reflects Burghley’s ceaseless supervision of the regime in the 
1580s, not its decline as is often supposed. Even in overseas exile, these Catholic 
gentry still retained a high degree of sensitivity about home politics, in which Burghley 
was still at the very top.  
 
Finally, although Queen Elizabeth remained silent in this intelligence rivalry in Paris, 
her royal prerogative over official appointments did break Walsingham’s governmental 
intelligence monopoly very cunningly and at crucial times. This restored the power 
balance of her regime; her supreme authority was safeguarded.  
 
An alternative interpretation of the unusual increase in Catholic double agents or 
converts during the final two decades of the sixteenth century has also been provided 
in this chapter. Suffering internal divisions and subject to the English strategies of 
coercion and mercy, some exiles preferred following the model of ‘church papistry’, 
and tried to set up a new way, creating a distinction between politics and religion. 
Through a peaceful compromise with their Protestant government, they were striving 
to win more space for personal survival, and more time for a future Catholic 
restoration. Unsurprisingly, their apostasy was denounced as heresy or atheism by their 
pro-Jesuit opponents, who accused them of protecting temporal good at the cost of 
spiritual welfare.172 However, their anti-militant moderation has met with applause 
from certain historians. Bossy recognises Thomas Morgan as someone who ‘did a good 
deal to maintain the traditionalist force among the Elizabethan aristocracy.’173 His 
anti-militant insistence and that of the Morgan–Paget grouping perhaps won more 
room for Catholic survival in England, whether for other moderate exiles abroad or the 
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semi-conformists at home.  
 
In the competition for intelligence in Paris, Burghley and his party, through Stafford’s 
embassy, won an absolute advantage. Walsingham, however, made a successful 
comeback in the matter of home counter-plots. The secret manipulations against Mary 
Queen of Scots held in English captivity were almost exclusively monopolised by 
Walsingham. Burghley and his men were gradually withdrawn and isolated from these. 
It is to these issues that we now turn in the next chapter. 
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Chapter IV: Plots and Counter-plots 
 
My only feare is that her majestye wyll not use the matter with that 
secreacye that apperteynethe, thowgh yt import yt as greatly as ever any 
thing dyd sythenceshe cam to this crown. And surely yf the matter be well 
handeled yt wyll breacke the necke of all dayngerowse practyces duryng 
her majestyes reygne.1 
     
The above comes from a confidential letter Secretary Francis Walsingham wrote on 9 
July 1586 to the Earl of Leicester, who was then heading to the Low Countries to fight 
the Spaniards. It alludes to a great event impending at home: the discovery of Anthony 
Babington’s conspiracy. Certain sensitive words were expunged, probably by Leicester, 
in accordance with Walsingham’s instructions to burn this letter. The partially 
concealed information underlines three important themes for discussion when 
considering Elizabethan plots: namely counter-plots, partisanship, and queenship. The 
modern term ‘counter-plot’ here means a scheme designed to subvert any regicidal and 
treasonable revolt (usually accompanying a foreign invasion) that was either brewing 
or was in process against the life of Queen Elizabeth, and the safety of England and its 
Protestant establishment. There have for centuries been polemical arguments about the 
truth behind these Elizabethan plots. Catholic apologists have ceaselessly accused 
Elizabeth’s Protestant ministers of fabricating plots in order to eradicate the Catholic 
Church from England. However, under conditions of risk to national security, it may be 
that certain political parties manipulated counter-plots as a tool in their struggle for 
dominance over policy. The scheme to counter the Babington Plot was so highly secret 
that Walsingham made ‘none of my fellows here privy thereunto’, except for Leicester. 
Burghley seems to have been excluded from Walsingham’s clandestine plan, and the 
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probable alienation between them reflects the worsening partisan polarisation within 
Elizabeth’s regime. Lastly, this confidential letter sent by Walsingham disclosed his 
intention to nurture a regicidal plot, in order to urge the irresolute Elizabeth to execute 
Mary Stuart and also to participate more actively in the continental Protestant wars. 
Walsingham’s highly efficient espionage not only drew the Queen towards the military 
Protestantism he favoured, but weakened her queenship within the patriarchal Council.  
 
A great deal of attention from scholars like Francis Edwards and, recently, Stephen 
Alford, has been paid to the workings of the Elizabethan plots and government 
counter-measures. 2  For centuries, the controversy surrounding them has drawn 
historians to two opposing positions, either in defence or refutation of the reality, 
legitimacy and motives of these uprisings and of the tragic figure of Mary Stuart. The 
diverse arguments have hinged on patriotism, dynastic fidelity to the ruling regime, 
political partiality, clientele, and especially the different religious convictions held by 
the Jesuit historians (John Hungerford Pollen and Leo Hicks) and their non-Catholic 
counterparts. Martin Hume (the compiler of the State Paper Calendars) and Francis 
Edwards have tried to understand these intrigues in terms of factiousness, by which 
means explaining the sudden absence of plots from 1573 to 1583, and an unusual blank 
in both the archives and historiography around Burghley’s participation in the home 
counter-plots of the 1580s.  
 
This chapter begins by exploring scholarly arguments over the reality of the plots, 
moving on to explain the unusual absence of intrigues from 1573 to 1583 in terms of 
factiousness or party rivalry. This perspective is also helpful in explaining why and 
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how Walsingham isolated Burghley from his domestic counter-plots in the 1580s. In 
looking at the Walsingham-led discovery of the Babington Plot, the chapter will reveal 
the delicate division of spying labour and the workings of Walsingham’s fully 
empowered intelligence secretariat. The final section will contend that Burghley was 
not, however, completely excluded from intelligence matters. By being held in 
absolute trust by Queen Elizabeth, through his patronage of wardships, and as a result 
of his spies doing service for both sides, Burghley avoided being ignorant of the 
espionage monopolised by the Walsingham-Leicester party. 
 
1.  Plots Real or False 
Within months of Mary’s death in February 1587, indignation was stirring throughout 
the Catholic world at her ‘cruel murder’ by the English government. She was soon 
listed in Catholic martyrologies like Richard Verstegan’s Theatrum Crudelitatum of 
1587, which denounced as groundless treason the charges against her. In the following 
year, her Scottish adherent Adam Blackwood completed the History of Mary Queen of 
Scots, describing ‘the sawage Englishe’ as ‘more brutishe and sawage then the most 
sawage brutish beast we can reade’, and their sovereign Elizabeth as a ‘monster of all 
womankinde’.3 Any form of representation of the martyr Mary was prohibited inside 
England until the end of the Tudor period. Instead, Mary’s guilt was propagandised 
into popular memory indirectly through text and drama such as John Lyly’s Endimion 
in 1590 and Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene in 1596. 
 
The accession of King James I to the English throne rehabilitated his mother’s 
                                                 
3 Adam Blackwood, History of Mary Queen of Scots (Edinburgh, 1834), 197, translated from the 
original French of Adam Blackwood, Martyre de la Royne d’Escosse, douairiere de France (A 
Edimbourg, 1588).  
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reputation. He never let ‘a day pass without lamenting that his mother’s head fell’.4 
After his succession, the Venetian envoy wrote that ‘Elizabeth’s portrait is being 
hidden everywhere, and Mary Stuart’s shown instead with declaration that she suffered 
for no other cause than for her religion’.5 Henry Howard, one of Mary’s surviving 
partisans who had been appointed to the new King’s Privy Council and created Earl of 
Northampton in 1604, in 1612 received a royal mandate to translate ‘our dearest 
mother’ Mary’s remains from Peterborough Cathedral to Westminster Abbey. In the 
Latin elegy Northampton composed for her new tomb, Mary was remoulded into a 
courageous figure fighting during her English captivity against ‘the obloquies of her 
foes, the mistrust of the faint-hearted, and the crafty devices of her mortal enemies’. 
Regrettably her struggle culminated in an ‘unhappy murder’.6  
 
Who were Mary’s ‘mortal enemies’ to whom Northampton alluded? He was hardly 
likely to be referring to a ‘faint-hearted’ Queen Elizabeth. Earlier Catholics like Robert 
Persons and John Gerard had vindicated Mary at the expense of Elizabeth. Defaming 
an esteemed Tudor monarch, native born and bred, would however have easily aroused 
English anxiety over the foreign Stuart succession.7 On behalf of King James therefore, 
Northampton’s lament may have set an official precedent for Stuart encomiums or 
historiography: to exonerate the King’s natural mother Mary without implicating his 
metaphorical progenitor Elizabeth. In a later letter to Rochester, Northampton accused 
                                                 
4 Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli, Venetian Secretary in England, to the Doge and Senate, 22 May 1603, 
CSP Venice, 1603-1607, 33. 
 
5 Scaramelli to the Doge and Senate, 24 Apr. 1603, CSP Venice, 1603-1607, 10.  
 
6  The translation of the Latin inscriptions on Mary’s tomb in Westminster Abbey: 
http://www.westminster-abbey.org/our-history/royals/burials/mary-queen-of-scots 
 
7 John Watkins, Representing Elizabeth in Stuart England: Literature, History, Sovereignty (Cambridge, 
2002), 22. 
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Burghley and his son Robert of being the ‘chefe artificeres’ who inflamed Queen 
Elizabeth’s ‘feares and ielousies’, in order to engineer Mary’s tragedy. 8  Not 
surprisingly, Northampton made this charge to blacken the posthumous reputation of 
the Cecils as part of an ongoing political feud between the two families. This hostility 
originated with the courtly competition between Thomas Howard, the fourth Duke of 
Norfolk (who was eventually executed in 1572), and Burghley, and continued into 
antagonism in the Stuart period between the Duke’s brother, Henry Howard himself, 
and Robert Cecil, Earl of Salisbury.  
  
By contrast, William Camden, another commentator on the same Elizabethan politics, 
in his work the Annales insinuated that Leicester and Walsingham were the leading 
contrivers of Mary’s death.9 And he underplayed Elizabeth’s involvement in Mary’s 
death by picturing both Elizabeth and Mary as innocent women undone by ‘the 
political machinations of English, Scottish, and French courtiers’. Mary’s ‘unthankful 
and ambitious subjects’ and Elizabeth’s male counsellors kept fomenting the mutual 
distrust between the two ‘sisters’, nudging it towards grudges and ‘emulation’ that 
eventually ‘could not be extinguished but by death’.10 By this means, John Watkins 
suggests, Camden fulfilled King James’s commission to exonerate Mary from the 
charge of high treason.11 This has implications for a controversy regarding whether 
Camden was impartial, or whether his writing of history was influenced by Stuart 
patronage.12 Watkins emphasises Camden’s fidelity to the new dynasty and sympathy 
                                                 
8 TNA, SP 14/71/16, the Earl of Northampton to Rochester, 10 Oct. 1612.  
 
9 See Introduction.  
 
10 William Camden, Annales or the Histories of The Most Renowned and Victorious Princesse 
ELIZABETH, Late Queen of England (London: [Thomas Harper], 1635), STC 4501, 343.  
 
11 Watkins, Representing Elizabeth in Stuart England, 61-63.  
 
12 William Camden, The History of the Most Renowned and Victorious Princess Elizabeth, Late Queen 
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for Mary, though in his narrative Camden did not hide her collusion in various 
treasonable plots. Wallace MacCaffrey believed in Camden’s integrity as a historian, 
praising him for having cautiously matched the government’s accusations and the 
private apologies of Mary’s supporters. And ‘while he had lived close to the world of 
high politics and the men who ruled England, he had not lost the freedom and 
detachment which differentiated the observer from the participant’.13 But, in actual 
fact, Camden had not detached himself from the courtly factions. The Annales show 
his political partiality for Burghley, which was partly affected by his privileged access 
to Burghley’s voluminous papers, and partly by his own inclination towards moderate 
Protestantism. Camden did not skimp in his criticism of Burghley’s 
antagonists—Walsingham and particularly Leicester, the leaders of the 
militants—positioning them as being guilty of personal immorality and political 
aggression. A suspicion was left for his readers that in 1586 Leicester had poisoned 
Walter Devereux, the first Earl of Essex, in an inglorious attempt to marry the 
widowed countess Lettice.14 Camden also imputed Mary Stuart’s death to the ‘subtill 
practises’ engineered by Leicester and Walsingham:  
 
Leicester (who was thought to cast in his head to prevent the lawfull succession) sent 
privily certaine murders (as some say) to take away her life. But Drury being a most 
sincere honest man, and detesting from his heart to so foule a fact, denyed them all 
access. Neverthelesse there crept forth certaine spies, and letters were secretly sent as 
well as fained as true, whereby her womanish impotency might bee thrust on to her 
own destruction.15 
 
                                                                                                                                               
of England, edited and with introduction by Wallace T. MacCaffrey (New York, 1970), xxxvi. 
 
13 MacCaffrey, ed., Annales, xiv, xxxvii.  
 
14 Camden, Annales, 290-91. 
 
15 Ibid., 261, 269. 
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And Camden expunged Burghley’s role entirely from his accounts of these anti-Mary 
intrigues from 1583 until Mary’s final trials in 1586. He tried to whitewash Elizabeth 
and his old patrons the Cecils, exonerating them from culpability in a Stuart 
sovereign’s death.  
 
The disagreements between Northampton and Camden as contemporary witnesses to 
Mary’s demise raise a question about the reality of her plots; this question in turn 
impacts on the nature of Mary’s execution, whether it is to be understood as an act of 
legal retribution, a political murder, or religious persecution. But a supplementary 
question is often ignored: who was the leading figure who discovered (or fabricated) 
these plots that were to prove so fatal for Mary? Was it the silent Burghley whose voice 
was nearly eliminated from the archives and historiography until Mary’s trial, or the 
blackened Leicester, or Walsingham who owned the foremost Elizabethan espionage 
network, or Queen Elizabeth herself? Touching Elizabeth’s involvement in Mary’s 
death, both Northampton’s and Camden’s accounts downplayed her absolute monarchy, 
saying her ‘womanish impotency’, like Mary’s, was manipulated by her male ministers. 
Even though Camden attempted to redeem the image of her royal supremacy in terms 
of the Queen’s two bodies, the natural and politic, her role in patriarchal government 
still seemed relatively slight. In the later historiography relevant to Mary’s plotting, 
Elizabeth I, compared to her active male councillors, appeared either as a passive 
listener or as an indecisive woman. Elizabeth’s male ministers’ traditional bias against 
perceived female inferiority, and their antipathy towards Elizabeth’s habitual 
irresolution on policy, would sometimes isolate her queenship from the 
male-dominated circle of intelligence, indirectly depriving her of initiative in 
policy-making. This action encouraged a power transfer from absolute monarchy to a 
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mixed rule with the Council.16   
 
The authenticity of the Elizabethan plots is rarely admitted by Catholics, who instead 
declare them to have been a government fabrication. Their attempts to expunge past 
discrimination against Catholic ‘treachery’ became more intense during the nineteenth 
century, as a result of a great Catholic influx into Britain, of French exiles feeling the 
Revolution and of Irish immigration following the creation of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland in 1801. They pressured the government on the issue of 
Catholic Emancipation, seeking to abolish anti-Catholic laws and grant Catholics civil 
equality and religious freedom. Victorian Catholicism also initiated a canonisation 
movement for English and Welsh martyrs; so did the Scottish for Mary Stuart’s 
beatification. This means of exculpation sought to establish Catholics as innocuous and 
loyal to the state. Accordingly, from the late nineteenth century, certain Jesuit 
historians, including John Hungerford Pollen and recently Francis Edwards and 
Thomas McCoog, have rewritten the history of Elizabethan plotting, redefining the 
beheaded Mary Stuart as a tragic martyr, instead of a murderous traitor.  
 
Pollen conceded that rising discontent over the English government’s persecution had 
unavoidably provoked the exiles into running hazards, which for a time involved 
Catholics at home. But none of these ‘would ever be hatched on English soil, nor 
would the Queen’s life ever be for a minute in danger’.17 The so-called plots were 
either rumours, or deceptions instigated by Elizabeth’s Protestant ministers to falsely 
incriminate Mary; they announced they were carrying out an obligation imposed by the 
                                                 
16 See Chapter VI. Patrick Collinson, ‘The Monarchical Republic of Queen Elizabeth I’, in John Guy, 
ed., The Tudor Monarchy (London, 1997), 110-34.  
 
17 John Hungerford Pollen, The English Catholics in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth: A Study of Their 
Politics Civil Life and Government (1558-1580) (London, 1920), 296.  
 
 162 
Bond of Association and its legislation Act for the Queen’s Safety. The former, drawn 
up by Walsingham and Burghley in 1584, required all the signatories ‘to the uttermost 
of their power, at all times, to withstand, pursue and suppress all manner of persons 
that shall by any means intend and attempt any thing dangerous or hurtful to the 
honours, estates or person of their sovereign’.18 If there was a real plot in Mary’s 
favour, Pollen maintained, it must have been hatched by her ‘unscrupulous, 
quarrelsome, and reckless’ adherents, Thomas Morgan and Charles Paget, without her 
knowledge.19 Even though Mary did partake in murderous rebellions, Pollen and 
George Turner still vindicated her on a nearly sophistic excuse: justified self-protection. 
‘If the assassination was a crime, Mary was not free from guilt’, Pollen proclaimed, ‘if 
it was not a crime, but an inevitable incident in the struggle for liberty, Mary was free 
from blame’.20 Turner echoed that ‘she plotted unceasingly to escape, but never 
against Elizabeth’s life—and even had she done so, no less an authority than Lord 
Brougham has laid it down that she would have been amply justified’.21 Her intriguing 
was a proper self-defence against a variety of alleged murders designed by Queen 
Elizabeth, who, Turner condemned, should hardly have complained even if Mary had 
plotted against her life. 
 
Pollen’s works need to be considered carefully, for they remain affected by a 
centuries-long antagonism between the Jesuits and Appellants, or priests opposed to 
Jesuit control. How far Pollen’s work has influenced modern historical debates is 
                                                 
18 John Cooper, The Queen’s Agent: Francis Walsingham at the Court of Elizabeth I (London, 2011), 
194. 
 
19 J. H. Pollen, Mary Queen of Scots and the Babington Plot (Edinburgh, 1922), xxxv; ‘Mary Queen of 
Scots and the Babington Plot’, The Month, 109 (1907), 358.  
 
20 Pollen, Mary Queen of Scots and the Babington Plot, cxliv.  
 
21 George Turner, Mary Stuart: Forgotten Forgeries (London, 1934), 249.  
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doubted by the Catholic scholar John Vidmar. His investigation into English Catholic 
historiography between 1585 and 1954 suggests that Philip Hughes’s Reformation in 
England (1954) led the debate on the Reformation into ‘a new phase with the 
ground-breaking work of A. G. Dickens and G. R. Elton (non-Catholics) and the 
Catholic scholars Dom David Knowles, J. J. Scarisbrick and Eamon Duffy’.22 The 
religious zeal faded away from the true work of history. In 2002 Francis Edwards 
observed that ‘one would hope that nowadays the prejudices and crude emotions which 
accompanied historical writing in the past are much diminished if not eliminated. The 
religious spirit does not invariably assist the cause of truth’. 23  However, 
notwithstanding this modern trend for less emotional historiography, Pollen’s work still 
continued to receive some support from likes of the Jesuit Leo Hicks, who coloured his 
An Elizabethan Problem (1964) with strong Catholicism and, much like Pollen, 
remained hostile to both Thomas Morgan and Charles Paget.  
 
Martin Hume likewise looked askance at the official judgements on the treasonable 
plots, and have ascribed them instead to government policy. He in his 1901 book 
Treason and Plot, declared that the indictments, made by the government and having 
been repeated by nearly every English historian, ‘are to a large extent unsupported by 
serious evidence’.24 Stephen Alford agrees that the lack of decisive proof for certain 
Elizabethan plots, in some degree, discredited the relevant trials and convictions, and 
reduced them to the level of historical controversy. In Mary’s trial on 11 October 1586, 
respecting her complicity in the Babington Plot both she and the English commission 
                                                 
22 John Vidmar, English Catholic Historians and the English Reformation, 1585-1954 (Brighton, 2005), 
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23 Edwards, Plots and Plotters, 16. 
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‘were on decidedly uneven ground’.25 Mary did not deny her correspondence with 
Babington, which had been confessed by her two intimate secretaries Jacques Nau and 
Gilbert Curll. But the commission found their charge embarrassed by the lack of 
evidence in Mary’s own hand, notably of her decisive reply on 17 July 1586 to 
Babington’s regicidal plan. They only held the copies Thomas Phelippes made when he 
intercepted the letter. Mary grasped this advantage of evidentiary insufficiency. She 
blamed Walsingham, accusing him of wanting ‘to bring her to her death, who (as she 
heard) had practised against her Life and her Son’s’. Thereupon she softened to appeal 
to him: ‘I think you are an honest man. And I pray you in word of an honest man 
whether you have been so or no.’ Walsingham, joining the trial as one of the 
commissioners, rose to protest that ‘his Mind was free from all Malice’. He added:  
 
I call God to record, that as a private Person I have done nothing unbeseeming an 
honest Man; nor as I bear the place of a publick Person, have I done anything 
unworthy my place. I confess, that being very careful for the Safety of the Queen and 
Realm, I have curiously searched out the Practices against the same.26 
 
According to David Jardine writing in the nineteenth century, such practices were the 
‘consummate art’ of Elizabeth’s councillors, which deceived the masses into an 
unsuspecting belief in the whole political narrative.27 Their criticism earned an echo 
from the Catholic side. Edwards demonstrates it through a confession made by the 
Elizabethan politician Edward Coke during the trial of Henry Garnet, a Jesuit accused 
of involvement in the Gunpowder Plot, on 28 March 1606, that,  
                                                 
25 Stephen Alford, Burghley: William Cecil at the Court of Elizabeth I (New Haven & London, 2008), 
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26 William Cobbett and Thomas Bayly Howell, ed., A Complete Collection of State-Trials, and 
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There was a particular apology spread abroad for this man, and another general for all 
Jesuits and priests, together with this imputation, that king-killing and queen-killing 
was not indeed a doctrine of theirs, but only a fiction and policy of our State thereby to 
make the popish religion…despised and in disgrace.28 
 
Adrian Morey and Albert Loomie also reproved the Elizabethan government for 
contriving plots. By doing so it would have been easy, they stated, to stir up popular 
horror and animosity, together with civil patriotism against Catholicism and Spain.29 
 
A more considerable claim made by Hume is that the manipulation of plots may have 
become a necessary instrument for Elizabeth’s ministers in their struggles for power. 
Certain intrigues, like the one involving William Parry, and that of Michael Moody and 
William Stafford, were ‘more or less bogus plots, in which agent provocateurs were 
sacrificed to exigencies of party politics’. He further argued that,  
 
One of the secrets of Burghley’s great influence had been his elaborate system of spies 
everywhere, which had given him a monopoly of information, and an unrivalled 
control over affairs. Essex determined to organise a similar system, which should 
enable him to countercheck the Cecils…to draw England into war with Spain, and so 
to vanquish the moderate policy of Cecil.30 
 
Hume wrongly located the so-called sham plots in 1586 and 1587 as part of the 
factional rivalry between Burghley and Robert Devereux, the second Earl of Essex, in 
the 1590s; he neglected the real opposition rising during the 1580s between the 
moderate Burghley and the militants Leicester and Walsingham. Additionally, Francis 
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Edwards attributes the Ridolfi Plot to faction fighting rather than Mary’s treachery, 
accusing Cecil of ‘contriving’ this plot and its trials to eliminate his prime opponent, 
Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk. True, the disclosure of this plot was far from being 
what Burghley announced to the public as an ‘act of providence’.31 Rather, its 
discovery was owing to a combination of Cecil’s intense intelligence network, overseas 
espionage by William Sutton, Walsingham’s Paris embassy, and Herle’s spying in the 
Marshalsea prison. The successful discovery of the Ridolfi Plot rearranged power 
politics within Elizabeth’s regime: Burghley replaced the executed Norfolk, to become 
‘the principal person in the Council at present’.32 Edwards also accused Cecil of 
falsely impugning Mary Stuart’s innocence as part of his power struggle. In other 
words, the initiation of plots depended not on whether Mary yielded obediently to 
English captivity, but on the stability of Elizabethan power politics. A stable and 
absolute dominance by a specific party under the regime would see no plot ‘created’ as 
it was unnecessary, until a new opposing power rose. This claim gives a possible 
explanation for the apparent absence of plots in England between 1573 and 1583; 
during this decade Burghley and his conservative group retained their dominance over 
national policy. 
 
2. The Absence of Plots: 1573-1583 
In contrast to the earlier period 1568–1572 and the later 1583–1587, both of which 
were rife with plots and appeals for her execution, the middle period of Mary’s 
nineteen-year captivity, from Norfolk’s death in 1572 until the Somerville Plot in 1583, 
is unusually silent. No plots were devised (or at least none was exposed). When the 
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Ridolfi Plot was disclosed with the arrestment of Charles Bailly at Dover in 1571, the 
hostile voices in the Parliament of 1572 for ‘cutting off the heads of the Scottish Queen 
and the Duke [of Norfolk], taking away Mary’s title to the succession, and the 
establishment of a certain successor’ won support from an overwhelming majority in 
both Houses.33 However, in the later Parliament of 1576, suddenly, ‘all was so quiet 
on the Marian front’.34 Burghley fell into similar calm. His spy William Parry began 
one letter to Burghley in 1580 with worry ‘of your longe sylence’, ‘in so daungerouse a 
tyme’.35 This mysterious blank in the official papers has created an obedient Mary in 
the historiography. Historians emphasise her day-to-day captive life, declining health, 
financial problems, and her time at a spa in Buxton, and not her political intrigues.36 
 
However, some of Mary’s letters, particularly those collected in Prince Alexander 
Labanoff’s Recueil Des Letters De Marie Stuart, reveal that Mary’s custody during this 
decade was not as peaceful as it appears in official or scholarly documents.37 After the 
northern uprising in 1569 and the Ridolfi Plot in 1571, the conditions of her captivity 
had been increasingly intensified. She was transferred further south to Sheffield Castle, 
far away from her party in Scotland and the traditional Catholic forces in the far north 
of England. Under the guardianship of George Talbot, Earl of Shrewsbury, ‘no restore 
of strangers should be suffered to come near her’. Numbers of armed men were ‘under 
her windows, over her chamber, and of ever side her’, day and night. Her escape was 
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impossible ‘unless she could transform herself to a flea or a mouse’.38 
 
Even in such restricted custody, Mary did not stop her illicit correspondence. She 
devoted a great majority of her French dowry, up to £12,000 annually derived from 
lands in the Duchy of Touraine, to sustain her intelligence work and finance her exiled 
partisans. Some of Shrewsbury’s household servants—his secretary Thomas Morgan 
and the family tutor Alexander Hamilton—and local residents, like Thomas Burley, a 
glover from Sheffield, and Henry Cockyn, a London bookseller, were engaged in 
conveying messages either to or from her. This intelligence channel was disclosed at 
the beginning of 1575. Cockyn’s confession thoroughly acquainted Walsingham, newly 
assigned to the Secretaryship, with the details of Mary’s custody: her covert 
correspondence with discontented recusants and her exiled adherents, the negligent 
guardianship of the Earl of Shrewsbury, and Queen Elizabeth’s irresolution and mercy 
towards her Stuart kinswoman. Through the French ambassador Monsieur de la Mothe 
Fenelon and her envoy James Beaton in Paris, Mary transferred Morgan and Cockyn to 
France with substantial pensions as reward.39 In addition, from 1573 she had jointly 
designed a Spanish-led military invasion, grounded on the basis of two 
Stuart–Habsburg marriages, between Mary and Don John of Austria, and between her 
son James of Scotland and the Infanta Isabella Eugenia, the second daughter of Philip 
II.40 Don John hastened this enterprise as ‘next to the service of God’, when he 
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became the governor of the Netherlands in 1576.41 In 1577 there had been ‘divers 
practesis’ by two leading English Catholic exiles in Madrid, Francis Englefield and 
Anne Percy (née Somerset), Countess of Northumberland. They informed Don John 
that ‘with a smale number of horsemen, upon the suddane it is verie easy to carry her 
[Mary Stuart] awaye’.42 This plan would be repeated in the later Babington Plot: 
writing to Anthony Babington on 17 July 1586, Mary suggested that ‘at one certeine 
daie apointed in my walking abroad on horsback on the moore betwixt this and 
Stafford, where ordinarely you knowe verie fewe people doe passe, a fiftie or 
threescore men well horsed and armed come to take mee there, as they maie easely’.43 
 
The English government were aware of Mary’s tricks.44 In early 1575, Elizabeth 
warned Shrewsbury that his household servants were transmitting letters for his royal 
prisoner.45 Touching Mary’s collusion in Don John’s armed invasion, Walsingham 
kept receiving relevant intelligence papers, partly from Thomas Wilson, Elizabeth’s 
envoy in the Low Countries, partly from Ambassador Paulet in Paris, and notably from 
his closest Protestant ally William of Orange.46 The Prince showed Walsingham some 
of Don John’s letters, which had been intercepted by his right-hand man La Noue in 
France, and deciphered for Daniel Rogers, another of Elizabeth’s envoys in the Low 
Countries. On 20 July 1577, Rogers sent two detailed reports individually to 
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Walsingham and to Leicester.47 William of Orange also sent an envoy, M. de Famars, 
to reveal their content to Queen Elizabeth.48 
 
Elizabeth’s sympathy for her abdicated Stuart cousin was eventually exhausted by the 
daily increasing intelligence of the latter’s disobedience. In 1578 in an audience with 
the French envoy, the Count de Retz, Elizabeth said loudly that ‘she know very well he 
had come to disturb her country and to act in the favour of the worst woman in the 
world, whose head should have been cut off years ago’. She declared angrily that Mary 
would never be free ‘as long as she lived’ even if this would cost ‘her realm and her 
own liberty’.49 In 1581 Elizabeth even considered no longer defraying the cost of 
Mary’s captivity, stating that if Mary had to maintain herself, she would hardly spare 
money to promote plots and mischievous practices against England.50 Despite all this, 
if Elizabeth’s government had indeed penetrated Mary’s collusion with foreign powers, 
why were none of these intrigues disclosed until 1583? If, in contrast, Edwards’s view 
of the factional value of plots is correct, why did no ministers exploit the situation to 
foment plots to empower themselves? As for Burghley, had his status and following 
within the regime become so invincible that ‘creating’ plots had become unnecessary? 
It is by turning to contemporary international politics that we can explain these 
questions. 
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The international climate in the late 1570s was far from ideal for Mary’s intriguing. 
Some plans came to nothing, such as the one that foundered at Don John’s death in 
1578. Mary had also been forsaken by her Scottish homeland, which under the 
leadership of the Anglophile Regent Morton from 1572–1580 had politically adhered 
to England.51 Mary’s French relatives either treated her with extreme coldness or were 
too weak to help her. The House of Valois had less sympathy for their Scottish 
daughter-in-law, partly because of her loathsome Guise blood, but chiefly because of 
the impending Valois–Tudor alliance that was being attempted through Anjou’s 
courtship. In an audience of 1578, Henri III told Ambassador Paulet that he preferred 
Elizabeth’s ‘friendship before that of the Scottish Queen’.52 The Queen Mother, 
Catherine de Medici, was also ‘no friend’ of Mary. She refused James Beaton’s request 
to support Mary’s party at Edinburgh in 1573, and ingratiated herself with Elizabeth.53 
When placed beside questions of the royal supremacy and the national interest, for the 
Valois the fate of an unlovable daughter-in-law was trifling.54 As for Mary’s two 
remaining allies, the Guises were feeble and Philip II was hesitant. By March 1579 the 
Guises had lost what influence they had once had from their niece Mary’s being the 
Queen of Francis II. Losing access to the king’s ear, Henry Duke of Guise’s credit fell 
and his financial affairs became pressing.55 At this point, the far more powerful Philip 
II, besieged with domestic troubles, became hesitant. Geoffrey Parker pictures him as a 
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‘Messianic’ king whose absolute enthusiasm to reunite Christendom drove him to 
involvement in the early Ridolfi Plot.56 However, worsening Spanish finances had 
twice led to bankruptcy (in 1557 and 1575), there was continuing domestic resistance 
to the Castile-based centralisation, and differences in policy between the Duke of Alva 
in Brussels and the court in Madrid resulted in stalemate. King Philip hence preferred a 
temporary truce, and repudiated the scheme—‘the conquest of England’—that the 
Pope insistently pressed on him.57  
 
In the context of this adverse international climate of the 1570s, it is definite that none 
of Mary’s intrigues could have reached maturity or obtained sufficient aid from foreign 
powers. This may explain why few plots matured enough to be disclosed in this decade. 
The weakness of the Mary–Guise party and Spain’s hesitation over war strengthened 
the power of Burghley’s conservative group. With the likewise conservative Queen’s 
support, their anti-military claims not only led English diplomacy towards peaceful 
negotiations and alliances, but strengthened Burghley’s dominance in high politics. 
Burghley of course still had rivals in the regime. But the international atmosphere in 
favour of peace, in which the Catholic powers were either weakened or were unwilling 
to initiate costly wars, left little room for his aggressively bellicose opponents. 
Therefore, at this moment, it was not necessary for Cecil to ‘create’ plots to enhance 
his status. But when the fog of war rose again between the Catholic and Protestant 
worlds, the advantage would switch to the opposing militants. This may explain why in 
the 1580s there was an unusually high intensity of plots and plot discoveries, by an 
intelligence service now led by Walsingham. By manipulating Catholic plots, Leicester 
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and Walsingham hoped to serve God by opening the eyes of their Queen who was slow 
to believe that a great increase of papists was a danger to her realm, and thereby draw 
England into the Protestant wars.58  
 
3. Walsingham’s Monopoly on Counter-plots  
According to Christopher Haigh, except for John Somerville’s regicidal plan of 1583 
and John Hacke’s self-announcement as the new Messiah in 1591, both of which he 
ascribed to ‘far-fetched stories and lunatic plots’, the Elizabethan assassination 
intrigues worked mostly under government supervision.59 Elizabethan plots did arise 
from Catholic ambition—though the plotters did not realise that how far they could go 
was decided not by their own efforts, but by the English government, more precisely 
by the spymaster Walsingham. Instead of nipping them in the bud, Walsingham’s 
espionage adopted a wait-and-see strategy, allowing plots to develop until he could 
obtain enough fatal evidence to put Mary on trial.  
 
Walsingham’s leading spy Walter Williams advocated this strategy in his letter of 31 
August 1583, praying that Queen Elizabeth would have more patience with his 
spymaster’s counter-plots. ‘Tyme breadeth daylie newe matters and ripe[n]ing of the 
oulde, so a fitter tyme maye serve to take the practisers and dealers agaynst your 
highnes’ state and quiet, with lesse suspition for your servantes discoverye, and greater 
confusion and shame to the trecherous and evell mynded agaynst your Majestie.’60 
The more time the government gave recusants to mature their rebellions, the more 
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damning evidence the treacherous parties would provide. ‘If Mary was bent upon the 
queen’s destruction, she would become hopelessly entangled in a conspiracy against 
her life, and therefore liable to the penalties laid down’ in the new 1584 statute.61 
Mary’s appetite for freedom and the English crown, and the recusants’ for Catholic 
restoration in England, had prepared the gallows ready for them. Elizabeth’s 
government only made plots practically certain, by activating Catholics’ potential 
rebellious ambitions, arranging watchful control over their communication routes, and 
then waiting for the best chance to entrap Mary in her own intrigues.  
 
Generally, Elizabeth’s Protestant ministers are acknowledged as having been the 
contrivers of these counter-plots; Queen Elizabeth, stated Pollen, was led by her 
ministers’ hostility to acquiesce in their plans.62 Robyn Adams’s investigation into 
Herle’s spying in the Marshalsea in 1571 has illustrated Cecil’s delicate espionage that 
led to the disclosure of the Ridolfi Plot.63 In the plots during the 1580s, Walsingham’s 
espionage system, presumably having reached a high level of efficiency, monopolised 
the leadership over any involvement of Burghley’s party.64 
 
The Protestant zealot Walsingham’s burning animosity towards Mary brought this 
Catholic pretender to the English crown to the executioner’s block.65 As far back as 
his French embassy, he had announced that ‘as long as that develyshe woman lyve 
                                                 
61 G. R. Elton, England Under the Tudors (London, 1997), 363-64. Black, The Reign of Elizabeth 
1558-1603, 379. Susan Doran, Queen Elizabeth I (New York, 2003), 98-100. 
 
62 Pollen, Mary Queen of Scots and the Babington Plot, xiv.  
 
63 Robyn Adams, ‘ “The Service I am here for”: William Herle in the Marshalsea Prison, 1571’, 
Huntington Library Quarterly 72 (2009), 217-38. 
 
64 Read, Walsingham, II, 287. Derek Wilson, Sir Francis Walsingham: A Courtier in An Age of Terror 
(New York, 2007), 142. 
 
65 Walsingham to Thomas Randolph, 19 Apr. 1572, CSP Scotland, 1571-1574, 238-39.  
 
 175 
neyther her Majesty must make accounte to contyneue in quyet possession of her 
crowne nor her faythefull servantes assure themselves of savetye of their lyves. God 
therefore open her Majesty’s eyes to see that which may be for her best suartye 
[surety]’.66 His hostility was too hard to be softened by later goodwill from Mary’s 
party. Between 1579 and 1582, Michel de Castelnau, the French ambassador in 
London who was sympathetic towards Mary, kept lobbying her ‘mortal enemy’ 
Walsingham for improvements in the conditions of her captivity. 67  He urged 
Walsingham to ‘warm yourself up, therefore, a little with the grace and beauty of this 
fair Queen, and make yourself a suitor to make her position in her Majesty’s good 
graces a little better than it is at present’.68 Walsingham was extolled as a ‘sincere and 
honest man’ trusted by the Scottish Queen: ‘the more sincere and loyal you are in the 
service of your mistress, the more cause she will have to trust in you’.69 These 
compliments, appearing only in Castelnau’s letters but never in Mary’s, were 
presumably not given under Mary’s instructions. Until 1580 she still called 
Walsingham and the Earl of Huntingdon ‘the leaders of my enemies in this kingdom’.70 
 
3.1: The Throckmorton Plot 
From the early 1580s Walsingham’s spying arrangements became more intensive, 
closing in on the moment when he would be ready to grasp Mary’s neck. John Bossy 
draws attention to the success of Walsingham’s spies—Walter Williams, William 
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Fowler and William Herle—in infiltrating the French embassy in London by the eve of 
the Throckmorton Plot, a process which has received too much scholarly discussion to 
be repeated here.71 In May 1583, the mole Giordano Bruno, alias Henry Fagot, 
reported to Walsingham the secret visits of Francis Throckmorton and Henry Howard, 
‘the chief agents for the Queen of Scots’, to Ambassador Castelnau’s residence at 
Salisbury Court. They ‘never come to bring things from her [Mary] except at night, 
and the ambassador does the same (when he is sending to her)’.72 In November, Herle 
confirmed a Catholic enterprise underway inside the embassy, designed by the Duke of 
Guise and Castelnau, as well as by Howard and Throckmorton, ‘a partye very busy & 
an enemye to the present State’, to overthrow the English Protestant establishment.73 
 
The discovery of this plot surprisingly brought the French and Spanish ambassadors, 
both of whom were accused similarly of intriguing, completely different fates. 
Mendoza suffered an immediate expulsion in disgrace; henceforth no more Spanish 
embassies resided in Elizabethan England. Castelnau, however, was treated with 
respect until his successor Guillaume de l’Aubépine arrived in 1585. Bossy assumes it 
was because Walsingham preferred to publish evidence adverse to Mendoza but hide 
the part played by the French, in order to achieve Mendoza’s expulsion and a closer 
Anglo-French alliance. As soon as Mendoza had assumed the London embassy in 1578, 
Walsingham and Leicester had endeavoured to persuade the Queen to dismiss him, as 
‘she had none resident’ in Madrid.74 By contrast, Burghley had consistently apologised 
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to Mendoza for Elizabeth’s refusal to receive him.75 When ignominiously expelled in 
January 1584, this persona non grata at the English court swore that he would let 
Elizabeth learn that ‘Bernardino de Mendoza was not born to disturb countries but to 
conquer them’.76 His new embassy assignment to France moved the plotting centre 
away from London to Paris, where Mendoza promoted a more belligerent Catholic 
League between the Guises and Spain.77  
 
Walsingham, however, concealed the evidence detrimental to Castelnau, avoiding 
further infuriating Queen Elizabeth, who had been in an uncontrolled rage when 
formally confronted with a Catholic coalition to overthrow her. Walsingham knew well 
the necessity for England’s survival of having a powerful Catholic ally, and he 
preferred that it be France. Therefore, even though commanded by the Queen ‘to 
gather the particularytes against Moversier [Castelnau] for secreat dealing with the 
Scot[tish] Q[ueen]’, Walsingham may have declined to make such proof public. ‘If he 
had put his cards on the table’, Bossy concluded, ‘a weighty case against Castelnau 
could have been constructed’.78 By such moves, Walsingham broke off the traditional 
Anglo-Spanish alliance, and confronted Burghley and the Queen with the only other 
choice: France. Burghley’s party, originally being pro-Spain, was compelled to follow 
Walsingham, together defying Elizabeth’s ‘disposition’ to disclose the complicity of 
France, and saving the diplomacy between England and France. Ambassador Stafford 
refused to forward a very ferocious complaint to Henri III. England formally left the 
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traditional amity of Spain for France. This conflict again indicates that Elizabeth’s 
temper, irresolution, and inferiority in the collection of intelligence meant that her 
female authority was easily manipulated by her Council and their intelligence 
operations. 
 
The successful discovery of the Throckmorton Plot also resulted in the Earl of 
Shrewsbury, who had served as Mary’s keeper for more than a decade, being 
temporarily replaced in April 1584 by Ralph Sadler and John Somers, and ultimately 
by Amias Paulet in January 1585. The substitution announced Burghley’s forced 
withdrawal from first-hand intelligence concerning the imprisoned Mary, a position 
taken over by Walsingham. Shrewsbury’s tolerant guardianship had put him under 
suspicion of undue friendship towards Mary. Cockyn’s confession in 1575, and the 
complicity of his household secretary Thomas Morgan and tutor Alexander Hamilton 
in Mary’s illicit correspondence, provoked Walsingham to further discredit the Earl’s 
efficiency as Mary’s gaoler. Walsingham is assumed to have arranged spies around the 
Earl, who in July 1582 was to complain, ‘I have too many spies in my house already.’79 
A series of rumours further destroyed Shrewsbury’s reputation at court. At the end of 
1583 there was scandalous gossip concerning an alleged affair between the Earl and his 
royal prisoner, and an accusation of having fathered two bastard children by her.80  
 
The Earl’s friend, Burghley, also fell under suspicion of exercising undue goodwill 
towards Mary. Burghley’s fidelity to Queen Elizabeth is indisputable, but as 
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Elizabeth’s fertility became less hopeful and the Stuart succession seemed more likely, 
he needed to pretend friendliness towards Mary. The resulting rumours were spreading 
as early as 1574, coincidentally shortly after Walsingham left Paris to take up the 
Secretaryship. Cecil’s meetings with Mary at Buxton in 1574 were used by ‘some that 
loved me [Burghley] not’, to defame him for his friendliness towards the Scottish 
pretender, and for his attempt ‘to enter into intelligence with the Queen of Scots’ via 
routes known to the Earl and his wife. Burghley defended himself, asserting that ‘I am 
the most dangerous enemy, and evil-willed to her, and her title, …If she shall intend 
any evil to the Queen Majesty, my sovereign, for her sake, I must and will mean to 
impeach her; and therein I may be her unfriend or worse’. To avoid all possible 
excuses used by ‘unfriendly persons to calumniate my actions’, in 1575 he declined a 
proffered marriage between his daughter Elizabeth and Shrewsbury’s son Edward 
Talbot.81 But the rumours ceaselessly spread through foreign embassy reports to their 
home governments. In 1580 Ambassador Castelnau reported: ‘I found the Lord 
Treasurer for the present to be very favourable towards her [Mary], and to hold the 
counterpoise against those who wish to do her an injury…he assists me very willingly 
in all things which concern her, and is very disappointed when things do not turn out 
well.’82 When Mary was beheaded in 1587, Giovanni Dolfin, the Venetian ambassador 
in France, understood her demise in the following terms: that Burghley, ‘a person of 
the highest authority, who had always favoured her cause, has now fallen from the 
Queen’s favour’, while Mary’s mortal enemies, Leicester and Walsingham, had kept 
urging Queen Elizabeth to ‘grant her subjects that satisfaction’.83 Mendoza also 
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reported on Burghley’s public opposition to this execution.84 It was a means for 
Burghley to extricate himself, as well as his Queen, from the international implications 
of a Catholic sovereign’s death. He tried to guarantee the Cecils’ political future by 
saving their reputation from a regicidal charge: killing the heir presumptive, the 
likelihood of whose son being the next ruler of England was increasing daily.  
 
Walsingham or Leicester may have been covertly working for years to remove Mary 
from the pro-Cecil Shrewsbury’s charge at Sheffield, to some place ‘where she might 
be more narrowly looked into and more safely kept’ by their own men.85 Burghley, in 
a Council meeting at the end of 1582, had opposed ‘her being removed from where she 
had remained for 15 years, especially as Shrewsbury had not failed to carry out any 
point of his instructions’; ‘her removal would scandalise the country.’86 The discovery 
of the Throckmorton Plot succeeded in transferring Mary’s guardianship from 
Shrewsbury to Paulet, a client of Leicester’s, who in Morgan’s words was ‘a Puritan in 
religion and very ambitious’, after Walsingham’s own heart. 87  For this new 
responsibility, Paulet gave a loyal oath to the Secretary, that  
 
Touching the safetye, and forth cominge of this Q[ueen’s] person, I will never aske 
pardon, if she depart out of my hands by any treacherous slight, or cunninge advise, 
because I must confesse that the same canne not come to pass without some grose 
negligence, or rather traiterous carelesnes; and if I shalbe assaulted with force at home 
or abrode, as I will not be beholdinge to traitors for my lyfe, wherof I make little 
account, in respect of my alleageanuce to the Q[ueen] my Sovereign, so I wilbee 
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assured by the grace of God, that she shall dye before me.88 
 
Under his charge Mary was first removed to Tutbury in Staffordshire in January 1585. 
In September, in accordance with Walsingham’s instructions, Paulet closed Mary’s last 
legitimate channel via the French embassy with the outside world. ‘To tell her 
understand that all the pasquettes that she doth hereafter send into France must be 
directed unto me [Walsingham], and not unto the newe frenche ambassador, for that 
her majestye[’s] meaninge is that he shall not have ane thinge to do with the 
conveyance of her letters into France, havinge also geiven order unto the Bishop of 
Glascoe, that such letters as he shall send from thence shalbe delivered unto Mr. 
Stafforde.’89 This closure originated in Walsingham’s fear that it would become 
difficult to continue his spying on the newly assigned French ambassador Châteauneuf, 
who had suspected that Laurent Feron—the former Ambassador Castelnau’s clerk who 
had been passing information to Walsingham—was a spy. Even so, at this time Mary’s 
correspondence with her partisans was not shut down as effectually as Conyers Read 
has believed.90 Paulet still suspected her of continuing to send and receive letters at 
Tutbury via her laundresses.91 In December Mary was again transferred to Chartley, an 
estate owned by Leicester’s stepson Robert Devereux. There Paulet was convinced of 
the impossibility of any of Mary’s men being able to ‘convey a piece of paper as big as 
my finger’ out of or into the castle.92 Hereafter, Walsingham and Leicester had Mary 
under their absolute control, in terms both of her gaoler and her location. Their 
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systematic elimination of loopholes and the tightening of the net around her stimulated 
Mary’s hunger for intelligence, tempting her into the fatal Babington Plot. However 
first, and unexpectedly, came the Parry Plot of 1585.  
 
3.2: The Parry Plot 
The man behind it was a Welshman called William Parry, who had served Burghley as 
a voluntary informant while travelling in Rome and Siena from May 1577.93 Around 
about early 1580, forced to flee his creditors, Parry abruptly left for Paris.94 There he 
rehabilitated himself through further work for Burghley, monitoring the city’s exiles 
and recruiting some like Charles Neville and Thomas Copley, who solicited Burghley’s 
influence to intercede for Queen Elizabeth’s pardon.95 On 1 May 1580, to Burghley, 
Parry swore his fidelity to the Queen and his support of her practices against her 
Catholic enemies in Paris:  
 
The name and title of a true subiect have bene alwayes so dere unto me, that I cannot 
but hould hym and his religion for suspected that practiseth any thing against Her 
Majesty, whose governement and fortune have bene no lesse comfortable to all good 
men at home, then straunge and fearefull to her ennemyes abrode.96  
 
Back in London in September, Parry became involved in an affray with the 
moneylender High Hare, and was imprisoned for burglary and attempted murder. Freed 
in August 1582, Parry immediately received a licence to travel abroad for three years. 
Firstly reaching Paris, he won the trust of Allen, Persons, Paget and Morgan. By 
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January 1583, in Venice, the Jesuit Benedetto Palmio introduced him to Campeggio, 
the papal nuncio to Venice, to whom Parry acted as outwardly reconciled to 
Catholicism:97 
 
After twelve years in the service of the Queen…I came to the conclusion that it was 
both dangerous to me and little to my honour. I have accordingly changed my mind 
and made a firm resolution to relinquish the project assigned to me and, with 
determined will, to employ all my strength and industry in the service of the Church 
and the Catholic faith.98 
 
Campeggio passed this letter to the Cardinal of Como, the cardinal Secretary of State. 
By May, Parry flourished this achievement to Burghley: ‘if I be not deceived I have 
shaken the Foundation of the English Seminary, that at Rheims; and utterly overthrown 
the Credit of the English Pensioners in Rome.’ Inevitably, he requested more money 
for espionage: ‘if I were well warranted and allowed I would either prevent and 
discover all Romayne and Spaynish practises against our state, or lose my life in 
testymony of my loyalty to the Queen Majesty and the duety to my honorable frendes 
that have protected me.’ 99  Almost simultaneously, he sought employment with 
Walsingham, who had become the sole Secretary from 1581, in order to escape arrest 
for robbery and to solve his financial difficulties.100 By October 1583, likely directed 
by Burghley, he headed for Paris to monitor some suspicious preparations for the 
invasion of England connected with the Throckmorton Plot.101 The failure of this 
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intrigue had brought new exiles to Paris, including Thomas Paget and Charles Arundel, 
with whom Parry ‘had sundry conferences…thereof I means to make your 
[Walsingham] pryvy upon my returne’. Maybe this intimacy of daily spying excited 
Parry’s compassion for these exiles: ‘I finde theym not to complayne of Her Majesty’s 
governement, but that, oppressed by ther contraryes, they were either to leave their 
Countrey or to abide and suffre more disgraces then they deserved or were able to 
beare.’102 Between October and December, Morgan persuaded Parry to ‘doe some 
service for God and his Church’. Parry promised to do it ‘if it were to kill the greatest 
subject [Burghley] in England: whome I named, and in trueth then hated’. Morgan 
rejected this proposed target, ‘let him live to his greater fal and ruine of his house’, and 
suggested instead the assassination of Queen Elizabeth.103  
 
Back to London in January 1584, Parry was granted an audience ‘at large’ with the 
Queen, probably achieved through Ambassador Stafford’s praise and Burghley’s 
influence. Parry ‘very privately discovered to her Maiestie’ his ability to foment a 
conspiracy between Morgan, Campeggio and Como to assassinate her and crown Mary. 
Elizabeth ‘tooke it doubtfully’.104 In reward for this effort, in May Parry desperately 
pleaded with Burghley for the mastership of the Hospital of St Catherine in East 
London, but failed.105 Despairing of any preferment, Parry left the court in July, 
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‘utterly rejected, discontented, and as her Majestie might perceive by my passionate 
letters, carelesse of my self’.106 Probably aiming to procure patronage, Parry risked 
resuming the stock trick of instigating plots. In August, Parry lobbied Edward Neville, 
Walsingham’s spy in Rouen, to murder the Queen for the cause of religion, Mary’s 
succession, and justice in general. After his second effort at persuasion on 6 February 
1585, a day later Neville lodged information about Parry’s treason with the Queen.107 
Quite aware of Parry as an agent provocateur, the Queen assigned Walsingham to 
conduct a closed examination at his private residence; this was a chance she gave Parry 
to clear himself. At his trial on 25 February, Parry confessed the indictment: ‘I am 
Guilty of all that is therin contain’d; and further too, I desire not Life, but desire to 
die.’108 Parry was hanged in Westminster Palace yard on 2 March.  
 
The Parry Plot has been a conundrum to generations of historians. According to Penry 
Williams, the plot uncovered in February 1585 shortly after Parliament reconvened 
was intended to give urgency to attempts to convert the Bond of Association into a 
formal statute, ‘For the surety of the Queen’s most royal person’.109 In actual fact 
though, through parliamentary patronage exercised by the likes of Burghley, Leicester 
and Bedford the Council dominated both Houses; any law the Council had decided on 
could be passed without the help of Parry’s blood. John Bossy calls Parry’s execution a 
‘judicial murder’ and ‘a grave discredit’ to Queen Elizabeth: faced with rising 
indignation from the Council and Parliament at her hesitation over the Bond of 
Association, the Queen threw the loyal Parry ‘to the hounds in Council and Parliament 
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so as to get them off her back and preserve the integrity of her crown’.110 Stephen 
Alford, however, convicts Parry of high treachery. Swayed by materialism and 
megalomania, he risked playing a double game between Catholicism and his home 
government, and ‘the cold welcome he found in London and fear of financial ruin only 
fixed in his mind a desperate mission to assassinate the queen’.111 Alford reads Parry’s 
personality uncompromisingly: ‘He was a social climber and something of a snob’, 
‘perilously self-deluding’ and ‘born for self-destruction’.112 By contrast, John Cooper 
agrees with Julian Lock’s understanding of Parry, seeing him as a man whose multiple 
personalities left ‘his loyalties irredeemably confused and compromised’, and who 
took a gamble on persuading another spy Edmund Neville to murder the Queen.113  
 
Parry died because of his increasing greed for patronage, and for compromising his 
fidelity to Queen Elizabeth with a growing sympathy for Catholicism. His failure in 
achieving the mastership of the Hospital of St Catherine in May 1584 and a Deanery 
(Provostship or Mastership of Request) in September, inevitably led to discontent: 
‘why should I care for her [Queen Elizabeth]? What hath she done for me? Have I not 
spent 10000 markes since I knew her service, and never had penie by her?’114 More 
fatally, the long-term intimacy of spying on exiles, and the effect of Robert Persons’s 
De Persecutione Anglicana (1582), had cultivated his probable sympathy for 
                                                 
110 Bossy, Under the Molehill, 133-34.  
 
111 Alford, The Watchers, 180.  
 
112 Ibid., 83, 88. 
 
113  ‘Parry, William (d. 1585)’, Julian Lock in DNB (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 
http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.york.ac.uk/view/article/21437 (accessed September 27, 2012). 
Cooper, The Queen’s Agent, 198-99.  
 
114 BL, Lansdowne MS 43 f. 34r, Parry to Burghley, 3 Sept. 1584. [Barker], A True and plaine 
declaration of the horrible Treasons… by William Parry, 16. 
 
 187 
Catholicism.115 Sitting in the Parliament of 1584 for Queenborough in Kent, on 17 
December Parry made a pro-Catholic protest against the new legislation for the 
Queen’s safety, denouncing the bill as ‘full of blood, danger, despair and terrour or 
dread to the English subjects of this Realm’. Next day, at the Queen’s suggestion, he, 
‘kneeling upon his knee in very humble manner’, apologised for his rashness as a new 
member unfamiliar with the proper way to behave in the House.116 When under arrest 
in the Tower, on 14 February 1585 he wrote to Queen Elizabeth, beginning with a 
confession: 
 
Your Majesty may see by my voluntary confession the daungerouse fruietes of a 
discontented mynde, and how constantly I pursued my first conceaved purpose in 
Venyce for the relief of the afflicted Catholiks, contyneued yt in Lyons and resolved in 
Paris to put yt in adventure for restitution of England to the auncient obedience of the 
sea Apostolike. 
  
The whole second half of this letter he then spent on condemning Elizabeth’s 
intolerance for Catholics, her aid to the Dutch rebels against Spain, and her evil 
treatment of her relative Mary: 
 
Give some ease to your Cath. Subiects…the indignytyes passed your Majesty and the 
king Catholike are many. You have disquieted his state, mayneteyned his rebelles and 
do beare not such as have robbed hym and his subjects…The Qu of Scotland is your 
prisoner, let her be honourably in treated but yet surely garded. She may do you good 
she will do you no harme if the fault be not English. Satisfy her reasonably in her 
keeper…A new governor and a new gard may brede new doubte. Emulation may do 
harme, please your selfe in this case, yt importeth you moste, so long as yt is well with 
her this faulte with you when she is in feare, you are not without peril. Cherish and 
Love her, she is of your blood and your undoubted heyre in succession.117  
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This part was deleted from the official printed account of the Parry Plot, implying that 
this official pamphlet was heavily censored by the Council.118 On 18 February, to 
Leicester and Burghley, Parry also confessed that ‘my case is rare and strange, and, for 
any thing I can rembember, singular: a natural subiect solemnely to vowe the death of 
his naturall Queene…for the reliefe of the afflicted Catholiques, and restitution of 
religion’.119 His sympathy towards Catholicism caused him to unconsciously cross the 
red line of treason. At the last moment on the scaffold, he finally sobered up: ‘Here I 
protest vnto you all I am clean of that I am condemned to dye for: I did never intende 
to laye violent handes on her most sacred Majesty, whome I beseche God longe to 
preserve from all her enemyes, and here I will take it on my deathe and seale it with 
my blood.’120 
 
It may also be worth considering Parry’s death in terms of personal enmity and the 
worsening of party rivalries in the mid-1580s. Edmund Neville voluntarily denounced 
Parry’s treachery, probably out of his hostility towards the Cecils. He even claimed the 
estates of his late great-uncle, the fourth Lord Latimer, but these had instead been 
obtained by Burghley’s eldest son Thomas through marriage to Latimer’s heiress 
Dorothy.121 After this, Neville devoted himself to Walsingham’s espionage activities in 
Rouen from 1582, in order to plead for Walsingham’s influence with Queen Elizabeth 
to restore his family reputation and the lost wardships.122 More interestingly, Neville 
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disclosed the plot at a very politically sensitive time. A week before, on 30 January 
failure in a patronage suit and divergence over policy towards the Dutch infuriated 
Walsingham to the point where he proclaimed that he held Burghley more ‘as an 
enemye then as a frende’.123 Parry may have been sacrificed as cannon fodder in 
Walsingham’s campaign to sustain hostility towards his old patron. A confession by 
Thomas Harrison, a servant of Walsingham’s, long after the latter’s death admitted that 
‘the plot by Parrye was wrocht by thame’: Walsingham, Thomas Phelippes and 
himself.124 It happened at an unsuitable time and hence ended in bloodshed.  
 
Burghley kept an unusual silence throughout his spy’s trial. Probably, as Parry’s patron, 
he avoided suspicion by doing nothing, or else was powerless to rescue him because of 
his limited access to the workings of Walsingham’s espionage. On 1 March 1585, a day 
before Parry’s execution, he wrote to Walsingham suggesting the necessity of 
establishing the official public line about the truth of Parry’s treason because various 
rumours had spread in print.125 Three days later, he informed Walsingham again: ‘This 
after noone my L. of lec. [Leicester] Master vich. [Christopher Hatton] and some 
others do mete here at my howss [on the Strand] to consider of thynges by us 
committed this morning to Master att[orney] and Master sollicitor for publication of 
the truth of parriss fact.’126 They deleted from the official pamphlet a great part of 
Parry’s statement favourable to Catholicism. It is not that we can treat Burghley’s two 
letters to Walsingham as direct evidence that they cooperated, together with Hatton and 
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Leicester, to bury Parry in obloquy. Rather, their action was a Council measure to 
suppress the various post-event rumours about the Parry Plot. 
 
Since January 1585, the discovery of the Throckmorton Plot had restricted Mary’s 
correspondence with the outside world; in March 1585 the disclosure of the Parry Plot 
sent Morgan, Mary’s chief cipher clerk, into the Bastille.127 These efforts were made 
in readiness for the impending Babington Plot, to entrap Mary, who was hungry for 
intelligence, into intriguing again. The complicated process and consequent trials of the 
Babington Plot have received adequate scholarly discussion. The research that follows 
will thus focus on Walsingham’s intelligence operation: the elaborate division of labour 
and Walsingham’s full empowerment of his secretaries.  
 
3.3: The Babington Plot 
The Babington Plot reveals a well-organised division of labour between Walsingham’s 
overseas and home intelligence networks, and between spies and organisers. A great 
number of his agents and spies had infiltrated the suspicious community of plotters. 
Proclaiming himself ‘a party in the action’, Amias Paulet kept his ‘very curious and 
watchful’ eyes trained on the chief conspirator, Mary Stuart.128 In Paris, in the spring 
of 1585, Solomon Aldred and Gilbert Gifford lobbied the leading secular 
priests—William Gifford and Edward Grately— in order to exacerbate the latter’s 
rivalry with their Jesuit opponents. The traditional historiography presumes Gilbert 
Gifford’s work in Walsingham’s espionage began in December 1585, when he was 
detained at the port of Rye as Morgan’s courier between the French embassy in London 
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and Mary.129 Actually, by April 1585 Phelippes may have already directed him to 
monitor Mendoza and the exiles in Paris.130 Nicholas Berden landed on France in 
early August 1585, and soon noticed that Dryland and John Ballard (alias Fortescue) 
were conversant with the exiled Earls of Cumberland and Rutland.131  
 
As the disclosure of the Babington Plot approached, certain spies were recalled to 
service at home. Around Christmas 1585, Phelippes arrived at Mary’s prison residence 
in Chartley, to contrive a new route for conveying Mary’s letters: via a brewer’s house 
in Burton where the letters would be securely sealed in a waterproof tube in an ale 
barrel.132 Using this method, Gifford and his substitute courier, his cousin Thomas 
Barnes, conveyed letters between Mary and the French embassy.133 In February 1586, 
Gifford brought Phelippes twenty-one packets ‘great and small’ from the house of 
Ambassador Châteauneuf. 134  Protective of Gifford’s work, Phelippes advised 
Walsingham to allay the suspicions of Richard Young, a JP of Westminster, directing 
him not to penetrate their spying—‘it may please you to limit him by some peremptory 
speche’.135 In April, Berden left Paris for London, employed as a letter-courier by 
Charles Paget, Charles Arundel, Stephen Brynkeley, Godfrey Foulgiam and Thomas 
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Fytzharberd, being used to transmit intelligence to them from England. Berden kept up 
an entire system of correspondence with the above parties using their cipher alphabets: 
from Paget he was to receive letters from Paget’s brother Thomas and others émigrés; 
from Arundel, letters from Francis Englefield; from Brynkeley, Berden received 
intelligence of the affairs of Allen and Persons; from Foulgian, all the business of Mary 
Stuart; from Fytzharberd, the devices of the Queen Mother Catherine de Medici. 
Berden also requested Walsingham consult with Justice Young, who had nearly 
arrested him: ‘yf the sayd Master Younge be not warned by your honor to be silent my 
travel wilbe but vayne.’136 In late April, Berden offered Walsingham a list of the 
Catholic priests living in London, and cautioned him against Peter Wylkox, a supplier 
of the royal buttery, who was actually a spy of Morgan’s and conversant with 
Walsingham’s chamber employees. Again he called Walsingham’s attention to 
‘Fortescue alias Ballard’.137 Because of this, on his voyage to France in June Ballard 
was monitored by Barnard Maude, who successfully made him disclose all his secret 
dealings with Mendoza.  
 
In England Robert Poley was the key watcher over the main plotter, Anthony 
Babington. Having served Walsingham since 1582, he was ordered to befriend Morgan, 
first in 1584 by volunteering his service to Mary, and then in 1585 by making use of a 
reference from his distant relative, Christopher Blunt. The hoodwinked Morgan 
admitted Poley, who had a good geographical knowledge of England and Scotland, to 
his correspondence with Mary and the French ambassador Castelnau. Morgan also 
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placed Poley in the household of Philip Sidney and his wife Lady Frances, 
Walsingham’s only daughter. Now Walsingham directed Poley ‘to move Babington to 
deal with the principal practisers in the state’.138 And because Phelippes learned from 
an unknown ‘secret party’ that the French ambassador ‘has been anxious to find some 
spy means to send a packet into Scotland with some secret matters’, he suggested 
Walsingham should send Poley into that embassy ‘to see what he will offer touching 
the convoy of these letters’.139 Surely, Walsingham was knitting a delicate spy network 
in which to smother Mary.  
 
As to the management of Walsingham’s espionage, during the Babington Plot, 
Walsingham left London for his country manor at Barn Elms, partly because of his 
illness but more possibly because he thereby avoided any direct involvement in this 
counter-plot. His intelligence team shielded him likewise. Francis Mylles, organising 
the arrest of John Ballard on 4 August 1586 with the warrant of Lord Admiral Charles 
Howard, carefully avoided his master being identified.140 Nevertheless, Walsingham’s 
prominence in the English regime meant he was hardly detached from this secret game. 
From June 1586, Walsingham in person socialised insincerely with Babington who 
pleaded via Poley for private interviews with the keeper of the Privy Seal. Walsingham 
succeeded in manipulating Babington’s hunger for a travel licence to obtain still more 
intelligence. Babington learned from Poley of Walsingham’s suspicions of his sincerity, 
that ‘Babington was so close and spare in opening himself “and the means of his 
offered service” that he [Walsingham] had no great liking of him nor to deal with her 
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majesty for him’. Babington therefore confided more ongoing intrigues: the planned 
murders of the principal governors under Queen Elizabeth, especially Leicester, 
Burghley and Walsingham.141 
 
From his house at Barn Elms, Walsingham fully authorised his secretariat to direct the 
espionage. Phelippes was nominated to take full charge. He juggled busily between 
Walsingham’s official lodging in London, Barn Elms, and Chartley. Phelippes worked 
at Walsingham’s lodging at court, chiefly to inform the Queen of the latest spying 
developments and win her support for their schemes.142 Sometimes he was recalled to 
Barn Elms to brief Walsingham. In early July when the game was reaching its climax, 
Phelippes returned to Chartley. On 6 July, Babington addressed Mary, outlining a plot: 
‘the dispatch of the vsurping Competitor [Elizabeth]’ and the release of Mary, with 
support from an invasion from Spain. ‘For the dispatch of the vsurper, from the 
obedience of whome wee are by thexcommunication of her made free, there bee six 
noble gentlemen all my private frends, who for the zeale they beare to the Catholick 
cause and your Majestie service will vndertake that tragicall execution.’143 Ten days 
later, Phelippes collected Mary’s answer to Babington’s plan, the so-called ‘bloody 
letter’ dated 17 July 1586; its copy was presented at Mary’s trials as the decisive proof 
of her treason. Walsingham hoped ‘ther wyll be a good course haht [held] I this cause. 
Otherwise we that have ben instruments in the dyscoverye shall receyve lyttle comefort 
for our traveyle.’144 Phelippes added to the original letter a postscript to query ‘the 
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names and qualities of the sixe gentlemen which are to accomplish the designment’.145 
Pollen believed this postscript was ‘the only forgery which Phelippes was allowed’; in 
other words, the rest of this letter was genuine. On 2 August, Walsingham revealed his 
fear to Phelippes, of that ‘the addytyon of the postscrypt hathe bread the jealousie’.146 
This self-produced evidence that Mary Stuart was guilty of planning the assassination 
of her royal cousin successfully forced the hesitant Elizabeth to sign the warrant for 
Mary’s execution. 
 
With regards to this plot, MacCaffrey believes that Walsingham kept it top secret, 
rarely sharing even with Leicester, Burghley, or the Queen. This blockade on 
intelligence continued until July, at which point Mary’s response to Babington’s 
regicidal plan was in hand.147 On 9 July 1586, Walsingham sent the first hint of his 
plan concerning the Babington Plot to his ally Leicester, then away in the Low 
Countries. The Earl was cautiously informed of the progress of this intrigue, albeit 
surreptitiously by the letter-carrier. The Secretary promised the Earl that, ‘I mean, 
when the matter is growen to a full ripenes, to send some confydential person unto you, 
to acquaynt you fully with the matter’.148 This letter reflects their political alliance. 
However, Leicester did not entirely rely on Walsingham’s intelligence supply; there 
was some overlap or connection between Walsingham’s espionage network and 
Leicester’s. The company of players known as Leicester’s Men was integral to the new 
establishment of the Queen’s Men. Both were suspected of being employed by their 
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sponsors in domestic spying and political propaganda. 149  Giordano Bruno, it is 
possible, can be identified as Henry Fagot, one of Walsingham’s informants inside the 
French embassy, who had been admitted to Leicester’s clientele via his devotion to 
Philip Sidney.150 In Walsingham’s operation around the Babington Plot, Leicester’s 
men were present. Leicester’s Master of Horse, Christopher Blunt, may have informed 
his master in advance of his being introduced by Thomas Morgan into Mary’s 
correspondence, and when he commended Robert Poley to Morgan as a spy.151 In 
March 1586 another of Leicester’s men, Thomas Barnes, was recommended for 
Walsingham’s service by his cousin Gilbert Gifford. Barnes was involved as a 
substitute letter-carrier during Gifford’s time in France. Accordingly, Walsingham was 
not the only source of intelligence for Leicester.  
 
Queen Elizabeth, as Pollen stated, was not bent on Mary’s death, though she was not 
entirely innocent of Walsingham’s clandestine schemes. In April 1586, she made an 
inscrutable speech to the French ambassador:  
 
You have much secret intelligence with the Queen of Scotland. But, believe me, I 
know everything that is done in my kingdom. Beside, since I was a prisoner in the time 
of the Queen my sister, I know what artifices prisoners use to gain over servants, and 
to have secret information.152  
 
Apparently Walsingham did not hide all of his espionage work from his royal mistress 
until July, for he needed her financial support for his costly spying. She issued £500 to 
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pay Walsingham’s intelligencers in 1585, and £600 in February 1586, with a further 
£500 in June as a response to the impending Babington Plot.153 Besides this, in May 
1586 the financially cautious Elizabeth granted Phelippes a pension of a hundred 
marks; in July Nicholas Berden and Gilbert Gifford shared another piece of royal 
patronage.154 She must have learnt about the spying activities of these men before 
rewarding them. In addition, the prime purpose of Phelippes working at the Secretary’s 
court lodging was to facilitate the Queen’s understanding of their latest actions and to 
obtain her approval. In a letter to Phelippes on 22 July 1586, Walsingham reminded 
him of this duty, that ‘at your return you shall from her Majesty’s selve understande 
howe well she acceptethe of your servyce’. 155  Through the royal privilege of 
patronage, Queen Elizabeth prevented herself from being an ignorant puppet on the 
throne.  
 
Compared with Leicester and the Queen, the intelligence Walsingham passed to 
Burghley was scant. Whether in the archives or in the historiography, Burghley rarely 
appears on stage until the plots were disclosed to the public and open examinations 
were entered into. Even so, some scholars insist that Burghley was the real helmsman 
behind the English counter-plots and behind Walsingham. Pollen states that ‘it is true 
that Burghley was not quite so bitter a hater as Walsingham, but a mortal enemy for all 
that, who took the lead in all the proceedings for Mary’s death’.156 Francis Edwards 
describes Walsingham as an executor, obedient to Burghley. John Guy’s use of the term 
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‘Cecils’ spymaster’ in his biography of Mary Stuart, subordinates Walsingham to 
Burghley’s spy network. 157  However, these arguments are doubtful; the 
intelligence-patronage cooperation between Cecil and Walsingham had foundered by 
the late 1570s. The question remains, however, as to why Burghley and his system of 
espionage become so quiet in the 1580s?  
 
Burghley’s absence from the record perhaps represents activity that was intentionally 
concealed by Burghley himself, as well as by pro-Cecil clients and historians. After 
Mary died in February 1587, Burghley reiterated to King Philip of Spain his opposition 
to her execution, sending multiple explanations via Stafford, Charles Arundel, and 
Mendoza. He imputed her death to his radical rivals—‘a pair of knaves’—Leicester 
and Walsingham.158 In 1600, possibly at the request of Robert Cecil, Patrick Lord 
Gray, the former Scottish ambassador during Mary’s execution, explained to King 
James that Leicester and Walsingham were ‘the cutters of her throat and inducers of 
Davison to do as he did…it was far from the Q. [Elizabeth] or his father’s [Burghley’s] 
mind that she should die when she died’.159 The Cecils, however, falsified the facts. 
Henry Howard, Earl of Northampton, accused Burghley and his son Robert of Mary’s 
destruction, by acting as the ‘chefe artificers though covered and shadowed by the 
passions of Walsingham’.160 Evidence certainly exists to identify Burghley as the 
pivotal director in drafting the warrant of Mary’s execution and in calling the Council 
to dispatch it to completion. Cecil’s patronage network, though, lasted until the modern 
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period, and this has facilitated the absolution of Burghley from charges of regicide.  
 
The Cecils whitewashed themselves from Mary’s execution, in order to sustain the 
long-term position of their family in English high politics. Mary’s death, whether it 
was promoted by Elizabeth’s government or not, would unavoidably incur criticism 
from Catholics and from her son King James. After the breakdown of matrimonial 
negotiations with the Archduke Charles and then the Duke of Anjou, the likelihood of 
Queen Elizabeth having an heir reduced as her age increased, and James VI’s 
succession to the English throne became more probable. Aiming at building a Cecil 
dynasty under the English regime, Burghley had to avoid possible hostility towards his 
family from the motherless King James. Walsingham, well known for his enthusiasm 
for radical Protestantism and his enmity towards Mary, may have been pushed 
forwards as the best available scapegoat. In the story of English intelligence against the 
plots of the 1580s, Burghley’s dissembling created his absence from both the archives 
and the pages of written history.  
 
On the other hand, this silence also represents Burghley’s real absence from 
Walsingham’s schemes concerning the Babington Plot. By early 1586, Walsingham 
had held specific intelligence regarding Burghley’s undue friendliness to Mary. On 3 
May, in a letter congratulating Phelippes on his newly awarded pension, Walsingham 
stated at the end: ‘I have saved that packet that touchethe the great person [Burghley], 
as neyther he nor the cause shall take lack. Some warning is to be gyvan to G. [Gilbert 
Gifford] and Foxley [Edward Grately] lookethe for an answer.’ 161  Saving this 
intelligence from becoming public, Walsingham waited for a further investigation by 
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his spies among the exiled Catholic circle. On 15 May, Walsingham received 
intelligence from Berden, concerning the attempts of the French ambassador to convey 
letters to Mary by Lord Treasurer Burghley.162 In the autumn, all his suspicions were 
verified. At the beginning of October, Burghley sent a ciphered letter to Stafford, 
urgently warning him that the home government (meaning Walsingham) had 
intercepted letters to Mary from Thomas Morgan and the Archbishop of Glasgow. 
What was more hazardous was its unfavourable record of Stafford’s favour to her. 
Burghley was also named, for helping Mary by facilitating her correspondence with the 
former French ambassador Castelnau, via her guardian Shrewsbury. Burghley thus 
suggested,  
 
I perceave we both have been sinisterly dealt withal, in that these Matters have been 
kept close, thereby bredyng Suspicion where I am sure none were deserved. 
Nevertheless, where Conscience is found, I way not Danger of Detraction. Truth will 
always have the upper Hand, and so also am I fully persuaded for you.
163  
 
Evidently, at the moment when such intelligence fell into Walsingham’s hands, 
Burghley and his party had been entirely isolated from Walsingham’s counter-plot 
against Babington, until the plot was disclosed and entered formal court proceedings. 
The other reason for Walsingham to stop sharing his intelligence with Burghley was 
their increasing rivalry over policy. Through this monopoly on intelligence, 
Walsingham hoped to alter the English conservative policy to more active involvement 
in the Protestant wars; this will be discussed in next chapter. Despite his efforts, 
however, Walsingham did not succeed in entirely banishing Burghley from his 
espionage in the 1580s. The following section will examine how Burghley protected 
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himself from being isolated from knowledge of the counter-plots led by Walsingham. 
The double service of Burghley’s spies, Queen Elizabeth’s confidence in him, and his 
authority over wardships, all helped him to break through Walsingham’s monopoly 
over intelligence. 
 
4.  An Ignorant Burghley? 
On 10 August 1586, Burghley described to Walsingham a comic encounter he had had 
on his way home. During the journey he saw groups of ten or twelve men standing 
together in every town, the watchmen appointed to apprehend three young men 
concerned in Babington’s conspiracy. Burghley asked how they would recognise the 
targets they were searching for. They responded that ‘Marry, my Lord, by Intelligence 
of their favour’. ‘What mean you by that’, Burghley continued to ask. ‘Marry, one of 
the parties hath a hooked nose’, they replied. After arriving at Theobalds, Burghley 
wrote without delay to remind Secretary Walsingham of the negligence of the Justices 
in appointing such foolish men:  
 
And if they be no better instructed, but to find 3 persons by one of them having a 
hooked nose, they may miss thereof, and thus I thought good to advertise you, that the 
justyces that had the charge as I thynk may use the matter more circumspectly.164 
 
This episode happened between the arrest of John Ballard on 4 August, and that of 
Anthony Babington and his associates ten days later. It demonstrates the fact that by 10 
August Burghley knew about Walsingham’s clandestine counter-plot to the Babington 
conspiracy before it broke. Who offered him access to Walsingham’s key secrets? 
 
Anthony Tyrrell, an exiled Catholic priest and a fickle apostate, might be the one who 
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offered Burghley news. He had served Burghley as an informant since 1576, when 
Cecil had ordered his release from prison. During his subsequent second exile he 
rendered himself popular amongst Catholic émigrés and particularly familiar with John 
Ballard. From 1584, the two young priests made a grand tour around the continental 
centres of English exiles, to canvass for the assassination of the queen. Back in 
England at the end of 1585, they began undertaking their regicidal plan. Unfortunately 
there is little evidence of Tyrrell’s intelligence employment for Burghley during this 
decade. But in his third captivity in July 1586, or at least after the arrest of his friend 
Ballard, fearing execution, he may have exposed to Burghley all he knew of this 
brewing plot in exchange for pardon.165 
 
Queen Elizabeth’s absolute trust in Burghley also ensured the latter avoided being 
entirely ignorant of Walsingham’s espionage. As Bossy indicates, when Walsingham 
left for his Scottish embassy in 1583, he had no confidence in letting the Queen and 
Burghley deputise in his control of the spying arrangements inside the French embassy. 
In actual fact though, his concern was unnecessary. His well-organised secretariat had 
been fully empowered in operations. Walter Williams, having penetrated Salisbury 
Court as a fieldworker and acting as an intermediary with the mole Laurent Feron, 
Ambassador Castelnau’s clerk, was the one assigned a temporary charge inside the 
embassy during Walsingham’s absence. Probably seeking royal patronage, Williams 
sent an intelligence letter dated 31 August 1583 to Queen Elizabeth, whose name is 
miswritten as ‘Mary Queen of Scots’ in the calendar.166 Bossy has rectified this 
mistake, believing ‘nobody in August 1583 was likely to write to her [Mary] about the 
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peace and quiet of her present state and kingdom’; the ‘Sovereign Lady’ addressed 
should therefore be logically assumed to be Queen Elizabeth. Surprisingly, this letter is 
preserved in the Hatfield archives. Presumably, Queen Elizabeth did not burn it in 
accordance with Williams’s request, but instead forwarded it to Burghley.167  
 
Occasionally Burghley’s intelligencers also acquainted their patron with Walsingham’s 
moves in the espionage game. Although Burghley and his party were unhappy to see 
their spies’ additional loyalty to other colleagues, this double obligation also acted as a 
kind of infiltration, by which patrons could learn of the intelligence moves undertaken 
by their opposition. William Herle had served Burghley since 1559 and Leicester from 
the early 1560s. By early 1581, owing to his financial difficulties he was again 
pleading with Secretary Walsingham for ‘the dutye I desire to do yow the best service I 
can’. 168  From April to September 1582, he intensively offered Walsingham 
intelligence about Antwerp. He then accepted Walsingham’s arrangement to act as an 
intermediary for Henry Fagot in the French embassy. In letters to his old patron 
Burghley in mid-November 1583, Herle shared intelligence which he had reported to 
Walsingham, concerning a Catholic enterprise inside the embassy: the forthcoming 
Throckmorton Plot.169 The next day, again to Burghley, Herle wrote: ‘Those solempne 
dayes have bred danger mani tymes and the worlld is full of mischeeff, for the enmy 
slepes nott.’170 Through dual service therefore, spies not only earned additional 
patronage from other intelligence systems, but also increased their value to their 
original patrons.   
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It is unclear how much the foregoing intelligence access contributed to Burghley’s 
prior understanding of the Babington Plot, shrouded as it was in high secrecy. He must 
have known some of Walsingham’s arrangements through Mary’s final custodian, 
Amias Paulet. As Master of the Court of Wards, Burghley’s predominance over the 
distribution of national patronage lured some claimants to his intelligence system. For 
a long time historians suspected Paulet of betraying his partisan allegiance, by serving 
Burghley in order to further his suit for the Paget estates.171 Walsingham’s man and a 
client of Leicester’s, Paulet has been shown to have sent Burghley duplicates of almost 
every letter he sent to Walsingham in 1585, when he was guarding Mary Queen of 
Scots in Tutbury. During this time—continuously from May until the summer of 
1585—he was pleading with Cecil for patronage. He sent Burghley copies of the 
dispatches and minutes that circulated between him, Walsingham and Leicester.172 
These evidently revealed some valuable information that should have belonged 
exclusively to Paulet’s ostensible party, including Mary’s transfer, her letter-packets 
and correspondence passed via her laundresses, and most crucially, Walsingham’s 
spying arrangements. ‘My purpose and meaning is’, Paulet proclaimed to Burghley, 
‘according to your lordship’s grave and most friendly advice, to keep the broad 
highway in all my actions and doings, and will strive to be blameless’, and to ‘pray 
your lordship’s favour towards me’.173 In reward for Paulet’s selling out, Burghley 
granted him his dream piece of patronage. In the summer of 1585, through Burghley’s 
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influence Paulet procured the stewardship of the Paget lands in Staffordshire and 
Derbyshire, which belonged to the exiled Thomas, Lord Paget. 
 
However, it would be improper to blame Paulet’s treachery entirely on his desire for 
worldly advancement. His ‘business’ of intelligence with Burghley may have come to 
an end when he procured the stewardship in the summer of 1585. After offering the 
final copy of his letters to the Secretary on 18 August, there were no more transcripts 
to Burghley. Paulet terminated his sales before Walsingham’s main strategy of 
December 1585, when Phelippes arrived at Chartley to prepare the reopening of 
Mary’s correspondence under Walsingham’s control. Although Paulet did not stop 
sending letters to Burghley, the contents of these concerned nothing of Walsingham’s 
intelligence moves, except to complain of the expenses of Mary’s custody, and his 
request for Burghley to help in their defrayment.174 
 
Royal trust, his spies’ double obligations, and his own control over wardships, meant 
that Burghley did not become isolated from the English espionage activity around the 
Catholic conspiracies. But these sources merely gave second-hand and very limited 
access to Walsingham’s hidden moves. In the 1580s the party polarisation between 
Burghley, Leicester and Walsingham seemed to become worse.  
 
Conclusion  
Suffering a setback in the competition for intelligence in Paris, where Burghley 
emerged predominant thanks to Stafford’s embassy and his own mastership of the 
wards, Walsingham won the advantage back at home. His successful counter-plots tore 
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off Mary’s pretence of innocence in front of Queen Elizabeth, who eventually learned 
of her Scottish cousin’s treacherous dealings towards ‘the saviour of her life for many a 
year’ and signed Mary’s death warrant.175 In the context of the domestic espionage of 
the 1580s, Burghley and his men suffered virtual isolation. This strengthened 
Walsingham’s dominance in national policy, moving England towards war with Spain. 
Walsingham’s successful discovery of the conspiracies finally urged the irresolute 
Queen Elizabeth to confront the impending crises.  
 
The first four chapters have pictured the development of the relationship between 
Burghley and Walsingham in terms of their respective intelligence systems, which 
began with close cooperation, but ended in division. Their espionage, which should 
have been used to defend national security, had become a necessary tool for them to 
suppress each other and pursue their struggle for absolute dominance in the regime. 
The final two chapters will move the focus away from the subordinate intelligence 
employees, towards their spymasters and the authorities in high politics—in other 
words, from the process of intelligence gathering towards the influence of espionage 
on national policy and the relocation of power in Elizabeth’s regime. We will see how 
Walsingham’s intelligence system promoted his political prominence, and supported 
his enthusiasm for militant Protestantism. The source of these intelligence rivalries at 
home and abroad—the worsening hostility between Burghley and Walsingham—will 
be examined in the next chapter.
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Chapter V: A ‘Factional’ Elizabethan Regime? 
 
The issue of Elizabethan factionalism, introduced by William Camden and Robert 
Naunton, today remains deadlocked in a debate over three questions: the terminology 
of ‘party’ and ‘faction’; the periods during which it existed; and its nature, whether 
about personal enmity, or material or ideological divisions. Conyers Read and John 
Neale were the first to discuss terminology, and whether the phenomenon was about 
policy or patronage. Simon Adams then develops the theory of faction in terms of 
personal enmity. Yet he and Wallace MacCaffrey together deny there was any element 
of Elizabethan factionalism before the 1590s. Many historians, including Paul Hammer, 
see the 1590s as being a different, even unique, decade, mired in vividly factional 
hostility between the Cecils and Robert Devereux, the second Earl of Essex, under the 
rulership of the aging Queen.1 The research on the competition for intelligence 
between the individual Elizabethan spy systems, however, demonstrates the existence 
of partisan rivalry within English high politics from the late 1570s through to the 1580s. 
This rivalry originated not in personal enmity or struggles for patronage, but mainly in 
differences on the policy of English intervention in the international Protestant revolts.  
 
In terms of research into the divisive Elizabethan intelligence systems, this chapter 
aims to develop an overall response to the issue of Tudor factionalism. First of all, the 
words ‘party’ and ‘faction’ in the Tudor reign will be redefined explicitly, by 
examining the diverse contemporary usage. The term ‘party’, rather moderate and less 
dangerous to political stability, seems more proper to represent the mid-Elizabethan 
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political divide. The second section verifies that a partisan rivalry existed in English 
high politics from the late 1570s and peaked around 1585. Irrelevant to personal 
enmity, this political divide resulted mainly from ideologies: whether English policy 
should serve first godly glory, or state interests. To promote their ideologies in the 
arena of policy debate, Elizabeth’s ministers struggled for patronage, contesting 
positions in local and central government to enhance their partisan dominance over 
administration, and to finance their espionage. Specifically, to the traditional concern 
around the Leicester–Burghley antagonism will be added consideration of another 
alleged party leader, Walsingham, who reached his political apogee in the 1580s by 
monopolising the Secretaryship and intelligence supply. Finally, the chapter will 
explore how Walsingham’s intelligence service worked in making policy concerning 
armed English intervention in the Dutch Protestant revolt of the mid-1580s.  
 
1. ‘Faction’ or ‘Party’? 
The year 1578 saw political polarisation arising inside Elizabeth I’s court when the 
second Anjou courtship formally entered the Council debates. The French ambassador 
Castelnau complained of some ‘grands factions’ at Elizabeth’s court covertly thwarting 
this match.2 The dispatches of the Spanish ambassador Mendoza to Madrid confirmed 
a distinct rivalry over the issue of foreign policy, invoked by the ‘extremely 
self-seeking’ Leicester and his ‘spirit’ Walsingham against Burghley. 3  In 1580, 
Lorenzo Priuli, the Venetian ambassador in France, was still observing that Queen 
Elizabeth ‘is under great apprehension, especially as she has now a divided Council’, 
principally over her matrimonial negotiations with Anjou. Offensive language passed 
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between the two opposing ‘parties’, which were centred around the key figures of 
Leicester and Burghley.4 According to Jacques du Vray, one of Anjou’s financial 
secretaries, by 1582 this political quarrel had expanded beyond the court:   
 
The erle of Sussex likewise had joyned with the principall nobility of the realme, in 
nature of a league, against the said Erle of Lecester, to ruine him & his howse, & had 
the Catholicks of his side, beside others (men of good spirite & vallew) which made in 
nomber more than 2 thirds of england, redy to take parte with Sussex. The said Duvray, 
naming particularly the noble men, that were of this confederacy…Only master 
Secretory Walsingham, might seme for his place & religion, to be his great support: 
but if the erle were once removed, one spurne should overthrow the said Sussex his 
adherents & credit.5 
 
Around 1585, this divergence deteriorated sharply into a degree of open antagonism. 
Walsingham, at the beginning of 1585, declared that he would hold his old patron 
Burghley ‘rather as an enemye than as a frende’.6 In March 1587, Burghley grumbled 
to Christopher Hatton of the Queen’s gratuitous aversion to him, ‘as my enemies 
presume her ears to be open to any calumniation to be devised against me’.7 His 
‘enemies’ implied Leicester and Walsingham, who together inspired Elizabeth’s 
suspicion of her Treasurer’s undue friendliness to the captive Mary Stuart.8 Later in 
August, departing for the Dutch campaigns, Leicester prayed his ally Walsingham ‘to 
stand fast for your poor absent frend against calluminators’ in the Council. Three new 
Councillors favourable to Burghley were added during Leicester’s absence: John 
Whitgift, Archbishop of Canterbury, William Brooke Lord Cobham, and Thomas 
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Sackville Lord Buckhurst, ‘being all three for theyr lives opposite to Leycester and to 
his desseingments’.9 Was the Elizabethan regime factional in the 1580s? 
 
William Herle denounced any foreign conjecture of English factiousness as arising 
from ‘jelouse’, designed to ‘nourish diffidence among us, the mother of factions’.10 
Walsingham, Leicester, and Burghley, who were all under great suspicion of 
nourishing factions, never stopped denying such accusations. In 1565 Cecil clarified 
his stance on partisanship: ‘I have no affection to be a party, but for the Queene’s 
Majestie.’11 Leicester, as Chancellor of Oxford, defended his role in the controversial 
election to the rectorship of Lincoln College in April 1577: ‘I have never loved or 
favoured factious dealing, nor have used it in my whole course of this action.’12 
Walsingham in January 1585 protested at being defamed as ‘a partye’ of the ‘Factyon, 
that reyghnethe ordynaryly in coortes’.13 Later in August, Herle reported to Burghley 
that King James of Scotland and his intimates reproached Burghley, first for his 
temporisation, which—‘with fayre semblans & with cracked promises & assurances, 
without end or any sincerity ment’—sought to starve the Dutch Protestants, and hence 
meant the loss of Antwerp. Other charges included Burghley’s building houses 
‘ynfinite & eqwall to Kings palacs’, his son’s friendship with the rebellious 
Northumberland family, and Burghley’s maintenance of spies abroad. ‘England was 
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becom Regnum Cecilianum.’14 Burghley refuted the ‘notable absurde lye’ that ‘owr 
Cowncellors yf they were ani thing, or wolld obtayne ani thing, must addresse theme 
sellves as Precarios to yow [Burghley] only’:  
 
Yf it were considered, how and uppon whom for these late yeres all manner of offices 
good and badd, spirituall and temporall have bin bestowed, to whom the persones 
benefitted do belong, and whom they do follow, it will easilye be judged, how rarely I 
do or have dealt therin…I know my creditt in such cases so meane, and others I fynde 
so ernest and hable to obteine anie thing, that I do uterly forbeare to move for anie, 
Wheruppon manie my good freindes do justly challendge me as unwise, that I seeke to 
place neither man nor woman, in the Chamber, nor without to serve hir Majestie.15 
 
The ‘whom’ of Burghley’s insinuations refers to the Walsingham–Leicester grouping. 
He claimed to be proud of his administrative justice, never placing his men, whether at 
court or in government. In March 1586 Walsingham complained to Leicester, then 
away in the Dutch enterprise, that ‘The opinion of my partyalytie conytnewethe 
noryshed by faction, which makethe me weerye of the place I serve in and to wysshe 
myself emongst the trewe harted Swy.’16 However, these denials do not verify 
whether the Elizabethan regime had lapsed into factiousness, but rather imply a 
contemporary loathing of the word ‘faction’, which signified social disorder, political 
disunity and treachery. 
 
Conyers Read preferred the term ‘party’ to ‘faction’, in policy debates grouping the 
mid-Elizabethan Council into the ‘war party’ led by Walsingham and Leicester, against 
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the Burghley-headed ‘peace party’.17 But his preference for the term soon gained him 
the censure of other historians. John Neale redefined ‘party’ and ‘faction’:  
 
In Elizabethan England there were no political parties as we know them. True, from 
time to time there were differences among statesmen, but since privy councillors 
played a merely advisory role in matters of policy, owed a personal and not corporate 
obligation to the Queen…there was neither the mechanism nor the mentality to foster 
party politics…The place of party was taken by faction.18 
 
Geoffrey Elton voiced the severest criticism of Read: this ‘biographer of Burghley and 
Walsingham was able to write five large volumes without seemingly becoming aware 
that Court faction differed from political party, even if (possibly) one fathered the 
other’.19 Both critiques share a misconception. Concerning his use of ‘party’, Read 
had explained in the same article that ‘it would perhaps be misleading to speak of these 
groups as political parties…nothing like party organization in the modern sense of the 
term. Yet each group had its leader and its programme, to which each lent a fairly 
consistent support’.20 Blind to Read’s clarification, Neale and Elton wilfully and 
irrelevantly located the sixteenth-century ‘party’ or ‘faction’ on a modern model of 
party politics.  
 
‘Faction’, whether as a noun or in its adjectival form ‘factious’ (or ‘factional’) has been 
one of the most over-used terms in Elizabethan historiography. Compared with the 
pejorative ‘faction’, it seems more appropriate to use the relatively moderate term 
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‘party’ that Conyers Read adopted to define the mid-Elizabethan political schism. In 
the seventeenth century, ‘party’ started becoming the notion of a formal political group, 
constituted on a national basis, which partook in government through public elections. 
In the Tudor period neither ‘party’ nor ‘faction’ were so developed. In contemporary 
usage both of them referred to an informal community, sharing either patronage or 
political and religious conviction, and linked to specific figures. However, ‘faction’ 
was mostly used in conjunction with ‘rebellious’ or ‘anti-English’ subjects, in contrast 
to ‘party’, which was associated with ‘Anglophile’ subjects; the two terms were thus 
polarised between negative and positive usages. 
 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘faction’ first appears in the Bishop of 
Rochester, John Fisher’s Mornynge Remembraunce Countesse of Rychemonde (1509). 
Delivering a sermon on Margaret Lady Beaufort, mother of Henry VII, he recorded her 
strict household rule. ‘If ony faccyons or bendes were made’ secretly among her head 
officers, ‘she..dyde boulte it oute’. Later in the Elizabethan reign the term was often 
used to condemn any association holding selfish or mischievous ends, or using 
unscrupulous methods, against its authority. ‘Faction’ implied social turmoil, national 
schism, and high treason. A judgement on a riot at Lynn in 1582 denounced faction as 
an evil seed breaching the social peace, and prohibited anyone from ‘raising or 
mayntaining of any faction’ in the said town. Responsible for this case, Walsingham 
declared that any surviving faction would be given ‘some charge, lesson, and 
admonition’. 21  Any power adverse to the church settlement and Queen 
Elizabeth—especially Mary Queen of Scots—was labelled as ‘faction’ as well.22 For 
                                                 
21 11 May 1582, Acts of the Privy Council of England 1581-1582, 411. 
 
22 Memoryall at Hampton Court, from a Minute of Secretary Cecil, 10 Mar. 1569, A Collection of State 
Papers, Relating to Affairs in the Reigns of King Henry VIII, King Edward VI, Queen Mary, and Queen 
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instance, perturbed by the abrupt rise of the Duke of Lennox in Scotland in the early 
1580s, the English government accused him of abusing Catholicism for the purpose of 
faction.23  Moreover, during his early French embassy, Walsingham had labelled 
Mary’s followings as faction. ‘Late I caused one under the couller [colour] of a 
Catholique to repayre to a Darbisheire, an Englishe Jesuyte in Paris, for that I 
understoode that ther ys a concurrencie of intelligence between hym and thos of 
Lovayne, and also with thos of the Scottishe Queene’s faction.’24 In August 1572, still 
shuddering at the recent St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre, Robert Beale compiled a 
‘Discourse after the great murder in Paris & other places in France’, claiming the 
safety of Queen Elizabeth and England rested on the survival of Protestantism in 
Europe. And touching England’s own defences, ‘the chiefest mischief is to be found 
inwardly, I mean the faction of the Queen of Scots and papists in this realm’.25 In a 
conference with the complicit Mary after the Throckmorton Plot, Elizabeth’s envoy 
William Waad attacked her overseas agents in Paris for investing her French dowry in 
nourishing a faction against Queen Elizabeth inside England.26 
 
The term ‘party’ was more flexible and moderate, applied to both anti-English enemies 
and Anglophile alliances. In the second Anjou marriage negotiations, Burghley’s 
personal memorandum detailed the national benefits likely to accrue from this royal 
match. ‘Her majestie by her husband shall have a stronge partye in Fraunce of the 
                                                                                                                                               
Lord Burghley, I, (London, 1740), 579.  
 
23 TNA, SP 52/28 f. 4, Instructions to Captain Errington, [22 Feb.] 1580. TNA, SP 52/35/3, Walsingham 
to William Davison, 3 Jun. 1584. 
 
24 BL, Cotton MS Caligula C/III f. 230, Walsingham to Burghley, 4 Mar. 1571/2; TNA, SP 70/120 f. 66r, 
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25 John Cooper, The Queen’s Agent: Francis Walsingham at the Court of Elizabeth I (London, 2011), 
80-81.  
 
26 TNA, SP 53/13/20, Mr. Waad’s conference with Mary, Apr. 1584.  
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relygyon and others, who by this meanes shalbe suer from the tyrrany of the King and 
the papists.’ It was urgent for her to ‘kepe a partye there’ to secure the Huguenots from 
massacre and assure the King of their service.27 Walsingham used ‘party’ likewise in 
positive terms. In order to resist Lennox, Walsingham’s cousin by marriage, Thomas 
Randolph, was assigned to procure ‘a sufficient party’ in Scotland for the Queen.28 
‘Her Majestie’s partye’ would secure support from ‘dyvers Barons and Borough 
townes in Scotland…yf they may be assured see some good hope to be backed and 
countenanced by her in the action’.29 
 
The Elizabethan distinction between ‘faction’ and ‘party’ is clear. The friction amongst 
Elizabeth’s first-generation ministers never deteriorated so dangerously as to become 
rebellious ‘factionalism’, unlike the later hostility between the second Earl of Essex 
and the Cecils, which imperilled the state through domestic chaos. When that political 
polarisation peaked in 1598, Lord Grey complained in July that ‘my Lord of 
Essix…hath forced mee to declare my self either his only, or frend to Mr. Secretary 
and his enimy: protesting that there Could bee noe neutrality’.30 Accordingly, Simon 
Adams denies the existence of factionalism in the period from the late 1570s to the 
1580s.31 Mid-Elizabethan politics did separate vividly into a variety of partisan 
competitions for espionage, patronage, and policy. However, Conyers Read praised the 
divided Council of the 1580s that had equipped England flexibly for impending crises. 
‘Burghley’s prudence made England strong for the crisis, and Walsingham’s fine faith 
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carried her safely through the crisis when it came.’32 Precisely because of its character 
as a lesser danger to political stability than ‘faction’, the moderate ‘party’ is a better 
term with which to define the English political controversy of the 1590s.  
 
Prejudiced against ‘faction’, few Elizabethan politicians would have liked to style 
themselves as leaders of factions. And sufficiently aware that ‘faction’ would breed 
nothing good—except loopholes for their watchful foes to profit by—in making 
policies they tried to avoid factional demarcations.33 In the spring of 1579, on the eve 
of the formal Council discussion of the second Anjou match, Walsingham asserted that,  
 
The tyme requyreth a unitie and perfect agrement rather in them that make profession 
of that truthe which is elswheare impugned, and hathe so mightie enemies and so cruel 
wars in kindling against it in their dayes amongest our fellow membres abrode. Our 
unitie mighte be a strengthe to ourselves and an ayde unto our neighbours, but if wee 
shall like to fall at division among ourselves, wee must need lye open to the common 
enemie, and by our owne faulte hasten or rather call uppon ourselves our own ruin.34 
 
Likewise, Leicester specifically cleared himself of standing in the way of Council 
unity: ‘I have never byn wylling to make quarrels in this court, nor to breed any. My 
nowe honour and por credyt always saved. I nether have nor wyll be a peace breaker 
but a peace maker.’35 Ironically, both Leicester and Walsingham broke their own 
manifesto for internal unity, precisely on this issue of the second Anjou match. Its 
effect on court politics, claims Susan Doran, was devastating: ‘Division which 
emerged in the Council spilled out into the country, threatening to paralyse policy 
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making and revolutionise political life.’36 Elizabeth’s ministers would have liked to 
locate the interest of the whole situation above personal zeal, but they individually 
insisted that their own ideology—either Protestant internationalism or limited 
intervention—would be most profitable for England.  
 
2. The Nature of Mid-Elizabethan Partisanship 
This section aims to demonstrate that Elizabethan partisan rivalry did exist between the 
late 1570s and 1580s, but was due to ideological divergence rather than personal 
enmity or the struggle for patronage. William Camden and Robert Naunton, both as 
contemporary witnesses with first-hand access to high politics, were the first to colour 
Elizabeth’s court with factiousness. Camden’s Annales repeatedly represents Leicester 
as a troublesome and divisive element: Leicester against Sussex in 1565, Leicester and 
Norfolk against Cecil in 1569, and Leicester against Walter Devereux, the first Earl of 
Essex, in 1576.37 Camden also exonerated his patron Burghley from the execution of 
King James’s mother, and imputed it to the ‘subtill practises’ designed by Burghley’s 
opponents Leicester and Walsingham. Similarly, Naunton’s Fragmenta Regalia focuses 
on several of the antagonisms at the mid-Elizabethan court. Sussex appears as the 
‘direct opposite’ of Leicester; ‘they grew to a direct frowardnesse, and were in 
continuall opposition, the one setting the watch, the other the guard each on the others 
actions, and motions.’38 As for Burghley, his dexterity and competence ‘challenged a 
roome in the Queen’s favour, which eclipsed the others overseeming greatnesse, and 
made it appear that there were others steered, and stood at the Helme besides 
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himselfe’.39 Despite being disinclined to raise a party, Burghley’s influence on the 
Queen naturally attracted both suitors and opponents.  
 
Camden and Naunton delivered opposing judgements on Elizabeth’s queenship in the 
politics of faction: whether it was a limited monarchy ruled by factions, or an 
absolutist one that ruled the factions. Camden diminished the extent of Elizabeth’s 
power without her male counsellors by repeatedly emphasising her ‘womanish 
impotency’ in making decisions.40 By contrast, Naunton complimented her as a 
veritable queen in both name and political reality, deft in manipulating factions to 
solidify royal supremacy. ‘She ruled much by faction and parties which she herselfe 
both made, upheld, and weakened, as her owne great judgement adversed.’41 She 
governed by ‘her own Princely judgement’. 
 
While Conyers Read equated mid-Elizabethan partisan politics with division over 
foreign policy, Neale read it as faction linked to patronage allocation. Faction, claimed 
Neale, was ‘centred on what mattered supremely to everyone: influence over the 
Queen, and, through that influence control of patronage with its accompanying 
benefits’.42 The sovereign dominated the whole downwards dissemination of vast 
patronage: grants of honour, offices, royal estates, export licences, and influence in 
business and wardships. Generally the monarch granted benefits via his or her 
trustworthy ministers. They, as handlers alloting royal resources, naturally attracted 
suitors, who either proffered allegiance in politics, or service as a client, as an 
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intelligencer, or in the household. In this way ‘an association of self-interest, a 
mutual-benefit society’ was formed.43 The monarch could excite competition for 
patronage amongst factions in order to maintain a domestic equilibrium; ‘there could 
be no greater disaster than a single faction.’44 More significantly, MacCaffrey agreed 
with Neale that royal control over patronage distribution could safeguard royal 
superiority over factionalism. In 1579, when her Council split on the issue of the Anjou 
courtship, Queen Elizabeth was urged to ‘have all men of value in your realm to 
depend only upon yourself’. Very cautiously, she refused to concentrate her confidence 
in a single favourite but kept ‘open a number of channels to her bounty’.45 According 
to MacCaffrey, ‘It was she who brought the Council to life, in its collective 
consultative capacity, by asking its advice; without her command it could not function 
in this way.’46 The initiative of policy hence rested solely with the sovereign. 
 
Except for Leicester’s Commonwealth of 1584, however, Neale offers little consistent 
evidence to verify if ‘faction’ existed before the 1590s.  MacCaffrey believed there 
was discord between Dudley and Cecil due both to issues of succession and the Dudley 
suit in the 1560s, but he argued that this antagonism had faded away with the 
termination of these conflicting policies. In the late 1570s, the new issues of the Dutch 
revolt and the second Anjou match fomented another split inside the Council, though at 
this time the division had ‘taken on a more impersonal tone and… focussed on 
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differences of opinion rather than on personalities’. After tiding over the crisis, the 
Council ‘seems to have closed ranks and to have acted with general unanimity in 
support of the Queen’s initiatives in the early 1580s’.47 MacCaffrey doubted the 
survival of any Elizabethan partisan politics in the 1580s. 
 
The theory of factional patronage which Neale initiated and MacCaffrey developed 
dominated subsequent historiography until the 1970s.48 Eric Ives reaffirmed Tudor 
‘faction’ as a group of people seeking objectives ‘primarily in personal terms’—either 
gaining or keeping patronage for their associates, or denying this to rivals.49 He 
quarrelled with the assumption that the essence of factional struggle was ‘over-riding 
personal rivalry’, because this phenomenon is only found during three specific crises: 
Anne Boleyn’s faction against Thomas Wolsey from 1527 over the issue of Henry 
VIII’s marriage; under Edward VI, the rise of John Dudley, later Duke of 
Northumberland, against Edward Seymour, Duke of Somerset; and in the 1590s the 
antagonism between the Earl of Essex and Robert Cecil. 50  According to Ives, 
‘Burghley and Leicester—Elizabeth’s closest confidant and her most intimate 
courtier—were recognised rivals, but there was never a complete breakdown of 
relations.’51 Ives also depoliticised faction, questioning its nature as a ‘recognisable 
ideological’ form in the loyal political struggle of the sixteenth century to promote a 
desired policy, first, because the advancement of such concerns was likewise for 
personal advantage, and second, because ‘policy debates would be resolved in terms of 
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people’, with the sovereign putting confidence in those who shared his or her 
opinions.52 The monarch, as the ultimate dispenser of all major patronage, ensured that 
personal monarchy had control over faction. Couriers and ladies admitted to the Privy 
Chamber, ‘rather than those who held formal appointments there’, would earn more 
patronage from, and influence over, the sovereign. In brief, the politics of intimacy 
affected factiousness.53 It is why in the locally litigious quarrels between the families 
of Talbot and Stanhope in the 1590s, the newly rising member of the gentry Thomas 
Stanhope of Shelford, who had strategically cultivated a foothold at court and in 
central office, and friendship with both Burghley and Robert Cecil, Queen Elizabeth’s 
chief confidants, successfully beat the great territorial noble Gilbert Talbot, seventh 
Earl of Shrewsbury, whose position at court had become slight and uncertain.54 
 
Nevertheless, Mitchell Leimon and Christopher Haigh doubted Neale’s theory as being 
‘too far into an unrelenting materialism’, from which personal enmity, politics, and 
ideology were entirely eliminated. 55  Haigh envisaged factions as ideological 
groupings. 56  Elton agreed with Haigh that ‘faction existed for the purpose of 
promoting individual fortunes…it was the mechanism, which, at court, organised the 
satisfaction of personal ambition for wealth and power’. The element of ideology 
receives his attention as well. ‘Every one of the factions that one can identify cherished 
and promoted political ends that had nothing to do with mere personal advancement or 
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the exploitation of patronage.’ However, regarding the Elizabethan factions of the 
1580s, Elton wondered ‘whether the power of ideological politics was then quite as 
strong as it had been in the 1530s’.57 
 
Simon Adams welcomes Elton’s query. There are only two Tudor periods, he believes, 
that were dominated by factional rivalry: the middle years of Edward VI’s reign 
(1548–1552) and the 1590s.58 Adams questions the existence of any factionalism 
between Cecil and Leicester earlier in Elizabeth’s reign for three reasons. First, there is 
little evidence of intense competition over patronage between the heavyweights at 
Elizabeth’s court before the 1590s—Leicester may even have once assisted in Cecil’s 
promotion to the peerage as Baron of Burghley in 1571.59 Second, no evidence shows 
that either Burghley or Leicester owned an exclusive following. Third, Adams stresses 
that Burghley and Leicester were ‘men from a similar political milieu’, sharing ‘too 
much in common for permanent antagonisms to be established’.60 Even if there was 
some potential tension between them, or between Elizabeth’s household and Council, 
for the greater part of Elizabeth’s reign it could be resolved, ‘whether by accident or 
design, through her reliance upon men who were both leading household officers and 
major political figures’. In other words, any divergence on policy could be resolved ‘by 
the Queen in consultation with her intimates’ who were selected ultimately by the 
Queen in terms of her personal relationship with them.61 Penry Williams suggests 
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likewise: ‘while major issues of policy—the Queen’s marriage, the succession, foreign 
policy, military affairs, and religion—did stir heated debate and divide courtiers from 
one another at times, there was more agreement than dissonance among Elizabethan 
politicians, at least until the 1590s’.62 John Guy agrees that the issue of military 
overextension during the 1580s divided Elizabeth’s Council into ‘the interventionists’ 
inclined to open outright war, and ‘the neutralists’ (‘Fortress English’) who argued for 
a coastal defence, but both sides operated under a broader Protestantism (though 
towards which Burghley worked more cautiously than Leicester and Walsingham). 
‘That is not factionalism but judgement.’63 Guy admits that a strong factional element 
only appeared under the aggression of Essex post-1596.  In this light, therefore, 
Adams clarifies the nature of faction:  
 
A faction was not the same thing as a clientage; nor was it the exercise of patronage; 
nor was it the taking of sides on a major political issue: a faction was a personal 
following employed in direct opposition to another personal following. A Faction 
struggle could involve disputes over patronage or debate over matters of state, but its 
essence was a personal rivalry that over-rode all other considerations.64 
 
He therefore ascribes factionalism to personal enmity, which is different from both 
Conyers Read’s linking of factions to policy divisions and Neale and MacCaffrey’s 
understanding of faction as based in the struggle for patronage.  
 
My research into the divisive Elizabethan spy systems and their competition for 
intelligence to fuel their patrons’ political rivalry can address Adams’s three doubts 
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discussed above. Turning from the traditional concerns around the Cecil–Dudley 
relationship, this thesis moves the focus towards the relationship between Burghley 
and Walsingham, which has received surprisingly little scholarly attention. First of all, 
Adams’s core concept of personal enmity is unhelpful in explaining the divided politics 
of the 1580s. Adams himself undermines it, as he finds little evidence at this point of 
personal antagonism or open rupture between Elizabeth’s councillors. There was a 
tension between Leicester, Sussex, and the latter’s friend Cecil, growing over the 
Queen’s matrimonial diplomacy. This discord, Adams notes, never added ‘up to a 
factional conflict, and the distinction becomes apparent when the real faction struggles 
are examined’.65  
 
Their increasingly diametric ideologies did confuse Walsingham in his attitude towards 
Burghley. Walsingham was so grateful for Cecil’s early patronage which promoted him 
speedily into central office, that he devoted the time of his first French embassy service 
to Cecil’s overseas espionage and to supporting the first Anjou match. In 1573 their 
respective transfer to the offices of Lord Treasurer and the Secretaryship formally 
activated their potential divergence on the English policy of intervention in continental 
Protestant battles: whether their primary concern was for the glory of God, or for 
England’s interests and being mindful of ruling legitimacy. Treasurer Burghley shared 
the conservative outlook of Queen Elizabeth, urging peaceful diplomatic negotiations 
instead of costly wars. The new Secretary Walsingham, daily confronted with 
unpleasant news, the sorts of which would naturally infuse the recipient with alarm, 
was reinforced in his beliefs: ‘above all things I wish God’s glory and next the Queen’s 
safety’.66 This position coloured his whole view of foreign policy, and led him to drift 
                                                 
65 Ibid., 37. 
 
66 TNA, SP 70/117 f. 179v, Walsingham to Leicester, Apr. 1571; Cooper, The Queen’s Agent, 64. 
 225 
towards his aggressive ally Leicester. In September 1575, Burghley labelled 
Walsingham as a ‘courtier’ beside Leicester.67 Thomas Smith’s resignation in 1576 
marked, Leimon states, the real beginning of Walsingham’s escape from Burghley’s 
‘tutelage’.68 In January 1585 their discord reached a showdown. Discontented with 
Burghley for hindering his suit for a custom farm and for disagreeing over Dutch 
policy, Walsingham angrily declared their friendship was converted into enmity; the 
whole background to this division in policy will be discussed in the final section.69  
 
The rupture between Walsingham and Burghley was chiefly restricted to policy issues. 
Once away from the Council table, Walsingham was a ‘very friend’ to Burghley, 
sharing in Burghley’s family joys or sorrows, and assisting in his family difficulties.70 
Edward de Vere, Earl of Oxford, Burghley’s son-in-law, was imprisoned in the Tower 
in March 1581, on a charge of fathering an illegitimate child (Edward Vere) with the 
Queen’s maid of honour, Anne Vavasour. Walsingham, jointly with Christopher Hatton, 
pleaded with Queen Elizabeth for the Earl’s liberty.71 In late 1586, Burghley helped 
Walsingham with his late son-in-law Philip Sidney’s debts. It is wrong, therefore, to 
consider the political divide between Burghley and Walsingham in terms of Adams’s 
theory of purely personal enmity.  
 
Secondly, Simon Adams believes there is little evidence of intense contention for 
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patronage between the political heavyweights at Elizabeth’s court before her last 
decade. Actually this competition had existed since 1578, when the 
Walsingham–Leicester party gained an overwhelming majority of central or local 
offices. Mendoza reported to King Philip in early 1578 that Queen Elizabeth ‘sent all 
through the country fully authorised officers with powers such as never have been 
invested before, to seize and imprison Catholics, without appeal’. Most of these local 
officers were ‘pernicious heretical Puritans and creatures of Walsingham, who is a 
great supporter of their sect’. 72  In central government, Walsingham led the 
Secretaryship from 1576 and had sole charge from 1581. Through it, he controlled all 
official papers to and from the Queen, as well as holding mastery over the Signet 
Office and the Privy Seal Office. He, via Thomas Heneage, also befriended 
Christopher Hatton, Lord Vice-Chamberlain, one of the chief functionaries of the court 
administration and gate-keepers of the Queen’s ‘house’. Significantly, the 
Walsingham–Leicester party coveted certain high offices originally held by Cecil’s 
men. In November 1577, the second Secretaryship, vacant since Smith’s retirement, 
was filled by Thomas Wilson. This old Leicestrian acted as a militant ally for 
Walsingham, for the ‘glorie of God’ endeavouring Mary Stuart’s execution and 
England’s international intervention against Catholicism. Now both the Secretaries 
were of the war persuasion. Meanwhile, Wilson, together with Hatton and Edward 
Horsey, ‘a Leicestrian trio’, were nominated as new Councillors. Horsey’s appointment 
was foiled at the last moment; Wilson joined the Council in October though Hatton had 
to wait until December. The death of Nicholas Bacon, Burghley’s brother-in-law, 
emptied the offices of Lord Chancellor and the Great Seal in 1579. Leicester and 
Hatton, promised rich rewards by the candidate Thomas Bromley, successfully 
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advanced him to this vacancy, in spite of opposition from Burghley and Sussex.73 
After the Throckmorton Plot, the Earl of Shrewsbury was deprived of the custody of 
Mary Stuart, replaced by Amias Paulet. It was an outcome Walsingham and Leicester 
had striven towards since 1582, to remove Mary into their exclusive charge.74 
Shrewsbury’s dismissal in 1584 announced Burghley’s forced withdrawal from 
first-hand intelligence concerning Mary and her intrigues. Leicester’s Commonwealth, 
published in the same year, accused Leicester of monopolising courtly offices and 
preferment, for his partisans: 
 
In the privy Chamber, next unto her Majesties Person, the most parte are his owne 
creatures…his raigne is so absolute in this place, (as also in all other parts of the Court) 
as nothing can passe but by his admission, nothing can be said, done, or signified, 
whereof hee is not particularly advertised: no bill, no supplication, no complaint, no 
sute, no speech, can passe from any man to the Princesse (except it bee from one of the 
Councell) but by his good liking…Wherby hee holdeth as it were a lock upon the eares 
of his Prince…no man may bee preferred in Court…except hee bee one of Leycesters 
faction or followers; none can bee advanced, except hee bee liked and preferred by 
him.75 
 
As polemic propaganda this contemporary pamphlet is not totally trustworthy. 
However, Elizabeth herself had felt astonished at seeing Leicester’s over-expanding 
power both at court and in government, and that ‘he had taken advantage of the 
authority she had given him to place kinsmen and friends of his in almost every port 
and principal place in the kingdom’.76 
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It is worth noting Walsingham’s five-year monopoly over the Secretaryship, following 
Thomas Wilson’s death in May 1581 until William Davison’s appointment in 
September 1586. It was not Elizabeth’s custom to appoint two Principal 
Secretaries—Cecil alone occupied this seat from her accession until 1572, and Smith 
briefly in 1572 and 1573. But at this period (1581–1586) a sole appointment was 
unusual. From the beginning of his official career, Walsingham was a known sufferer 
from chronic illness, constantly driven to retire from the court. A substitute Secretary 
seemed necessary, to share responsibility and be ready in case of emergency. 
Furthermore, the overexpansion of the Leicester–Walsingham group in the official 
administration had imperilled the power balance Elizabeth had cultivated so carefully. 
However, despite all this, strangely neither Elizabeth nor Burghley wanted to nominate 
a successor to Wilson, letting the post’s responsibilities significantly devolve upon the 
militant Walsingham alone.  
 
David Loades ascribes the absence of the second Secretary to Burghley’s intention to 
reserve the post for his second son Robert, Cecil consequently dissuading the Queen 
from making an immediate appointment.77 But in light of Burghley’s decreasing 
control over intelligence affairs after leaving the office of Secretary, it seems unlikely 
that he would forsake this opportunity of placing his man in this office and thus risk it 
falling into the hands of opponents, as happened with the assignment of Davison in 
1586. Queen Elizabeth was the one who determined to keep her second Secretaryship 
vacant, and for two reasons. First, she considered that two appointees would find it 
difficult to work cooperatively: ‘how rare a thing it is to fynd colleagues and 
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companyes in authority soundly to agree together’.78 Her second reason was due to her 
financial caution. The regular allowance of the Secretary was £100 annually; not 
generous but extended with plentiful subventions. Thomas Wilson in 1579 was 
rewarded with the office of dean of Durham, worth £666 per annum. Two further 
assignments—the parsonage of Mansfield in Nottinghamshire, and the manor of 
Saltfleetby in Lincolnshire—brought him handsome revenues. Walsingham obtained 
more royal lands and patents, as well as more central and local offices profitable in 
substantial annuities.79 Maintaining a single Secretaryship was expensive; Elizabeth 
was unwilling to have the charge of a second. Her financial caution, therefore, fostered 
the power imbalance in her regime.80 
 
Walsingham himself was loath to share his Secretaryship with colleagues. Even when 
the position was held jointly with Wilson in 1576 and later Davison in 1586, both acted 
as merely ‘a minister of the inferior order, and more exercised in the forms than 
essence of business’. ‘And though it does not appear in what manner the province of 
secretary was then divided, yet it is probable that the secret part of it was entirely 
managed by Walsingham.’81  Unlike Burghley’s power which was rooted in the 
Queen’s absolute confidence, and Leicester’s in his role as her favourite, Walsingham’s 
political prominence hinged on Elizabeth’s reliance on his efficient espionage system. 
He needed to grasp its leadership fast and exclusively. Hence, he privatised his spy 
system, withdrawing it from government halls and the control of official colleagues, 
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into his private residences and the hands of his household clients. Even when 
temporarily leaving for embassies, he let no colleagues deputise in his Secretaryship. 
Usually, Robert Beale was assigned as his substitute; his private secretariat and Walter 
Williams ensured the intelligence business worked as usual. Consequently, despite 
being antagonistic to her aggressive Secretary, Elizabeth had to rely on his skilled 
espionage and allowed him to keep, and further monopolise, the Secretaryship.  
  
A surprising number of Elizabeth’s diplomats abroad were little more than agents of 
Walsingham or Leicester. After Walsingham assumed the chief Secretaryship in early 
1576, Amias Paulet assumed the embassy in Paris that September. Meanwhile, 
Leicester’s and Walsingham’s men had undertaken up to 87 per cent of the diplomatic 
visits to the Low Countries made from April 1576 (after Smith retired in March) to 
1587. William Davison, Daniel Rogers and Thomas Wilkes were the candidates 
assigned most frequently.82 All three had joined Walsingham’s patronage network via 
diplomatic employment in the early 1570s. Other envoys there were also clients, like 
Edward Horsey (December 1576–February 1577), who was characterised by the 
scurrilous Leicester’s Commonwealth as Leicester’s ‘great friend and a trustie 
servaunt’. He entered Leicester’s clientele as early as the latter’s Marian exile. Thomas 
Leighton (December 1577–February 1578) was one of Leicester’s ‘most obliged 
dependentes’; his family ties and marriage to Elizabeth Knollys located him at the core 
of the Dudley clientele.83 Fulke Greville (March–April 1582) and Edward Dyer 
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(January–March 1584) were allied with Leicester through their boyhood friendship 
with Philip Sidney, whose lyric celebrated the ‘happy blessed Trinitie’ they formed.84 
Thomas Randolph, Walsingham’s cousin by marriage and similarly sympathetic to 
radical Protestantism, often led embassies to Scotland.85 
 
The growing monopoly of the Leicester-Walsingham party over government 
administration alarmed Burghley. Susan Doran and David Loades assume that 
Burghley’s assumption of the Treasurership, and tension with Walsingham over foreign 
policy, undermined his role in the Council. No longer attending daily on the Queen, as 
did the favourites Leicester and Hatton, and also as did Secretary Walsingham, 
Burghley had been reduced to a back seat in the formulation of policy.86 In actual fact, 
as Stephen Alford suggests, Burghley was ‘never far away from the most secret 
counsels of Elizabethan and her Secretary’.87 From 1578, when foreign policy reduced 
the Council to a state of partisan division, Burghley collaborated with the similarly 
conservative Queen Elizabeth, who applied her royal prerogative over official 
appointments to balance the scales of administrative power. The pro-Cecil Lord 
Cobham, William Brooke, was assigned to accompany Walsingham on the special 
embassy to the Low Countries in mid-1578. His brother Henry Brooke replaced Amias 
Paulet in the residential embassy in France in 1579; Stafford succeeded him from 1583 
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to 1590.88 Those new diplomats’ kinswomen—Frances Lady Cobham and Dorothy 
Lady Stafford—who served in the royal bedchamber, strengthened Burghley’s 
influence on the Queen. And the threefold connection between Burghley, the embassy, 
and the female chamber, created an alternative intelligence-diplomacy route at court, 
bypassing the formal secretarial procedure. It restrained Secretary Walsingham’s 
monopoly over both national and foreign affairs, as well as the circulation of 
intelligence. In addition, Henry Carey, Lord Hunsdon, Elizabeth’s first cousin, filled 
the office of Lord Chamberlain made vacant by the death of Sussex in 1583. After the 
failure of the Ruthven raiders who rebelled to wrest control from King James of 
Scotland in the spring of 1584, Hunsdon was authorised to open negotiations with 
James Stuart, Earl of Arran, about the possibility of an Anglo-Scottish league. Arran 
was now the most powerful intimate of James VI. Siding with Burghley, Hunsdon 
blamed Leicester and Walsingham as ‘two princypale counselars [that] have so smale 
care of hyr majesty’s estate [as] for theyr private causes to lose hyr majesty a King’. 
He warned of a ‘further matter worse than this’: their intention to secure the English 
succession for Henry Hastings, Earl of Huntingdon. 89  Hastings was Leicester’s 
brother-in-law and a committed Protestant, standing distantly in line to the English 
throne through his mother’s family, the Poles. In October 1562, when Elizabeth fell ill 
with smallpox, the radical group even planned to recommend him as a claimant to the 
throne. Walsingham despised Burghley’s use of Hunsdon, whose only advantage was 
his nearness to the Queen through Boleyn kinship. Walsingham also suspected them of 
being in secret communication with Arran, ‘both to my disgrace and the hindrance of 
her Majesty’s service’.90 Early in 1586, during Leicester’s absence in the Dutch wars, 
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three new pro-Cecil members—John Whitgift, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord 
Cobham and Lord Buckhurst—joined the Council. 
 
The partisan competition over patronage included money as well. In his indignant 
letter to Burghley on 30 January 1585, Walsingham was infuriated by Burghley’s 
hampering his claim for a farm of the customs After the Babington Plot, Walsingham 
angled to be awarded Babington’s forfeited estates, as repayment for his espionage and 
the mountainous debts left by the late Philip Sidney. However, in March 1587 the 
Queen granted Babington’s Derbyshire properties to her favourite, Walter Raleigh; 
Burghley’s role in this decision is unclear.91 
 
Walsingham’s efforts to secure financial patronage aimed to fund his costly espionage. 
Independent from the official administration, Walsingham’s household-based 
secretariat had to recruit more members to cope with the daily growing business of the 
Secretaryship and espionage. Consequently the bulkiness of his secretariat, at least six 
times the size of Burghley’s, incurred financial embarrassment. His pan-European 
espionage further emptied his purse. For Walsingham, if knowledge was needed it 
could never be too dear. When faced with the threats that stirred in Scotland in the 
early 1580s, he instructed Robert Bowes, English special envoy there, and Ambassador 
Henry Brooke in Paris, to ‘spare no cost’ to gather intelligence.92 Walsingham’s 
generosity fostered his spies’ endless greed. The Frenchman Pierre d’Or, alias Henri 
Châteaumartin, demanded no less than £1,000 to meet his expenditure.93 For these 
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ballooning costs, the royal warrants rising from £500 in 1585 up to £2,800 in 1588, 
were so insufficient that Walsingham was forced to pay out of his own purse.94 In a 
literary appreciation written after his death, Walsingham is described in the following 
terms: ‘He did foster and help to prevent many dangers, practices [plots] as well as 
abroad as at home against his Prince and his country in discovery of which he was so 
largely liberal that he neglected much of his private estate as well as for health and 
wealth.’95 Walsingham strove for patronage and burdened himself with debt in order 
to uphold his espionage, ultimately to further his policy of universal Protestantism: ‘the 
pursuit of God’s glory’.  
 
The shortage of funds for spying forced Walsingham ceaselessly to request royal 
patronage. This point counters Simon Adams’s allegations of factional competition for 
patronage, and the exclusive nature of Burghley’s and Leicester’s respective followings. 
Adam states that regarding ‘Walsingham himself, Henry Killigrew, Robert Beale, 
William Herle—clear lines of allegiance have been very difficult to draw’. Firstly, this 
claim can be doubted because focusing narrowly on the Burghley–Leicester 
relationship, Adams overlooks the rising prominence of Walsingham in the regime. 
Indeed, Adams locates Walsingham within Cecil’s clientele, when in fact he had left 
around 1576 and risen to the very top official rank. Secondly, the lines of allegiance 
running between personal clientele and official duty could be confused and conflicting. 
Many officials were colleagues in government, albeit adversarial in politics and in 
competition for patronage. Furthermore, it was usual for Elizabethan politicians to 
assume multiple loyalities to different people, on the various bases of patronage 
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transactions, intermarriage, and common ideology. Henry Killigrew, Cecil’s brother by 
marriage, nonetheless shared radical sympathy with Walsingham, and in diplomacy 
served his lifelong patron Leicester. Nevertheless, away from officialdom, excluding 
the examples of double agents (like Herle and Parry), fidelity to a single patron can 
definitely be seen within the ministerial private secretariats. The research on 
Elizabethan espionage in the previous chapters has disclosed the intelligence-patronage 
followings, individually led by Burghley and Walsingham. Between the two systems 
there was little overlap of personal intelligence employees. In order to be away from 
Burghley’s influence in government, Walsingham designed his intelligence 
administration towards the utmost privatisation, centred on his household clients. 
Accordingly, the official intelligence machinery under the Secretaryship was converted 
into a private clientele, pledging exclusive loyalty to its patron.  
 
In contrast with Walsingham’s household-based privatised system, Burghley attached 
his intelligence network to the government and the royal court. Although his retirement 
from the Secretaryship forced him to withdraw his information secretariat into his 
household, in fact Burghley’s team remained in close alliance with the government. 
Along with clients, some of them were planted in government, not only for reasons of 
patronage but also to secure Burghley’s control over official information.96 Moreover, 
unlike Walsingham with his preference for gathering intelligence with private spies, 
Burghley allied himself with officials like Ambassadors Cobham and Stafford, who 
worked amongst the Catholic exiles, and the Earl of Shrewsbury who had ready access 
to Mary Stuart. Unavoidably, these diplomats came to owe official obligations to 
Secretary Walsingham, but their partisan loyalty to Cecil remained striking. Although 
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Sussex often worked with Leicester in the Council, he gave his unstinting support to 
Burghley and stuck ‘as near to you [Burghley] as your shirt is to your back’.97 
Burghley also befriended the kinswomen of these ambassadors who were appointed to 
the chief posts in the royal bedchamber, which therefore had an even stronger partiality 
for Cecil.98 More significantly, these female intimates offered Burghley an alternative 
intelligence access to the Queen. In short, Walsingham’s intelligence system combined 
his Secretaryship with his household clients and spies. Burghley tied his network of 
intelligencers to the government and court, which was more stable and cheaper, and 
offered more opportunities to influence the Queen. Both systems fostered specific 
loyalty to their respective spymaster, although unavoidably the clients and spies of 
both often stumbled across one another in the course of government business.  
 
These individual intelligence systems served the specific parties their spymasters 
belonged to. The achievements of those employed in hunting out intelligence won the 
initiative for their patron within the regime, and the patronage for themselves that 
ensured their own survival. This formed, therefore, a complicated triple relationship of 
interdependence between patronage, intelligence, and party. Simon Adams’s three 
doubts are thus resolved.  
 
It seems fairly obvious that a political divide existed in the mid-Elizabethan regime, 
split over competition for influence and rewards. But why did parties struggle thus for 
patronage? The patronage in offices and emoluments profited Walsingham very little in 
terms of personal wealth, and even drew him into financial embarrassment for the 
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remainder of his life. He applied those royal rewards to establishing his own partisan 
dominance over the administration, and funding his private espionage. Both efforts 
were aimed at achieving success for godly Protestantism. In terms of the first, placing 
his men and associates in domestic office, parliament, and overseas embassies, 
Walsingham hoped to ‘have all reformations done by public authority’ rather than 
private zeal. Personal enthusiasm would carry policy further awry. Much of his 
financial patronage was, secondly, injected into espionage. His secret service fulfilled 
its national responsibility, defending the Queen, the state, and the church establishment, 
despite Walsingham being dissatisfied with the structure and doctrine of the latter. 
Through its success in counter-plots from 1583, Walsingham drove the Queen and 
national policy step by step away from Burghley’s conservative side and towards the 
Protestant battlefields against Spain. In short, the fundamental spirit of partisanship (or 
factionalism) was ideology, for which the competition for patronage was merely a 
prelude. This is the next issue to be discussed.  
 
3.  The Divided English Interventionist Policy 
During the second half of the sixteenth century, claims Simon Adams, the Protestant 
Reformation transformed the nature of conventional aristocratic clientage. The 
emerging self-identification of Protestants as the ‘godly’ created a new type of social 
allegiance, with individuals eager to execute their offices to honour God. ‘The Court, 
council and parliament took on a new importance, for they now became the means 
through which a godly policy would be formulated.’99 Walsingham’s clientele network 
was the one of the first conforming to this newly ideological type. His private 
secretaries like Robert Beale, Ralph Warcop, Laurence Tomson and Thomas Phelippes, 
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and his spies like Maliverey Catilyn, preferred Walsingham’s employment mainly 
because of their godly affiliations. Walsingham’s household service became a ‘perfect 
hot-bed of Puritanism’.100 By the 1580s, Leicester’s clientage, ‘based not upon vast 
inherited estates, but upon borough lordships and high stewardships acquired through 
being a courtier and a royal favourite’, may have also assumed this new shape.101 
‘Loyalty to the Earl himself was increasingly overshadowed by his identification with 
the cause.’102 In 1581 one Puritan Richard Knightley told him that,  
 
You have lightened many a godly man’s heart and I am sure you have thereby gotten 
you such friends as would be ready to venture their lives with your lordship in a good 
cause, even such as would not do it so much in respect of your high calling, as for that 
they espy in your lordship a zeal and care for the helping and relieving of the poor 
church.103 
 
This image that Leicester fabricated himself as a godly defender successfully attracted 
numerous Protestant zealots.104 This new type, the ideologically committed, also 
organised the pivot of Leicester–Walsingham party. Instead of materialism, ties by 
blood, intermarriage and godly ideology formed its heart: the Dudleys, the Sidneys, 
Francis Knollys, Walsingham and Francis Russell, Earl of Bedford. The cosmopolitan 
Protestantism of the three latter figures particularly was activated during their Marian 
religious exiles in Italy.105 They defined the success of English foreign policy in terms 
of liberating all Protestants, notably the Dutch Calvinists and the French Huguenots, 
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from Catholic persecutions and menaces. Their universal Protestantism challenged the 
Burghley-led conservatism, which gave priority to England’s interest and ruling 
legitimacy. From 1578 when the Dutch Protestants rose against Spain, this divergence 
split the Privy Council over whether England should interfere in the Dutch revolt.  
 
This political divide was frequently reported to Madrid by the newly assigned Spanish 
ambassador Mendoza. On 31 March 1578, he observed that the Elizabethan regime 
was falling into inner division: 
 
The bulk of the policy really depends upon the Queen, Leicester, Walsingham and 
Cecil, the latter of whom, although he takes part in the resolution of them by virtue of 
his office, absents himself on many occasions, as he is opposed to the Queen’s helping 
the rebels so effectively and thus weakening her own position. He does not wish to 
break with Leicester and Walsingham on the matter, they being very much wedded to 
the States, and extremely self-seeking, as I am assured that they are keeping the 
interest of the money which the Queen has lent to the States...They urge the business 
under cloak of preserving their religion, which Cecil cannot well oppose, nor can he 
afford to make enemies of them, as they are well supported…Leicester, whose spirit is 
Walsingham, is so highly favoured by the Queen, notwithstanding his bad character, 
that he centres in his hands and those of his friends most of the business of the 
country.
106 
 
Mendoza accused Leicester and Walsingham, ‘the reform party’, of fomenting policy 
antagonism towards the anti-war Burghley, deliberately misleading the Queen into an 
open rupture with Spain, and profiting themselves on the strength of it. Elizabeth was 
persuaded by them that she could only ensure her safety and enhance England’s 
strength by harrying Spain in long and costly wars. Accordingly, Leicester and 
Walsingham hatched up Drake’s armed expedition and arranged for French Huguenot 
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aid to help the Portuguese pretender, Don Antonio, in his enterprise to Portugal.107 
Mendoza also reproached Walsingham and Leicester for being driven more by avarice 
than by patriotism or faith. Their cooperation with the Prince of Orange both profited 
them financially, and in respect of the English succession. Queen Elizabeth promised 
Walsingham and Leicester that if they were able to persuade the Dutch rebels to pay 8 
per cent of the costs annually, they would obtain its revenue.108 In reward for their 
efforts at the English court, William of Orange had engaged to uphold their proposed 
succession of the Earl of Huntingdon, promising to support them ‘by sea with ships’ 
when the Queen died.109 
 
Conyers Read cited Mendoza’s diplomatic reports as proof of the mid-Elizabethan 
political disunion. He divided the Council at this time into the ‘peace party’ and the 
‘war party’, and marked their ‘partisan spirits’ by a list of neat antitheses between the 
party heads. Walsingham ‘was quite prepared to sacrifice England’s interests for the 
sake of what he considered the great cause’; Burghley was ‘chiefly guided by reasons 
of state…preferred national considerations before religious ones’. Walsingham 
supported any anti-Spanish movements, like the Dutch Protestant revolts, Francis 
Drake’s maritime robberies, and the Portuguese pretender Don Antonio’s rebels. By 
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contrast, Burghley promoted the Anjou courtship, and the nomination of Stafford to the 
French embassy to counter Walsingham’s monopoly on diplomacy and intelligence.110 
Burghley and Sussex supported the suppression of Catholicism via non-military means 
like negotiation, diplomatic alliances, or royal matrimony. This view met with fierce 
opposition from the godly group, and was denounced as an appeasement of Catholic 
tyranny. To free their persecuted coreligionists, the radicals believed that the most 
effective method was to counter violent Catholicism with violence. As a consequence 
of this stalemate in the foreign policy, the Elizabethan espionage service split from the 
late 1570s. The party heads individually organised and privatised their own spy 
systems, competing for valuable intelligence to further their partisan ideologies within 
policy debate, as well as to diminish each other’s influence within the regime.  
 
Mitchell Leimon, however, doubts this view of Read’s concerning divisions in the 
Council before the Spanish Armada, and thinks Read’s proof rests too narrowly on 
Mendoza’s biased ambassadorial reports.111 Nevertheless, certain contemporary and in 
the main strongly partial works, record the same political strife and ascribe it likewise 
to the divisions over policy. John Clapham, ‘a clerk to the Lord Treasurer’, compiled a 
treatise Elizabeth of England some twenty years later, accusing Leicester of ‘being in 
great favour with the Prince and desirous for his own glory’, who urged English 
intervention ‘in the behalf of the United Provinces’.112 William Camden wrote the 
Annales to publicise his old patron Burghley’s moderation by condemning Leicester’s 
personal immorality and his party’s grandiose military policy. And he verified that in 
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1584 Elizabeth’s Council was mired in a worsening stalemate over the issue of whether 
England should offer more active aid to the Utrecht Union, then in both military and 
political collapse.  
 
The new change in the Dutch war appeared to be quite adverse to the Protestant cause. 
Alexander Farnese, Prince of Parma, had overrun the part of Flanders south of Lys in 
1583, and later in 1584 most of Brabant. By February 1585, Antwerp and Ostend were 
beleaguered, and Brussels was ready to surrender. Suddenly in May 1584 the Duke of 
Anjou died. Queen Elizabeth had used Anjou in the English diplomatic arrangements 
in the Low Countries to counter-balance the triple powers of the Dutch Protestants, 
France, and Spain. Anjou’s English connection as a presumptive suitor of Queen 
Elizabeth temporarily placated the Dutch Protestants’ request for English intervention. 
His proximity to the French succession and personal ambition discouraged his brother 
Henri III from occupying the Low Countries. Furthermore, Anjou’s acting as a tie to 
the joint Valois–Tudor alliance made him a menace to Spain. Unfortunately, Anjou’s 
demise upset this delicate power balance. More ruinously, Prince William of Orange 
was assassinated in July, and his son Maurice was too young to fill his place. The 
headless commonwealth was desperate for a foreign sovereign that could bring 
substantial military and financial aid; only Henri III of France and Queen Elizabeth of 
England qualified for their requirements.  
 
Originally King Henri was their prime candidate. As early as the June of 1584, at the 
urging of William of Orange shortly before his murder, the State Generals had sent two 
envoys to Paris, formally offering Henri III his late brother Anjou’s title accompanying 
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the right to garrison the principal Flemish and Brabantine towns.113 Yet fear of the 
Guises motivated King Henri’s refusal to act. Anjou’s death had all but confirmed the 
Huguenot head Henry of Bourbon, King of Navarre, as the next heir presumptive to the 
French throne. Consequently, the Catholic League and the Guises armed to force King 
Henri to disinherit Navarre, and instead recognize as his heir the latter’s uncle, the 
Cardinal Charles de Bourbon, and to root out the Huguenots. Therefore, in July 1584, 
King Henri refused the first offer of the Dutch Protestants.  
 
While continuing in their attempts to persuade King Henri, the States Generals began 
to turn to the alternative candidate, Queen Elizabeth. In August their agents reached 
London with a request for succor of 6,000 foot, 3,000 horse, and 300,000 lbs of 
powder.114 This new development compelled the Queen to ponder the feasibility of 
whether she could rescue the Dutch Protestants alone without French help. Doubtless it 
would be regarded by King Philip as a declaration of war. Her Council also fell into 
quarrels over whether or not to send military aid to the Dutch rebels against Spain.115 
Walsingham and Leicester headed the war party, denouncing Philip’s suppression of 
the Dutch Calvinists, his pensioning of English exiles to further conspiracies, the 
anti-Elizabeth plots designed by his diplomat Mendoza (formerly in England but now 
in Paris), and the avaricious malice with which he fought against the whole 
Reformation. In one way, through the discovery of the Throckmorton Plot, 
Walsingham had successfully tempted his indecisive Queen to expel the complicit 
Ambassador Mendoza and break openly with Spain. This left England no alternative 
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but to turn to France as an ally. In addition, Walsingham also encouraged an activist 
policy, of direct, immediate, and armed intervention in the Low Countries by England 
‘alone’, without waiting on the French. Walsingham justified the claim to open war, 
that while wars in pursuit of dynastic ambition were unacceptable, those ‘grounded on 
necessary, not for sovereignty but for safety, not to enlarge but to retain’, were 
justifiable.116  
 
Burghley opposed this call for armed engagement because of its enormous expense, its 
threat to commerce, and the legitimacy of the Spanish suppression of its rebellious 
territories. Burghley defined the Dutch as rebels, and King Philip was only doing ‘a 
thing that any prince would do’.117 Furthermore, Burghley argued, England should 
avoid being involved in wars, in order to preserve her strength for home defence:  
 
if the Queene would intermeddle no more in the matters of the Netherlands, but most 
strongly fortifie her owne kingdome, binde the good unto her daily more straitly by her 
innated bounty, restraine the bad, gather money, furnish her Navy with all provision, 
strengthen the borders toward Scotland with garrison, and maintaine the ancient 
military discipline of England…So would England become impregnable and She on 
every side most secure, and dreadfull to her enemies. That this was the most 
commodious means for those which had ever mighty neighbours, to avoid warre…But 
they which were of this opinion, incurred heavy displeasure amongst martiall men, as 
inclining to the Spaniards party, degenerate, and faint-hearted cowards.118 
 
Burghley was not callous towards non-English Protestants in distress. He chose to help 
them through diplomatic negotiations and a royal matrimonial alliance, on the premise 
of not damaging English interests. However, this only slowly effective remedy 
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dissatisfied the eager Walsingham, who preferred a faster and more forcible strategy.  
 
In stalemate over the Dutch policy, in mid-November of 1584 the Council dispatched 
William Davison to discover the Dutch intentions and hopes for English assistance. 
The initial information Davison sent back, probably deliberately, strengthened 
Walsingham’s arguments. ‘To conclude, I finde these countries yet so stronge, the 
meanes to mentaine the wares so great with good governement, and the affections of 
the people universallie so aliened from the French, as if theie had any asseurance of her 
Highness’ disposition to relieve and help them, their treatie with France…wold coole 
of itself.’119 Elizabeth was greatly encouraged, consenting to an initial investment of 
£6,000 to advance the cause. But this fund was transferred, for some unclear reason, to 
Truchsess, Elector of Cologne. Walsingham, absent from the court ‘for the cure of my 
olde desease’, attributed this change to the influence of Burghley, who ‘as I suppose is 
principallie made acquainted with this despatche’.120 Again during Walsingham’s sick 
leave, on 14 January 1585 Burghley instructed Davison that the Queen ‘hath heretofore 
at divers time offered to the Frenche Kinge to join with him in succouring [and 
protecting] of the States’ against Spain.121 Previewing this letter on 11 January, 
Walsingham addressed Burghley at length with his hard arguments. He impatiently 
described the Queen’s ‘good consideration’ on the Dutch issue as irresolution at the 
wrong time. He appealed to her (and Burghley) to consider more ‘the perilous state 
that those countries do presently stand in’. He once again asserted that the Queen 
should ‘resolve to take the protection of them herself, which would be most profitable 
for the cause, the most surest course for herself, and the onlie and likeliest waie to 
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drawe the malcontentes to revolte from the Spanishe course, which would worke more 
furtherance unto the cause than myllion of poundes’.122  
 
Displeased at Burghley’s interference in these matters during his enforced absence, 
Walsingham also observed that Burghley had hindered his petition for a farm of the 
customs of certain English ports. Consequently, the irritated Walsingham wrote 
Burghley a letter using exceptionally harsh rhetoric (some passages were later 
underlined by Burghley), first refuting certain libellous reports in the latter’s hands, 
which ‘myght work some doubtfull conceypt of my good wyll towards you’. Then he 
proceeded to reproach Burghley’s ‘opposytyon in my sute for the farming of the 
custome’. So many reasons, ‘confyrmed so many wayes’, induced him to believe ‘the 
truthe of former reports of your L. myslyke of me’. The indignant Walsingham 
announced:  
 
yt was a more save [safe] coorse for me to howlde your L. rather as an ennemye then 
as a frende…Nowe whyles I was possessed with this dyscontentement I confesse I 
sowght up sooche informatyons as heretofor (unsowght for) have ben gyven unto me, 
that myght any way towche your L., and meant…to have proceaded by conference 
with the partyes to have drawen some further lyght from them herin.123 
 
His recriminations expose the papered-over antagonism beneath Queen Elizabeth’s 
seemingly harmonious regime in the mid-1580s. Interestingly, Burghley underlined the 
terms respecting Walsingham’s sources of such information, rather than his 
announcement of enmity. This implies Burghley’s interest in knowing who offered 
Walsingham intelligence adverse to him, and Burghley’s tolerance of his hot-tempered 
junior. Walsingham did not mention that his information came from his spies; he only 
                                                 
122 TNA, SP 12/176/5, Walsingham to Burghley, 11 Jan. 1585.  
 
123 TNA, SP 12/176/19, Walsingham to Burghley, 30 Jan. 1584/5. 
 
 247 
used the word ‘informer’ in the following different context of Exchequer business: 
‘And towching the partyculer matter your L makethe mentyon of in your letter that a 
cliente of myn should deale with an Esschequer man by my order for the searche of 
some matter that might towche your L. I doe assure your L I doe not remember any 
sooche matter and therfor doe howld my selve wronge therin by the informer.’  
 
From Walsingham’s second letter of the same day, after Burghley’s speedy reply (now 
lost), we can assume that Walsingham gained his information not from spies, but from 
within the Privy Chamber, or even possibly from the Queen. He was reluctant to reveal 
his source to Burghley, writing rather delicately: ‘And towching the producyng of the 
reportes yf I myght doe yt with the credyt of an honest man I woold not fayle to 
satysfyie your L. therin Besydes yt may reatche to sooche persons as are not to be 
caused in question.’124 If his information came from the Queen, it is well worth 
considering how Elizabeth ruled by faction in order to strengthen her royal supremacy. 
She passed on to Burghley intelligence from Walsingham’s spies like Walter Williams, 
and conversely to Walsingham some concerning Burghley. Elizabeth was cunningly 
skilful in creating or provoking tension between her chief ministers, in order to 
maintain the equilibrium between the parties in her regime. Moreover, at the beginning 
of this second letter, Walsingham was open in his appreciation of Burghley ‘for your 
frendely acceptyng of my playne manner of wrytyng: assuring your L that you shall 
fynde at my handes all dewe and synceare performaunce of my promysed good wyll 
towards your L’. It looked like reconciliation. But, after a week, Walsingham’s spy 
Edmund Neville denounced to the Queen a regicidal plot instigated by Burghley’s 
chief agent provocateur, William Parry. Parry was tried and convicted on 25 February 
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1587, and was hanged on 2 March. Parry died for his growing greed and his confused 
loyalty between his Queen and Catholicism. However his death was also probably in 
part due to Walsingham’s remaining animosity towards his patron. This event might 
have somewhat damaged Elizabeth’s confidence in Burghley’s espionage. 
 
The international climate in early 1585 developed in favour of the war party. On 27 
February, Henri III restated his inability to help the Dutch, as his own estate was ‘so 
fickle and so unsound within itself that he was to fear lest in going about to get upon 
others he should put in a venture to “leese” himself’.125 This was true, and on 20 
March, the Catholic League seized Chalons, signalling the outbreak of a new civil war 
in France; in June King Henri yielded to the League, agreeing to the Treaty of 
Nemours. Meanwhile, Philip II suddenly seized all the English ships lying in Spanish 
ports, on the excuse that he needed shipping for a fleet assembling at Lisbon. The 
Dutch revolt came to another point of military collapse. Brussels and Malines had 
surrendered to the Prince of Parma, and besieged Antwerp was parleying with him. 
These new dangers promoted Walsingham’s interventionist claim for godly glory, and 
converted Burghley to the policy of giving aid to the Dutch. The Queen, too, 
reluctantly recognised that she could no longer stand as a spectator beyond the seas.126 
 
In June 1585 a Dutch envoy arrived to offer Elizabeth their sovereignty. She refused in 
order to avoid a limitless obligation for their defence, as well as because of the risk of 
further infuriating Spain. In July, Walsingham may have ensnared Burghley through a 
double agent. There is some evidence that through William Herle, Walsingham was 
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trying to inspire Burghley’s support in the projected Dutch enterprise by tempting his 
greed with a very desirable profit. On 25 July, Herle informed Walsingham that ‘as 
much as your instructions ymported’ he had written to Burghley, persuading him of a 
scheme to help the Low Countries which would return a rich bonus, £10,000 monthly 
to the Queen and £1,000 to Burghley. Herle added that ‘the matter sholld passe 
scylently bettwen theme’. Seemingly, Herle ingratiated himself with his new patron 
Walsingham by entrapping his old one, dangling a bribe in front of Cecil.127 Conyers 
Read, however, assessed this differently, seeing Herle, as ‘a clever scoundrel’, who 
falsely played up to Walsingham in order to show Walsingham’s trickery to his old 
patron Burghley. In short, he served Burghley as a spy inside Walsingham’s system.128 
 
Probably because of Herle’s intelligence, Burghley was sufficiently alert. His response 
to this proposal effectively eliminated any design to corrupt him. He replied on 24 
July:  
 
How I can be tempted with allowance of a devise to gaine to hir majestie 10,000 l 
monethly, and to my self one other 1,000, so as hir majestie will help the states…But 
for ani offer to my self, I do utterly refuse either such, or a less sum, thinking it more 
charitie to yeild of myne owne to the comen Cawse, than to receave a penye. 
 
In the postscript he added with caution, 
 
I mervaile that anie malicious disourser can note me a Counsellor that I do abuse my 
creditt to my private gaine. I may say boldly, that I have neither made nor had sute 
from hir majestie these ten yeres, by lease, lycence, gyfte, lone or any other waie worth 
ten li. How others ar fraught with sutes, the world may easely see, which I do not 
mislyke.129 
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Burghley’s words do not demonstrate his incorruptibility; he had been enriching his 
own purse via his mastery of wardships. But they show Burghley’s discreetness and his 
insight into the Queen’s real attitude towards the Dutch rebels.130 In addition, the 
cunning Burghley had suspected Leicester of initiating these schemes to disgrace him. 
Faced with Burghley’s questions, Leicester denied any charge, and continued attempts 
to canvass Burghley on how beneficial the diplomatic commission would be.  
 
Eventually on 10 August, through the preliminary Treaty of Nonsuch, England agreed 
to dispatch and pay, as long as the war continued, an auxiliary force of 5,000 foot and 
1,000 horses. The vanguard of the English auxiliary army, under John Norris, reached 
the Low Countries by mid-August. In September Leicester was assigned as their 
General, and crossed in December. At home, Walsingham and Hatton did their utmost 
to defend Leicester’s Dutch expedition.131 Walsingham particularly ‘hath bene behind 
hand to no one of the rest in an honest and honourable defence of your [Leicester] 
doings, but th’opinion of his partiality to your Lordship hath somewhat prejudiced his 
credit with her [Majesty]’. 132  Walsingham, as Secretary regulating the flow of 
information and intelligence from and to the Queen, exercised real power through his 
office, and used it to protect his political and ideological policy.  
 
Queen Elizabeth did know of Walsingham’s manipulation of intelligence in his 
attempts to sway her opinions, so her relationship with her aggressive Secretary often 
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became tense. For example, one of the most polemical oppostions to the second Anjou 
match came from John Stubbs’s Discoverie of a Gaping Gulf whereinto England is like 
to be swallowed by another French mariage, published in early August 1579 and 
widely distributed. Susan Doran points out that Stubbs’s arguments against the match 
were quite similar to those listed in the Council meeting the previous spring, including 
Anjou’s faith, his nationality, Elizabeth’s age, and the dangers of a marriage to ‘the 
brother of childless France’. Both Doran and Leimon labelled the Discoverie a 
‘politically factious’ and ‘factional’ book. Elizabeth strongly suspected her Secretary 
Walsingham of having ‘knowledge of this affair’ and acting as Stubbs’s informant. 
Hence in October 1579 the gossip in Paris was that Elizabeth had dismissed 
Walsingham from the Court as a ‘protector of heretics’.133 In the 1580s, the partisan 
combativeness of Leicester and Walsingham frequently enraged the Queen.134 She 
blamed Walsingham for his expulsion of non-military men from the government, such 
as the replacement of the Earl of Shrewsbury by Paulet as Mary’s keeper: ‘you do 
nothing but stir up things to gain other ends, but it all ends in smoke’.135 She 
condemned Leicester and Walsingham as ‘a pair of knaves’, who not only disturbed 
her marriage to Anjou, but led her to be ‘in peril of losing her throne and her life by 
having burdened herself with a war’. She announced ‘if she had done her duty as a 
Queen she should have had them both hanged’.136 In March 1586 she even threw a 
slipper in Walsingham’s face, when she discovered he had been downplaying the threat 
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of the Spanish navy allegedly assembling at Lisbon, in order to avoid resources being 
spared from Leicester’s campaign in the Low Countries.137 Elizabeth’s relations with 
Walsingham reached a new low. 
 
But why would she have tolerated a Principal Secretary she found so obnoxious? 
Walsingham was allowed to keep his Secretaryship until his death in 1590, and even to 
monopolise it between 1581 and 1586. Walsingham rooted himself in Elizabeth’s 
regime as a technical bureaucrat. For this aggressive but diligent Secretary, Queen 
Elizabeth always hesitated to give her favour as she had to Burghley, or to her ‘eyes’ 
Leicester. She never tried to hide her opprobrium or hostility towards Walsingham 
from the public. Poor Walsingham, flogging himself to death in the performance of 
governmental business, remained a Secretary and a mere Knight. Nevertheless, despite 
her loathing for his radicalism and the godly ideology which placed his faith before 
sovereignty, Elizabeth never doubted Walsingham’s fidelity to her and to England. 
More significantly, Walsingham’s highly efficient espionage consolidated Elizabeth’s 
reliance on his supply of intelligence, and further pushed him to his political apogee in 
the 1580s. In 1581, Elizabeth accorded Walsingham the nickname ‘the Moor’, 
implying he was formally admitted into the élite circle of the Queen’s intimates.138 
 
Conclusion 
This thesis examines two power landscapes of the mid-Elizabethan regime in terms of 
espionage: partisan rivalry between ministers, and the balance of power between the 
Queen and her Council (or government). Touching the first issue of factionalism, this 
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chapter has demonstrated that the political divide had existed from the late 1570s to 
1580s, mainly because of differences over English interventionism. Walsingham used 
his espionage quite well to irritate and drive the moody Queen Elizabeth towards his 
military policy. In a series of counter-plots, he brought Mary Stuart to the block, led 
England to a formal diplomatic break with Spain, and tied an English alliance most 
closely with France. Walsingham’s administrative dominance and his espionage 
successfully gained him political prominence and promoted his party’s godly ideology, 
moving England from the complacent Elizabethan Settlement, towards a cosmopolitan 
Protestantism. 
 
It is noticeable that policy quarrels at this time never deteriorated into anything as fatal 
as factionalism. In 1587 the rivalry, indeed, seemed to have softened, partly because of 
the virtual certainty of Mary’s execution, and partly because Burghley had assisted 
Walsingham to settle the late Sidney’s debt and to achieve the patronage of the Duchy 
of Lancaster. Mostly, however, it was because a policy of war had been all but 
confirmed, and the diverging elements of the regime had thus reunited. Part of the 
evidence for this is that Walsingham started to admit Burghley into his espionage. The 
Stafford Plot in January 1587 saw cooperation in spying between Walsingham’s system 
and the Burghley-Stafford one. William Stafford, the younger brother of English 
Ambassador Edward Stafford in Paris, who had been under an obligation to 
Walsingham from June 1585, worked with Michael Moody, a trustworthy servant of 
Ambassador Stafford’s, to involve the new French ambassador Châteauneuf, and his 
secretary Des Trappes, in an intrigue to kill the Queen.139 This plot was proposed in 
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order to strengthen the irresolute Queen Elizabeth, and push her into executing Mary. 
By drawing Ambassador Châteauneuf into this plot, it was intended to put him under 
house arrest during the time of Mary’s execution and thereby cut off his link with 
France. In addition to cooperation over the Stafford Plot, later in June 1587, receiving 
Anthony Standen’s intelligence from Spain regarding its naval preparations for the 
impending Armada, Walsingham passed this to Burghley. In a postscript he added, ‘I 
humbly pray your Lordship that Pompey’s letter may be reserved to yourself. I would 
be loathe the gentleman should have any harm though my default.’140 
 
The portrayals of Camden and Naunton respecting Elizabethan factionalism bring into 
focus another controversy over Elizabeth’s queenship: whether her monarchy was 
limited or absolutist. In the male-dominated world of espionage or ‘faction’, Queen 
Elizabeth remains silent in the historiography. According to the theory of patronage 
distribution, supported by Neale, MacCaffrey and Eric Ives, the monarch was at the top 
of the market for royal favour at court. His or her privilege of patronage distribution 
first ensured multiple channels of intelligence for the monarchy, second, balanced the 
power landscape in the regime, and ultimately safeguarded royal superiority. However, 
as Simon Adams states, Elizabeth’s playing her leading councillors off against each 
other had its limits. ‘The comparative unanimity of the inner ring of councillors 
provided for a basic political consensus, and maintenance of a common front against 
the Queen became a pronounced feature of the Council’s advisory function.’141 In 
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brief, operating the leverage on parties/factions was risky. Any truce between factions 
for a common purpose, or ascendancy of one faction over another, would bring 
problems for sovereignty. In 1587, Walsingham and Burghley reconciled with each 
other in order to work towards Mary’s execution. Their intelligence operations together 
isolated the Queen, as in the Council-led execution of Mary without Elizabeth’s 
knowledge. These two opposite images have led Elizabethan historians to a debate the 
extent of either royal supremacy or the monarchical republic. The final chapter that 
follows will examine this second issue of the Elizabethan polity, by discovering the 
Queen’s voice in espionage, and redefining her role within the politics of the regime.
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Chapter VI: A ‘Rule Mixte’? Queenship and the Control of 
Information 
 
Compared with the active involvement of Mary Queen of Scots in espionage, Queen 
Elizabeth and her female courtiers look relatively quiescent. Usually, Elizabeth appears 
either as a patron for her male ministers’ espionage, or as a passive listener to whom 
they fed intelligence selected to favour their partisan policies. These two distinct 
images reflect her inconsistent queenship within patriarchal politics. Her dominance 
over patronage distribution, as Wallace MacCaffrey and Eric Ives suggested, ensured 
her royal superiority over factiousness, and resisted an intelligence monopoly. 
Spymasters from either party could hide little intelligence from her if they needed 
royal subsidies. Her royal prerogative of appointment to court and state offices assisted 
Burghley’s party to break Walsingham’s monopoly on intelligence and acted as a 
counter-balance to factionalism. Queen Elizabeth was speculating in intelligence. As 
will be argued here, Elizabeth’s own less efficient female information system forced 
her to rely heavily on the male systems. While male partisan rivalry benefited her in 
providing multiple intelligence sources, when the parties became reconciled for a 
common purpose, their information systems could together blind the Queen by the 
selective presentation, or withholding, of intelligence, and thus deprive her of her 
initiative on policy. Elizabeth’s inconsistent queenship has initiated a debate in the 
historiography: should the Elizabethan polity be characterised in terms of personal rule, 
or a monarchical republic?  
 
It was William Camden’s argument for Elizabeth’s ‘womanish impotency’ in 
rule—which contrasted with Robert Naunton’s assertion of her superiority over 
faction—that formally introduced this issue into the historiography. Patrick Collinson 
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joined this debate with his notable concept, the monarchical republic of Elizabeth I.1 
MacCaffrey defended Elizabeth’s personal rule in terms of her monarchical control 
over patronage, and Natalie Mears likewise emphasizes her initiative in assembling the 
counsel group.2 With regard to the female information network at court, the research 
of Pam Wright and of Charlotte Merton offers the best guide to Elizabeth’s female 
chamber, and that of James Daybell to Tudor aristocratic women’s information 
activities.3 
 
This chapter proposes to discuss the two political issues that impacted on the Privy 
Council’s decision to execute Mary Stuart without Queen Elizabeth’s knowledge: 
Elizabeth’s comparative weakness in the courtly circulation of news, intelligence and 
information, and the Privy Council’s degree of independence from the monarchy. It 
first examines how Elizabeth employed her female chamber in the transmission of 
information and intelligence. Then, through consideration of Mary’s execution, it 
presents Elizabeth’s incapacity in her ministerial circulation of information. The 
reasons why the Council isolated their Queen—their appeal for a mixed rule, the 
traditional concept of female inferiority, and their antipathy towards Elizabeth’s 
irresolution—will be discussed in terms of ministerial dominance over intelligence. 
The lack of control over intelligence had gradually reduced Elizabeth’s regime towards 
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an acephalous conciliar one. Certain pivotal ministers, usually also as spymasters and 
managers of state information, became alternative leaders of her regime. But these two 
heads, the monarchy and its Council, coexisted uneasily. 
 
1. The Female Circulation of Information at Court 
Conventional scholarship pays little attention to female participation in the Tudor news 
network. Queen Elizabeth is habitually imaged as being attached to her male officials’ 
supply of intelligence. This section focuses on an alternative information service, 
centred on Elizabeth’s female privy chamber, which served the Queen to break 
Walsingham’s monopoly on intelligence, as well as to balance partisan power in the 
regime. But its low level of efficiency did not help the Queen become independent of 
the male systems of information supply.  
 
Ian Atherton has presented a very masculine world of news transmission and 
readership. Firstly, men, by vocation, dominated a wider range of news than women. 
Acting as merchants, lawyers, officials and courtiers, men frequented the 
environments—St Paul’s, the Inns of Court, and the royal court—where the bulk of 
news flourished and circulated. Furthermore, men were recipients of newsletters, 
whereas women, ‘less interested in news’, ‘rarely included even a line of news’ in their 
private letters. In terms of the nature of information in correspondence, women were 
traditionally deprecated as ‘gossips’, peddlers of trifling tittle-tattle, in contrast with 
men who were seen as ‘intelligencers’, suppliers of information of serious import.4 
Atherton ascribed to women an apolitical world of the family; the public one of politics 
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and its information circulation was vested only in men.5  
 
This picture of female insignificance in news networks originated in the traditional 
focus on the government system, with the absent women being viewed as apolitical or 
negligible political players. Mortimer Levine agreed that ‘the evidence would have it 
that what was true for queen consort surely held true for all women in Tudor England: 
they held no prominent place in Tudor government’. 6  Barbara Harris ascribed 
women’s eclipse in the Tudor political scene to the traditional focus of political 
historiography on formal institutions—monarchy, council, parliament, courts, and 
administrative bodies—that excluded women.7  
 
Pam Wright developed the first full, convincing portrait of the Elizabethan Privy 
Chamber. In light of David Starkey’s model of the ‘politics of intimacy’ in Henry 
VIII’s reign, she illustrated that the accession of a female monarch incapacitated the 
Privy Chamber, now a female entity, from being a political forum.8 Women were 
prevented from assuming key administrative offices like the Keepership of the Privy 
Purse, as well as from counselling the sovereign over key issues. This Henrician 
‘cockpit of faction’ ceased to be a ‘barrier or cocoon’. In Elizabeth’s reign, it was 
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shrunk into a purely household charge, attending to the Queen’s daily routine, personal 
jewellery and dress. Its political role became ‘accidental, rarely sustained, and never 
pursued to the uttermost’. Nevertheless, Wright argues that bodily attendance on the 
Queen privileged female chamberers into ‘a free market economy of favours’, as 
patronage brokers.9 
 
In her as yet unpublished doctorial thesis, Charlotte Merton challenged Wright on her 
assertion of the feminised Privy Chamber’s neutrality in politics. But she repeatedly 
narrowed the political function of female courtiers to patronage suits, away from a 
wider range of political activities, notably policy debate and governance. On the other 
hand, and most effectively, Merton added women to the news networks. In her 
narratives, female courtiers kept abreast of international ‘information’ on their own 
initiative. Quite often they served as a medium between the Queen and their male 
counterparts outside the Chamber, ‘with regard to the gathering of information and 
rumour-mongering’.10 
 
James Daybell and Natalie Mears both recognise the participation of noble women in 
news activities. Women at court, Daybell states, ‘were at the very centre of where news 
was exchanged: Anne Talbot (née Herbert) thought the court a place to “learn” news 
“worthey the wrytynge”’. Female courtiers elevated themselves as privileged 
intermediaries to the royal presence, and as purveyors of information from and to the 
court. ‘A court without women is like a body without a nervous system’, Olwen Hufton 
argues, and ‘women are part of a vital system of communications through which 
                                                 
9 Pam Wright, ‘A change in direction: the ramifications of a female household, 1558-1603’, 147-72. 
 
10 Merton, ‘The Woman who served Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth’, 154-202.  
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messages are transmitted, channels opened up’.11 In light of the correspondence of 
Elizabeth Talbot, Countess of Shrewsbury (better known as Bess of Hardwick), 
Daybell demonstrates women’s information management, as gatherers, readers, 
purveyors and writers of news, and as spymasters. Far from being ‘gossipers’, women 
had interest in areas of news identical to the ones with which men were concerned: 
parliamentary business, war, armed rebellions and naval preparations.12  
 
Mears does not doubt that the female correspondence bristled with gossip concerning 
the Queen’s health and moods, court progresses, fluctuations in royal favour, 
aristocratic marriages and appointments to office. However, it also comprised political 
information from home and abroad. Hugh Fitzwilliam’s letters to the Countess of 
Shrewsbury in the early 1570s offered an overview of continental and court news: the 
French civil war, Spain’s armed suppression of the Moors and the Dutch revolt, and the 
arrest of the Duke of Norfolk.13 Male courtiers were just as interested in so-called 
tattle, like the queen’s health. ‘Gossip was neither the preserve of women nor trivial.’14 
Both Daybell and Mears picture a gender-equal network. ‘Information was shared 
between men and women and their networks of contact comprised both genders.’15 
 
Initiated by Merton, and developed by Daybell and Mears, research on this theme has 
recognised women as an integral part of news networks. Women have been upgraded 
                                                 
11 Olwen Hufton, ‘Reflections on the Role of Women in the Early Modern Court’, The Court Historian, 
5 (May 2000), 1. 
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13 Ibid., 123. 
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15 Ibid., 113-14.  
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from traditional patronage suitors and debased ‘gossips’, to gatherers and circulators of 
‘information’. But the implications of this are unclear when considering female roles in 
the circle of ‘intelligence’, which remains overwhelmingly male. In fact, the 
attendance upon the Queen’s body facilitated the female chamber in running an 
alternative circulation of information and intelligence, unofficially but more closely 
linked to the Queen. Their male counterparts had to befriend or even ally with female 
chamberers, in order to gain timely enlightenment on the royal disposition. For Queen 
Elizabeth, an intelligence channel via her female companions that circumvented her 
male government could potentially free her from the male monopoly on intelligence. 
 
Female chamberers, barometers of the Queen’s temper, exported credible intelligence 
of the capricious Queen’s mood and disposition to their counterparts outside the 
Chamber. Robert Beale suggested the secretary candidate Edward Wotton should 
‘Learne before your accesse her Ma[jes]tie’s disposic[i]on by some in the Privie 
Chamber w[i]th whom you must keepe credit, for that will stande you in much 
steede.’16 Their attendant observance of monarchical fickleness could make policy and 
requests work smoothly at the right times. In 1587 John Whitgift, Archbishop of 
Canterbury, sent a copy of a petition of the clergy of Ireland to Dorothy Lady Stafford, 
who since 1564 had served as Mistress of Robes responsible for the Queen’s clothes 
and jewellery, ‘desiering her in my name to geve it to her majestes, when shee sawe 
tyme’.17  
 
Sometimes the female chamberers offered opportune cautions. Robert Cross, in a letter 
                                                 
16 Beale, ‘Instructions for a Principall Secretarie’, in Conyers Read, Mr. Secretary Walsingham and the 
Policy of Queen Elizabeth, I (Oxford, 1925), 437.  
 
17 TNA, SP 63/129/70, John Whitgift to Burghley, 7 May 1587. 
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dated 26 April 1600, appreciated Robert Cecil’s ‘so wyse’ advice three years earlier, 
‘which was, that I depended and was at charge with wymon to solicit for me, and that 
the Queen would give them good words it [yet] the [they] should never effect sutte’.18 
In 1574, the marriage between Charles Stuart, Earl of Lennox, and Elizabeth 
Cavendish, the daughter to the Countess of Shrewsbury and her second husband 
William Cavendish, aggravated Queen Elizabeth. Several friends of the Countess at 
court worked for her. Frances, Countess of Sussex suggested she should appease the 
Queen by sending her a luxurious gift. Not gold or plate, she was especially reminded, 
but better a cloak of watchet (blue) or peach satin, ‘embroidered with some pretty 
flowers and lined with sundry colours made with gold spangles; such fantastical things 
will be more expected than cups or jewels’. She also advised Bess to seek the help of 
other chamber staff—Secretary Walsingham, Blanche Parry, Mary Scudamore (née 
Sheltton), and Dorothy Bradbelt—‘these wyll Do more for my l[ady] than Mrs 
knoll’.19  
 
Some messages were released by female intimates on the basis of royal orders. In 
August 1571, the Queen used Elizabeth Stafford, the daughter of Dorothy Lady 
Stafford, who had served in the Privy Chamber from 1568 and would remain until her 
own death in 1599, to recall the Earl of Rutland from Paris. Lady Stafford notified her 
cousin that his return would gratify the Queen, and cautioned that ‘she looks for you 
                                                 
18 CP 78/96r, Sir Robert Cross to Sir Robert Cecil, 26 Apr. 1600. 
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(c.1550–1603)’, Simon Adams in DNB (Oxford: OUP, October 2006), 
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shortly, and I hope she will not be deceived’.20 
 
The state of the Queen’s health, an issue of paramount political importance in a 
personal monarchy, was sometimes leaked by her female attendants. It is well known 
that Elizabeth fell dangerously ill of the smallpox in October 1562. However, in the 
previous autumn she may have had another close encounter with death, if the 
intelligence the Spanish Ambassador Alzarez de Quadra received was true. According 
to his budget of intelligence in September 1561, Elizabeth was dangerously ill, 
‘becoming dropsical and has already began to swell extraordinarily…she is falling 
away, and is extremely thin and the colour of a corpse’. Regarding the high secrecy of 
Elizabeth’s illness at court, Quadra learned this from three different sources and ‘a 
person who has the opportunity of being an eye witness’.21 Two of his informants may 
have been the two leading gentlewomen at court: Elizabeth Parr (née Brooke), first 
Marchioness of Northampton, ‘who is in a better position to judge than anyone else’, 
and her sister-in-law Frances Lady Cobham, a Chamberer of the Privy Chamber since 
1559. Apparently, the ambassador adopted the advice of the Count de Feria, cultivating 
the Marchioness of Northampton, ‘who is in high favour with the Queen, has served 
His Majesty [Philip II] when opportunity has occurred’. 22  Quadra’s successor, 
Guzman de Silva, continued this contact with the Marchioness, praising her as ‘a 
person of great understanding’.23  
 
                                                 
20 Elizabeth Stafford to Earl of Rutland, 16 Aug. 1571, HMC, The manuscripts of his grace the Duke of 
Rutland, I, 95-96. 
 
21 Bishop Quadra to the King, 13 Sept. 1561, CSP Spanish, 1558-1567, 214. 
 
22 Memorandum from the Count de Feria, 29 Feb. 1559, CSP Spanish, 1558-1567, 36. Quadra to Philip 
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At times female courtiers were suspected of betraying state confidences. Early in 
Elizabeth’s reign, some of her leading ladies, including the Marchioness of 
Northampton, Elizabeth Fitzgerald, Lady Clinton, Mary Sidney, and Frances, Lady 
Cobham, may have divulged national secrets to one of their former colleagues in 
Queen Mary’s reign, Jane Dormer, Duchess of Feria. Mary Sidney wrote to this exiled 
kinswoman in Spain, promising to keep sending her English news.24 The intelligence 
sent the Duchess—regular and exclusive concerning the English Queen and 
Ireland—enhanced her own value and that of her husband the Count de Feria within 
the Spanish court and the Catholic exiled community; her husband hence became King 
Philip’s principal adviser on English matters. On 3 August 1559, Thomas Challoner 
reported to Queen Elizabeth on his first arrival in Ghent, of his puzzling at how the 
Count de Feria was privy to ‘the most secret thinge of the State of Ingland’.25 In 
addition, during the second Anjou courtship, Ambassador Mendoza fostered an 
informant at Elizabeth’s court who offered trustworthy information on Walsingham’s 
affairs, as well as on Elizabeth’s Privy Chamber through a lady there. But by April 
1579 he had lost this informant, ‘with whom it is now almost impossible for me to 
communicate’.26 
 
While exporting intelligence regarding both the Queen’s status and national secrets, the 
female chamber also imported news to Elizabeth. 27  Its peculiar privacy, which 
bypassed the male-dominated procedures of the Privy Chamber and the Secretary’s 
                                                 
24 The Bishop of Aquila to the Duke of Alba, 7 Sept. 1559, CSP Spanish, 1558-1567, 95-96. 
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office, constituted it as an alternative route for the Queen’s correspondence. In high 
politics and diplomacy, courtiers serving sovereigns in a physical proximity were seen 
as an extension of the royal body or sovereignty. Accordingly, Elizabeth’s female inner 
circle was often assigned to participate in, or supervise, her courtship negotiations. Her 
initial suitors included two of the Holy Roman Emperor’s sons, the Austrian Hapsburg 
Archdukes Ferdinand and Charles. In May 1559, Augustin Gyntzer, Secretary to the 
Hapsburgs, reported that he had delivered the Emperor’s letter to the Queen but 
refrained from submitting the two Archdukes’ portraits. Instead, he ‘placed them so 
that they could not fail to catch the eyes of those noble ladies who are most in the 
Queen’s good graces, and that, you may be assure, is as if the Queen herself had seen 
them. More I need not say’.28 Female courtiers’ eyes, he presumed, were the Queen’s 
eyes.  
 
Well aware of the symbolism by which her female companions were recognised in 
diplomacy as an extension of her royal person, Queen Elizabeth employed them in her 
marriage negotiations, using them as her representatives in place of male officials. For 
example, Mary Sidney joined in the negotiations regarding a marriage between 
Elizabeth and the Archduke Charles, which were being canvassed with the Spanish 
Ambassador de Quadra in 1559. Katherine Ashley and Dorothy Broadbelt supported 
the courtship of Eric XIV of Sweden in 1562. In 1565, the pregnant Lady Cobham was 
assigned to receive Cecilia, Marchioness of Baden-Baden and sister of Eric XIV, 
whose visit was widely supposed to be connected with negotiations for a Swedish 
match.29 Regarding her suitors, Queen Elizabeth exercised her ladies as her eyes, ears 
                                                 
28 Report of Augustin Gyntzer to Count Helffenstein, May 1559, in Victor von Klarwill, ed., Queen 
Elizabeth and some Foreigners, transl. by T.H. Nash (London, 1928), 64.  
 
29 Queen Elizabeth to the Lady Cecilia of Sweden, 30 Aug. 1565; Challoner and Scudamore to Phayre, 
8 Sept. 1565, CSPF, 1564-1565, 441, 454. Lord Cobham William Brooke to William Cecil, 1 Sept., 1565, 
 267 
and mouthpiece. As Natalie Mears sums up, the Queen’s ladies exported information to 
suitors outside the Privy Chamber, and equally, Elizabeth ‘was able to exploit their 
social and correspondence networks to convey her wishes easily and informally’.30 In 
terms of Elizabeth’s use of her female intimates in matrimonial negotiations, Mears 
emphasises Elizabeth’s supreme queenship, refuting Pam Wright’s claim of the 
declining importance of the Privy Chamber in politics and a consequently weak 
queenship. Closeness to the Queen would win royal intimates access to the very heart 
of policy-making. Elizabeth’s gender did not diminish her ultimate leadership over her 
regime. Yet Mears’s arguments overlook a key element: Elizabeth’s marriage was a 
national policy but also a personal issue. This is why, according to Mears, every 
marriage negotiation reveals a dominant Queen in contrast with her active but impotent 
male advisers. Yet it is insufficient to picture a consistently strong queenship based 
only on marriage policy.  
 
Despite being absent from government and certain professional arenas like the Inns of 
Court, female courtiers still obtained entrées to political intelligence through their 
social contacts, status (sometimes associated with their spouses’ work), and personal 
wealth. A number of Elizabeth’s court women were Marian exiles, or were born and 
brought up abroad, consequently possessing first-hand experience of, and contacts with, 
foreign personages and courts. Frances Seymour, first Countess of Herford, resided in 
France before assuming a position as Maid of Honour in 1568 (retained until 1598), 
and retained a close friendship with a French peeress of the royal d’Angoulême 
                                                                                                                                               
CSPD, 1547-1580, 258. Guzman de Silva to Philip II, 2 Jul., 9 Jul. 27 Aug., 5 Nov. 10 Nov. 1565; Philip 
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family.31 Two of Queen Elizabeth’s favourite chamberers, Dorothy Lady Stafford, and 
her daughter Elizabeth, were Protestant exiles with William Stafford, who initially 
sheltered in Geneva in 1555. Then in 1557 the newly widowed Lady Stafford moved to 
Basel, staying until early 1559. There she was joined by her cousin Elizabeth Sandys 
(later Lady Berkeley), who had accompanied Princess Elizabeth (as one of her three 
gentlewomen) to the Tower of London and then to Woodstock, although in May 1554 
had been dismissed by Queen Mary from Elizabeth’s household for her obstinate 
pro-Protestantism. Sandys may have been the source for John Foxe’s portrait of 
Elizabeth’s captivity. In August 1559, both women returned to England by way of 
France, probably instructed by the newly enthroned Queen Elizabeth to gather useful 
intelligence on the way. There they, as ‘the queen’s own gentlewomen’, had an 
audience with Mary Queen of Scots, then Queen of Francis II.32 Lady Stafford initially 
preferred the radical society in Geneva to the conservative ones of Frankfurt, 
Strasbourg or Venice, though she never became an effective advocate for the godly at 
court. This was partly due to her disillusionment with Calvin, and partly to her shrewd 
insight into Elizabeth’s disfavour towards radical Puritanism. So she estranged herself 
and her family from the radical godly at court.33 It was difficult for the female 
chamberers who had been Marian exiles to influence Elizabeth’s religious settlement, 
doing little good and only straining their relations with the Queen. For example, the 
Marian émigré Katherine Bertie, Duchess of Suffolk, unduly urged Secretary Cecil and 
the Queen to promote a puritan faith, and in doing so damaged her relationship with 
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the Queen. Well aware of this, Lady Stafford devoted herself to patronage suits instead 
of religious ones. More significantly, she acted as a medium for the Queen’s (and 
Burghley’s) hidden intelligence correspondence with her son, Ambassador Stafford in 
Paris. 
 
A surprising number of Elizabeth’s resident ambassadors in France had kinswomen in 
daily attendance on the Queen. This conjunction between the female chamber and 
foreign embassy sometimes affected Elizabeth’s appointments. Anne Carew, the wife 
of Nicholas Throckmorton, Elizabeth’s first ambassador to France (1559–1563), was 
nominated to the Privy Chamber in 1559. She showed herself ‘so good a sollicitor’ to 
the Queen of her husband’s desire to be recalled; she had her wish fulfilled and 
Throckmorton was replaced at the embassy by Thomas Smith.34 Queen Elizabeth also 
used her female chamberers and their kinsmen in embassies to build an alternative 
intelligence-diplomacy route for herself. As Merton points out, Elizabeth expected her 
ladies with embassy connections and access to intelligence from foreign courts, to be 
more useful than merely ‘to find and acquire various items on their mistress’s 
behalf’.35 Ambassador Stafford’s wife Douglas Howard, for example, successfully 
made herself familiar with the French court via her friendship with the Queen Mother 
Catherine de Medici. Their female talk touching on Anjou’s death was reported by her 
husband to his home government.36 
 
On occasion, embassy intelligence reached the Queen via her female chamber, 
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bypassing Secretary Walsingham. This route emerged in 1578 when the Anjou 
courtship entered into official negotiations and continued throughout the 1580s, 
undercutting Walsingham’s monopoly on intelligence and state information achieved 
through his office as Secretary. Over these dozen years, Elizabeth assigned Burghley’s 
men to head the English embassy at Paris, the English headquarters for continental 
information and diplomacy: Henry Brooke and then Edward Stafford, both of whose 
kinswomen assumed the chief posts in her inner circle. This threefold connection 
between Burghley, embassy, and the female chamber introduced to the Queen other 
non-military voices, especially from Catholic Spain and the Guises. This mechanism 
also facilitated her maintenance of a balance of power within her regime, countering 
the Leicester-Walsingham grouping.  
   
A mysterious report dated February 1580 brings this hidden intelligence route to light. 
It records a private audience granted to Anne Brooke, Lady Cobham, wife of 
Ambassador Henry Brooke in Paris, when she met with King Henri III and his young 
queen at the French court.37 The first part of it reported Henri’s discussion of the 
Anjou match and his insistent request to see Elizabeth’s portrait, which Lady Cobham 
proposed to send to the ailing Queen Mother. This report was written in the first person, 
without signature. It was not compiled by Ambassador Brooke, whose handwriting 
does not match. It was possibly written by Lady Cobham or her secretary. The 
addressee is unclear as well, although Secretary Walsingham seems an unlikely 
candidate. In 1578, the Anjou match entered into formal consultation in the Council, 
and met with strong opposition from the radical Protestants headed by Walsingham and 
Leicester. Thereafter Queen Elizabeth started to exclude their party from this scheme. 
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In October 1579, their ally Amias Paulet was replaced by Henry Brooke as new 
ambassador in France. This appointment announced Elizabeth’s will to proceed with 
her last chance for marriage. Later in 1580 Elizabeth excluded Walsingham from her 
communications with Anjou; after this, Ambassador Cobham rarely reported to his 
superior, Secretary Walsingham. The nomination of Henry Brooke may have been 
partly because the Cobhams retained a strong allegiance to Burghley, who was a close 
ally of Sussex, the outspoken promoter of the Anjou match, and partly because 
Brooke’s sister-in-law, Frances Lady Cobham, had been elevated to the Bedchamber in 
the 1570s. Elizabeth resumed her use of her female chamber as an extension of her 
royal body in marriage negotiations. Neither addressed to Walsingham nor to Queen 
Elizabeth (evidenced by the use of ‘her Majesty’ in the letter), this diplomatic report 
may have been addressed to Burghley, or more probably to Lady Frances Cobham, for 
forwarding to the Queen.  
 
From 1583 the route between embassy and chamber was dominated by the Staffords. 
Both Dorothy, Lady Stafford and her daughter Elizabeth, Lady Drury-Scot provided a 
chamber channel of correspondence direct to the Queen for their respective son and 
brother, Ambassador Stafford (appointed to Paris in 1583). Walsingham had tried to 
obstruct this secret intercourse which he could not control, by repeatedly issuing 
cautions and intercepting Stafford’s private letters at the port of Rye. But his efforts 
were in vain. The informal route via Ambassador Stafford kept operating between 
Queen Elizabeth and certain foreign aristocrats like the Duchess of Guise, at least until 
early 1587.38 The female chamberers cooperated with their kinsmen in government to 
acquaint the Queen with certain information withheld by her Secretary. It marked an 
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interference of the female chamber in the foreign affairs of government. 
 
Female political involvement also extended into domestic affairs. Some local officials 
submitted domestic intelligence directly to Queen Elizabeth via their kinswomen at 
court. Ruth Elizabeth Richardson states that during the Northern Rebellion of 
1569–1570, John Vaughan, a member of the Council of the North, provided a source of 
intelligence for the Queen via his aunt Blanche Parry, the Chief Gentlewoman of 
Queen Elizabeth’s Privy Chamber. His efforts were probably aimed at having his 
appointment to the office of Sheriff withdrawn. On his behalf, Lady Parry also 
interceded with the Queen for patronage.39 
 
It is difficult to measure the amount of intelligence Queen Elizabeth learned from her 
female informers, because of the flexible (or unstable) employment of her female 
chamber, and their oral exchange of information. Being named on the list of chamber 
servants did not necessarily imply a resident attendance on the Queen; sometimes it 
just represented a royal honour for noblewomen who were absent from the court. Anne 
Dudley (née Russell), Countess of Warwick, was appointed as a maid of honour to 
Queen Elizabeth in 1559; she was the one ‘more beloved and in greater favour with the 
queen than any other woman in the kingdom’.40 Controlling the extensive Russell and 
Dudley networks of patronage and of intelligence, in 1596 she received secret reports 
about the Landgrave of Hesse from an attendant on George, Lord Hunsdon, the newly 
designated envoy to Hesse. But the Countess, states Merton, always came to the court 
as an attendant rather than as a member of the Chamber staff. Her customary absence 
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from court and greater enthusiasm for her family interests, are barriers to accurately 
estimating the level of her involvement in the Queen’s information network.41 
 
Elizabeth’s female information network functioned far less efficiently than its male 
counterpart. It is reasonable to ascribe this inefficiency to three factors: first, the 
self-interest of female informers led to an unstable supply of intelligence; second, 
Queen Elizabeth’s financial caution caused her female system to stagnate; and third 
and most importantly, the protest of male officials against female involvement in 
politics hampered the flow of key state information to the female chamber.  
 
In terms of the first point, Natalie Mears has summarised the reasons for ‘courtiers’ to 
gather intelligence: local rivalries, personal friendship, ideological beliefs, practical 
political issues, and self-defence.42 In short, female intelligence work was born from 
self-interest, narrowly directed to the person or family. The case of the Countess of 
Shrewsbury’s spying on the captive Mary Stuart characterises female espionage that 
was motivated more by egoism, than by an obligation or duty to the Queen.  
 
Along with her husband, the Countess was Mary’s guardian, but did far more than 
simply accompany Mary at her embroidery. Bess was one of the wealthiest women in 
Elizabethan England; she was able and had elaborated a pan-European network of 
intelligence. Whether at court or in any of her residences, she received regular letters 
from family, servants, friends, social contacts, and semi-professional writers of 
newsletters. They acquainted her with a wide range of up-to-date matters: from family 
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status and estate management, to events within the court or the locality, and further 
afield concerning the continental political scene. What assisted her most was her 
correspondence with Elizabeth’s female intimates at court, including Dorothy Lady 
Stafford, Mary Scudamore, Frances Lady Cobham, Susan Countess of Kent, Elizabeth 
Wingfield, and Katherine Countess of Pembroke. Lady Wingfield, Bess’s younger 
half-sister, the Queen’s Mother of the Maids with responsibility for the supervision of 
the young Maids of Honour, often sent Bess news of the Queen’s favour towards her. 
In the autumn of 1568, she informed Bess of Elizabeth’s recent praise of her: ‘I assure 
you there ys no Lady yn this land that I beter loue.’43 On 2 January 1576, she reported 
the Queen’s great pleasure at her New Year’s gift: ‘Her maj[estie] never liked any 
thinge you gave her so well the color and strange triminge of the garments…cost 
bestowed vpon yt hath caused her to geve out such speeches of my lo[rd] and you la[dy] 
as I never hard of better.’44 She further moved the Queen on Bess’s behalf when the 
latter tumultuously separated from the Earl. 
 
The Countess’s intelligence work infiltrated into Mary’s affairs as well, where she set a 
spy, Hersey Lassells, to offer her intelligence of all things and report on Mary’s 
practices and devices only to her.45 Queen Elizabeth commended Bess in this matter 
for her ‘manner of service to us’:  
 
Thereby letyng you to understand, that we do most assuredly accept your faythfull 
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service towards us is as good part as yourself can desire, and what so ever occasion 
have bene given us to minister any doubt at the begynning of your lack of care about 
the charge committed to your husband. We ar well assured that your dedes have bene 
such as in dede we cannot conceave no such dout but think yourselves assured of a 
faythful servant and so shall you in contynuance of your well doyng fynd us a frendly 
good mistress.46 
 
The Countess, however, was playing a dangerous double game. On the one hand, she 
swore fidelity to Queen Elizabeth and spied on Mary. On the other, she pretended to 
befriend Mary, promising to help her escape if at any time her life was in danger, or if 
she was ordered to be removed from Shrewsbury’s guardianship. It was an insurance 
policy that many other Elizabethans, like Burghley and Leicester, also adopted to 
ensure their future political careers—especially when rumours circulated of Elizabeth’s 
impending death from illness or asassination, with Mary being the most likely 
successor.47 Moreover, Bess’s intelligence service acted more as self-protection than 
as a feudal obligation to the monarch. Often away from London in Sheffield while 
undertaking so sensitive a guardianship, the Countess had to keep abreast of domestic 
and foreign events, specifically those touching her Scottish prisoner.48 In October 
1571 Lassells was cross-examined by the Council for his suspected dealings with 
Mary.49 The Countess confessed all her knowledge to Burghley, in order to defend 
herself and her family from any further accusation: 
 
I assure your L. on my faith that I was never made privy nor knowe of any dealing 
between her and the duke of Norfolk done either by the said Lassels or by any other 
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living creature or by any meanes els[e]. If I had I trust you L. think that I wold have 
discovered them same as I wold in dede according to my bounden duty to the Quenes 
Majestie as her true subjecte or other god grant me no longer to lyve.50 
 
It was not a voluntary submission but a forced self-defence. Behind the common 
purpose of national security, both male and female intelligence operations ran with 
individual intentions: to drive the Queen towards their political ideologies or personal 
interests. However, the male officials practised espionage as a permanent ‘duty’ of 
state administration, so their supply of information was compulsory and stable. But 
female intelligence arrived irregularly, usually as a ‘gift’ or as ‘pleading’ when 
something happened that concerned personal or family interests. The irregularity of the 
supply of information forced the Queen to rely on male systems. 
 
The second factor adversely affecting the efficiency of the female information network 
was the issue of cost. Not all female intelligence collectors were as rich as the 
Countess of Shrewsbury and thus able to run an extensive intelligence network. 
Women, forbidden from assuming key government offices—like Burghley’s 
mastership of the wards and control of the forfeited estates of émigrés, and 
Walsingham’s control over travel licences via the Privy Seal—were unable to employ 
relevant authorities to support their espionage. The double insufficiency—in wealth 
and in administrative resources—stopped the development of female news networks 
into forms as extensive and efficient as the male ones.  
 
Furthermore, the Queen herself must assume some responsibility for the failure of the 
female intelligence network to integrate and become more efficient. For the financially 
cautious Elizabeth, espionage was too expensive to invest in further, beyond the 
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existing male networks. Frances Lady Cobham, for instance, could have become a spy 
who might have disclosed Mary’s revolts, but Elizabeth did not cultivate this. At the 
point when Mary was exiled into England in 1568, Lady Cobham had been her main 
ally at Elizabeth’s court. In 1571 Frances lost her place because of her husband 
William Lord Cobham’s alleged complicity in the Ridolfi Plot. Thereby Frances 
tightened her connection with Mary.51 In 1574 when she was ‘growen into very good 
favour and lyking ageyn’ at court, the discovery of Mary’s secret correspondence 
centred on the Shrewsbury household servants again disclosed Frances’s familiarity 
with the Scottish captive.52 Henry Cockyn’s confession under torture denounced 
Frances as a ‘favourer’ of Mary at court.53 His accusation forced Lady Cobham to 
leave hastily for Kent. Thenceforth she may have terminated her correspondence with 
Mary. When Lord Cobham entered the Privy Council in 1585, Thomas Morgan advised 
Mary to revive her contact with Lady Cobham via Anne Dacre, Countess of Arundel, 
or Lord Stourton (Lord Cobham’s son-in-law and a Catholic).54 This letter was 
intercepted and placed in Walsingham’s hands; Lady Cobham signed it to declare her 
innocence. This episode did her little damage; the Queen had known of her lady’s 
friendliness with Mary. It was regrettable that Elizabeth wasted this excellent 
intelligence source.  
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The third factor undermining female intelligence supply was the prejudice of male 
ministers against female inferiority and their consequent antipathy to female 
involvement in policy-making.55 Tied by blood, marriage, or common interest, the two 
sides—male bureaucrats and female courtiers—would sometimes share intelligence, 
offer assistance to each other, and develop a specific allegiance. Leicester fostered his 
own female supporters in the chamber, such as his sister Mary Sidney, Blanche Parry 
and Dorothy Bradbelte, who ‘have been firm and stead to him through all the past 
troubles’.56 Burghley’s patronage, notably his capacity as Master of the Wards and his 
household ‘train of attendants’, attracted aristocratic women.57 Frances, Lady Cobham, 
firmly committed herself only to the Cecils, promising to smooth Burghley’s return in 
the aftermath of Mary’s death:  
 
I do besyche your Lordship to hassten your comynge hether. Yf you wyll wryte I wyll 
delyver yt. I do desir to be commandid bi you. Others heyr in presence do spek for 
themselves and do excuse that wyche ys don in putting ther handes to the letter as thou 
they knewe not what they did not what was therin contayned. I do mene the ii lords 
[possibly Leicester and Lord Admiral Howard] wyche ar here.58 
 
In spite of this, female involvement in faction remains unclear. Pam Wright defended 
women’s ‘tendency to a carefully cultivated neutralism’. The ties of kinship and family 
interests located women in an impartial position, familiar with each party. Blanche 
Parry retained affinity with Leicester and Hatton, as well as her ‘cousin’ Burghley. 
However, it is also true that certain female courtiers remained hostile or loyal to 
specific statesmen. The amity of Lady Stafford and Lady Cobham with the Cecils 
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against Leicester, for instance, greatly strengthened Burghley in the partisan rivalry for 
intelligence.59 
 
Even friendship, though, could not alter male statesmen’s traditional resistance to 
women’s political participation. The Queen and her councillors vigorously suppressed 
any unauthorised meddling by her ladies or others outside the Council. Soon after 
Elizabeth’s accession, she ‘made a speech to the women who were in her service 
commanding them never to speak to her on business affairs’.60 Christopher Haigh 
stated that the Queen ‘was to be the only petticoat politician’.61 The chief protest 
against female involvement in political debate came from Elizabeth’s male councillors. 
It was a result of a tradition of misogyny, rooted partly in the Bible, and partly in 
Greek philosophy and medical theory. The Bible, notably Genesis, and the 
admonishments of Sts Paul and Peter, constitute a concept of the inherent inferiority of 
women. Women, who were originally subordinate to men as being created from 
Adam’s rib, and who in Eden had reduced humanity to moral degradation, were strictly 
prohibited from assuming public offices or having ‘authority over men’. Women were 
theoretically confined to the household, where they were to keep absolute silence and 
defer to men, their ‘heads’.62 Misogyny in classical Greek thought, as Amanda 
Shephard explains, further influenced the early humanists in the light of physiology 
and rationality. Plato affirmed female insufficiency in regards to judgement and 
strength. Aristotle’s dichotomy characterised men by courage, fortitude and generosity, 
in sharp contrast to women, characterised by weakness, timidity and irrationality. 
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‘Wheresoever women bear dominion, there must needs the people be disordered, living 
and abounding in all intemperancy, given to pride, excess and vanity.’63 Accordingly, 
when early humanists constituted a new social hierarchy based on virtue, instead of 
birth as in feudalism, power was bestowed on men only. Women, with inferior virtue, 
were expelled from the public field of power, and limited to the private one of the 
household. Educated in humanism, naturally, Elizabeth’s male ministers opposed any 
style of female interference in politics, including gynaecocracy. 
 
Therefore, Wallace MacCaffrey agreed with Haigh that Elizabeth’s Privy Council 
‘denied [courtiers] any major role in power-brokering or decision-making’.64 Simon 
Adams points out that Burghley disliked those within the court, especially female 
courtiers, becoming involved in affairs of state, and Leicester too restricted such 
discussions to the Council only.65 Walsingham narrowed the official circulation of 
information to an essentially male network, which rarely transmitted to the female 
chamber. There is little doubt that the female news network had to rely greatly on male 
officials as sources of information. Sometimes male bureaucrats would be glad to 
exchange information for friendship. At crucial times their prejudice against female 
participation in politics would terminate the circulation of information or intelligence 
between court and Council.  
 
Female information-gathering, then, to some degree released Queen Elizabeth from 
Walsingham’s monopoly on intelligence, and counter-balanced party politics within the 
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regime. But its limited efficiency never wholly mitigated the Queen’s excessive 
reliance on the male system. When the rival parties became reconciled for a common 
interest, the Queen was in danger of being held captive by male intelligence 
manipulation. This did happen during the Council-led manipulation of Mary Stuart’s 
execution in February 1587. The female news network failed to acquaint the Queen 
with her Council’s closely held action, but reduced her to mortification at having been 
excluded from the core of policy-making by her own government. Both Elizabeth and 
her female network were together isolated from the government intelligence system. 
Lacking the initiative in gathering information and intelligence, Elizabeth’s specifically 
female grasp on authority faltered. This is the next question that will be discussed, 
touching the Elizabethan polity and the organisation of the regime. 
 
2. ‘Rule Mixte’ or Personal Rule? 
In the case of Mary’s execution in February 1587, Elizabeth’s queenship stumbled 
embarrassingly over her male ministers’ superiority in intelligence and information. 
Walsingham and Burghley, who were the first to learn of Elizabeth’s hesitation despite 
having given her agreement to the execution, called the Council and forestalled her 
withdrawal of the execution warrant. The whole process was undertaken in the highest 
secrecy, without Elizabeth’s knowledge.  
 
Walsingham’s disclosure of the Babington Plot in 1586 finally convinced Queen 
Elizabeth to inflict the death penalty on her rebellious Scottish cousin, but she wanted 
Mary dead without shouldering any responsibility for this herself. Elizabeth preferred 
to use the Bond of Association (every subscriber to the Bond was obliged to kill 
anyone who threatened Queen Elizabeth’s life or crown), rather than the ‘Act of 
Queen’s Safety’, as the basis of action against Mary: achieving her death by civil 
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murder, rather than official execution. Elizabeth proposed the convenience of having 
Mary ‘violentlye murthered’ to Mary’s joint keepers, Amias Paulet and Dru Drury. In a 
letter drafted by Walsingham and Davison, the Queen reproached both keepers for ‘a 
lack of that care and zeal of her service’ that she looked for at their hands, and 
instructed ‘in all this time of yourselves (without other provocation) found out some 
way to shorten the life of that Queen’.66 The guards rejected this secret errand as 
‘dishonorable and dangerous’, and resolved to ‘have it done according to lawe’.67 
They soon replied to Walsingham: 
 
I am so unhappy to have liven to see this unhappy day, in the which I am required by 
direction from my most gracious sovereign to do an act which God and the law 
forbiddeth. My good livings and life are at her Majesty’s disposition, and am ready to 
so lose them this next morrow if it shall so please her, acknowledging that I hold them 
as of her mere and most gracious favour, and do not desire them to enjoy them, but 
with her Highness’ good liking. But God forbid that I should make so foul a shipwreck 
of my conscience, or leave so great a blot to my poor posterity, to shed blood without 
law or warrant.68  
 
Disappointed with this refusal, the Queen stormed at Paulet’s ‘daintynes’ and 
‘perjurye’, and broke off her conversation with Davison when he was defending 
Paulet.69 
 
Simultaneously on 1 February, Queen Elizabeth signed the warrant for Mary Stuart’s 
execution, either simply to validate this act of regicide as a legal and normal procedure, 
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or to appease the urge of her government to behead Mary. The Queen willed Secretary 
Davison to seal the signed warrant straightaway.70 She merrily jested to Davison that 
on the way to Lord Chancellor Thomas Bromley he should show this signed warrant to 
Walsingham, then sick in bed at his London residence, and communicate the matter 
with him, because ‘the griefe thereof would growe neere to kill him [Walsingham] out 
right’.71 Unexpectedly, the following day, she commanded a postponement of the 
process if the warrant had not yet been sealed. When learning that it had, she muttered 
‘what need that haste?’, and then ‘absolutely forbade me [Davison] trouble her anie 
further or let her heare anymore hereof till it was done’.72 Elizabeth’s shift in attitude 
alarmed Davison that his Queen had started to ‘wash her hands of it all’, meaning the 
Queen was extricating herself from the performance of the execution, preparing to be a 
spectator so that her ‘innocency’ could be proclaimed in the aftermath. Thereupon, 
Davison showed the warrant to Lord Vice-Chamberlain Christopher Hatton, detailing 
‘some doubtefull speeches of hirs bewrayenge a disposytyone to throwe the burden 
from hir selfs yf by any meanes she myghte’. He reminded Hatton of the example of 
Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk, whose execution ‘shee had layde hevelye vppon 
my Lord Treasorore for a long tyme aftere’. Accordingly, Davison announced ‘I was 
for my owne parte fully resolved, notwithstandinge the directyones that I had recaved 
to doe nothinge that myghte geve hir any advantage to caste aburthen of so great 
weighte vppon my single and weake shoulderes.’73 Davison refused to meddle in this 
alone, though in his study of Robert Beale, Mark Taviner suggests this was 
‘retrospective wisdom’ which Davison indulged in when later sent to the Tower for his 
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part in the proceedings.74 Davison was alert to the Queen’s ‘escape’, though not 
enough of his colleagues’. He appealed to Burghley as his staunchest associate during 
Walsingham’s illness. That Davison handed Burghley the warrant confirmed 
Burghley’s charge of the whole proceedings from hereon. Regrettably, this new anchor 
did not act as trustworthily as Davison had presumed he would. During the later 
examination and trial, Burghley and other complicit councillors made Davison their 
scapegoat, and singled him out for prison. 
 
Immediately on hearing from Davison, Burghley informed the still bed-ridden 
Walsingham of the Queen’s possible change of heart. The latter soon planned a 
timetable for dispatching the warrant and for the execution, which he then passed to 
Burghley for inspection.75 At 11 pm on 2 February, Davison sent a message to Robert 
Beale, the Clerk of the Council, to meet him at Walsingham’s London house the next 
morning. At 9 am on 3 February, Walsingham showed Beale the sealed warrant, and 
informed him first of his new assignment from the Council to carry this down to 
Fotheringay Castle, where Mary was held captive, and second, that he should first 
accompany Davison to the Council meeting at Greenwich that morning.76 Around 10 
or 11 am, ten councillors—Burghley, Leicester, the Earl of Derby, Lord Admiral 
Charles Howard, William Lord Cobham, Lord Hunsdon, Francis Knollys, Hatton, John 
Wolley, Davison—and Beale, as the intended messenger, called together by means of 
Randolph Bellin, Keeper of the Council Chamber, gathered in Burghley’s private 
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chamber.77 After Burghley ‘shewed and read the warrant’ out aloud, the Council 
formally appointed Beale to carry the warrant and some attached Council letters to 
Fotheringay. He was to escort the Earls of Shrewsbury and of Kent, both of whom 
were chosen to direct Mary’s execution, and in order to cloak their real mission, 
pretend to go into Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire to hear hues and cries. More 
significantly, the councillors had all agreed to obey Burghley’s directive to dispatch the 
warrant ‘without troubling her Majestie anie further in that behalf’, and made a mutual 
oath that no one, including the Queen, was to be informed of their proceeding.78 Then 
Beale took the accompanying Council letters for Walsingham’s signature in the 
afternoon. 
 
At home, Walsingham was occupied in arranging for an executioner in the greatest 
secrecy. His servant Anthony Hall hired one, paying him £10 ‘for his Labor’. Not 
going with Beale, this executioner was escorted by George Digby, another servant of 
Walsingham’s, by way of Buldeck. Originally Walsingham gave Digby a letter for 
Walter Mildmay to arrange for their lodging at Mildmay’s house, Apthorpe, two miles 
distant from the castle. It is unclear whether in this letter Walsingham explained the 
clandestine mission to Mildmay. But Mildmay refused to receive them, probably out 
of dread of Queen Elizabeth’s possible reaction to his ‘collusion’. The executioner 
therefore had to stay secretly at the house of Jean Erust in the town of Fotheringhay.79 
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On 8 February 1587, around 10 am, Mary Queen of Scots finally laid down her neck 
for two strokes of the axe. Presumably, Queen Elizabeth was the last in London to 
learn of Mary’s death. Around 3 pm on 9 February, ‘all the bells of the town began to 
ring and bonfires of joy were made in the streets, with celebrations and banquets, in 
sign of the great rejoicing’, but Elizabeth had been out riding with the Portuguese 
ambassador in the morning.80 Later in the evening, she was apprised by Davison of 
this news, in public. Elizabeth was so astonished at being at open loggerheads with her 
Council, that Davison was committed to the Tower on 14 February, on the double 
charge of a breach of secrecy and of dispatching Mary’s death warrant without royal 
approval. The aged Burghley and ailing Walsingham came close to accompanying him. 
Elizabeth vetoed this idea on grounds that imprisonment would kill Burghley, and 
Walsingham was too ‘stout’ and ‘wold utter all’, particularly of her secret order to 
murder Mary. Elizabeth’s wrath directed at her complicit councillors paralysed the 
government for the next few months, hindering ‘the necasserye consultatyon that were 
to be desyered for the prevencyon of the manyfest perryells that hang over this 
realme’.81 
 
Queen Elizabeth claimed innocence in the matter of Mary’s death by shifting all the 
blame onto her Council.82 She wrote without delay in her own hand to James VI of 
Scotland:  
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My dearest brother, would God thou knowest, yet selfest not, with what imcomparable 
griefe my minde is perplexed for this lamentable event which is happened contrary to 
my meaning, which for that my penne trembleth to mention, you shall fully understand 
by this my kinsman, I pray you, that as God and many others can witness my 
innocency in this matter.83 
 
She shirked her responsibility for his mother’s death, ascribing it to an accident: 
she had no will to implement the execution, despite having signed the warrant 
under pressure from her Council and Parliament; the warrant was dispatched by her 
presumptuous councillors without them notifying her. On the other hand, 
Elizabeth’s ‘innocency’ exposed her relative powerlessness in the male-dominated 
circulation of information. The male dominance over espionage and state 
information benefited specific ministers, as managers of knowledge, in assuming 
the initiative over policy. Walsingham, who was the first to be informed by 
Davison that Mary’s death warrant had been signed, and Burghley, informed also 
by Davison of Elizabeth’s likely withdrawal from Mary’s execution, both secured 
the command to call the Council and to direct the execution. Elizabeth was 
marginalised from this policy decision.  
 
This episode roused two controversies: the councillors’ ‘unduly’ independent action 
against the supreme monarch, and the fact that they prioritised their allegiance to the 
Council over the Queen. These two issues transformed Davison’s resulting trial into 
another open polemic on the Elizabethan polity: whether it was governed by personal 
rule or was a monarchical republic. On 28 March 1587, Davison was tried in the Star 
Chamber before thirteen Commissioners and four members of the Queen’s learned 
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counsel; none of the eleven complicit councillors was selected for this Commission.84 
Davison was formally prosecuted for betraying the privity of the signed and sealed 
warrant to the Council, and for dispatching this warrant without the Queen’s approval. 
His punishment was set at a fine of 10,000 marks and imprisonment at the Queen’s 
pleasure, and was passed by the whole Commission.  
 
Faced with the two charges of contempt of queenship and misprision of the 
Secretaryship, Davison began his defence by attempting to move the Commission with 
patriotism. He alleged that all his actions were ‘vpon a zeale for the saffte of her Queen 
and the realme and not vpon malice or vpon any bludthirstines for he had that all men 
knowe he was not blood thirstne’. He attributed his misunderstanding of the Queen’s 
meaning that Mary should have been executed, to his inexperience with the Queen’s 
manner of speech.85 Actually, however, Davison had been alert to the unease that 
hinted at the Queen’s likely impending change of mind about Mary’s execution, when 
she had questioned, ‘what need that haste?’. He acted swiftly in concert with Burghley, 
to whom he consigned the troublesome signed warrant. Davison was a well-trained and 
practised diplomat, who had been trusted by Walsingham with the intricate Dutch 
diplomacy; he was definitely not as green as he claimed. Davison laid more emphasis 
on the charge of his ‘breache of secrecy’ to the Council. He acknowledged that the 
Queen did caution him to seal the signed warrant in secrecy, ‘leste the devulgyng 
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thearof befoare the executyon myghte, as she pretended, encrease hir daunger’.86 But 
he clarified the fact that the Queen herself had already informed four members of the 
Council, ‘namely hym self, the L. Admirall, mr. Sec. Walsingham and the Lo. 
Chancellor who ought to loke upon euery thing which he sealeth’. Burghley learned of 
the situation from the Lord Admiral and Leicester after the warrant was signed, and 
Hatton from the Queen herself.87 Most significantly, he explained that as a privy 
councillor ‘he knoweth no reason whie the lords of the councele beinge counsellors of 
estate should not be made privie & acquainted with a matter which ded so nerely 
concerne the state of the Realme.’88 Davison upgraded the role of the Privy Council to 
be an alternative ruler of England. It is unclear whether this was one of Davison’s 
intentions: to distract the Commission from his own guilt by introducing the question 
of an unduly powerful Council. As Taviner has pointed out, the oath to maintain 
secrecy had not been laid as ‘an explicit responsibility’ of Davison’s, but was ‘rather an 
act of mutual and shared connivance of the whole of the Privy Council’. Davison was 
loath to be singled out to shoulder the whole responsibility, either for the Queen or the 
Council.89  
 
Queen Elizabeth called the Commission to confirm her innocence by declaring 
Davison’s and the Council’s guilt, as well as presumably to protect her personal rule 
against the rising Council. The Commission’s verdict of Davison’s guilt was opened by 
the chairman of the judges, Walter Mildmay. He alleged that Davison, fully entrusted 
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with the Queen’s business and willed to keep secrecy, ‘did not withstanding open it to 
the hole counsel’.90 Davison’s offence should be recognised as ‘a grete contempte and 
misprison’. 91  Lord Lumley questioned the leniency of Mildmay’s proposed 
punishment. He denounced Davison’s misconduct as Secretary, in not seeking 
confirmation of the Queen’s final intention.92  
 
There were, nevertheless, contrary voices that honoured the patriotic performance of 
Davison and the Council against the evil of Mary Queen of Scots. Roger Manwood, 
Lord Chief Baron, viewed Davison’s offence as an execution of justice, rather than a 
misprision.93 ‘That the execution of the Q. of Scotte vpon the delyverye of the 
commission by the commissioners was to do justum; yet that the deliverye therof by 
Mr. Davison was not juste.’94 Lord Grey defended Davison with the greatest sympathy. 
He reminded the other Commissioners of Davison’s praiseworthy achievement: he had 
saved England from the crises when that malicious Catholic pretender had been 
conspiring towards ‘the death of our soveraigne, the invacion of the realme by forrayne 
power and our owne distructions’. Davison did his duty under two ‘exigents’. Of these, 
the first was the Queen’s danger. Grey posed a rhetorical question: ‘if her majestie had 
miscaried and the warrant had ben found in his hand, that we ought to have counted 
hym a greater traytor then they which had so slayne her.’ The other exigency was 
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Davison’s own security if he had acted against the Queen’s wishes. Grey commended 
Davison’s bravery, in having ventured his land, living and life to perform such a duty 
at the risk of infuriating the Queen. ‘He preferred the saftie of his prince and contrie 
before his owne welfare’, so his altruistic effort and courage were worthy of being 
rewarded.95 
  
Echoing Grey’s position, Edwin Sandys, Archbishop of York, also pleaded for Davison. 
He insisted that obedience was a virtue, and resistance a vice, but that obedience 
should be first observed towards God, and then princes. He accepted Davison’s excuse 
of administrative inexperience, believing that the Secretary had offended not wittingly 
but negligently. Davison was praised for his ‘zeale [that] did move hym to cut of the 
head of our common enemy, whom justice wold not suffer to lyve’. This was an 
implied criticism of the Queen, whose undue charity had hazarded her state, people, 
and church in endless menaces inspired by Mary Queen of Scots. In sum, Mary’s 
execution was just, though Davison’s over-zealous actions in protecting the state did 
affront the monarchy, so in terms of punishment he agreed with Mildmay. Yet 
Davison’s service, the archbishop also believed, glorified God, to whom was owed the 
highest allegiance.  
 
Touching the definition of the role of the Privy Council in the Elizabethan polity, Lord 
Grey was the only supporter of Davison’s allegation that the Council owned 
independent prerogatives to national secrecy. He agreed that counsellors were ‘well 
knowen to haue ben acquainted with the greatest matters of secrecie concerninge her 
Majestie and the realme, since the beginning of her highnes reigne’.96 He suggested 
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that the power of the Council rested on a public recognition of accustomed trust, 
established as early as 1558 when the Queen acceded to the English throne. However, 
the majority of the Commission supported an absolute queenship. Mildmay reiterated 
Queen Elizabeth’s insistence on ‘Councillors by choyce, and not by birth’, and their 
subordinate position to the monarch: 
 
For although they be all of her majesties priuie counsel by name, yet they are but onely 
soe farre priuie as it shall please her highness to call them unto it…to acquaint fewe, 
sometimes one with greate actiones of secrecie and importaunce (as she 
wished)…otherwise it might fall out dangerous many tymes to prince & state, that 
euerie one of counsel should be partaker of all secretes of princes.97 
 
In light of royal absolutism, Mildmay ascribed the initiative to convoke the Council to 
the sovereign only.98 Croft agreed that it was not essential to acquaint the whole 
Council with all of the Queen’s doings, and Davison as her Secretary was supposed to 
devote his obligation to the Queen only.99  
 
Lumley tied Davison’s guilt in with the whole Council as a complicit body, who 
colluded to send the warrant ‘without her [Elizabeth] privitie’. He condemned the 
‘mutuall promises of the lords of the counsel’, which misguided the Queen’s Council 
to the point that they ‘conspire together in a privie chamber in her owne house’. ‘This 
is the most haynous affair which he hath heard or held of to have ben committed 
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against the prince this manie yeares.’100 Lumley denounced the action of those 
councillors as conspiracy, signifying the political tension within Elizabeth’s regime 
between these who supported a personal monarchy and those who defined the polity as 
a monarchical republic. 
 
It is worth noting that the execution of Mary did not involve the whole Council. 
Burghley and Walsingham selected a narrow group of individuals, both trustworthy 
and available at court, to join in their action. Beale, not a councillor but a clerk of the 
Council, was selected on a ‘need to know’ basis, as ‘the fittest person theie could 
advise of to whome theie might commit that charge’.101 This selective combination of 
certain councillors and specific individuals revealed a fact: the heart of the Elizabethan 
policy-making group was far from having a stable constitution. Instead it was flexible 
and mobile, in terms of time, agendas, and relationship with its conveners. These 
conveners were in general individuals who held espionage secrets or initial information. 
Their absolute control over information or intelligence empowered them to choose 
their companions to share such secrets and jointly make policy. In short, information 
managers, and those being notified of such information, constituted the core of the 
Elizabethan regime. Within this framework, as in the episode of Mary’s death, the 
male-dominated circulation of information, controlled by Burghley and Walsingham, 
restricted their Queen’s influence over certain vital political issues. 
 
Except for declaring Davison’s punishment, the Commission reached no conclusion 
over the validity of Davison’s actions, whether they showed patriotism or allegiance to 
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God in addition to disobedience to the monarchy. Their debates reflected two 
divergences touching the Elizabethan polity: first, should the Council assume more 
power to assist the Queen, or even plenary power in the event of the Queen’s untimely 
death? Second, did the initiative in organising the governing (counsel) group belong 
either to the Council or to the Queen, or alternatively, to certain oligarchic elites who 
dominated state information and intelligence?  
 
The best way to start is by considering why those complicit councillors risked 
proceeding with Mary’s execution without the Queen’s knowledge, even though it was 
possible to foresee that the loss of their lives and estates might accompanying the 
Queen’s resulting fury. Davison wrote down the key reason:  
 
Muche hir disavouynge of this justice was moare to bee feared, consyderyng the 
tymerousnes of hir sexe and nature, the quallety of the person who it concerned and 
respecte of hir frende with manye other cercomstances that myghte further and inclyne 
therunto.102 
    
Elizabeth’s three-decade governance had increased universal doubt about gynaecocracy, 
the government by a single woman. Her parsimony and irresolution constantly 
frustrated her government and strengthened their sense of insecurity under female rule, 
which originated from a theory of female inferiority and a tradition of misogyny.103 
Their doubts about the Queen’s capability to rule drove them to exclude her from 
sensitive intelligence and relevant policy decisions, and promoted the Council to be an 
alternative ‘ruler’ in male politics.  
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Elizabeth’s expenditure on fashion, but financial caution on matters of state, was seen 
as a lack of judgement. There had been complaints to the Queen that she was keen on 
gaining advantages from her subjects’ wealth. In 1581, Elizabeth instructed the Earl of 
Shrewsbury to decrease Mary Stuart’s custody fee weekly from £52 to £30. Actually, 
the Earl had paid far more than that—more than £3,000 annually simply to feed 
her—and personally covered the annual deficit by up to £10,000, including additional 
costs like the keeping of 40 soldiers to guard Mary, and meeting her extra requests.104 
The Queen’s irregular payments for Mary’s maintenance had already dissatisfied the 
Earl, and now he was faced with a budget cut. Walsingham feared an insufficient 
budget would produce an inefficient guardianship. He interceded in this case with the 
Queen:  
 
How can my Lord maintain his people about him, and if she not been seen unto, she 
will escape. I beseech your Majesty, let not the pinching and sparing of a thousand 
pounds…work such extremities. And [even] if no such thing were to happen, I would 
not keep so dangerous a guest to gain as much money as my Lord.105  
 
Consequently Walsingham was refused an audience for two weeks. There were similar 
setbacks when he urged the Queen to bestow diplomatic pensions. Elizabeth would 
become jealous at such requests, which were intended ‘only to have drawen some 
treasure from her coffers’.106  
 
More discontent arose with Elizabeth’s ‘irresolution’ and ‘delay’, two terms repeated 
constantly in Walsingham’s grumbles. That ‘her Majestie beinge by sexe fearefull, 
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cannot but be irresolute’, was a difficulty for policy decisions in times of dangerous 
uncertainty.107 ‘Irresolution and long weytyng’, Thomas Smith confided to Burghley 
his frustrations with the Queen, ‘will make oportunyte and occasion to flit away’.108 In 
February 1575, Walsingham remonstrated with Elizabeth frankly, that her ‘delaye in 
resolvynge doth not only mak me voyd of all hope to do anye good therin (the 
opportunite beynge lost), but also quite discourages mee to deale in like causes, 
seeynge myne and other yours poore feythfull servants care for your safetie 
frutelesse’.109 The following month, he again lamented her delay in accepting the 
Scottish offer of a mutual league of defence. This vacillation not only discouraged her 
devoted Council, but ‘breede in them [their Scottish ally] an opinion that your 
maajesties hath them in contempt, wherby there maye followe in them by some like 
conceipt on alienation uncurable’.110 In the meantime, Walsingham felt frustrated at 
Elizabeth’s improper tolerance for Mary. Recently he had discovered Mary’s 
clandestine communication with the outside world via Henry Cockyn. But Elizabeth 
thwarted the investigation and forgave the collusive Henry Howard. Walsingham 
complained to Leicester in disgust: ‘her majesty’s strange dealings in this case will 
discourage all honest ministers that are careful for her safety to deal in the discovery of 
the sores of this diseased state, seeing her majesty bent rather to cover than to cure 
them.’111 Walsingham consequently took leave, using the excuse of illness.  
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Queen Elizabeth’s irresolution also caused her to be criticised in later historiography. 
William Camden called her a women ‘being naturally slow in her resolutions’.112 In 
1870, the Victorian historian James Froude reproached Elizabeth I for lacking all the 
necessary capacities for being a sovereign like her heroic father. He attributed the 
successes of her glorious reign to the efforts of her male bureaucrats:  
 
Vain as she was of her own sagacity, she never modified a course recommended to her 
by Burghley without injury both to the realm and to herself. She never chose an 
opposite course without plunging into embarrassments from which his and 
Walsingham’s [skills] were barely able to extricate her. The great results of her reign 
were the fruits of a policy which was not her own, and which she starved and mutilated 
when energy and completeness were most needed.113 
 
So low an appraisal did he make of Queen Elizabeth’s decisiveness.114 Implicit in 
Froude’s criticism was a reference to the withdrawal from her own queenship of the 
recently widowed Queen Victoria. John Black blamed Elizabeth for her ‘illogicality, 
irresolution, and timorous clemency’ towards the national foe Mary Stuart. Elizabeth 
acted mercifully as a cousin, shielding Mary from the fury of the English Protestants 
who had announced that ‘so long as the “monstrous and huge dragon” lived, not only 
their own queen’s life was in danger, but the security of the state’.115 Yet the 
ungrateful Mary, professing the most amicable intentions, never abandoned her hope of 
bringing Elizabeth and the Protestant establishment to ruin. Black accused Elizabeth of 
being an unduly sentimental and irresponsible sovereign, putting England’s security at 
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risk from an abundantly plain aggression. For him, England and its Queen were lucky 
to be guided by a group of intellectual male ministers. 
 
A long attendance on the capricious Queen trained Elizabeth’s counsellors to exercise 
a high degree of vigilance over, and resistance to, her changeable mind. Walsingham 
therefore ran his espionage, applying decisive (or selective) intelligence to open her 
eyes ‘to believe that the great increase of papists is of danger to the realm’.116 His 
success in counter-plots did tempt his hesitant Queen to break off the traditional 
Anglo-Spanish alliance in 1584, and then to sign Mary’s death warrant in 1587. 
Nevertheless, Elizabeth’s gender had always been the problem, states Patrick Collinson, 
so the stuff of Elizabethan politics—especially the activities of Leicester, Burghley, 
and ‘the Privy Council as a body’—had been the seeking of ‘an acceptable path back 
to normality in the shape of a male successor, virile and virtuous in the Protestant 
sense’: the essence of what Collinson has called ‘the Elizabethan monarchical 
republic’.117 The Tudor polity was never defined as royal absolutism, but instead 
thought of as a mixed rule. This concept originated, assumed Geoffrey Elton, from the 
‘king-in-parliament’ creed of Henry VIII’s chief minister Thomas Cromwell.118 Under 
Edward VI’s minority, this idea was rehearsed and became significant in the Protestant 
propaganda against Mary I’s Catholic gynaecocracy. Marian exiles welcomed 
Elizabeth’s succession as divine providence, but because of both traditional misogyny 
and Marian persecution, they urged the new Queen to be a ‘godly Deborah’ sharing her 
rule with parliament. John Hales ascribed Mary’s failed regime to her refusal to 
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acknowledge parliamentary superiority. In 1559, John Foxe, ‘on the restoration of the 
light of Gospel’, cautioned the Queen that she could only fulfil God’s promise to 
protect England if she sought the counsel of divinely ordained advisers; they were the 
wisest chosen ‘from the pious and the most pious from the wise’.119 John Aylmer 
apologised for Elizabeth’s fitness to rule. She was ‘weake’, ‘feable’ and ‘softe in 
courage’, albeit being God’s choice. Female rule in England was not dangerous, he 
added, inasmuch as the Queen would do little under England’s peculiarly mixed polity: 
‘the regiment of England is not a mere Monarchie, as some for lacke of consideracion 
thinke, nor a meere Oligarchie, nor Democratie, but a rule mixte of all these.’120 One 
Presbyterian leader Thomas Cartwright defined the Elizabethan polity as a ‘mixed 
estate’, in which ‘monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy were admixed and conjoined 
in the forms of Queen, Privy Council, and Parliament’.121 Female rule would be 
accepted only if the Queen co-ruled with a selected group of male elites. 
 
Of the design of mixed monarchy, one key masculine element which counterbalanced 
Elizabeth’s sex and made her rule tolerable was the theory of godly assigned officials. 
Essentially male and ‘intellectual’, they came to form an alternative governing group, 
allowed to practise some kind of conditional resistance to stop Elizabeth abusing her 
royal prerogative or making false judgements in matters of state. Such officials 
believed in sovereignty, but more so that they could ‘serve God, by serving of the 
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Queen, for all other service is indeed bondage to the Devil’.122 Obedience was a virtue, 
though inapplicable in the case of tyrants and incapable rulers. From such spurious 
authorities, godly-assigned magistrates would have to ‘protect’ and ‘preserve’ the 
Protestant state at the expense of the Queen’s instructions.123 These ideological 
positions—the Marian exiles’ appeal for the ‘rule mixte’, and the awareness of 
conditional resistance as an option for godly officials—were strengthened by 
Elizabeth’s irresolute governance within practical politics and her accustomed absence 
from Council consultations.124 This theory of resistance was, for example, fully 
applied in the case of the Council-led implementation of Mary’s execution. Aware of 
Elizabeth’s likely withdrawal of Mary’s death warrant, this alternative governing group 
enforced the execution, and sealed the relevant information off from the Queen until 9 
February. In these events, Queen Elizabeth found herself isolated from her ministerial 
circulation of intelligence and information. The male ministers involved denied that 
their behaviour was misprision or disregard of the monarchy. It arose, they believed, 
out of godly obligation and their understanding of the English polity as a mixed rule.  
 
Walsingham was a follower of the theory of the godly mixed rule. John Cooper states 
that traditional concepts of female inferiority, the education of the Renaissance and 
Reformation, and his experience of exile in Basel and Padua shaped Walsingham’s 
attitude towards monarchy. His relationship with Queen Elizabeth would never have 
been ‘as simple as that of mistress and servant’.125 Echoing Henry VIII’s Secretary 
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Thomas More’s self-identification as ‘the king’s good servant, but God’s first’, 
Walsingham declared that ‘above all things I wish God’s glory and next the Queen’s 
safety’.126 
   
Burghley was of the same mind. Thomas Smith’s De Republica Anglorum, written in 
1565, reflected Burghley’s definition of the Tudor polity. They, like Cromwell, all 
confirmed the Tudor sovereignty, worshipping the prince as ‘the life, the head and the 
authoritie of all thinges that be done in the realme of England’. But they overruled the 
idea of English sovereignty as absolutism, denying the idea that ‘the Queen really did 
attend personally to everything of any consequence which was done in her name’. 
‘Common wealthes or governements are not most commonly simple but mixt.’127 
There was a paradox in Burghley’s political creed, situated in the struggle between 
being a royal servant and a civil official. Stephen Alford tries to clarify Burghley’s 
religious character, which historiography has explored less than his political one. 
Alford pictures him as a ‘tough and clever politician driven by the true religion’. In a 
letter home addressed his son in 1596, Burghley clearly placed service to the Queen 
ahead of everything except service to God: ‘presuming that she being God’s chief 
minister here it shall be God’s will to have her commandments obeyed after that I have 
performed my duty as a counsellor’.128 This conviction cultivated his crucial concept 
of the godly anointed counsel.  
 
It was the duty of counsellors, responsible first to God, to oppose their sovereigns’ 
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false decisions. Accordingly, by December 1559, when Queen Elizabeth blocked the 
decision of the Council that she should send men and money into Scotland to expel the 
French, Cecil sorrowfully begged the Queen to dismiss him from her service (the 
surviving text is either a copy of the original, or a draft):  
 
I will never be a minister in any your Majesty’s service, wherunto your owne mynd 
shall not be agreable. for thereunto I am sworne, to be a minister of your Majesty’s 
determynations and not of myne owne, or of others though they be never so many. and 
on the other part to serve your Majesty in anythyng that my self can not allow, must 
nedes be an unproffitable service, and so untoward, as therein I would be loth your 
Majesty should be deceyved.129 
 
Stephen Alford extols this passage as having ‘a wonderful double edge’. It looks like a 
submissive announcement of obedience as a minister, but actually Cecil’s use of the 
very strong word ‘allow’ conferred on counsellors ‘the freedom to disengage from any 
course of action not conformable to judgement or conscience’.130 Cecil’s belief in 
conditional resistance to royal irrationality and in the concept of godly officials, 
brought Mary to the block in 1587 without Elizabeth’s knowledge. Other councillors 
involved likewise submitted their first allegiance to the Council, not the wearingly 
irresolute Queen. They took it as their duty assigned by God to protect England from 
any harm resulting from the Queen’s indecision.131 
 
With respect to the composition of this godly advisory group—the pivot of the 
regime—Elizabethans fell into disagreement. Marian exiles like Hales and Aylmer 
preferred Parliament to constitute its core. Thomas Smith agreed that it should be 
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based within Parliament, but confined to the House of Lords only, as ‘the highest court 
of the realm’.132 Burghley inclined towards oligarchy. His plan for an  Interregnum in 
the emergency case of Queen Elizabeth’s sudden or violent death, drafted in 1584 and 
1585, envisaged a basically conciliar government: a Great Council or Grand Council. 
Its thirty members consisted of the privy councillors serving at the time of Elizabeth’s 
death, with selective recruitment from the principal offices of state and the House of 
Lords.133 This temporary body would be authorised ‘to remedy all violence committed 
against’ the Queen, to recall the last Parliament to select a new sovereign, and to ensure 
‘the government of the realme shall still contynew in all respectes’.134 Burghley 
defined the Privy Council as occupying a position as the vice-sovereign.  
 
Walsingham favoured a narrower oligarchy out of considerations of secrecy, and as the 
manager of intelligence and information he could assume the initiative of calling the 
counsel group to direct policy. As part of his manipulation of Mary’s execution, in his 
separate letter to Paulet and Drury carried by Beale dated 3 February 1587, 
Walsingham first cautioned both of them of the ‘greate care taken to haue the matter 
passé in secrecie’. He betrayed his deepest fear of Burghley’s over-expansive selection 
of insiders. There were ‘so manie commissioners consellors made acquainted withall’, 
that Walsingham worried that secrecy would not be maintained.135 His fears in this 
regard reflect his character as a spymaster. Ironically, though, Walsingham seems to 
have forgotten to look back at his own unduly expansive intelligence secretariat. 
Walsingham’s concern for secrecy strictly enclosed information transmission within a 
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very limited group, which was recruited mainly from the Council with the addition of 
certain professional or experienced individuals like Beale.136  
 
Burghley preferred a larger and multi-departmental governing body, probably out of 
consideration for the power balance between the Council (government), court, and 
Parliament. His design conforms to the traditional assumption of a constitutional 
regime, like Penry Williams’s courtly regime, or MacCaffrey’s ‘collective’, 
‘quasi-organic’ and ‘stable’ Council-regime.137 The model of the polity Walsingham 
designed is narrow out of considerations of secrecy, and flexible and variable in its 
constitution. In other words, its membership would not be limited to holders of specific 
offices and to the noble class, but be selected and adjusted according to policy need 
and the relevance of individuals’ professionalism and experience. These differences 
reflect their diverse characters. The conservative Burghley did everything by the rules; 
Walsingham broke the existing establishment, and adjusted the counsel team to new 
matters. Flexibility was necessary to the success of speculative espionage, and hence 
promoted Walsingham’s outstanding performance in the Elizabethan secret service. 
Furthermore, in accordance with Walsingham’s concept of a flexible governing group, 
the men controlling initial intelligence or information would be the organisers of it. In 
other words, only spymasters or information managers would be able to select suitable 
individuals to share information and jointly make policy.  
 
It is unsurprising to see Queen Elizabeth’s hostility to these theories and practices of 
resistance to her personal rule. John Guy observes that whenever certain crucial 
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political issues—Elizabeth’s matrimony and succession, foreign policy (particularly in 
Scotland, France and the Low Countries), and the alteration of the religious settlement 
of 1559—were aired, Elizabeth attempted to forbid or limit discussion, or declined to 
take her councillors’ advice. She even consistently reserved matters ‘for her own 
decision—or more often indecision—by invoking ‘humanist-classical’ idioms to argue 
that she needed to be further “advised” on matters touching her Crown and state, 
thereby turning recognition of the need for ‘counsel’ into the excuse for rejecting her 
councillors’ advice’.138 Moreover, Elizabeth had manipulated the dichotomy of the 
Queen’s two bodies to diminish suspicion over her ability to rule, and any attempt to 
reduce her limited queenship would also be suppressed. Consequently, John Aylmer, 
the promoter of the concept of a ‘rule mixte’ in 1559, waited another nineteen years for 
his bishopric of London. Edmund Grindal, Archbishop of Canterbury, was nearly 
forced to retire in 1583, probably partly as a result of his emphasis on Queen 
Elizabeth’s obligation to not only solicit and listen to, but also to follow, the counsel of 
the ‘bishops and other divines of your realm’ and ‘other head ministers’, who ‘were not 
mere agents of the royal will but bearers of authority’.139 In 1582, Elizabeth further 
prepared to let her Council understand that ‘they are Councellors by choice, and not by 
birth, whose services are no longer to be used in that publike function then it shall 
please her Majestie to dispose of the same’. 140  She overruled the Council’s 
self-identity as god-assigned ministers born to assisting the monarch in matters of state, 
and here redefined them as ‘principall members of the Crowne’, ultimately by the 
Queen’s choice. The councillors were not destined by God, but replaceable as the 
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sovereign’s willed. Queen Elizabeth asserted her unique initiative in organising her 
Council and regime. 
 
Natalie Mears accepts Queen Elizabeth’s argument, judging her to have been an 
authoritative monarch by ascribing to her the initiative in organising the advisory 
group. Mears agrees that Elizabethan policies were made not by the regular Privy 
Council, but by a flexible ‘probouleutic group’ which the Queen convened. The Queen 
selected her advisers in terms of her personal relationship with them, the specific 
agenda under consideration, and their inside knowledge, rather than their conciliar 
status. Hence her advisers ranged from councillors and ambassadors to her household 
officers.141 Elizabeth’s use of personally selected groups was intended to ‘sideline the 
council and maintain control of policy-making’. 142  Nevertheless, regarding the 
Council’s ‘conspiracy’ for Mary’s execution, Mears is not able to illustrate why this 
royal initiative fell into the hands of Burghley and Walsingham. It remains unclear 
whether Mears ascribes this event to a simple accident of no threat to royal supremacy, 
or as a fact illustrative of a declining queenship accompanying a powerful and stable 
Council. This event exposes a monarchical crisis, when Queen Elizabeth lost her 
general control over government. The Privy Council, by controlling intelligence and 
information, was elbowing the Queen backwards, away from the pivot of policy 
decisions inside her regime.  
 
Conclusion 
There is no doubt that Secretary Davison was sacrificed at the trial of March 1587. 
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Elizabeth used his trial and punishment, not only to exculpate herself from a Catholic 
Queen’s death, but also to warn her Council against further pursuing the practice of a 
mixed polity. For Burghley and other complicit councillors, Davison had been prepared 
to be singled out as their shield, bearing the brunt of Elizabeth’s fury. As William 
Camden argued, Davison, ‘a man ingenuously good, and simply practised in Court 
arts’, had been promoted to be a joint Secretary in September 1586 and ‘brought upon 
the Court stage’, simply to be a suitable scapegoat for the tragedy of Mary’s execution. 
‘Soone after, this person being taken away, as if he had failed in the last act, hee was 
thrust downe from the stage, and not without pitty of many, shut up a long time in 
prison.’143 Taviner, in his study of Robert Beale, pictures a cunning and somewhat 
immoral Burghley, who for reasons of personal survival kept unloading his own crime 
onto a colleague who was as yet inexperienced in court arts. Davison was alert to 
Queen Elizabeth’s intended withdrawal from Mary’s execution, but not alert enough to 
avoid being used as cannon fodder by the Privy Council.  
 
This chapter confirms knowledge as having been a key source of power in the 
Elizabethan regime. In contrast to the traditional concern with male espionage systems, 
it has presented an alternative information network, based on the female chamber. 
However, the low efficiency of this network did not protect the Queen within the 
operation of patriarchal politics. Her male ministers, as spymasters and managers of 
state information, were taking over her initiative in policy decision.  
 
It is still unclear whether Elizabethan England was a monarchical republic. From her 
accession, Elizabeth’s personal rule ceaselessly encountered appeals for a mixed 
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rule—first from the Marian exiles, then from Smith’s De Republica Anglorum, and 
from Burghley’s proposed ‘Great Council’ in 1584. The Council-led action for Mary’s 
execution brought this debate into public view in the context of Davison’s trial in 1587. 
Today, modern historians are divided, either in defence or refutation of Elizabeth’s 
personal rule. Natalie Mears stresses Elizabeth’s unique initiative in organising her 
regime, countering Patrick Collinson’s concept of the Elizabethan ‘monarchical 
republic’. Other historians vacillate within this dichotomy. Geoffrey Elton’s portrait of 
the policy decisions taken by an absolute Queen Elizabeth obviously contradicts his 
previous claim of a Tudor power transfer from the court to the government.144 
Likewise, Wallace MacCaffrey pictured a powerless Elizabeth within her patriarchal 
Council in the early years of her reign, but stressed a royal absolutism that had been 
safeguarded by her prerogative of patronage.  
 
Their paradoxes result from Elizabeth’s inconsistent queenship on different political 
issues. As Susan Doran states in the context of research into Elizabeth’s courtships, 
certain specifically personal issues like marriage, or royal prerogatives like patronage, 
revealed Elizabeth’s great strength as a monarch. Others concerning national security, 
diplomacy, and espionage, empowered her male ministers instead.145 These ministers 
affected or directed policies, either by—together with Parliament—turning the screws 
on the Queen, or by manipulating intelligence. Walsingham was the one that excelled 
in the latter art. He often felt frustrated with his Queen’s irresolution and 
short-sightedness, and used his espionage to hasten her decisions. His successful 
counter-plots infuriated the moody Queen to a point where she broke openly with 
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Spain and executed Mary Stuart. Elizabeth’s undue reliance on the male intelligence 
(or information) system weakened her queenship. Certainly she was cunning enough to 
apply her prerogative over patronage and official appointments to counter-balance 
faction at court, and successfully broke Walsingham’s monopoly on intelligence. Yet it 
meant that Queen Elizabeth rested her sovereignty on the power lever of faction. This 
was highly risky. If the parties on either side collapsed, or they became reconciled for a 
common purpose, the exercise of queenship would be hijacked. Such a reconciliation 
did happen when Walsingham and Burghley cooperated to promote Mary’s execution. 
Elizabeth’s male officials shared a strong suspicion of her female inferiority, and grew 
weary of her irresolution. When faced with sensitive policy issues, male ministers 
selected intelligence in order to affect her decisions, or isolated her from their 
intelligence-information system to act by themselves. Elizabeth was in danger of 
becoming a figurehead. And her male-based government, by controlling espionage and 
information, was securing increasing initiative over policy decisions. The case of 
Mary’s execution was just one of the inevitable encounters and quarrels during this 
transfer of power from court to government.
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Conclusion 
 
On 6 December 1602, four months before she died, Queen Elizabeth made the final 
journey of her reign, visiting her Principal Secretary Robert Cecil at Salisbury House 
in the Strand. As part of the entertainment there, the majestic Rainbow Portrait of 
Queen Elizabeth was presented to the Queen.1 The canvas is undated, but had 
probably been painted by Marcus Gheeraerts the Younger over the previous two years. 
In this portrait, Queen Elizabeth emerges in a golden light from the darkness, the 
ageless mask of youth and beauty a contrast to her actual 67-year-old decline. Her 
ruby-jewelled crown is decorated with a crescent moon at the top. On each side of it is 
a wired veil protruding in hoops and bordered with pearls. An orange-crimson mantle, 
embroidered with eyes and ears (as well as mouths, evident on the unnatural lateral 
creases) lies across her spring-flowered dress. Her left sleeve is adorned with a serpent, 
from whose mouth hangs a heart-shaped ruby with an armillary sphere above its head. 
Her right hand clasps the cylinder of a colourless rainbow, with a motto above it: 
‘NON SINE SOLE IRIS’ (no rainbow without the sun).  
 
The iconography of these symbols proceeds diversely from courtly panegyric, the 
Bible, and the worship of absolute sovereignty, which come together in this portrait as 
a glorification of Elizabeth’s reign. Frances Yates and Roy Strong read the portrait 
according to Renaissance allegory and English courtly eulogy. Using Caesare Ripa’s 
Iconologia (Rome, 1593) reveals that the eyes, ears, and mouths all over the cloak may 
represent the Queen’s fame, ‘flying rapidly through the world, spoken of by many 
mouths, seen and heard by many eyes and ears’. The court poet John Davies’s acrostic 
Hymnes to Astraea of 1599 suggests that the flowers on the Queen’s bodice allude to 
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the return of ‘Astraea, Queen of Beauty’. Elizabeth grasps the rainbow as an architect 
of peace; her rule by wisdom and prudence leads England away from that ‘angry aged 
Winter’ towards a golden age.2  
 
Where Yates and Strong found political encomiums, René Grazaini read professions of 
Christian imagery. The mantle is re-evaluated to signify that the Queen, wearing God’s 
blessing, becomes ‘one who has seen and heard, an exemplary Christian and someone 
specially favoured’. Her clutching at the rainbow implies her hold on a Divine promise, 
and a thanksgiving for the repulse of the Spanish Armada threat. The portrait, states 
Grazaini, ‘keeps a fine balance between what belongs to the Queen as a great Christian 
sovereign on the one hand and on the other confession of utter dependence on God’.3 
Daniel Fischlin, however, doubts both Grazaini and Strong’s interpretations, as being 
caught up in a ‘diffuse and rather clichéd’ symbolism. He chooses instead to elaborate 
on the Renaissance embodiment of kingship. In an example of publicity for the 
absolute monarchy, the eyes and ears symbolise sovereigns’ ceaseless vigilance, 
encouraging subjects’ conformity to the state. Elizabeth’s seizure of the bow-sized 
rainbow intimates her female superiority over men, or a ‘political androgyny’.4 
 
All these readings of the painting narrow themselves to pure iconology and the 
fabrication of supreme queenship, but overlook the ‘realpolitik’ of 1602 that lay behind 
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the painting. What the portrait extols is, presumably, not the false omnipotence of 
Queen Elizabeth, but its potent patron Secretary Robert Cecil and the Cecils’ political 
ideology of a monarchical republic. Roy Strong was the first to associate the portrait 
with the Cecils’ client John Davies. Commissioned by Robert Cecil, Davies first 
composed Hymnes to Astraea in 1599, and A Contention betwixt a Wife, a Widdow and 
a Maide for an entertainment in 1602. Kevin Sharpe developed an analysis of this new 
interrelationship, disclosing the political ambition of Robert Cecil, ‘to be the queen’s 
eyes and ears…at a time of jockeying to be the principal minister’.5 Eyes and ears, in 
the sense of politics, symbolise those who watch and listen to supply intelligence to 
rulers, which in the context of Tudor government implies the office of Principal 
Secretary. 6  This post, strengthened successively by William Cecil and Francis 
Walsingham, had assumed full charge of official diplomacy and espionage by the late 
Elizabethan period. Robert Cecil succeeded his father Burghley as the Secretary in 
1596; when his factional rival Robert Devereux, second Earl of Essex was executed in 
February 1601, Cecil took over Essex’s intelligence resources. Hereafter, Cecil became 
those exclusive eyes and ears (as well as mouths), enveloping Queen Elizabeth by 
monopolising state information and intelligence.7 The victory of the Cecils in the 
factional struggle drove the divided Elizabethan espionage system—which had 
developed in the policy rivalry between Burghley and Walsingham from the 
mid-1570s—towards a union.  
 
In this thesis, the focus of the investigation into the world of intelligence and espionage 
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has moved away from the traditional concern for national defence, towards a new 
location within the power politics of the mid-Elizabethan regime from 1568 to 1588. 
Intelligence services here emerge no longer as simply existing for national security, but 
as a support for power rivalry within the regime. Ministers organised their individual 
spy systems to contest intelligence for policy debates, to monitor opposing colleagues, 
and even to restrain the monarchy. Far from being an officially united department, 
Elizabethan espionage worked as individuals collaborating, revealing two power 
landscapes in high politics: a policy rivalry between parties, and another between 
bureaucracy and sovereignty. Firstly, the different approaches to English intervention 
abroad, whether conditional on account of realpolitik and ruling legitimacy, or based 
on support for universal Protestantism, drove the mid-Elizabethan ministers into a 
partisan divide between Burghley’s peace party and the militarists led by Walsingham 
and Leicester. The machinery of English espionage hence split into individual systems 
from the late 1570s, which contested intelligence as a necessary tool to benefit their 
parties in policy debate. Secondly, ministerial dominance over the circulation of 
official information and private espionage provoked a power competition between 
court and government. Male ministers, as spymasters and information managers in 
government, enveloped Queen Elizabeth either in selective intelligence favourable for 
their policies, or in ignorance. The court, inefficient in its control over government 
intelligence and information, gradually handed over the royal initiative on policy 
decisions to the male-based government. The Elizabethan polity was transferring from 
personal monarchy towards a mixed rule.  
 
This thesis began by revealing the shift from an early espionage alliance between 
William Cecil and Francis Walsingham, which was based on patronage, to a point 
where they were working separately and to some degree in opposition. From 1568 to 
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1573, Cecil’s espionage clientele promoted Walsingham to the very heart of the regime. 
From the late 1570s, their deepening divergence over the policy of English intervention 
in the continental Protestant wars, and their accompanying office transfers to the 
Secretaryship and the Treasurership, withdrew Walsingham from Burghley’s ‘tutelage’ 
and towards his own espionage system. This policy quarrel separated the Elizabethan 
intelligence service into individual cliental networks, leading to intelligence 
competition which lasted until 1602. Walsingham aimed through intelligence 
manipulation to devote England to the advancement of the Gospel. For the sake of 
gaining information for his exclusive use, his system was extremely privatised, 
employing personal residences and clients instead of government halls and officials. 
During Walsingham’s Secretaryship, the national intelligence machinery became a 
private clientele.  
 
In contrast with Walsingham’s household-based intelligence team, Burghley attached 
his system closely to the government and the royal court. While his resignation from 
the Secretaryship retired his information team back into household service, some part 
of his manpower was planted within the government administration to ensure his 
continuing patronage and access to information. Burghley also befriended the female 
privy chamber, via which he had the Queen’s ear. More significantly, his sympathy for 
Elizabeth’s anti-war conservatism and her aversion to intervention in foreign quarrels 
on behalf of rebellious subjects earned his party key appointments, particularly in the 
Privy Council and the Paris embassy, which countered the rising 
Leicester–Walsingham party. This court-based alliance created an alternative 
intelligence route for Burghley, and broke Walsingham’s monopoly on information. 
 
With the shared aim of national security, but divided over individual policies, the two 
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systems competed for intelligence at home and abroad. Paris, England’s key location 
for continental news and the prime refuge of English Catholic exiles in the 1580s and 
1590s, became their main arena for overseas competition. To support the second Anjou 
matrimonial negotiations and for multiple sources of intelligence, from 1579 to 1590 
Queen Elizabeth assigned Burghley’s men to her residential embassy there: Henry 
Brooke and then Edward Stafford, whose kinswomen assumed royal bedchamber 
attendance. This threefold connection between Burghley, the Paris embassy, and the 
female chamber offered Elizabeth an alternative intelligence-diplomacy route, 
bypassing the formal Secretarial procedure. This thwarted Walsingham’s expanding 
control over national diplomacy and information/intelligence circulation, and 
maintained the equilibrium of the regime. Burghley’s control over the French embassy 
obliged Walsingham to dispatch his personal spy team to Paris. Walsingham’s spies 
monitored Ambassador Stafford, and accused him of selling diplomatic secrets to the 
Guises and the Spanish Ambassador Mendoza. In actual fact, Stafford was preparing 
for secret diplomacy to be conducted between Burghley (and Queen Elizabeth) and 
Madrid. Through Stafford’s route, Burghley hoodwinked Spain by divulging false 
intelligence, and exculpated himself and his Queen from Mary Stuart’s execution. 
Meanwhile, the two systems contended for the loyalties of the English Catholic exiles. 
The exiled Catholic community had become mired in its internal divisions: the struggle 
of English patriotism against the threat of foreign invasions, the dilemma between faith 
and survival, and the secular party’s hostility to the Jesuits’ aggression towards secular 
governance. This benefited the English spymasters, and made possible their use of the 
dual strategies of coercion and mercy. In this area, Burghley stood to advantage thanks 
to his exclusive mastery of wardships and the credibility of Stafford’s official embassy. 
As Treasurer, Burghley’s command over forfeited home estates and his mastership of 
the wards exerted effective control over the family fortunes of aristocratic exiles. Some 
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secular exiles hence yielded conditional obedience, submitting intelligence to Burghley 
in exchange for pardons.  
  
Suffering a setback in the espionage competition in Paris, Walsingham won 
overwhelming dominance in the domestic counter-plots of the 1580s. His manipulation 
of evidence in the Throckmorton Plot formally terminated the traditional 
Spanish–Tudor alliance, and left England no alternative choice of ally except France. 
Later in 1586, he trapped those behind the Babington Plot to reveal themselves. This 
success pushed Queen Elizabeth to sign the execution warrant of Mary Queen of Scots, 
consequently forcing England into an open declaration of war against universal 
Catholicism. In the Walsingham-led counter-plotting of the 1580s, Burghley and his 
party were either excluded—like Mary’s guardian the Earl of Shrewsbury, who was 
replaced by Walsingham’s partisan Amias Paulet—or else simply isolated. In March 
1585 Burghley’s chief agent provocateur William Parry was hanged on the official 
charge of regicidal plotting, partly because of his greed and confused loyalties, and 
probably partly because of Walsingham’s fury over Burghley’s obstructing him in the 
matters of patronage and intervention in the Dutch wars.  
 
Walsingham’s intelligence system, although rather meteoric (lasting less than two 
decades), was significantly effective, and has been praised as a paragon of espionage in 
early modern Europe. It is reasonable to ascribe its outstanding achievements to 
Walsingham’s flexible character. Compared with Burghley, who did everything by the 
rule within the expectations of his constitution and class, Walsingham tolerantly 
employed a broader range of people. Unlike Burghley’s and Leicester’s gentry-based 
household service, Walsingham constituted his clientele from men from further down 
the social scale and from Protestant idealists. The education of this comparatively 
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low-born team was rarely inferior to that of its high-born counterparts, specifically in 
the arts of ciphering and counterfeiting, and even more so in cosmopolitan experience 
and contacts. The professionalism of these agents enhanced Walsingham’s espionage in 
the 1580s. Walsingham’s character of flexibility was likewise reflected in his 
advocating a very limited counsel team to be the pivot of the regime: to be selected on 
a professional basis, regardless of class and office. This model differed from both the 
initially promoted idea of a Parliament-based committee, and also Burghley’s Grand 
Council, which was founded narrowly on the House of Lords and the Privy Council. 
Walsingham’s character equipped him with a flexible approach towards the speculative 
espionage world.  
 
It is worth noting, however, that Walsingham’s intelligence and espionage abilities 
have been unduly credited by legend. He wrongly left Roberto di Ridolfi at liberty in 
1570 to plot again in the following year. Dudley Digges bemoaned Walsingham’s 
failure in discovering too late ‘the barbarous and bloody Massacre on St. 
Bartholomews Eve…till he was almost overwhelmed in it himself’.8 In addition, 
Walsingham’s espionage expanded too massively to remain secret and efficient. Unlike 
the conservative Burghley, who conducted intelligence business alone, Walsingham 
fully authorised his intelligence secretariat in order to train it to capably deputise 
during his frequent absences caused by illness, royal tournaments and diplomatic 
embassies. Yet this empowerment caused internal conflict, with two leading secretaries, 
Francis Mylles and Thomas Phelippes, individually allying with spies to contend for 
patronage. Moreover, Walsingham’s extremely privatised spy system caused him 
financial embarrassment for the rest of his life. Outside the government system, 
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Walsingham’s household-based secretariat required constant recruitment to cope with 
the growing business of the Secretaryship and espionage needs; Walsingham’s 
suspicious nature further enlarged its size. This bulkiness in scale burdened him with 
heavy patronage payments. What emptied his purse more, however, was his massive 
espionage reach at home and overseas, which extended as far as Turkey. The 
ballooning costs were far from covered by royal funds, and weakened Walsingham’s 
private estates and burdened him with debt.9 On 3 April 1590, shortly before he died, 
he sold some land to a consortium which included Francis Mylles, probably as a 
reward for the latter’s efforts against the Babington Plot.10 On the evening of 7 April 
1590, Walsingham was buried in the north side of old St Paul’s. The obsequies were 
performed quietly and hurriedly, without any extraordinary ceremonies, according to 
his will signed on 12 December 1589, ‘in respect of the greatnes of my debtes and the 
meane state I shall leave my wife and heire in’.11 
 
Most destructively of all, privatisation meant the disorganisation of Walsingham’s spy 
system immediately he died. The loss of Walsingham’s personal papers disconnected 
many of Walsingham’s spies from the English government. And Walsingham’s death 
with no male heirs meant the surviving portion of his intelligence service was divided 
between the Earl of Essex, the new royal favourite and Walsingham’s son-in-law, and, 
ironically, his conservative rivals the Cecils. This immediate transfer of the spy 
network originated in its weak foundation on private clienteles: if patrons could not 
pay, then individuals transfered their allegiance elsewhere. This kind of movement was 
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usually triggered by either power shifts inside the regime, or the death of patrons and 
their families’ decline at court. Robert Beale saw his exile from court between 1593 
and 1597 as hinging upon his pro-Puritan activity in the Parliament of 1593, but also 
partly because of the death of his powerful ally Walsingham. The majority of 
Walsingham’s secretaries, servants and spies were anxious to salvage their careers by 
adhering to either Essex or the Cecils. Most of them preferred service with the latter as 
it was more profitable, and held out the prospect of office in government that 
Walsingham had rarely offered. Nicholas Faunt transferred his loyalty to the Cecils and 
received rich rewards: crown lands in Yorkshire in 1594, an appointment as a Clerk of 
the Signet in 1595, and a lease of archiepiscopal lands for twenty-one years in 1600. 
Arthur Gregory served Robert Cecil until 1596. Thomas Lake entered the Parliaments 
of 1593 and 1601, and assumed the Clerkship of the Signet, both through Cecil’s 
patronage. Some of Walsingham’s informants, like Anthony Standen, Charles Chester 
(July 1592), the exile Anthony Roston, and the London grocer Thomas Millington, also 
offered their intelligence services to the Cecils.12 In October 1596, the spy John 
Mychell, used by Walsingham in Italy after the Spanish Armada, appealed to join 
Robert Cecil’s service, particularly in Ireland.13 Meanwhile, with perfect Spanish and 
French, Geoffrey Davis, who had been employed by Walsingham in Spain, may have 
served Robert Cecil too.14 Robert Poley was on the secret payroll of Secretary Robert 
Cecil until 1601,15 and in August 1601 John Owen, another servant of the late 
Walsingham, was introduced to Cecil by Lord Cobham and Lord Henry Seamer.16 
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Some opportunists served both sides for the rewards of double patronage. From 1591, 
Thomas Phelippes made an unstable career in deciphering and continental intelligence 
working simultaneously for the Cecils and for Essex. He was accompanied by Thomas 
Barnes and William Sterrell (alias Robert Robinson or Henry Saint Martin), two 
veteran spies from the late Secretary’s time who were valuable for their contact with 
the exiled leaders Charles Paget and Hugh Owen.17 From mid-1597 when Essex’s 
failure became clear, these three formally joined Robert Cecil’s espionage. Another spy, 
Thomas Harrison, lacked this keen sense of power politics. Walsingham had employed 
him with Egremont Radcliffe, the half-brother of the Earl of Sussex, to murder Don 
John of Austria in the Low Countries in 1578. Radcliffe and his man Graye were 
executed at Namur in January 1579; Harrison cunningly escaped. After Walsingham 
died, Harrison continued his dual gamble between Essex and the Cecils. Nevertheless, 
not all clients were motivated by material concerns: Laurence Tomson, loyal to 
Walsingham because of their shared religious affiliation, resigned from his public 
career simultaneously with his master’s death.18 
 
The posthumous blank Walsingham left in both his personal papers and in politics has 
made it difficult for historians to assess his reputation. William Camden used his 
Annales to defame his patron Burghley’s militant antagonists, Walsingham and 
Leicester, charging them with personal immorality and political combativeness, and 
imputing the death of King James’s mother Mary Stuart to their ‘subtill practises’.19 
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This influential calumny, in the following centuries, presented Walsingham to the 
public as a gloomy, brutal, and aggressive schemer. By contrast, the so-called ‘regnum 
Cecilianum’, a force in English high politics until today, has prettified its founder 
William Cecil into a bright, moderate and intellectual prime minister guiding the wilful 
Queen Elizabeth. The shadowed portrait of Walsingham partly originates from his 
obscure work as a spymaster, and was reflected initially in his epitaph and later in 
popular works. Drawing on Walsingham’s will, John Cooper, in the concluding pages 
of his latest biography of Walsingham, returns us to the original man—‘a godly 
Protestant’. Beneath the surface equipment of the cunning spymaster existed a 
Protestant heart, eager for salvation and the ‘most merciful protection’ of Christ. He 
prayed for an ‘increase of faith, strength and power to make a good Christian end’; his 
espionage, arising from his anxiety and conscientiousness, worked to benefit the cause 
of universal Protestantism, and ultimately to glorify God.20 Walsingham expected a 
posthumous assessment in heaven rather than on earth. Shortly before he died, he even 
stated his scorn for secular titles:  
 
As for titles, which at first were the marks of power and other rewards of virtue, they 
are now according to their name…like the titles of books, which for the most part, the 
most glorious things they promise, let a man narrowly peruse them over, the less 
substance he shall find in them. I say, let a man by doing worthy acts deserve honour 
and although he do not attain it, yet he is much happier than he that gets it without 
dessert.21 
 
Walsingham built neither effigy nor even a tomb to provide his epitaph: God had, he 
believed, made evaluation of his work. 
 
                                                 
20 Cooper, The Queen’s Agent, 323-23.  
 
21 Hutchinson, Elizabeth’s Spy Master, 243, cited from James Howell, ed., Cottoni Posthuma (London, 
1675), 338.  
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In terms of research into the competition for intelligence between the divisive 
mid-Elizabethan spy systems, the second part of the thesis offers an overall response to 
the historiography respecting the issue of Elizabethan factionalism. A misconception 
that factions existed only in the 1590s has been revised. A political divide arose 
between Burghley and Walsingham from the late 1570s, and peaked in 1585 to 1586. 
Rather than being based in personal enmity, it resulted chiefly from their differences 
over English intervention in the continental Protestant wars. Both sides of this divide 
grouped together to contest for patronage—offices and money—in order to strengthen 
their partisan dominance of government and to finance their espionage, ultimately in 
order to promote their partisan ideologies. However, this policy quarrel never 
deteriorated into full factionalism, as did the hostility between Essex and the Cecils in 
the 1590s that imperilled the state through domestic chaos. Indeed, it started easing in 
mid-1587, partly because of Mary’s execution and Burghley’s timely assistance with 
Walsingham’s financial difficulties, but more so because of the near confirmation of 
open war against Spain. Queen Elizabeth was stirred to sound the bugle herself, for 
battle against Catholicism.  
 
Not surprisingly, Queen Elizabeth did not attempt to end the contest between the 
espionage systems and integrate them into a collective and official institution. She 
benefited from their rivalry. Privatised intelligence employment saved her money, and 
their competition both brought her a highly efficient security service and prevented the 
monopolisation of intelligence by a specific ideology. More significantly, the Queen 
kept this political rivalry alive and in balance, so that it supported her supreme 
monarchy. The exclusive responsibility of the Secretaryship for information going to 
and from the sovereign had increased the strength of the office-holder, Walsingham. 
His power expanded speedily after Thomas Smith retired in 1576, and reached a peak 
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after 1581 when he virtually monopolised the office of the Principal Secretary. Aware 
of the expanding power of Walsingham and his military party, Queen Elizabeth kept 
them in check by employing her Privy Chamber as an alternative medium for news. 
Simultaneously, she nurtured other powers by adjusting office appointments, assigning 
Burghley’s party to her French embassy from 1578 to 1590. In mid-1587, during 
Leicester’s absence for the Dutch campaigns, she added three new pro-Burghley 
appointments to the Privy Council, John Whitgift, Archbishop of Canterbury, William 
Lord Cobham, and Thomas Sackville Lord Buckhurst. Later in the 1590s, the same 
strategy of equilibrium was again applied to the factionalism between Essex and the 
Cecils. The death of first Leicester and then Walsingham dangerously promoted the 
hegemony of the Cecils, who resumed the office of the Secretary until the Queen’s 
death. Elizabeth may have in turn decided to elevate Essex, appointing him to the Privy 
Council in February 1593 and to the employment of foreign intelligence.22  
 
It was perilous, though, for Elizabeth to gamble her success in intelligence and royal 
absolutism on such masculine rivalry. Her empowerment of, or indulgence towards, 
her male intimates in their privatising of espionage for competitive purposes risked her 
and her court being marginalised from the male-dominated circulation of government 
information and intelligence. Elizabeth’s inefficient female network, which worked 
outside the government and chiefly for self-interest, did not compensate for this. If her 
ministers became reconciled for a common purpose, their intelligence operations could 
together take the Queen hostage, as with the Council-led execution of Mary without 
Elizabeth’s knowledge. Similarly, Elizabeth’s operation of a power balance via party or 
faction would weaken her queenship further if either side failed, as happened when 
                                                 
22 Hammer, The Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics, 152-98. 
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Essex’s failure led to the union of the Elizabethan intelligence systems under Secretary 
Robert Cecil’s sole control. This time the aging Queen was unable to create another 
power to counter the exclusively powerful Cecil. 
 
Returning to the Rainbow Portrait, by the time that it was painted its patron Robert 
Cecil had united the divided intelligence systems into one network under his personal 
control. He became those eyes and ears, exclusively enveloping the Queen through 
intelligence. Apparently, Secretary Cecil was discontented with just being the Queen’s 
collector of news; he expected to act as her mouthpiece and jointly make policy. Roy 
Strong denied any sign of mouths on the mantle, seeing only eyes and ears. For him 
this implied that the Queen saw and heard many things, but—having the only mouth 
portrayed in the painting—‘Judgement and Election are her own’.23 This defines the 
portrait as a eulogy for Queen Elizabeth’s absolute monarchy. However, this portrait 
really mirrors the perceived inferiority of female rule. First, it relocates the traditional 
political roles of men (head) and that of women (body) that had been inverted in 
Elizabeth’s reign. Eyes, ears and mouths are relocated onto the body, symbolising male 
bureaucracy at work; the Queen becomes a figurehead. Second, the female features and 
natural weakness of Elizabeth are central to the portrait. She is labelled as the Moon, 
via the symbolism of the jewellery on her crown, which alludes to her chastity as the 
Virgin Queen and also serves as a reminder that she is a female ruler.24 In the absence 
of a Sun, an icon suited for kings, Elizabeth’s moonlight blanches the peaceful rainbow 
into an unusual pallor. To the right of the rainbow lies the serpent embroidery, which 
casts doubt on the Queen’s qualities as a sovereign. Roy Strong suggested that the 
                                                 
23 Strong, Gloriana, 158-59 
 
24 Strong, The Cult of Elizabeth, 52. 
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serpent implies the Queen’s rule by ‘wisdom’ or ‘prudence’. Ironically, it was this 
virtue that the Queen fell short of, as her male ministers knew all too well. Her 
inappropriate financial caution in matters of state compared to her spending on 
personal fashion was identified as vanity and lack of judgement. Her notorious 
irresolution and fickleness, ‘by sexe fearefull’, increased political uncertainty and 
frequently drove England to the edge of crises.25 It is reasonable to assume the 
potential beholders of this portrait were a very limited group of high officers or 
intimates of the Queen. Their education in Renaissance allegory, together with their 
frustrations in serving the Queen would make them aware of this irony.  
 
To this group of elite bureaucrats, the portrait conveyed the political ideology of its 
patron Robert Cecil: the monarchical republic. The heart-shaped ruby hanging from the 
serpent’s mouth evokes ‘Counsel’, pleading with the stubborn Queen to seek the 
counsel of her male advisers, who were the wisest chosen ‘from the pious and the most 
pious from the wise’. Among them, Robert Cecil expected that he would himself be the 
‘principal minister’. His client John Davies may have praised him in the Hymnes to 
Astraea:  
 
E ye of that mind most quick and clear, 
L ike Heaven’s eye, which from his sphere 
I nto all things prieth;  
S ees through all things everywhere,  
A nd all their natures trieth.26 
 
Secretary Cecil was the eyes, ears and mouths, ordained by God to assist the Queen in 
                                                 
25 BL, Harley MS 168/54r, ‘Whether it may stand with good policy for her Majesty to join with Spain in 
the enterprise of Burgundy’. 
 
26 Strong, The Cult of Elizabeth, 52. 
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co-ruling England. This sense of divine obligation, in association with that female 
inferiority verified by Elizabeth’s inefficient rule, constituted an alternative governing 
group, essentially male and Council-based. These self-identified godly magistrates 
never doubted the existence of royal supremacy, but more so considered that they 
could ‘serve God by serving of the Queen’.27 The mantle embodied with the eyes, ears 
and mouths of male offices, and worn by the Queen, proposed to propagate this mixed 
polity between the monarchy and the Council-led government. It still granted the 
Queen her royal prerogative in selecting her own counsel, as with that replaceable 
mantle, using her favour and personal relationships. However, it is clear that certain 
leading councillors, by asserting their control over intelligence and information, were 
securing a status equal to the sovereign in the making of policy. This dichotomy of 
power between court and government was leading to a silent transformation in early 
modern England—as Wallace MacCaffrey stated as long ago as 1969, ‘from an age of 
dynastic politics to one of national politics’.28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Stephen Alford, ‘The Political Creed of William Cecil’, in John F. McDiarmid, ed., The Monarchical 
Republic of Early Modern England: Essay in response to Patrick Collinson (Ashgate, 2007), 85.  
 
28 Wallace MacCaffrey, The Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime (London, 1969), 315-17. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Elizabeth I: The Rainbow Portrait, at Hatfield House, Herfordshire, probably painted 
by Marcus Gheeraerts the Younger during 1600-1602 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.marileecody.com/gloriana/elizabethrainbow1.jpg
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